




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LIFE OF

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

VOL. II.

LONDON: PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
AND PARLIAMENT STREET



Frontispiece

BROADLANDS

THE
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

BY THE
HON. EVELYN ASHLEY, M.P.



IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

LONDON
RICHARD BENTLEY & SON, NEW BURLINGTON STREET
Publishers in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen

1879

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.



Book II.

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
Third Tenure of the Foreign Office—Switzerland—Spanish Mar- riages—Portugal—Annexation of the Punjaub	1

CHAPTER II.

Lord Minto's Mission to Italy—Ireland—Sicily	4
--	---

CHAPTER III.

Arbitration—Movements in Italy—French Revolution—Chartist Agitation in London—War between Austria and Italy—Sir Robert Peel at the Mansion House—French Occupation of Rome—Debates in Parliament—Cholera Naples	59
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

War in Hungary—Question of the Hungarian Refugees	103
---	-----

CHAPTER V.

Greek Affairs and 'Don Pacifico' Debate	126
---	-----

CHAPTER VI.

	PAGE
Letters—General Haynau at Barclay's Brewery—Ecclesiastical Titles Bill—National Defences—Mr. Gladstone's Letters about Neapolitan Prisons—Ionian Islands—Defence in Parliament—Question of 'Holy Places'	164

CHAPTER VII.

Removal from the Government—Explanations in the House of Commons	193
--	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

Fall of the Russell Administration—Lord Derby's Government—Dissolution—Speeches at Tiverton and Lewes—Letters—Defeat of the Derby Cabinet	229
---	-----

CHAPTER IX.

Goes to the Home Office in the Aberdeen Administration—Work at Home Office—Temporary Resignation	258
--	-----

CHAPTER X.

Russian Policy—Occupation of Principalities; movements of English Fleet—Lord Aberdeen—Active preparations for war—Reform Club Banquet—Proposes Crimean Expedition—1855—Motion of Mr. Roebuck—Resignation of Lord John Russell—Defeat of the Government	272
--	-----

CHAPTER XI.

Becomes Prime Minister—Attends to State of the Army—Negotiations at Vienna—Reforms for Turkey—Conference breaks up	304
--	-----

CHAPTER XII.

Renewal of Negotiations—Peace Signed—Declaration of Paris—Disputes about execution of Treaty—Misunderstanding with the United States—Death of Sir William Temple—Egypt—Persian Affairs	322
--	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

	PAGE
Quarrel with China—Resolution carried by Mr. Cobden against the Government—Dissolution—Indian Mutiny—Government India Bill—Defeat on Conspiracy Bill—Resignation	344

CHAPTER XIV.

Out of Office—Goes to Compiègne—Derby Government defeated on Reform Bill, 1859—Dissolution—Outbreak of Franco-Austrian War—Vote of Want of Confidence in Ministers—Second Premiership—Italian Affairs—Spain and Morocco—Fortifications	358
--	-----

CHAPTER XV.

France and the Italian Duchies—Syria—Emperor Napoleon's Schemes—Neutrality of Savoy—Attitude of France—The 'Derby' of 1860—Conflict between Lords and Commons on Paper Duties—Discussion about the 'Press'	379
--	-----

CHAPTER XVI.

State of Parties—Lord Wardenship of the Cinque Ports—Civil War in America—Cotton Supply—Turkish Finances—Visit to Harrow—Father Daly—Death of Prince Consort—'Trent' Affair—National Expenditure—Church Patronage	402
---	-----

CHAPTER XVII.

Russia and Poland—Visit to Scotland—Proposed Congress—Denmark and Sleswig-Holstein—London Conference—Danish Debate—Visit to Northamptonshire—Criminal Lunacy—Cuban Slavery—Irish Catholics—Convocation—Last Illness and Death	419
---	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

Character—Characteristics of Style of Writing and Speaking	458
INDEX	487

LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE

THIRD VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G., G.C.B.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

THIRD TENURE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE—SWITZERLAND—SPANISH
MARRIAGES—PORTUGAL—ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAUB.

LORD PALMERSTON was close upon sixty-two years of age when, in 1846, he went to the Foreign Office for the third and last time. Nearly twenty years elapsed before he died, but death found him still in harness and the working head of a powerful Administration. During this long space, with only two short intervals, he was continuously in office—first as Foreign Secretary, next as Home Secretary, and twice as Prime Minister.

Of these years the five given up to ‘Foreign Affairs’ were the most unquiet which, with his own country at peace, could fall to any man’s lot, and culminated in his abrupt retirement at the close of 1851. The year which immediately succeeded his taking the seals was sufficiently full of anxious events,

such as the Spanish marriages, civil wars in Spain and Portugal, and the disturbances in Switzerland, which, at one moment, seriously threatened the independence of that sturdy little republic; but these formed but a fit prelude to the storm which broke over Europe in 1848, and continued to rage throughout the following year.

To aid, by his countenance and counsel, the triumph and maintenance of constitutional freedom, was Lord Palmerston's desire. He foresaw clearly enough the results of despotic repression. The events of the revolutionary year were, in his opinion, but the natural fruits of the growths planted by the hands of absolute sovereigns. To prune betimes was, as he incessantly pointed out, the only check which kings, ministers, and patriots could usefully apply. In fact, during the whole of 1847, he was bent on giving such aid as was in his power to those Governments which were willing and able to 'put their house in order.' While, however, he recognised the necessity, he was little hopeful in the prospect. History admonishes us, he used to say, that rulers seldom have the forecast to substitute, in good time, reform for revolution. They take no note of changes around them, and forget that it is the pre-existing spirit of slavery in the people that has made tyrants in all ages of the world. No tyrant ever made a slave who was not one already—no community, however small, having the spirit of freemen ever had a master for long. When subjects change their spirit, they will also restrain or else change their rulers.

The following extract from a circular despatch sent to the British representatives in Italy, in January, 1848, gives such a clear compendium of his views and of his previous endeavours in other directions that I here insert it:—

The situation of the sovereigns of Italy towards their subjects is one of which advantage may be taken by the enemies of both. It is not difficult to convey to the sovereigns false reports that risings are intended, and to create in their minds

unfounded impressions that revolutionary plots are in agitation. On the other hand, the same agency may be employed to represent to the people that their sovereigns are insincere in their promises of concessions, and thus the people, being stimulated to use force for the purpose of securing political reforms, the very acts to which they may have been delusively led on may be converted into a pretext for depriving them of the objects of their legitimate expectations.

It will be your duty to counteract, as far as possible, these sinister efforts. You are instructed to say to the Minister that the direction of the progress of reform and improvement is still in the hands of the sovereigns, but that it is now too late for them to attempt to obstruct reasonable progress; and that resistance to moderate petitions is sure to lead ere long to the necessity of yielding to irresistible demands. That it is better for a Government to frame its measures of improvement with timely deliberation, and to grant them with the grace of spontaneous concession, than to be compelled to adopt, on the sudden, changes perhaps insufficiently matured, and which, being wrung from them by the pressure of imperious circumstances, invert the natural order of things, and being of the nature of a capitulation of the sovereign to the subject, may not always be a sure foundation for permanent harmony between the Crown and the people.

To the popular leaders with whom you may have intercourse, you should use language of the same tendency and arguments drawn from the same considerations. You should tell them that force put upon the inclinations of their sovereigns will produce ill-will and repugnance, which must lead their rulers, on their part, to be constantly looking out for an opportunity of shaking off the yoke which they may have been obliged to bear. That mutual distrust will thus be created between the governors and the governed. That this distrust will break out in overt acts on each side, intended perhaps defensively by those by whom done, but regarded as offensive by the other party. That open discord will thence ensue, and foreign interference may be the ultimate result.

It was imbued with these sentiments that Lord Palmerston scanned the horizon, and one of the first matters to attract his attention was the state of Switzerland. He naturally viewed with the greatest concern the possibility of any such interference by the Great

Powers with that free confederacy as might compromise her political independence, or endanger the position which she held as the home and refuge of liberty on the Continent. His influence, as will be seen, contributed very materially to avert any such intervention.

To understand the events which were occurring in that country, it is necessary to remember that, up to the commencement of the present century, the condition of a Swiss canton was like that of a feudal lord with an aggregate of seigneurial and subject properties. It had two councils, great and small, but the real powers of government were all exercised by the small or executive council, while the great or legislative council had neither initiative, independence, nor publicity of debate. In 1846, of the 2,400,000 inhabitants of Switzerland, about 900,000 were Roman Catholics, and the remainder Protestants, while each of the twenty-two cantons had an equal voice in the Diet whatever the disparity as to size, wealth, or, we may add, intelligence. In the Catholic cantons the clergy enjoyed great privileges and power, and the people generally were in a state of ignorant submission to their directions.

The French Revolution of 1830 gave an impetus to a movement towards more liberal and popular institutions, and the Radical party became speedily opposed to the Conservative. The Roman Catholic priests and Jesuits in three of the small cantons took, as might have been expected, an active part on the Conservative side, and were incessant workers in a series of counter-revolutions.

The introduction of the Jesuits into the important canton of Lucerne, which had, up to the year 1844, been free from their noisome presence, put the torch to materials which had thus long been piling up ready for the flame. The seven Roman Catholic cantons found it necessary, if they wished to resist the decrees of the rest of the Federation, to form themselves into a

separate league—offensive and defensive. This new Confederacy took the name of the ‘Sonderbund.’

On the 20th of July, 1846, the Federal Diet voted the Sonderbund illegal, and decreed, on the 3rd of September, the expulsion of the Jesuits from the four cantons of Lucerne, Schwytz, Freyburg, and Valais, in which they were established. A civil war was the inevitable consequence.

Meanwhile, however, the French Government had proposed that England, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia should make a collective declaration recommending the arbitration of the Pope in the dispute about the Jesuits—proposing a conference for modifying the Federal compact, and announcing to the Swiss Diet that if they refused these propositions and proceeded with the war, the five Powers would consider the Confederation as no longer existing—in other words, a proposal to compel the Swiss by force of arms to adopt the views of the Great Powers. Lord Palmerston, on behalf of the British Government, refused to accept this proposal. He stood at first alone, because the rights of Prussia over Neuchâtel prompted her to interfere, although, as a Protestant Power, she felt no sympathy for the seceders; and the Austrian, followed by the Russian, was not more with him than the Frenchman. The view that Prince Metternich took was, that the neutrality of Switzerland could only be respected so long as she was one Federal Republic—her neutrality being founded on her Federal constitution; but the view of Lord Palmerston was, that her independence would be equally necessary and equally right whether she was federated or not. Metternich and Guizot were both jealous of Switzerland becoming a united and, therefore, powerful military state. They, accordingly, secretly aided the seven cantons, and, in the words of Lamartine, almost treated the Diet as a ‘faction.’

The matter was, no doubt, for a time one full of anxieties. Mr. Morier had reported from Berne in

October, 1846: 'Altogether it may be safely affirmed, that from this time forth the Federal Bund is virtually dissolved, and Switzerland, as a political body, in a state of decomposition;' and Chevalier Bunsen, Prussian Minister in London, becoming at length alarmed, wrote to Lord Palmerston: 'Don't let the affair slip out of your hands; it is very serious.'

The following letter to Lord Minto, who had gone on a mission to Italy, gives the views of the British Government:—

F. O.: November 11, 1847.

If the Diet get possession of the canton of Freyburg and dispose of the Jesuits there, it will go some way towards settling the pending questions, and if the Diet can also get a friendly Government established at Lucerne, and by that means drive the Jesuits out of that canton, I should think that they need not very much care about their remaining in some of the smaller cantons. But the best would be if the Pope would take some step to induce them to evacuate Switzerland altogether.

Broglie¹ says that there will be no difficulty in getting the Pope to take some steps about the Jesuits, but then he says that they are not the real object, but only a pretence, and that when they are got rid of some other demand will be made which will be found unreasonable. I say, in reply, yield to-day that which is reasonably asked, and resist to-morrow that which you will be borne out in resisting, but do not let us put ourselves in the wrong to-day merely for fear that we may find ourselves in the right to-morrow. I send you copies of the communication which we have received from the French Government on Swiss affairs; I am going immediately to write an answer. It will be in substance that we are willing to join the other Powers in an endeavour to put an end to the civil war by an offer of mediation, but not willing to meddle with the revision of the Federal compact. But that before the five Powers make a joint offer of mediation, it seems desirable that they should be agreed as to the conditions of settlement which they would think fair between the parties. That our notion is this: We think that the Jesuit question is a political as well as, and much more than a religious question, and that it is at the bottom of the whole of the present quarrel. We therefore propose that the Sonderbund cantons

¹ French ambassador in London.

should declare themselves ready to abide by any decision which the Pope may make on that question, and that the five Powers should pledge themselves to the Diet to use all their influence at Rome to obtain from the Pope the recall of the Jesuits from the whole of Switzerland, they receiving, of course, compensation for lands or houses which they might be thus obliged to leave. This grievance removed, we should propose that the Diet should renounce all hostile intentions against the seven cantons, and should renew their often-made declaration that they acknowledge and mean to respect the sovereignty of the separate cantons of which the Confederation is composed. This done, the Sonderbund having no further pretence for their union, that union should be dissolved, and then the whole matter is settled. The Swiss would then go to work, in the manner prescribed by the Federal compact, to make any alterations or improvements in that compact which they might wish or want. I do not expect that the five Powers will agree to this scheme; for Austria, France, and perhaps Russia take part openly with the Sonderbund, and Guizot's despatch only repeats the proposition made by the Sonderbund, and rejected by the Diet, and any proposal to that effect made by the five Powers would of course share the same fate. Guizot's object, of course, is to try to put the Diet apparently in the wrong, so as to afford him and Austria some kind of pretext for violent measures afterwards. The draft of note is a paraphrase of the manifesto of the three Powers last year about the extinction of Cracow. I could not possibly put my name to such a paper, and I wonder how Guizot would defend himself to the deputies for having put his name to it.

And on November 17 he writes to the same:—

Guizot will have to choose between us and the three Powers; for I conclude that his draft of note was suggested by Austria. Russia will follow Austria; and the Prussian Government have at once accepted his plan. Broglie, however, says his own personal and private opinion is with us; and it seems to me that public opinion in France would not go along with Guizot in the course he has proposed to us. We shall lie on our oars till we get an answer from Paris to the despatch which went thither last night. In the meantime, if the Pope would take any steps about the Jesuits, he would increase the chances of peace; but they have gone too far in Switzerland to admit of a settlement on the principle of the mere recall of the Jesuits from Lucerne.

France having accepted the modifications proposed by Lord Palmerston in the plan of mediation, he writes to Lord Ponsonby at Vienna on the 20th:—

F. O.: November 20, 1847.

You will see that the French Government are willing to agree to our proposal as to the offer of mediation between the contending parties in Switzerland. The explanations which they wish us to accept, and to which we have no objection, are, that the Jesuits should be withdrawn, by the joint concurrence of the seven cantons and of the Pope. All we require is, that the foundation of the arrangements should be that the Jesuits should be removed from the whole of the territory of the Confederation, because we are now quite convinced that things have now gone so far, and popular feeling has been so strongly roused against them, that unless they leave Switzerland entirely there is no chance of peace in that country. The next explanation of the French is, that they understand the separate sovereignty of the confederated cantons to carry with it the result, that no change can be made in the Federal compact without the consent of all the cantons, and they hold that this principle ought to be admitted by the Diet. We think this reasonable, and are willing to agree to it as the foundation of the settlement which is to be proposed. The French, thirdly, say that, in agreeing to our proposal that the refusal of the joint offer of mediation, if it should be unfortunately refused, is not to be used as a pretext for armed interference, they must make this reserve, that all parties are to remain after such refusal possessed of all the rights in regard to measures with respect to Switzerland which they at present possess. To this we can, of course, make no objection.

The French agree to the conference being in London, and we hope that P. Metternich will not object to this. I do not think that we should willingly consent to join a conference to be held anywhere but here.

Meanwhile, however, the capture of Freyburg by the forces of the Diet under General Dufour brought the war to an abrupt termination, and obviated the necessity of the proposed mediation. Lord Palmerston's object had been gained, and the delay had been of incalculable service to the cause of Swiss independence.

Sir Stratford Canning, who was on his way to his post at Constantinople, had been instructed by Lord Palmerston to take Berne on his way, where his character and abilities might be of service in enforcing the counsels of the English Foreign Office. Lord Palmerston writes to him :—

F. O. : December 18, 1847.

I hope you may be able to persuade the Diet to give up their vindictive measures against their opponents at Freyburg and Lucerne. It really would be very disgraceful of them if they made such a bad use of their victory ; and they might remember that the wheel of fortune has many turns, and that it might happen that, in some future change of things, the measure which they now mete out to others might be measured back again to themselves. At all events, such confiscations and punishments leave enduring resentments and perpetuate party animosities, without any counterbalancing advantage, except to the individuals who thus transfer to themselves the property which rightfully belongs to others. Besides, there is not in this case a shadow of a principle to justify their proscriptions. If a set of Russian, or Polish, or Galician nobles revolt against their sovereign, they are clearly on the wrong side of the law ; and if they fail, they must abide by the consequences. If a Polignac violates the constitution of his country, and fails in his attempt, he may partly be made to pay in person and in fortune the penalty of his illegal acts. But in the case of Freyburg and Lucerne there was no violation of the laws of the canton. There was a decision taken by the sovereign authority of the canton which the Federal Government thought at variance with the Federal obligations and engagements of those cantons ; but this cannot, by any fair construction of words, be called high treason. Treason means the violation of some duty towards the sovereign power of the state of which the accused is citizen or subject ; but such a crime cannot be committed by the government of a sovereign state towards the confederates of that state. Freyburg and Lucerne were not subjects of the Confederation, and could not be guilty of high treason towards it.

There being still some danger of an Austrian intervention, Lord Palmerston sent the following to Lord Ponsonby :—

F. O. : December 21, 1847.

It seems to me, from Canning's accounts of his conversations with Ochsenbein,¹ that the Swiss will pursue a more moderate line of conduct than at first appeared likely ; and it seems quite certain that they will afford the four Powers no valid reason for interference. At the same time, I wish you to lose no opportunity of endeavouring to dissuade Metternich from any attempt of the kind. He could not interfere without France doing so too ; and whatever may be the professions or even the sincere intentions of Louis Philippe and Guizot, he may depend upon it, as sure as he is alive, that any interference of France in the internal affairs of Switzerland would turn to the account of France, and would be adverse to the interests of Austria.

In fact, if French troops were to enter Switzerland, they would sympathise with the Liberals, and not with the party which Metternich would wish to favour. If there is one maxim of policy which Metternich ought to hold by more than another, it is to keep the French out of Switzerland and out of Italy ; but if Austrian troops enter one or the other, French troops will follow, and Austria will rue the day when she paved the way for such a military movement by France.

Spain was once described by the Duke of Wellington as the only country where two and two did not make four, and the unexpected events of which it has so often been the theatre might appear to justify the assertion. Few of them, however, have been so whimsically sudden, or so uselessly mischievous, as that which towards the end of the year 1846 startled and irritated England under the name of the 'Spanish Marriages.'

Queen Isabella and her sister the Infanta were young and unmarried. To secure the succession it was necessary to find them husbands. The question in debate was, who these were to be.

It had been the settled policy of England—as indeed of the other European Powers—ever since the War of the Spanish Succession, to provide against the contingency of a union of the crowns of France and Spain, in the person of one sovereign or in the same

¹ President of the Diet.

line, and the Treaty of Utrecht gave solemn expression to this agreement. The rulers of England felt that, bad as it was for her in the last century to find herself engaged in differences and wars with Spain, not upon Spanish but upon French grounds, it would be still worse now, when France occupied 500 miles of the opposite coast of Africa with a large naval station at Algiers. It was held, therefore, to be a great and paramount object with us, that Spain should be completely independent, and that her policy should not be founded upon French considerations; so that if ever we found ourselves at war with France, we should not merely on that account find ourselves involved in war with Spain also. Lord Palmerston, therefore, when he succeeded Lord Aberdeen at the Foreign Office, reiterated the views which had been expressed by his predecessor, and which had elicited from the French Government distinct pledges that no son of Louis Philippe should marry Isabella, or even the Infanta until the succession to the Spanish throne had been secured by the Queen becoming a mother. These pledges were in the autumn of 1846 broken both in their letter and spirit. It was suddenly announced that the Queen would marry her cousin, Don Francisco, and that her sister would on the same day become the wife of the Duke of Montpensier, the youngest son of the King of the French. Apart from the discreditable breach of faith which characterised this intrigue, the peculiar foulness of the transaction lay in the fact that the French King and his Minister had ascertained that there could be no issue of the marriage between the Queen and her cousin, and calculated on securing by a disgusting fraud that which they were solemnly bound by their own engagements to prevent. Yet Guizot's ideas of right and wrong, of honour and dishonour, had become so warped by his feelings of antagonism to Lord Palmerston, that, regardless of the universal condemnation which his conduct and that of his master elicited both in England and throughout Europe, he

actually boasted to the French Chamber, when they met, that the Spanish marriages constituted the first great thing France had accomplished completely single-handed in Europe since 1830. Retribution, however, soon fell on all concerned, and the objects aimed at were not attained. Montpensier's wife never came to the throne, while Louis Philippe had to descend from his own. The fall of his Government and of his dynasty was undoubtedly hastened by the position of isolation, distrust, and contempt in which they were placed by this act and by the feelings which it provoked among the French people themselves as well as abroad. England only suffered in this respect, that from the date of this transaction the close alliance between the two countries was broken—distrust succeeded to confidence, causing, indeed, one of those periodical invasion scares to which the English people are liable—and the absolutist courts of Europe took advantage of this state of things to carry out their high-handed proceedings in Poland and elsewhere.

The following letter is amongst the first private papers of Lord Palmerston after his return to office. It is interesting, because we see in it the germ of his policy as to Italy, which found so many detractors and defenders. He foresaw that if Rome remained as it was, a French army would eventually enter it. He foresaw also, that if Italy remained as it was, a war between France and Austria was inevitable :—

Foreign Office : July 30, 1846.

My dear John Russell,—I send you a copy of the Memorandum which, in 1831, was presented to the Pope on behalf of the five Powers, and which was defeated by adverse influences, although the recommendations which it contains were entirely approved by Cardinal Bernetti and others in authority at Rome.

The matter is really one of great and serious importance, and has bearings much more extensive than at first sight might appear. Italy is the weak part of Europe, and the next war that breaks out in Europe will probably arise out of Italian

affairs. The government of the Papal States is intolerably bad ; nothing can make men submit to such misrule, but physical force and despair of external assistance.

These States had formerly municipal institutions of great antiquity, which gave them much civil security. These institutions were swept away by the French invasion, and were not re-established at the peace of 1815. Outbreaks and insurrections and conspiracies have followed each other in rapid succession, sometimes when there was, often when there was not, a prospect of succour from without. The French Revolution of 1830 produced an explosion in the Roman States, and that explosion led to the conferences out of which the Mem. arose. Nothing was done, and discontent has more than once been since manifested by overt acts. Leave things as they are, and you leave France the power of disturbing the peace of Europe whenever she chooses. Two or three millions of francs, properly applied, will organise an insurrection at any time, and the ascendancy of the Liberal party at Paris, whenever it may happen, either by the result of an election or by the death of the king, will soon be followed by an outbreak in Italy. That is the point to which the French Liberals look ; they know that if they tried to get back to the Rhine they would have against them all Germany united, Russia, and more or less England ; but in supporting an insurrection in Italy against Papal misgovernment, they would stand in a very different position. England would probably take no part against them ; Prussia would not stir a foot ; Russia would not be very active, and, perhaps, secretly not displeased at anything that might humble and weaken Austria. But Austria *would* interfere, and could scarcely help doing so, even though not very efficiently backed by Russia ; France and Austria would then fight each other in Italy, and France would have all the Italians on her side. But the war, begun in Italy, would probably spread to Germany, and, at all events, we can have no wish to see Austria broken down and France aggrandised, and the military vanity and love of conquest of the French revived and strengthened by success. If these things should happen, and they may not be so distant as many may suppose, people will naturally ask what the Whig Government of 1846 was about, and why they did not take advantage of the liberal inclinations of the new Pope to encourage and induce him to make reforms, which, if then made, might have prevented such events. I own that I for one should be altogether at a loss for any answer to such an interrogation.

If, on the other hand, we take the step which I propose to take towards the other four Powers, we shall either succeed or fail. If we succeed in getting any one or more to join us, I believe we shall be doing a thing agreeable, as well as useful, to the Pope, and shall strengthen and support him in effecting reforms which every enlightened member of the Roman Government has long seen and acknowledged to be necessary. If, on the contrary, we fail, and if all four should refuse to do anything, we shall at least stand justified, and shall be able to show that we are wholly absolved from the responsibility of any misfortunes which may hereafter arise from that quarter.

Far from being animated by the passions of the revolutionist—as it was the fashion of party then to describe him—Lord Palmerston wished to turn revolution everywhere aside by compromise.

His error, if error it was, consisted in thinking that a government of priests would willingly resign any portion of their power to laics; and that men of the stamp of Mazzini and his disciples would care two straws about moderate constitutional government. The first idea was to open diplomatic relations with Rome, and send a regular ambassador. No regular ambassador or minister, however, was ever named; and thus Lord Minto was ultimately sent on a special mission, which will presently be spoken of. The affairs of Italy were not alone in demanding attention at this time. In Portugal, the intrigues of France and Spain to undermine the traditional influence of England had created a confused variety of factions; whilst the want of tact and judgment on the part of the Court, both as to the measures it adopted and the men it employed, had produced dissatisfaction, terminating in insurrection. The civil war which broke out with the revolutionary supreme Junta was caused by the arbitrary acts of the Royal Government, who hoped for a Spanish intervention in their behalf. As the Crown could neither subdue the rebels, nor the rebels triumph over the Crown, the country was in a state of anarchy, amidst which the Queen was not unlikely to lose her

throne, and Portugal its last chance of reviving prosperity.

Lord Palmerston's endeavours, from October, 1846, to the following March, were directed to persuade the Portuguese Government to come to terms with the Junta, and to prevent Spain from interfering by force of arms. In the spring of 1847, he found that the Portuguese Government would not come to terms with the Junta, and that the Spanish Government would interfere, in spite of England, if the throne of Donna Maria should be in imminent danger. None could deny that her throne was in such danger, and that the whole country was going to ruin by reason of the war. The British Cabinet therefore, at last, determined to intervene, and, in conjunction with the naval forces of France and Spain, brought the conflict to an end on the basis of an amnesty and the constitution. By this means, while serving the interests of British commerce, Lord Palmerston was enabled to secure to the Portuguese nation those concessions which would not have been made if Spain had interfered singly at the request of the Absolutist Party, and saved the Portuguese Government from that political dependence on Spain which would have been the result of obligations due to her alone.

A more glaring violation of the Whig principle of non-intervention could hardly be cited; but it was a useful one, and served to add to the many proofs that might be given of the absurdity of establishing general theoretic rules to be practically applicable to every variety of case. In the mutable condition of human affairs there is but one universal doctrine that a statesman should preach to a sensible people—the necessity of acting in such a manner as, according to circumstances, may be the best for the particular country he governs, and most advantageous to mankind at large.

The following correspondence gives somewhat more in detail a consecutive account of the action taken by the British Government in the matter:—

Foreign Office : Oct. 30, 1846.

My dear Normanby,—I am this afternoon returned from Windsor, where I have been for two days. The Queen and Prince are very anxious and uneasy about the state of Portugal. We send off to-morrow Colonel Wylde, who goes in the *Cyclops*, from Portsmouth to Oporto and Lisbon, to see and report on the state of things, and we shall order a reinforcement of our naval force in the Tagus. But this is all we can at present do, and our interference must be confined to giving advice and taking care of the personal safety of the Queen. It is a most unfortunate state of things; but I trust the danger is somewhat exaggerated; still it is great; and what makes matters worse, it has been brought on by the folly of the Court, instigated I believe by the German tutor, Diez.¹ It was foreseen that, if the elections went on and the new Chambers should meet, one of their first acts would be to address the Queen to remove the intermeddling tutor. Thereupon he set to work to secure himself, little caring for or little foreseeing the danger in which he was involving the King and Queen. The only way, as he thought, to avoid the address was to prevent the meeting of the Cortes, this could only be done by getting rid of the Government which was pledged to call them; the way in which that could be accomplished was by making a *coup d'état*; and so it was made, against the advice of all persons whose judgment was worth having, and without consulting Lord Howard, because they knew he would have been against it; and contrary to the opinion of our Court, though I believe that opinion arrived too late.

Carlton Terrace : Nov. 1, 1846.

My dear Normanby,—We have heard of Parker's arrival at Lisbon, with his whole squadron, so that our naval force in the Tagus will now be respectable. No doubt his presence will produce a useful effect; when people see a strong force, they do not exactly know how far such a force may be authorised to act, and they fear the worst, and guide themselves accordingly. Parker will be instructed to protect the persons of the Royal Family, if they should be obliged to take refuge on board their own line-of-battle ship in the Tagus, or on board one of ours; and in case of need he will be authorised to garrison the fort of Belem with his marines; but you had better say nothing about

¹ This gentleman had been placed by his family about the young King.

this latter point, lest the French should intrigue to prevent it. But if you should hear of its having been done, you will know that it will have been sanctioned by the British Government. Rothschild said to me last night that he heard from Paris that the Government there said they should not mind our squadron going into the Tagus provided we did not send any land troops. I think they can hardly have said this, because they know well that we are bound by old and special treaties with Portugal, and that if the *casus fœderis* were to arise we should not inquire whether the French Government minded or not that which we might feel ourselves called upon by our treaty engagements to do.

It had been under the influence and auspices of Costa Cabral, who was once termed in a debate in the House of Commons the 'Jonathan Wild' of European diplomatists, and who had started life as a furious Liberal, that the Portuguese Government had entered on their course of exasperating tyranny. Soon after Cabral had been compelled to fly, the Marquis de Saldanha occupied the post of President of the Council, but he succeeded to the taint of Cabral's policy and reaped its fruits. The head-quarters of the rebels under the revolutionary supreme Junta of Government was at Oporto. Lord Palmerston, on the eve of an attack upon that place by the Royal troops, determined to try to negotiate between the parties, and so avoid the loss of life and property which the capture of Oporto by storm would necessarily involve. He wrote, therefore, to Colonel Wylde, under the date of January 26, 1847, instructing him to go to Oporto and to enter on the following negotiation:—

The basis of negotiation must be a declaration and engagement made by the Queen, to you, as the representative in this matter of the British Government, that immediately on the termination of the civil war, she will establish constitutional government, and call a Cortes without delay. Unless this assurance is given in the most formal and positive manner, we cannot meddle with the matter. She ought, I think, also to assure us that she will not, for the present at least, bring into office the Cabrals, against whom the revolt has taken place. Of course she would

not be expected to exclude them for ever from power ; their turn may come ; but to replace them just now would be to irritate and provoke a large portion of the country. With those assurances in your hand, you may be well entitled to urge the Junta to lay down their arms and submit to the Queen's authority. Of course they would say, the assurances given may be satisfactory as to the nation, but what is to become of us as individuals, and how are we to be secured ?

The general basis of the conditions should, I think, be amnesty for the mass of the insurgents ; precautions as to some of the chiefs and leaders. That security was wisely and liberally stated in Saldanha's Articles to consist in their temporary retirement from Portugal ; the military so retiring to have half-pay for their support. For the civilians no provision was proposed by Saldanha, because, I presume, he concluded that most of them had means of their own ; and I infer and take for granted, that no confiscations or sequestrations of property are thought of. The difficulty, and it is one which we in this country have no personal knowledge which would enable us to solve, is, how far these voluntary and temporary banishments are to go. There may be a certain number of men whom it would be better for their own sakes and for the peace of the country for a short time to remove from Portugal. But if the list is made large, and I think Saldanha's Articles make it much too comprehensive, the Queen will lose the services of many men who, though they have been opposed to her Government and Ministers on the present occasion, might, when the contest is over, become very useful servants of the Crown ; and it must also be remembered that if all the leading men of the Liberal party are to be compelled to leave the country, though only for a time, the conduct of affairs must necessarily fall into the hands of the opposite set of men, who have been clearly proved to be hateful to a large portion of the nation ; and that is not the way to restore contentment in the country.

Sir Hamilton Seymour had now succeeded Lord Howard as English Minister at Lisbon.

Carlton Gardens : Feb. 5, 1847.

My dear Seymour,—The Queen should remember that unless she shows herself to be the sovereign of the whole nation, she cannot expect the whole nation to regard and love her as their sovereign ; and that a throne whose stability rests on the point of the bayonet has a very ticklish and uncertain basis.

Pray preach all these things, and such others as may occur to you in the same spirit; and make the Court and the Government clearly and distinctly understand that they must expect no support from England to help them to continue a system of misgovernment; and that England will take care that no support for that purpose is given them by Spain.

Foreign Office : Feb. 17, 1847.

' Moncorvo has written for full powers to conclude some fresh engagement, if necessary, in the event of Don Miguel's returning to Portugal; but pray warn the Court against giving in to the delusion that they will by such means obtain aid against the Junta and the Liberal party; we shall take uncommon good care to prevent that. If the Queen fears Don Miguel, she must make haste to make up matters with the Junta, and to be able to unite all the parties who are for constitutional government in a compact band against the adherents of Don Miguel. If Portugal is to be governed despotically and by sword and bayonet, a man is as good as a woman for such purpose, and it matters little whether the despot is called by one Christian name or another. Pray make this very civilly to be understood by the King and Queen; and endeavour also to explain to them in courtly terms that the sending off the Torres Vedras prisoners to the coast of Africa¹ has done the Queen irreparable injury in public opinion here; and if it turns out that they are sent to a milder destination, you may observe how unfortunate it is that the Queen should have incurred unnecessarily the odium of a severity which she did not mean to inflict.

I hope and trust that Diez will be shipped off too; but the 'evil that men do lives after them,' and the mischief done by Diez will continue to be felt long after he has re-crossed the Bay of Biscay. It will be something gained, however, not to have such an evil counsellor always at the Royal ear; and better advisers will have more chance of swaying decisions upon new events as they arise.

I am inclined to think that Miguel has no intention at present of going to Portugal, and that he will not do so until, and unless, there is a considerable force in the field under his banners. He came overland from Italy as servant to a Captain Bennett, and arrived here on the 2nd inst. from Calais.

¹ They had capitulated on honourable terms, but were shipped off to Angola.

Foreign Office: Feb. 26, 1847.

I wish you to press in the strongest manner upon the Queen and King, and on any of the people about them who may be worth talking to, that it becomes every day more and more absolutely necessary for them to make overtures to the Junta, and to come to some amicable settlement, so as to put an end to the civil war. Tell them plainly that if they speculate upon a Miguelite insurrection, to bring in foreign troops to put down the Junta, they deceive themselves. We shall take good care that any measures to be adopted against Miguel, if he should return to Portugal, which he will probably not do, shall not be perverted into an interference between the Camarilla and Junta, between whom in reality the civil war is waged.

Tell them as to our guaranteeing a loan, they might as well ask us to give them a slice of the moon.

The only way in which the Queen can make herself strong against Miguel is by rallying again round her that portion of her subjects by whose exertions, devotion, and sacrifices she was placed upon the throne; but if the Constitution on which she rode in triumph is to be abrogated, and despotism is to be set up in its stead, such of the Portuguese who are for despotism will naturally say that it is Miguel, and not Maria, who is best entitled to be their despotic sovereign.

In the following Memorandum, Lord Palmerston puts on record the views which were afterwards embodied in the formal Convention of May, made between England, France, Spain and Portugal:—

Carlton Gardens: March 25, 1847.

I entirely concur in the view taken by Lord John Russell, of the nature of the present state of affairs in Portugal, and of the bearing of the letter and spirit of the Quadruple Treaty upon that state of things; and I am decidedly of opinion with him, that ‘there is at present no case for interference, either by the letter or the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty.’

But it may be argued, by those who ask for interference, that there may be ground for such interference, independently of that treaty, upon general principles of policy, and not in virtue of any anterior engagements. The Quadruple Treaty itself was, it may be said, the record of a determination taken upon general grounds of policy, and was not the fulfilment of

any anterior engagement; and the question may be asked, is there now a sufficient reason for interfering by force of arms in the civil war in Portugal, on grounds of general policy, and without reference to any anterior engagements?

It is acknowledged by writers on the Law of Nations that, when civil war has been regularly established in any country, and when the nation has been divided into two contending armies, and has been marshalled in two opposing camps, foreign States may treat the conflicting parties in the same manner as if they were two separate nations; and may allowably side with one or the other party in the civil war, as they would with one or the other belligerent in a war between two independent nations. The right to do so is acknowledged to exist in all such cases; the expediency of doing so must depend on the circumstances of each particular case.

The decision of any third party in such a case must depend upon the answer which it could give to two questions—First, Is the cause of the party whose side we think of taking, a just one? Secondly, Is it for our interest to give that just cause active assistance?

Now, in the case of a civil war which originates in a disputed succession, both of these questions may generally be answered without difficulty, either one way or the other. The Government of a foreign State may easily make up its mind as to which party is right in regard to a disputed succession, because the facts upon which the decision is to turn are known as well out of the country where the dispute exists as in it; and the interest which such foreign Government may have in the matter can be easily appreciated. Such was the case out of which the Quadruple Treaty arose. The civil war arose out of a disputed succession in Portugal and in Spain; and the interest which England had in the matter was a matter of comparatively plain and simple calculation.

But it is different when a civil war arises out of a contest between political parties in a country, who differ in regard to principles and forms of government, and who, without pretending to change the reigning dynasty, stand up for different systems of internal organisation.

It is more difficult, in such a case, for the Government of another country to pronounce with certainty that either party in such a civil war is absolutely in the right; and when the struggle for conflicting systems of government is mixed up with mutual accusations of illegal or unconstitutional proceedings,

the task of judging between them is rendered still more difficult. In such a case, too, it is far less easy to answer the second of the above-mentioned questions, even after having formed an opinion on the first; for, supposing the right to be pretty clearly on one side or the other, there are a vast number of considerations to be taken into account before a foreign Government could decidedly determine that it was for its well-understood interests to interfere by force of arms. But this is the present case of Portugal; and there would be much difficulty for the English Government to answer the two foregoing questions affirmatively in favour of the Queen of Portugal. At the same time, England has a great interest in the welfare of Portugal as a State; and the present course of events seems likely to ruin Portugal for a long time to come as a European Power.

Is there, then, any way open for England by which, without violating principles on which her foreign policy has always been founded, and without taking steps which would make enemies of the majority of the Portuguese nation, she might speedily put an end to this disastrous war?

England has offered the Queen of Portugal mediation between her Government and the Junta; the offer has been declined, because Marshal Saldanha does not choose the war to end by negotiation and reconciliation, and because he insists upon it that what is plainly the minority of the nation shall, by aid of a Spanish force, be enabled to crush the majority. But such an end would not be lasting; the defeated majority would wait their opportunity, and, whenever a party sympathising with them should rise to power in Spain, they would again try the fate of arms in Portugal. Saldanha's plan is, therefore, objectionable in policy, as well as in principle.

But might not the English Government renew its offer; but giving to its offer the character of arbitration rather than of mediation? Might some such communication as the following be made to the Queen?—The course you are following is fatal, end as it may; for it is evident that it will not end in your Majesty's triumph over the Junta and their adherents, by your own means. England is your ancient ally, and is bound to come to your aid in times of difficulty and danger. She is ready to do so now; but you must allow her to prescribe for Portugal such remedies as her disorders require. We demand, therefore, of you *carte blanche* as to the offers which we require you to authorise us to make in your name to your revolted subjects. These offers, however, we intend to be generally these: General

amnesty for all who shall tender their submission on or before a specified day ; such amnesty, of course, to include retention of titles, honours, and property ; and of military commissions, either on full or half-pay, for officers, according to the discretion of the Government ; and restoration to the Queen's service for such non-commissioned officers and privates as choose to be so restored. *Some few, and very few—probably not above ten—of the leading members of the Junta to retire for two or three years from Portugal.* A new Ministry to be formed, consisting of men belonging neither to the Junta nor to the Cabral party. All edicts by which the Constitution has, in any of its parts, or in the whole, been suspended, to be immediately rescinded, and the Constitution, as it stood before the 6th of October last, to be immediately restored. The Cortes to be summoned to meet on some specified day, not too distant ; and the elections to take place at a proper interval before their meeting. M. Diez to leave Portugal by the very next packet ; and the system of Camarilla Government to be for ever left off. If the Junta should agree to these terms, the civil war would be over ; and the fair and just demands of the Portuguese nation would be satisfied. The Junta, therefore, might be told, when those conditions were proposed to them, that if they should refuse them, the British Government would then be prepared to take an active part in favour of the Queen, and would join its forces to hers in order to restore peace to Portugal. Of course, in such case, the British Government must, however inconvenient it might be to do so, guarantee to the Junta the faithful performance of these conditions by the Queen ; and probably there would, in such a case, be no difficulty in enforcing their execution. There can be little doubt that such a course would put an end to the war in a fortnight after it was resolved upon.

If the Queen should say that she could not adopt such a plan, because Saldanha would resign, the answer would be : That plan would render his resignation a matter of indifference ; but we will offer you Colonel Wylde to take his place at once, or Colonel Wylde shall be Chef d'Etat-Major, to assist, with his skill and judgment, any Portuguese General whom you may place in nominal command.

If the civil war could be terminated in this manner, by England alone, without Spanish or French interference, the honour of the Queen would be saved, the liberties of the Portuguese nation would be respected, and the tie between England

and Portugal would remain unbroken. The despatches received this afternoon, from Lisbon and Oporto, seem to show the urgency of some energetic measure for putting an end to the calamities with which Portugal is now afflicted.

PALMERSTON.

Foreign Office: April 3, 1847.

My dear Seymour,—I send you instructions which I hope will put an end to the civil war. The only difficulty which I anticipate will be with the Queen, and with the people who govern her without her knowing it. But the recent change of Ministers at Madrid will probably help us,¹ because if the new Ministers have any predilections towards Portugal, I should think it might be rather towards Oporto than towards Lisbon. At all events, we may be pretty sure that they will not let their troops enter Portugal without our consent, and, therefore, the Queen of Portugal must feel that her chances of assistance from Spain are much lessened, if not extinct. I trust she will agree to our terms. If she does not, we must rest upon our oars, and wait till one side or the other is fairly worn out by fatigue and exhaustion.

I say in my despatch that the amnesty ought to be full and general; and you should try all you can to get it made so. The Queen must be made to understand that we are greatly stretching our established principles of foreign policy by engaging to coerce the Junta in any case, and that unless she gives us the broadest possible ground to take our stand upon, we could not justify our course to Parliament and the country; and therefore she ought to make the amnesty without exception.

There certainly was little in the conduct of the British Foreign Office compatible with the principle of non-intervention, and it was only on the ground that we were saving the Sovereign from ruin, and the country from confusion, and establishing something like a system of liberality, moderation, and equity, that we could justify our course; but if we did that, we might fairly contend that we did justify it, considering our peculiar relations with Portugal, and admitting that States, like individuals, have duties which may inspire them with an interest in their neighbours' welfare.

¹ The Pacheco Government.

The Portuguese Government, however, as the next letter shows, raised difficulties which were unworthy of them, and fitting only the character of men who were being saved in spite of themselves.

F. O. : April 30, 1847.

My dear Normanby,—Our monetary affairs look better ; panic is subsiding, and the funds rising ; and the notion, which seems well founded, that the Emperor of Russia is going to invest a few millions sterling of his hoardings in our funds has had a cheering effect in the City to-day.

You will see that the Queen of Portugal, or rather her advisers, stand out about sending a dozen men to live at the expense of the Portuguese Government for six months at Paris. If the subject-matter were less serious, one should call this childish. It is infatuation. They seem determined to put the throne of the Queen upon the result of a battle. If they have the best of the fight, they will not essentially mend their position, and if they have the worst of it, the Queen will be in great peril ; and at all events, if saved by us, will undergo the humiliation of submitting, after defeat, to terms which, before the battle, she might have worn the appearance of imposing. If we were merely messengers between the Government and the Junta, we should willingly have conveyed the Queen's demand for the temporary banishment of the sixteen or eighteen persons in question, but we had taken the resolution to combine with France and Spain to compel the Junta to submit, on the terms to be announced to them. It was necessary that we should be careful that the terms were such that a refusal of the Junta to agree to them would justify us and our allies in undertaking the conquest of Portugal, for such the compelling operation would be in the present temper of the Portuguese ; and whether that conquest might be difficult or easy, whether a short or a long operation, it would be an undertaking to which heavy responsibility would necessarily attach, and which the English Government at least ought to be able to justify to Parliament and to the world. Now we think that, supposing, as is probable, that the Junta should agree to submit on the terms offered them, provided the amnesty were general, but should refuse to consent to their own banishment, the expulsion for six months of a dozen and a half of men would not be an object of sufficient importance to justify the conquest and subjugation of Portugal in order to attain it.

Firmness, however, carried the day, as it usually does when it has right on its side.

F. O. : May 6, 1847.

My dear Seymour,—We have received your despatches, giving us an account of the Queen's acceptance of our terms. I am delighted ; it is indeed good news, and I trust we shall soon hear that the Junta have accepted also, and that this calamitous civil war has been brought to a close.

The Cortes ought to meet as soon as the preliminary arrangements can be made for it, and the sooner the Queen can substitute tongues for muskets, as instruments of civil and political strife, the better for her and her kingdom.

Saldanha's army is full of Cabralist officers. It is not very likely that Saldanha and his officers should attempt any prank, and fall back towards Lisbon, to coerce the Queen, and prevent her from acceding to our terms ; but if he were to do so, he might be told that we will coerce him just as readily as the Junta, and that he had better take care what he is about.

The British fleet was now directed to protect the Queen of Portugal's Government from an attack by the Viscount Sa da Bandiera, or any other of the leaders of the Revolutionary party. But Lord Palmerston considered the desired work was only half done so long as the constitution was dormant, and Parliamentary government not firmly re-established.

C. G. : May 26, 1847.

My dear Seymour,—I hope you will not have had occasion to employ force to protect Lisbon from attack by Sa da Bandiera : but if it has become necessary, I have no doubt it will have been done with effect, and the means at Sir William Parker's disposal will have proved amply sufficient. As to the demands of the Junta, we must be as firm in resisting any unreasonable pretensions of theirs as we were in refusing to comply with the overstrained expectations of the Court. Napier has been appointed to the *St. Vincent*, that he may go to Lisbon and take the command there when Parker moves on to the Mediterranean. We want to collect a larger force within that sea than we now have there ; and with Parker and Napier, both with their flags flying there and thereabouts, we shall probably have Joinville on his good behaviour.

C. G. : June 13, 1847.

Nothing can be more satisfactory than the course of things in Portugal, as far as we have hitherto learned them, and I trust that by this time the Junta will have submitted, and Bandiera also, and that the people in Algarve and in the other provinces having followed the example thus set them, the civil war will have become completely ended, and tranquillity will have been entirely restored. Now then comes the time for keeping a tight hand on the Portuguese Government, as to the faithful and immediate execution of the four conditions, which they must not, under any pretence whatever, evade. The men now in power will try to put off the elections and the meeting of the Cortes, because they will fear that the elections will go against them, and that the majority in the Cortes, being for the Liberal party, will turn them out, and put another set of men in. But to this they must make their minds up. What we have intended to do, and what the Portuguese Government is pledged to us to do, is to transfer from the field of battle to the floor of Parliament the conflict of political parties in Portugal. The people, or at least a large portion of them, said they had grievances which required redress. The Queen's Government told them they should have no Parliament in which to state and represent those grievances. The reply of the people was natural and just: they flew to arms. Driven from the hustings and from Parliament, they sought refuge in the field. We have said to the Queen's Government that they must give back a Parliament, and that then the people must lay down their arms. The people have laid down, or are about to lay down their arms. The Queen must give back the Parliament; upon this point there must be no mistake.

C. G. : July 6, 1847.

I am just come home, at half-past one, from the House of Commons, so my letter will not be long. I am glad to find that the Oporto Junta have at last given in. This puts an end to the civil war for the moment; whether it will be renewed or not depends on the Queen. If she fulfils faithfully her engagement, and governs in the true spirit of the Constitution, the Liberal party may be content with wielding power according to law; and being no longer fearful of being stripped of it, may be satisfied without upsetting or attacking the throne. But if the Queen breaks faith, or allows herself to follow the lead of the Cabral party, she will be, as you said in a former letter, a

doomed woman. We must try to save her against her will and against her tendencies; you cannot therefore be too firm in insisting upon the fulfilment both of the letter and spirit of the Four Articles. The Torres Vedras prisoners must be sent for immediately, and I would rather that an English ship of war were sent to fetch them than that they were left to the carelessness and delays of a Portuguese ship of war, such as it probably would be, with ostensible orders for despatch, and secret instructions to be slow. I should wish, therefore, that you and Parker should determine at once to send off the *Sidon*, or any other vessel of suitable dimensions, which Parker can spare, to bring these people back, and the ship should be off immediately. She ought to carry out orders *open* and *unsealed*, and none others, to the Governors of Angola and Benguela, to collect and give up all the prisoners at once, in order that they may be brought back. A list of them should be sent, and the ship should carry medical means for such as may be suffering from wounds or sickness, and bedding and other accommodation for them.

The honour of the British Crown and the good faith of the British Government is pledged to the strict fulfilment of the Four Articles, and there must be no exceptions. You will see that the tone of the debate last night was not a bit more favourable to the Queen, her present Ministers, and the Cabral party than the discussion which took place before. Moncorvo came to me this morning, and was evidently nettled at the things which were said, but I told him that Parliamentary privilege has no limit.

Portugal was not the only case in which—non-intervention being laid down as the Whig rule—intervention was the exception. The war between Monte Video and Buenos Ayres had long been the curse of La Plata, and not only injurious to the belligerents themselves but to the trade of the world. The Speech from the Throne, while Sir Robert Peel was still in office, announced an alliance between the French and English Governments for the purpose of suppressing it. This alliance was maintained by Sir Robert's successor, although Lord Palmerston clearly intimated to the French that the game of Algiers was not to be played over again in the river Plate; and, though the agents of

the two Governments differed wherever their instructions enabled them to differ—the French showing a decided partiality for the Monte Videans—the final result was successful, and peace and commerce once more expanded their wings in that quarter of the world.

In 1834 Prince Talleyrand had incidentally remarked to Lord Palmerston that Spain had always been to France in the same relation which Portugal had stood to England. Monsieur Guizot is known to have repeated the same sentiment in 1847, and, further, to have indicated that such close dependence was one of the principles of French foreign policy. It is not, therefore, a matter of wonder that the prospect of the succession of the Infanta with the Duc de Montpensier to the throne of Spain alarmed English statesmen, the only alternative being Montemolin, son of Don Carlos, symbol of absolute monarchy, and condemned beforehand by the Quadruple Treaty to be expelled the country by foreign forces. Portugal, meanwhile, torn by violent factions, offered a sorry prospect to those who desired her independent stability. Thus it happened that the idea of a union of Spain and Portugal under a Portuguese Prince, after the death of the Spanish Queen, found some favour. The view taken, was that a great free State extending from the Pyrenees to Lisbon would in all future times be a counterpoise to France, and thus save Belgium and the Rhenish provinces from the invading propensities of the French democracy. It was also asserted that the Progressists in Spain were ready to hold up their hands for the Prince of Portugal as a successor to Queen Isabella. Lord Palmerston, however, did not at all fall in with this plan, as is shown in the following letter:—

Broadlands : August 9, 1847.

My dear John Russell,—With regard to the possible union of Spain with Portugal, or, rather, the incorporation of Portugal with Spain, it may be said that if Spain is not now

by itself a great free State forming a counterpoise to France, and securing by that means Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, it is not because Spain is not large enough in territory, population, and natural resources; nor would the acquisition of Portugal give her, in this respect, any means the want of which cripples her at present, neither can it be said that by such incorporation Spain would be freed from controlling dangers in her rear which prevent her from facing France boldly to her front; because as long as Portugal is closely connected with England, Portugal would be a help and not a clog to Spain in the pursuit of such a policy. There seems no reason, therefore, to think that Spain, after having swallowed up Portugal, would be a bit more politically independent of France than she is or will be, without having so absorbed her neighbour, and, consequently, the probable result of such an annexation would be, that some fine day England would not only find Spain become a satellite of France, but would lose all the counterbalancing resources which, in such a case, Portugal, as a separate State, would afford us. Those advantages are many, great, and obvious; commercial, political, military, and naval, and if we were thus to lose them, some of them would not be mere loss, but would become formidable weapons of attack against us in the hands of a hostile Power. For instance, the naval position of the Tagus ought never to be in the hands of any Power, whether French or Spanish, which might become hostile to England, and it is only by maintaining Portugal in its separate existence, and in its intimate and protected state of alliance with England, that we can be sure of having the Tagus as a friendly instead of its being a hostile naval station. Only fancy for a moment Portugal forming part of Spain, and Spain led away by France into war with England, and what would be our naval condition with all the ports from Calais to Marseilles hostile to us, St. Malo, Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort, Corunna, Vigo, the Tagus, Cadiz, Carthagen, Port Mahon, Toulon, and with nothing between us and Malta but Gibraltar, the capture of which would be the bait which France would hold out to Spain to induce her to go to war with us. If, on the contrary, the Tagus were at our command, we should occupy an intermediate position greatly impeding the naval movements of France and Spain. Perhaps, if the scheme of an Iberian Republic could be realised, such a State might be more likely to remain independent of France than a Spanish Monarchy promises to be; but such a republic would soon fall back to be

a monarchy, and could not be created without sweeping away two existing dynasties allied to us by treaty engagements, and for which France would certainly take the field.

Among the other matters which engaged the attention of the Foreign Office at this time was the violence done by the ‘Holy Alliance’ to the Republic of Cracow.

In November 1845, a conspiracy was discovered in Posen to restore the independence of Poland. An advance was made in the early part of the following year upon the city of Cracow, and the Senate applied to Austria, Prussia, and Russia for their intervention. Austrian troops shortly after occupied the city, but were quickly expelled, and Russian troops, coming to their assistance, recaptured it. Although the independence of the Republic had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna, the three protecting Powers proclaimed its annexation to Austria in November 1846, and thus accomplished the extinction of the last remnant of Polish nationality.

Lord Palmerston says to Lord Normanby:—

Nov. 19, 1846.

I have prepared an answer about Cracow, which I shall send off to Vienna without waiting for Guizot. Our answer is, that we don’t admit the necessity of doing what the three Powers are going to do; and that we deny their competency to do it, and protest against it as a clear violation of the Treaty of Vienna. It comes very awkwardly at the present moment. Metternich has no doubt long intended it, and thinks the time propitious when England and France have differed, and when he thinks each would be willing to gain his support about Spain by being easy with him about Cracow.

Guizot will make a show of resistance, but the fact is that even if France and England had been on good terms, they have no means of action on the spot in question, and could only have prevented the thing by a threat of war, which, however, the three Powers would have known we should never utter for the sake of Cracow. The measure is an abominable shame, and executed by the most hollow pretences and the most groundless assertions.

I suspect that Prussia consents to it unwillingly; that

Austria is urged on by her own covetousness and hatred of freedom and independence, even in name, and is pushed on by Russia, who wants to have an example set, which may hereafter be quoted by her as an excusing precedent when she swallows and assimilates the kingdom of Poland.

Foreign Office : Jan. 21, 1847.

My dear Ponsonby,—I have seen Hummelauer and have had a preliminary conversation with him and Dietrichstein. He is to send me his papers to read. I have told him that if he is able to show that Cracow was the source of danger to the Austrian dominions, and if I am authorised to publish the proofs, that may go far to mitigate public opinion here ; though, of course, the question will still remain why the three Powers did not previously consult England and France, and the other parties to the Treaty of Vienna ; and the stronger the case the three Powers can make out for the necessity of some alteration in the political condition of Cracow, the less reason there was for fearing that they should not obtain the consent of those other Powers to some reasonable and fair arrangement.

Dietrichstein, Brunnow, and Bunsen stayed away from the House of Lords when the Queen made her speech, and I think that they were right, as it might have been unpleasant for them to have stood by to hear their Courts taxed with having violated a treaty.¹

During the first Session of 1847, Mr. Hume moved a resolution condemning the conduct of Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the affair of Cracow, and declaring that the payments to Russia by Great Britain on account of the Russo-Dutch Loan should be discontinued on account of her violation of the Treaty of Vienna without any previous communication with this country. A long discussion followed, one prominent feature of which was an eulogium of the conduct of the three despotic Courts by Lord George Bentinck as the leader of the Tory party. In a letter to Lord Normanby, Lord Palmerston

¹ 'The extinction of the free State of Cracow has appeared to me to be so manifest a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, that I have commanded that a protest against that act should be delivered to the Courts of Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, which were parties to it.' (*Extract from Queen's Speech, January 19, 1847.*)

says of this debate, 'Peel made a very good and very friendly speech; George Bentinck distinguished himself in his own way, in which he is likely also to extinguish himself as a candidate for office.' Lord Palmerston himself spoke very briefly, merely declaring that the incorporation of Cracow by Austria was undoubtedly a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, and had received universal condemnation, but that to meet it by such a pecuniary fine upon the Russian Government was, in his opinion, neither a legal nor a dignified course of action. Mr. Hume, after this, withdrew his motion.

The following letter¹ is quoted because the course we should pursue with Asiatic countries has sometimes been questioned, and the principle maintained that we should treat them exactly as we should European states; that is, according to a policy which they cannot understand, and will not appreciate. When their notions and usages become European, then we should of course deal with them as Europeans; but as long as their notions and usages are Chinese, we must treat them as Chinese. The moral nature of these Asiatics is the point to be considered, and that is not dealt with in treatises on international law:—

Broadlands: January 9, 1847.

We shall lose all the vantage ground which we have gained by our victories in China, if we take the low tone which seems to have been adopted of late by us at Canton. We have given the Chinese a most exemplary drubbing, and that brought them, not to their senses, because they never were deceived as to what we were; but it brought them to leave off the system of pretended contempt, under which they had so long concealed their fear. They will not forget that drubbing in a hurry, unless we set them the example by forgetting it ourselves; and we must take especial care not to descend from the relative position which we have acquired. If we maintain that position morally by the force of our intercourse, we shall not be obliged to recover it by forcible acts; but if we permit the Chinese, either at Canton or elsewhere, to resume, as they will,

¹ To Sir John Davis.

Minister, and also declined to receive an envoy from England on a unilateral footing. The truth was that representations made to him from Ireland induced him to imagine that we were in such straits in Irish affairs that we should be compelled to yield. When Lord Minto asked whether he would, on his part, receive as English Minister one of our Archbishops or the Moderator of the Church of Scotland in full canonicals, he frankly owned that he could not; but reciprocity has never been a weakness of the Vatican.

Lord Palmerston was in favour of the Eglinton clause. To Lord Clarendon he writes: —¹

I could not have consented to make myself responsible for receiving an ecclesiastic as Roman envoy, and it is much better that our refusal should stand upon a prohibitory law than upon our own voluntary determination. I quite concur in the view taken of that question by Aberdeen and Stanley, and I am convinced, by my diplomatic experience, that there would be no end to the embarrassments and inconveniences which we should suffer from having a Roman priest invested with diplomatic privilege holding his court in London, surrounded by English and Irish Catholics, and wielding a power of immense though secret extent, and capable of becoming an engine of political intrigue to serve all kinds of foreign interests.

As for the idea that we could manage the Irish priests by means of a Roman priest in London, I am convinced that the presence of such a man would only have given the Irish priests an additional means of managing us.

Cappucini, a liberal and enlightened man, was offered to be nuncio at Paris: he declined, and gave to his private friends the reason—that he knew he should have been obliged, by his official position, to side with the most ultra of the Catholic and Jesuit party in France, and as his opinions were against them, he would not place himself in so disagreeable a position.

Very shortly after Lord Minto arrived in Rome—namely, in January, 1848—an insurrection broke out at Palermo, the Sicilians demanding from the King of Naples the Constitution of 1812. Both parties applied to Lord Napier, then our *chargé d'affaires* at Naples, to

¹ F. O., March 9, 1848.

mediate between them. The Sicilians founded their application upon the former connection between England and Sicily, and upon the share which the British Government had had in the remodelling of the Sicilian Constitution in 1812. The Neapolitan Government founded their application upon the well-known interest which had always been taken by the British Government in the welfare of the kingdom of Naples. Lord Napier, however, did not undertake the office, because the Neapolitan Government was not willing at that time to authorise such proposals as were alone likely to lead to any arrangement. Soon, however, the King invited Lord Minto to Naples, and requested him to employ his good offices to effect a reconciliation between the Sicilians and the Home Government.

Foreign Office: Feb. 24,¹ 1848.

My dear Minto,—I have now but five minutes to write to you, more than enough to give you all the instructions you need, which are to act according to your own good judgment as events succeed each other. I most sincerely hope that you will have been able to bring the Naples Government round to your views about Sicily. Your scheme of amalgamation is excellent, and would afford the best chance of a permanent connection between the two countries; but one fears the blind obstinacy of the King. The Sicilians, moreover, doubt his future good faith, but things have gone much too far for it to be possible for him hereafter to retract; and as to our guarantee, that is out of the question, and would lead us into future embarrassments and responsibilities of the most difficult and inconvenient kind. In short, the position of a foreign Power who should be guarantee between a sovereign and a portion of his subjects would be embarrassing for such Power, and inconsistent with the independence of such sovereign. Probably the King of Naples would not consent to it.

As to the poor Pope, I live in daily dread of hearing of some misadventure having befallen him. Events have gone too fast for such a slow sailer as he is. I only hope he will not be swamped by the swell in the wake of those who have outstripped

¹ Two days before the Revolution at Paris.

Carlton Gardens : June 9, 1847.

My dear John Russell,—I return you Hardinge's letter and the Duke of Wellington's. These two generals are great military authorities ; but the Duke is a far greater one than Hardinge, of whose judgment I have no opinion, though his bravery in the field is undoubted. Both seem to agree in thinking that the Russians cannot conquer India, and in this opinion they are clearly right. I do not think, however, that Hardinge has demonstrated that the Russians might not give us much trouble and put us to much expense in India.

I would observe that Hardinge seems to think Scinde of no value in a military point of view, whereas the Duke considers the possession of it as a great security ; and, as regards the Punjaub, Hardinge is evidently against our possessing it, while, on the other hand, he says that the only gate through which an invader could attack India is through the Khyber Pass, which cannot be occupied and defended by us unless we do possess the Punjaub ; and he shows the necessity for this, because he says that it is only to the eastward of the Chenab that a large army could find subsistence. It is only there, consequently, that we could station a large army ; and, therefore, as the Khyber Pass, being narrow, could be penetrated by only one column at a time, our best means of stopping an invading enemy would be either to occupy the pass with a small force beforehand, or to station a small force at the outlet of the pass, to attack in succession the heads of the columns of march as they might open out into the plain. But, to do this, we must have the country up to the pass ; for we could not in such a case risk a small force three hundred miles from our main body through a country which, not being ours, might at the moment become hostile. If the Khyber Pass is the only gate to India, and if it is there we are to defend India, we ought to have, and must have, military occupation of the country up to that gate ; otherwise the pass is of no more defensive value to us than any other defile which the invaders would have to pass between Astrabad and Cabul. The advance of a Russian army is, however, far from being as impossible as Hardinge seems to think it. Persia must, I fear, now be looked upon as an advanced post for Russia, whenever she chooses to make use of it. She will command it either by overpowering force or by bribing the State by prospects of acquisitions in Afghanistan. There would be no insurmountable difficulty to prevent Russia from assembling a considerable force at Astrabad. The roads through

Persia are good, and the Caspian gives additional facilities. From Astrabad through Afghanistan are very practicable military roads; and the distance from Astrabad to Attock is not much, if at all, more than eight hundred miles, considerably less than the distance from Attock to Calcutta.

A Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan might not be able to march to Calcutta, but it might convert Afghanistan into the advanced post of Russia, instead of that advanced post being in Persia; and, whatever Hardinge may say of the security of the rest of our frontier, you would find in such case a very restless spirit displayed by the Burmese, by the Nepaulese, and by all the unincorporated States scattered about the surface of our Indian possessions. These things would lead to great expense, would require great efforts, and might create considerable damage. The best method of preventing these embarrassments seems to be to take up such a military position on the frontier, not in *posse*, as Hardinge would do, but in *esse*, as would make it plain to everybody that we could not be taken by surprise; that the decisive position could neither be snatched from us by a rapid movement, nor be wrested from us by a forcible assault.

Of course there are further considerations to which Hardinge does not advert, namely, that while Russia was thus marching on India, we should not be idle in Europe; but still Russia is strong in her European defences, whether in the Baltic or in the Black Sea, and it is well that we should be able to defend India in Asia, as well as in Europe.

*Extract from Letter of Lord Hardinge, dated Simla,
April 20, 1847.*

As regards the intentions of Russia, I am confident no hostile attempt will be made. They are confined to the extension of her trade with China and parts of Central Asia. A Russian force can only enter India through Afghanistan and by the Khyber Pass.

A Persian and Afghan force intermixed with Russians, on the same principle as in our Indian Army, would be required, on the modern system of war, to be supported by a large and well-equipped field-train of artillery, with all its numerous stores. This modern necessity entails great difficulty in moving an army through a sterile and mountainous country. The more you attempt to make your army efficient in artillery in such

countries, the greater becomes your difficulty of rapidly moving forward.

If Russia could afford the means of getting through the Khyber Pass with a well-equipped army, it must be an operation of time, and could not be disguised. The concentration of our military means would be comparatively easy. We have now 50,000 men and 100 field pieces, and 100 siege guns, with 500 rounds a gun, on this frontier. We should have the choice of meeting this Russian army where we pleased. Peshawur is a very small and poor district; Attock still more; and the country between the Indus and the Jehun, or Hydaspes, is so poor and barren it could not support an army. Between the Jehun and the Chenab, or Acesines, the case is the same, and it is only on this side, between the Chenab and the Sutlej, that a large army could be subsisted, with rivers intersecting the approach at right angles, of which we have no idea in Europe, one, two, and even six and seven miles broad, from June till October, when the snow melts and the rain falls, running five or six knots an hour.

Look at the map and you will find, from our new frontier on the Byar at Noorpor, passing to the eastward along the mountains which now bring us into contact with Chinese Tartary at Spitti, and the Nepaul hills, and thence by the Tennasserim provinces to the Straits at Singapor, that there is no enemy which can give this Government any uneasiness by an external attack for a distance of nearly 6,000 miles of land frontier.

Passing from Noorpor to the westward, down to Kurrachee on the sea, the only entrance into India is by the Khyber Pass. No general in his senses would attack India through the Bolan Pass for the sake of occupying Scinde, having then an impassable desert before him, or a flank movement of 700 miles through Bhawalpoor before he could reach this frontier.

Consequently, any attack on India is limited to a space of about 100 miles on the Sutlej, from Ferozepore to Rampoor. For 100 miles from Ferozepore down to Kurrachee no hostile attack could be made. Our coast, from Kurrachee down to the Straits, is between 5,000 and 6,000 miles. The land frontier from Kurrachee to the Straits, about 7,000 miles. Therefore, out of 13,000 miles of sea and land frontier by which the empire is encircled, the only practicable attack is confined to 100 miles between Ferozepore and the foot of the hills at Rampoor, or, if you please, the Khyber Pass, 300 miles in advance of the Sutlej.

If the Indus had turned out to be a navigable river, and that our military communications for troops and stores could have been secured from Kurrachee by the Indus, the Punjaub would have been of some military value; but that route has failed us, and there is no real military communication between this frontier and Scinde. However, I won't enter into the question of the annexation of the Punjaub. I have shown you that no external attack of any importance can be made except for 100 miles on the Sutlej; and, lastly, I give you my opinion that this entrance by the Khyber Pass for a Russian army with all the equipments and munitions of war is very nearly as impracticable as any other of the entrances into India.

The Afghan war has solved the problem of the possibility of Russian invasion. Afghanistan has no resources: it is by nature too poor to feed a large invading army; and even if such an army could reach the Indus, our British means are at all times ample to overwhelm it.

The schemes of Russia are restricted, I should say, to the extension of her trading speculations. She now supplies Chinese Tartary, Thibet, Cashmere, and Turkestan with broadcloths, velvets, leather, hardware, &c., and receives shawls and shawl wool, tin, furs, &c., in return. We should, in addition to what Russia supplies, export opium, sugar, indigo, and English cotton manufactures.

Here you have no cause for apprehension. Let us get rid of a nine-years' annual deficit by a surplus; pay off the five per cents.; improve the country—and you may do what you like; but as to a Russian invasion of India, depend upon it, my dear Lord, that it is a political nightmare.

Extract of Letter from Duke of Wellington, dated Windsor Castle, June 3, 1847.

‘Lord Hardinge is quite correct in his account and description of the frontier. You may rely upon it that you have nothing to apprehend from Russia in that quarter. The possession of Scinde is a great security.’

The corrupt system of government, which was ruining the monarchy in France, produced a scandal, to which reference is made in the following letters. General Cubieres was a Peer of France, and M. Teste was Minister of Public Works. In order to obtain a

concession of a salt mine for a company in which he was interested, the General had given large bribes to the Minister. In July a State trial took place with reference to these transactions, and the culprits were condemned to fine and imprisonment. Meanwhile, however, M. Teste had attempted suicide by placing a pistol to his mouth, which missed fire. He then discharged a second, so close to his breast that the ball did not penetrate, but fell to the ground, leaving only a bruise. Lord Palmerston seems to have had his doubts about the intensity of M. Teste's desire to die.

F. O.: May 7, 1847.

My dear Normanby,—These revelations about Cubieres and Teste will, no doubt, lead to other disclosures of a similar kind, because such exposures follow each other as murders do in this country; and if the system by which majorities have hitherto been obtained is laid bare, either the Ministry must fall by public disrespect for it, or it will be weakened by the cessation of the abuses upon which it lived. In either way, these things must be a blow to Guizot and the Philippine system.

What dashing fellows our cousins Transatlantic are! Who would have thought of Ulloa¹ surrendering without being attacked? I remember a Greek line which says that "silver spears will conquer all things." No doubt the fort was a little bombarded with dollars while they were shelling the town. The Yankees will end by becoming masters of the greater part of Mexico. We cannot prevent it without going to war with the United States; and to go to war with them for such a set of people as the Mexicans would not go down with the House of Commons in the best of times, and least of all just now. If the Union becomes very large, it will either split, or else the multitude of conflicting interests which will belong to its various component parts will be an obstacle to any unnecessary war with a great maritime Power and wealthy customer like England. Moreover, a great extent of fine land to the south will render the Americans less anxious to strip us of Canada. I hear that they are already become careless about Oregon, satisfied with having the ownership.

¹ The fortress of St. John d'Ulloa, which commanded the town of Vera Cruz.

C. G.: July 16, 1847.

Do you think Teste's attempted suicide was a reality, or anything got up for effect? It looks like the latter. In former times, a Sir William Meadows, in our service, was brought into trouble about some affairs of the same kind which had happened in India, and he discharged a pistol at his own head; the ball grazed his forehead, and friends who heard the report rushed in and found him bathing his forehead in cold water; and he said, in reply to inquiries, that he had had an affair of honour with himself, and having stood the shot, he had declared himself satisfied. But, though Teste has escaped the shot, the Ministry has had one between wind and water, which, sooner or later, must tell; and even if it tells in no other way than by making bribery more difficult, because more dangerous, it will in that way weaken a Government which relies so much upon such methods for its support. I get on very agreeably with Broglie, but as yet we have only talked about Switzerland and Greece, in regard to both of which we 'agree to differ.' We shall probably wind up by Thursday or Friday of next week, then dissolve, and then comes the tug of war. It is said we are to have in the new Parliament an absolute majority of our own of twenty to thirty out of the whole House. Be this as it may, we shall certainly win many seats.

Parliament was dissolved on July 23. There was little enthusiasm on either side during the general election which followed. The Free Trade question appeared settled; and though a more vigorous policy was anticipated from a Russell than from a Melbourne Administration, no great organic changes were expected from it. On the other hand, the remnants of the Conservative party had nothing to hold out beyond vague professions of attachment to our ancient institutions. In this absence of party feeling the men in possession gained a few votes, although among their nominal supporters were many independent members in no way pledged to go with the Government if they disapproved of its measures.

CHAPTER II.

LORD MINTO'S MISSION TO ITALY—IRELAND—SICILY.

LORD MINTO, as has been stated above, went about this time to Italy, on a mission which deserves some notice. The whole land was in a ferment, and was clamouring for liberal institutions. Sardinia led the way, despite the unconcealed disapproval of her Imperial neighbour. Tuscany followed, though with laggard steps, and the Papal Court suffered for its prostration under the general fever by the occupation of Ferrara by Austrian forces. Charles Albert at once notified to the Pope his readiness to assist him with a Piedmontese army if the Imperial troops made any further advance. Meanwhile Pius IX., being engaged in administrative reforms, had expressed to the English Government a wish to have the assistance of some person of rank and experience who might aid him by advice, and at the same time afford him the moral support of England. Lord Minto therefore went off to Rome in November, 1847, with directions to visit Turin and Florence on his way. His aim was so to represent the English Government as to strengthen the authority of the constitutional governments in Italy, but he did not profess to believe that English mediation or interposition in territorial questions was likely to turn to much account. He only thought it probable that, by taking a firm and decided line, England might enable the wise friends of order and freedom to cope in their domestic affairs with the sedition of the young Italy and Mazzini firebrands.

Lord Palmerston's instructions to Lord Minto were, first of all, to convey to the King of Sardinia the

sympathies of the British Government, and the expression of its surprise and regret that Austria should have intimated the possibility of an entry by her troops 'upon Sardinian territory, if the King, in the exercise of his indisputable rights of sovereignty, should make certain organic arrangements within his own dominions which would be displeasing to the Government of Austria.' Lord Minto was to add that Her Majesty's Government had learnt with much pleasure the assurances of friendly and defensive support which his Sardinian 'Majesty had recently caused to be conveyed to the Pope, and which did great honour to His Majesty as a generous Prince and as an Italian Sovereign.'

To the Grand Duke of Tuscany Lord Minto was instructed to address himself in a tone of encouragement, urging him to persevere in that independent course of enlightened progress which he at that moment seemed inclined to pursue.

You will be at Rome [proceeded Lord Palmerston], not as a Minister accredited to the Pope, but as an authentic organ of the British Government, enabled to explain its views and to declare its sentiments upon events which are now passing in Italy, and which, both from their local importance and from their bearing on the general interests of Europe, Her Majesty's Government are watching with great attention and anxiety.

Her Majesty's Government are deeply impressed with the conviction that it is wise for sovereigns and their governments to pursue, in the administration of their affairs, a system of progressive improvement; to apply remedies to such evils as, upon examination, they may find to exist, and to remodel, from time to time, the ancient institutions of their country, so as to render them more suitable to the gradual growth of intelligence and to the increasing diffusion of political knowledge; and Her Majesty's Government consider it to be an undeniable truth, that if an independent sovereign, in the exercise of his deliberate judgment, shall think fit to make within his dominions such improvements in the laws and institutions of his country as he may think conducive to the welfare of his people, no other Government can have any right to attempt to restrain or to interfere with such an employment of one of the inherent attributes of independent sovereignty.

Lord Palmerston concluded by authorising Lord Minto to say 'that Her Majesty's Government would not see with indifference any aggression committed upon the Roman territories, with a view to preventing the Papal Government from carrying into effect those internal improvements which it might think proper to adopt.'

Lord Minto was received with great ovations. At Avezzo, Genoa, and other places, he was called upon to address the people from the balcony amid flags and music. With wise discretion, he usually confined his speech to a cry of 'Viva l'Indipendenza Italiana!' which satisfied the crowds and caused their dispersion, to the sound of 'Viva l'Italia!'

On reaching Rome he placed himself in communication with the Papal Government, so as to carry out his instructions. Pio Nono was at this time apparently about to enter on a career of progressive and successful reform, but Lord Minto was evidently not sanguine as to His Holiness's ability 'to ride the whirlwind and direct the storm.' Writing home during the early troubles of 1848, he says:—

The Pope is a most amiable, agreeable, and honest man, and sincerely pious to boot, which is much for a Pope; but he is not made to drive the State coach. To-day he is in very good spirits, although he foresees the dangers of the country, because he has recovered a saint's skull which had been sacrilegiously stolen.

The fact is that Pio Nono was at that time, and always remained, far more anxious for his power as Head of the Catholic Church than for his position as a temporal sovereign; but the British Government sought to turn to account whatever anxiety he might feel in his temporal capacity by obtaining, in return for their good offices, the exercise of his influence in Ireland to second their efforts in the cause of national education, and to restrain the lawlessness of the priests.

In the following letters Lord Palmerston refers to

the Papal rescript against the newly-established Queen's Colleges, and to the fact that agrarian outrages were, if not sanctioned, at any rate not condemned by the spiritual guides of the people. England had communicated to Austria, as her old ally, her hope that the Pope would not be interrupted by foreign force. She was also considering the means of opening formal communications with Rome, and naturally expected meanwhile a friendly attitude on the part of the Head of that Church which had many adherents across the Irish Channel.

F. O. : October 29, 1847.

My dear Minto,—Nothing could be better nor, I trust, more useful than your negotiations at Turin, upon which I have written to you official approvals. That Italian Commercial League will be an excellent thing if it is placed upon a proper footing, commercial and political.

As to the Austrians, they have been headed, and will not break cover towards Italy. Many things have contributed to this, but we have had our share in the merit, and were the first to set up the view holloa which scared them. The Pope ought to feel grateful to us for this, and if he does so, he ought to give us some tokens of his thankfulness. I send you a copy of Memorandum sent some little time ago by Clarendon for your use. It is, in the main, good. There is a little inconsistency in the parts, for in one part he assumes that the priests have no influence in Ireland, and in another part he assumes that they have a great deal. But the fact is so: they have influence and they have not; they have it in some things and not in others. But we wish to make to the Pope the plain, and simple, and reasonable request that he would exert his authority over the Irish priesthood, to induce them to abstain from meddling in politics, but, on the contrary, to confine themselves to their spiritual duties; and in these duties to exhort their flocks to morality, good conduct, obedience to the law, and abstinence from acts of violence and crime, and, moreover, to inculcate on their flocks the propriety of not only obeying the law themselves, but of aiding honestly and fearlessly in the execution of the law, and in the attainment of the ends of justice by faithfully performing their functions, as magistrates, jurymen, and witnesses. I disagree entirely with Clarendon as to the expediency of advising or inviting the Pope to send any confidential

agent to Ireland. I should fear that such person, unless very well chosen indeed, would be got hold of by McHale rather than by Clarendon, and then if his reports were to be unfavourable to us, we should have increased our difficulties instead of diminishing them. I shall be able to send you by the next messenger a Memorandum about the letter which has recently been received by McHale from Rome, upon the subject of Irish colleges.¹ This is an unkind and a most mischievous measure, and was little to be expected at the hands of the Pope at the very moment that we were stepping out of our way to be of use to him. It is an ungrateful return, and can only be explained on the supposition that it was extorted by intrigue and false representations made at Rome by McHale, and that the Pope acted ignorantly and without knowing the mischief he was doing. But you should lose no time in making him aware of his mistake, and you should say that if he expects the English Government to be of any use to him, and to take any interest in his affairs, he must not strike blows at our interior. You may also say that an Act of Parliament will be necessary to enable us to establish diplomatic relations with him. Things of this kind may have so bad an effect upon public opinion in England as to make it impossible for us to obtain the consent of Parliament to any such measure.

¹ 'College of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Rome, October 9, 1847. The Sacred Congregation has felt it its duty to caution the archbishops and bishops of Ireland against taking any part in establishing them. But as it would have wished, before some of the prelates had entered into any negotiations with the Government for amending the law regarding the aforesaid colleges and procuring other measures in their favour, that they had taken the opinion of the Holy See, so it doubts not but that, from the profound obedience which the prelates of Ireland have invariably exhibited towards it, they will retract those things which they have done to the contrary.'

* * * * *

'Above all things, the Sacred Congregation would deem it advantageous that the bishops, uniting their exertions, should procure the erection in Ireland of such a Catholic academy as the prelates of Belgium have founded in the city of Louvain.'

* * * * *

'With these things you will, we are sure, comply with the greater alacrity since they are in all points in conformity with the judgment of our most Holy Lord Pius IX., who has sanctioned with his approbation the decision of the Sacred Congregation, and gave to it the supreme weight of his authority.'

'J. PHIL. CARDINAL FRANSONI, P.D.P.F.'

'ALEXANDER BARNABO, Pro-Secretary.'

Commercial distress is lessening, but still severe, and will so continue for many months to come. The grain which was imported into the United Kingdom in the first nine months of this year cost in prime cost and freight rather more than twenty-six millions sterling. We had to advance upwards of six millions for public works in Ireland, and the nation has spent this year forty-five millions in railways at home, and upwards of ten millions in railways abroad. The wonder is not that we are distressed, but that we are not all of us bankrupt.

The Memorandum on the 'Irish Colleges' referred to in the foregoing letter was as follows :—

Whether intentionally or ignorantly I know not, but the Pope, by his rescript against the Irish colleges, committed a hostile, ill-judged, and unnecessary act. It was hostile, because he publicly denounced and directed the Roman Catholic hierarchy to oppose a measure which had received the sanction of the Sovereign and Parliament of England. It was ill-judged, because he showed no regard for the opinion of the Roman Catholic prelates and a great proportion of the Roman Catholic laity of Ireland, who consider the colleges an important boon, and well calculated to supply a want that has been long and severely felt, and who are determined not to be deprived of institutions from which they expect much good. It has produced feelings of resentment and irritation among the Protestants of Great Britain, and, I may add, among many of the Catholics of Ireland, that will not easily be allayed, and that are much regretted by all those who desire to soothe animosity between the two creeds, and to promote the establishment of friendly relations with Rome.

The Lord Lieutenant was in communication with the Primate, Dr. Crolly, with Archbishops Murray and Nicholson. Every suggestion of theirs had been scrupulously attended to for securing the religious instruction and moral conduct of the Roman Catholic students, and in conformity with their wishes the statutes were under revision as soon after the long vacation as the Presidential Board could assemble. When these facts are brought to the knowledge of the Pope, it is hoped that His Holiness will see that he has been led into error, and that greater circumspection will be desirable in listening to malicious and unfounded reports transmitted from Ireland, and which have been hitherto too readily believed at Rome. There are among the Roman Catholic prelates of Ireland men of great

intelligence and activity, who lend themselves to political agitation, and who seek to obtain the sanction of the Pope's authority towards the maintenance of hostile feelings against the British Government, and between the Protestants and Catholics of the United Kingdom. These men untruly assume to speak in the name of the entire hierarchy, and their statements have in consequence had an importance given them at Rome to which they are not entitled. It is probable that by this time the Pope has received certain resolutions against the colleges, and against the national system of education in the name of the archbishop and bishops of Ireland in Synod assembled; but these resolutions were not passed in Synod at all. Many of the prelates had left Dublin at the time they were framed, and even Archbishop Murray, who was in Dublin, never heard of or saw them till he read them in the newspapers, when he highly disapproved of them, and felt sure that many of his brethren would do the same. His example, among many that might be quoted, will show the unscrupulous character of certain prelates, and the necessity of receiving with caution any facts or opinions put forward by them. The best course for the Pope now to pursue is to remain entirely passive until he receives further and more correct information. He may rest assured that in the establishment of these colleges the British Government have had no other object than to supply the best possible education to the middle classes in Ireland, and, as a consequence of that object, to promote religion and morality among the students of different denominations alike. The British Government has no ulterior or sinister design, as has been most falsely asserted. It uses no disguise. The Lord Lieutenant has freely communicated with the Primate, and Archbishop Murray has received and acted upon their suggestions, and will communicate to them the statutes as soon as they are revised, and before they are definitively determined upon. It may perhaps be desirable, in whatever form Lord Minto shall think best, to let the Pope understand that the Roman Catholics of Ireland have neither the means nor disposition to establish at their own expense such seminaries as are recommended in the rescript, and that they can only be provided for out of the public funds. That a large proportion of the Roman Catholic laity are so convinced of the desirableness of these colleges, that nothing will prevent them from sending their sons there when once they are satisfied that religious instruction is duly provided for, and that if the opposition of Dr. McHale and

others should unfortunately prove successful under the supposed sanction and authority of the Pope's name against the national system of education, by which four hundred thousand children are rescued from ignorance and its consequences, the large funds annually devoted to this object by the Legislature will probably fall under the exclusive management of the Protestants, by whom a large proportion of these children will be educated. For all who are acquainted with Ireland must be aware that not even the influence of the priesthood can check the uncontrollable desire for education that exists among the people. They will greatly prefer to receive it from Catholics, but, rather than forego its benefits, they will gladly accept it from Protestants.

CLARENDON.

November 20, 1847.

F. O.: December 3, 1847.

My dear Minto,—I send you a letter from Clarendon, the whole of which you may, I think, read to anybody with whom you are in communication on the part of the Pope. But you may safely go further than Clarendon has chosen to do, and you may confidently assure the Papal authorities that at present, in Ireland, misconduct is the rule, and good conduct the exception, in the Catholic priests. That they, in a multitude of cases, are the open, and fearless, and shameless instigators to disorder, to violence, and murder, and that every day and every week the better conducted, who are by constitution of human nature the most quiet and timid, are being scared by their fellow-priests, as well as by their flocks, from a perseverance in any efforts to give good counsel and to restrain violence and crime. Major Mahon, who was shot the other day, was denounced by his priest at the altar the Sunday before he was murdered. He might have been murdered all the same if the priest had not denounced him, but that denunciation of course made all the people in the neighbourhood think the deed a holy one instead of a diabolical one. The irritation and exasperation thence growing up in the public mind against the Catholic priesthood is extreme, and scarcely anybody now talks of these Irish murders without uttering a fervent wish that a dozen priests might be hung forthwith, and the most effectual remedy which has been suggested, and which seems the most popular, is that whenever a man is murdered in Ireland the priest of the parish should be transported.

In the meanwhile I begin to doubt whether it would be

prudent at present to bring in our proposed Bill for Legalising Diplomatic Intercourse with the Court of Rome. The sectarian prejudices which, under any circumstances, would give much opposition to such a Bill, but which, in a better state of things, we should be able to conquer, would find such sympathy in public opinion at present, that our task would be more difficult; however, we do not give up our intention, but must postpone its execution till after the Christmas recess. I really believe there never has been in modern times, in any country professing to be civilised and Christian, nor anywhere out of the central regions of Africa, such a state of crime as now exists in Ireland. There is evidently a deliberate and extensive conspiracy among the priests and the peasantry to kill off or drive away all the proprietors of land, to prevent and deter any of their agents from collecting rent, and thus practically to transfer the land of the country from the landowner to the tenant. I trust, however, that some of these murderers will be taken; some indeed have already been apprehended, and if evidence can be got against them, the hanging of a dozen of these miscreants all in a row may have some effect in deterring others from following their example, and if we could but get a priest in the lot it would be like a ptarmigan in a bag of grouse, or a pied or ring-necked pheasant in a battue.

Extract from Letter of Earl of Clarendon, dated V. R. Lodge, November 26, 1847.

McHale is a dangerous demagogue, whose proceedings as a citizen, and irrespective of their ecclesiastical indecorum, no Government in the world but ours would tolerate. Political agitation, popular elections, and inflammatory publications are his favourite pursuits. His object seems to be to set the people against their rulers; and if he could have his way their ignorance and their turbulence would be perpetual, and throughout his province those priests have the greatest share of his favour who most promote his sinister designs. The majority of the bishops dislike his proceedings and his character, but they succumb because he is audacious and overbearing, and they are afraid of making public the grave dissensions that exist among the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Such a man, however, and such a bitter opponent of the British Government and the true interests of Ireland, is not an adviser upon whom the Pope should rely.

With respect to the priests, I must again repeat that, as a

body, there is not in the world a more zealous, faithful, hard-working clergy, and most of the older priests are friendly to order, to education, and to the general improvement of the people. There are, however, some unfortunate exceptions, but it is among the younger clergy, the curates and coadjutors, that the real mischief-makers are to be found, and if they could be held in check, great scandal to religion and social order would be prevented. Things, however, cannot much longer go on in their present state: the duty of a Government towards the peaceable and well-disposed portions of the community will render special legislation necessary for a state of things which has become intolerable, if the existing laws should become insufficient, and if the timely exercise of spiritual authority be much longer withheld.

There are at this moment numerous cases in which, if evidence could be procured, a prosecution could be sustained against priests as accessories to atrocious crimes, by the inciting language they have held to people over whose minds they exercise an absolute control.

I have endeavoured to procure such evidence, because it is the duty of Government to punish misconduct that tends to the disruption of every social tie, and in the administration of the law no distinction of persons can be admitted; but such evidence in an available form is not to be procured. From different parts of the country, and from persons upon whose veracity I can confide, I hear either that a landlord has been denounced by name from the altar, in a manner which is equivalent to his death-warrant, or that persons giving evidence against criminals are held up as public enemies and traitors, or that people are advised to assemble in mobs and enforce their demands upon individuals. It was only yesterday that I heard of a priest (in the diocese of Dr. McHale) addressing a man in the chapel, and telling him that he would not curse him, because the last man he had cursed died directly, but that before *the blossom fell from the potato* he would be a corpse. This man's offence was having given evidence in a court of justice against a party that had broken into his house and robbed him. I have sworn depositions now lying on my table in proof of acts of this kind, but the deponents dare not come forward and openly give their evidence, for they say—and I know it to be true—that their lives would not be worth four-and-twenty hours' purchase. Indeed, to prevent any misunderstanding upon the subject, the

priest usually defies any person to give information of what he has been saying, and warns them of the consequences.

The result of all this is, not only that crime is encouraged, but that the priesthood must fall into contempt, and that the wholesome restraint and humanising influence of religion will decline ; that the people will become more barbarous ; and that the clergy, to maintain their position, must still pander to the passions of their flocks. In places—and there are many—where a priest friendly to order and anxious for the real welfare of his people has given good advice, and intimated that among those present in the chapel there were some who had been guilty of such and such crimes, the individuals alluded to will come forward and bid him hold his tongue, and threaten him with vengeance if he proceeds. I could multiply facts and details *ad infinitum*, for every day some fresh ones come to my knowledge, but the above are sufficient to exhibit the state of things in certain parts of Ireland, and all its evil tendencies ; for wherever the priests so misconduct themselves, there the people are always found to be the most turbulent and wretched. The indignation, and I may add shame, of the respectable Roman Catholic classes are extreme : they consider that the course pursued by these unruly priests is calculated to give a false impression of their (the Roman Catholic) religion and their politics ; to exasperate against them the entire Protestant people of England, and to check effectually any intentions on the part of the Government to place the two churches on a footing of equality.

The Pope may well hesitate to believe in things the like of which exist in no other part of the world ; but we don't ask him to take our words for them. He has himself proposed to send some person over here to examine and report, and I am sure that will be the best mode of proceeding, if any one sufficiently unprejudiced, and likely to resist the evil influences by which he will be surrounded immediately on his arrival, can be found to undertake the mission. He should not come in any public capacity, or with pomp and circumstance, but privately, and with instructions whom he should consult, and with powers to act, but not to go beyond the sphere of spiritual jurisdiction. The Primate and Archbishop Murray, and some of the metropolitan clergy, who well understand the interests of their Church, and are acquainted with all that is going on in the country, would be safe guides ; and I feel sure that a Papal prohibition to take part in political agitations, and to make use of the

places of worship for secular purposes, would be received as a great boon by the well-disposed priests (i.e. the majority of the clergy), who, when they become agitators, yield to intimidation, and are compelled to act against their judgment. If they could appeal to the sanction of the Pope's authority for confining themselves to their spiritual duties, they would not fear to have their chapels deserted, and thus find themselves destitute of the means of subsistence.

To the best of my belief, the bishops are not in the habit of punishing such misdeeds as those I have alluded to. They may do so; but I have neither official nor private knowledge of the fact, and if they do, their interference is not very successful.

Lord Minto had several interviews with Pius IX., both about the Papal rescript against the Queen's Colleges and also about the conduct of certain bishops and priests in Ireland who took so leading a part in the work of agitation and terrorism. Neither the Pope nor Cardinal Ferretti was versed in public affairs, and they were evidently much astonished at the state of things which enquiry revealed to them as existing in Ireland. The Pope expressed his entire disapprobation of the political activity of the Irish clergy, and he assured Lord Minto not only of his readiness but of his great desire to do whatever might be in his power to apply a remedy to these clerical disorders. He also spoke with regret of the effect which the missive of the Propaganda against the new Colleges appeared likely to produce, saying that he had postponed as long as he could giving his sanction to the report of the Sacred College, which he had finally done as understanding that it represented the deliberate opinion of the great majority of the Irish Bishops.

The 'Diplomatic Relations with Rome Bill,' to which Lord Palmerston refers, passed through Parliament, but Lord Eglinton, in the House of Lords, carried a clause against the Government by which the reception of an ecclesiastic as Papal Nuncio in London was forbidden. This condition was regarded at Rome with such dislike that the Pope refused to send any

Minister, and also declined to receive an envoy from England on a unilateral footing. The truth was that representations made to him from Ireland induced him to imagine that we were in such straits in Irish affairs that we should be compelled to yield. When Lord Minto asked whether he would, on his part, receive as English Minister one of our Archbishops or the Moderator of the Church of Scotland in full canonicals, he frankly owned that he could not; but reciprocity has never been a weakness of the Vatican.

Lord Palmerston was in favour of the Eglinton clause. To Lord Clarendon he writes:—¹

I could not have consented to make myself responsible for receiving an ecclesiastic as Roman envoy, and it is much better that our refusal should stand upon a prohibitory law than upon our own voluntary determination. I quite concur in the view taken of that question by Aberdeen and Stanley, and I am convinced, by my diplomatic experience, that there would be no end to the embarrassments and inconveniences which we should suffer from having a Roman priest invested with diplomatic privilege holding his court in London, surrounded by English and Irish Catholics, and wielding a power of immense though secret extent, and capable of becoming an engine of political intrigue to serve all kinds of foreign interests.

As for the idea that we could manage the Irish priests by means of a Roman priest in London, I am convinced that the presence of such a man would only have given the Irish priests an additional means of managing us.

Cappucini, a liberal and enlightened man, was offered to be nuncio at Paris: he declined, and gave to his private friends the reason—that he knew he should have been obliged, by his official position, to side with the most ultra of the Catholic and Jesuit party in France, and as his opinions were against them, he would not place himself in so disagreeable a position.

Very shortly after Lord Minto arrived in Rome—namely, in January, 1848—an insurrection broke out at Palermo, the Sicilians demanding from the King of Naples the Constitution of 1812. Both parties applied to Lord Napier, then our *chargé d'affaires* at Naples, to

¹ F. O., March 9, 1848.

mediate between them. The Sicilians founded their application upon the former connection between England and Sicily, and upon the share which the British Government had had in the remodelling of the Sicilian Constitution in 1812. The Neapolitan Government founded their application upon the well-known interest which had always been taken by the British Government in the welfare of the kingdom of Naples. Lord Napier, however, did not undertake the office, because the Neapolitan Government was not willing at that time to authorise such proposals as were alone likely to lead to any arrangement. Soon, however, the King invited Lord Minto to Naples, and requested him to employ his good offices to effect a reconciliation between the Sicilians and the Home Government.

Foreign Office: Feb. 24,¹ 1848.

My dear Minto,—I have now but five minutes to write to you, more than enough to give you all the instructions you need, which are to act according to your own good judgment as events succeed each other. I most sincerely hope that you will have been able to bring the Naples Government round to your views about Sicily. Your scheme of amalgamation is excellent, and would afford the best chance of a permanent connection between the two countries; but one fears the blind obstinacy of the King. The Sicilians, moreover, doubt his future good faith, but things have gone much too far for it to be possible for him hereafter to retract: and as to our guarantee, that is out of the question, and would lead us into future embarrassments and responsibilities of the most difficult and inconvenient kind. In short, the position of a foreign Power who should be guarantee between a sovereign and a portion of his subjects would be embarrassing for such Power, and inconsistent with the independence of such sovereign. Probably the King of Naples would not consent to it.

As to the poor Pope, I live in daily dread of hearing of some misadventure having befallen him. Events have gone too fast for such a slow sailer as he is. I only hope he will not be swamped by the swell in the wake of those who have outstripped

¹ Two days before the Revolution at Paris.

him, for this would perhaps bring the Austrians into the Roman States; and then we should have a regular European row. One thing, however, might prevent this, and that is, the change of Government which happened yesterday at Paris;¹ for Metternich, if he hears of it in time, will not be disposed to take any step which will irretrievably commit him until he is able to learn the views and intentions and policy of this new Government in France. It will, however, of course, be much more liberal than Guizot's, both at home and abroad, and especially in regard to Italian affairs. What had been happening in Italy ought to have been a warning to Guizot; what has now happened to Guizot ought to be a warning to Italy. Guizot thought that by a packed Parliament and a corruptly-obtained majority he could control the will of the nation, and the result has been that the will of the Crown has been controlled by an armed popular force. People have long gone on crying up Louis Philippe as the wisest of men. I always have thought him one of the most cunning, and therefore not one of the wisest. Recent events have shown that he must rank among the cunning who outwit themselves, and not among the wise, who master events by foresight and prudence. This surrender of the King of the Barricades to the summons of the National Guard is, however, a curious example of political and poetical justice.

After much discussion with the King and his Ministers, Lord Minto was authorised to propose an arrangement which, in his opinion, the Sicilians might reasonably and probably accept. He then sailed for Palermo. Meanwhile, however, arrived the news of the French Revolution. This was a spark that set fire to all that was combustible in Italy. The news turned the heads of the Sicilians, and they suddenly determined no longer to acknowledge the King of Naples as their sovereign. This was what Lord Minto found to be the state of affairs on his arrival. He refused to land unless the Sicilians consented to the union of the two crowns, and he found it eventually impossible to carry out his mediation, owing to the ferment caused by events in France. Lord Palmerston writes pro-

¹ M. Guizot's resignation.

phetically, though, as it turned out, ten years were to elapse before the fulfilment.

Foreign Office: March 28, 1848.

My dear Minto,—Was there ever such a scene of confusion as now prevails almost all over Europe? Fortunate, however, has it been for Italy that you crossed the Alps last autumn. If the Italian sovereigns had not been urged by you to move on, while their impatient subjects were kept back, there would by this time have been nothing but Republics from the Alps to Sicily.

I hope you will have been able to settle matters between the Sicilians and the Government of Naples without a separation of the crowns, though your last accounts, written just after your arrival at Palermo, inspired us with some doubts on that point.

This is one more in addition to the numberless proofs of the danger of delays. If Bozzelli had not been so obstinate, you would have been able to settle it all before the news of the French Revolution reached Sicily.

The greatest and most important event of these last few weeks is perhaps the retirement of Metternich. Happy would it have been for the continent of Europe if this had happened some years ago. But better now than later. We have just heard of the entrance of Sardinian troops into Lombardy to help the Milanese. Northern Italy will henceforward be Italian, and the Austrian frontier will be at the Tyrol. This will be no real loss to Austria. If North Italy had been well affected, it would have been an element of strength. Discontented as it was, it has proved a source of weakness. Of course Parma and Modena will follow the example, and in this way the King, no longer of Sardinia, but of Northern Italy, will become a sovereign of some importance in Europe. This will make a league between him and the other Italian rulers still more desirable and much more feasible. Italy ought to unite in a Confederacy similar to that of Germany, commercial and political, and now is the time to strike the iron while it is hot. Austria may perhaps lose Galicia also. I hope her losses will go no further; but enough will even then remain to her to make her, if well governed, a most powerful State. The question is, has she any men capable of making any State a powerful one by good government?

This country is for the present quiet, though the Repealers and the Chartists meditate some movement. I think, however,

that we shall be fully a match for them. The country is sound at heart, and there is a gallant public spirit which will show itself at the first intimation of real danger.

On the failure of Lord Minto's mediation the Sicilians proceeded to decree the separation of the crown of Naples and Sicily, and proposed to the Duke of Genoa to become their king, which he, however, declined. The King of Naples, on the arrival of this news, despatched ships and troops against Messina and Palermo. The bombardment of these towns was attended by such acts of violence and cruelty on both sides, that the English and French fleets interfered to procure an armistice. The period for cessation of hostilities expired, however, without any arrangement being arrived at. The fight was renewed; and the Sicilian revolt was finally put down by the middle of the year 1849.

CHAPTER III.

ARBITRATION — MOVEMENTS IN ITALY — FRENCH REVOLUTION —
CHARTIST AGITATION IN LONDON — WAR BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND
ITALY — SIR ROBERT PEEL AT THE MANSION HOUSE — FRENCH
OCCUPATION OF ROME — DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT — CHOLERA —
NAPLES.

THE repeal of the Navigation Laws was one of the most prominent measures promised in the Queen's Speech at the opening of the new Parliament. The Government having thus pledged themselves to deal with the question, Lord Palmerston saw that such a step would advantageously affect our foreign relations with maritime powers, and especially with the United States of America. He desired that the obstacles which such a measure would remove from the way of our free intercourse with the latter country should be succeeded by a cordial alliance. The following letter contains his views, and it is interesting as showing how different was the spirit with which he approached these subjects from that usually ascribed to him both at home and abroad. Even as early as 1848, anticipating Cobden and the Declaration of Paris, he was suggesting the principle of arbitration, and advocated the abolition of letters of marque :—

C. G.: January 20, 1848.

My dear John Russell,—If, as I hope, we shall succeed in altering our Navigation Laws, and if, as a consequence, Great Britain and the United States shall place their commercial marines upon a footing of mutual equality, with the exception of the coasting trade and some other special matters, might not such an arrangement afford us a good opportunity for endeavouring to carry in some degree into execution the wish which Mr. Fox entertained in 1783, when he wished to substitute close

alliance in the place of sovereignty and dependence as the connecting link between the United States and Great Britain?

A treaty for mutual defence would no longer be applicable to the condition of the two countries as independent Powers; but might they not, with mutual advantage, conclude a treaty containing something like the following conditions:—

1st. That in all cases of difference which may hereafter, unfortunately, arise between the contracting parties, they will, in the first place, have recourse to the (^{mediation}_{arbitration}) of some friendly Power; and that hostilities shall not begin between them until every endeavour to settle their difference by such means shall have proved fruitless.

2nd. That if either of the two should at any time be at war with any other Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to take out letters of marque from such other Power, under pain of being treated and dealt with as a pirate.

3rd. That in such case of war between either of the two parties and a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to enter into the service, naval or military, of such third Power.

4th. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the contracting parties should afford assistance to the enemies of the other, by sea or by land, unless war should break out between the two contracting parties themselves, after the failure of all endeavours to settle their differences in the manner specified in Article 1.

As to this arbitration question, however, he would in practice have tempered theory with prudence. In a debate in 1849 he spoke — I might almost say prophetically — of the disadvantages which England would probably have to encounter before such international tribunals. It was on the 12th of June, on a motion of Mr. Cobden's. Lord Palmerston combated vigorously the proposition that we should in any way pledge ourselves to submit to the arbitrament of a third party. He said:—

I confess also that I consider it would be a very dangerous course for this country to take, because there is no country which, from its political and commercial circumstances, from its maritime interests, and from its colonial possessions, excites

more envious and jealous feelings in different quarters than England does ; and there is no country that would find it more difficult to discover really disinterested and impartial arbiters. There is also no country that would be more likely than England to suffer in its important commercial interests from submitting the case to arbiters not disinterested, not impartial, and not acting with a due sense of their responsibility.

The fact is that, in weighing our position, whenever we have to consider such a proposal, we must not forget that no powerful nation can ever expect to be really loved or even liked by any other. The interests and views of nations perpetually clash, and men are apt to be angry with those who stand between them and the accomplishment of their wishes.

At the outset of the session a most violent onslaught was made upon Lord Palmerston and his policy by Messrs. Anstey and Urquhart, and an impeachment before a committee of inquiry demanded in two speeches which occupied nearly the whole of a Wednesday's sitting. He had scarcely begun his reply when the sitting came to an end by the six o'clock rule ; and in the stirring times that were coming on the House had something better to do than to listen to the outpourings of such men, who for many years would insist that in all his actions he was the secret agent of Russia.

The few words, however, which he had time to say contained the following manly and statesmanlike declaration :—

I am conscious that during the time for which I have had the honour to direct the foreign relations of this country, I have devoted to them all the energies which I possess. Other men might have acted, no doubt, with more ability. None could have acted with a more entire devotion both of their time and faculties. The principle on which I have thought the foreign affairs of this country ought to be conducted is the principle of maintaining peace and friendly understanding with all nations, as long as it was possible to do so consistently with a due regard to the interests, the honour, and the dignity of this country. My endeavours have been to preserve peace. All the Govern

ments of which I have had the honour to be a member have succeeded in accomplishing that object.

I hold, with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently strong to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government. I held that the real policy of England is to be the champion of justice and right : pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done.

As long as she sympathises with right and justice, she will never find herself altogether alone. She is sure to find some other State of sufficient power, influence, and weight to support and aid her in the course she may think fit to pursue. Therefore I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. And if I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.

He used also frequently to combat the romantic notion that nations or governments are much or permanently influenced by friendships, or that you could apply to the intercourse of nations the same general rules as to the intercourse of individuals. The only thing which makes one Government follow the advice or yield to the counsel of another is the hope of benefit to accrue from adopting it or the fear of the consequences of opposing it.

At the opening of 1848 Italy was agitated by the most violent heavings. To the thirst for social amelioration and political power were added aspirations for national unity. The reforms of Pio Nono, and the democratic concessions of Charles Albert and of the King of Naples, had so strongly stimulated the revolutionary passions, that it seemed only a question of

time when the smothered flames would break out in one general conflagration. Austria saw all this with declared uneasiness, and seemed inclined to interfere. This it was Lord Palmerston's object, if possible, to prevent.

F. O.: February 11, 1848.

My dear Ponsonby,—I send you an important despatch to be communicated to Prince Metternich, and I wish you to recommend it to his most serious consideration. It is worded, I trust, in such a way as not to be liable to give offence; but it must be understood as meaning and implying more than it expresses. The real fact is, that upon Metternich's decision in regard to the affairs of Italy depends the question of peace or war in Europe. If he remains quiet, and does not meddle with matters beyond the Austrian frontiers, peace will be maintained, and all these Italian changes will be effected with as little disturbance as is consistent with the nature of things. If he takes upon himself the task of regulating by force of arms the internal affairs of the Italian States, there will infallibly be war, and it will be a war of principles which, beginning in Italy, will spread over all Europe, and out of which the Austrian Empire will certainly not issue unchanged. In that war England and Austria will certainly not be on the same side—a circumstance which would occasion to every Englishman the deepest regret. In that war, whatever Louis Philippe and Guizot may promise, the principal champions contending against each other would be Austria and France; and I would wish Metternich well and maturely to consider what would be the effect on the internal condition of Germany which would be produced by a war between Austria and France, in which Austria was engaged in crushing and France in upholding constitutional liberty. It would be well for Prince Metternich to calculate beforehand, not merely what portion of the *people* of Germany he could count upon as allies in such a contest, but how many of the Governments even would venture to take part with him in the struggle. If he wished to throw the greater part of Germany into close alliance with France, he could not take a better method of doing so.

He best knows the disposition of his own States; but I should greatly doubt his receiving any support in such a struggle from Hungary or Bohemia; and he would of course have all the Emperor's Italian subjects against him.

When one comes to reflect upon all the endless difficulties and embarrassments which such a course would involve, one cannot believe that a statesman so prudent and calculating, so long-sighted and so experienced, could fall into such an error; but the great accumulation of Austrian troops in the Lombard and Venetian provinces inspires one with apprehension.

The recent debates in the French Chambers will have shown to Prince Metternich how little he can count upon the support or even the neutrality of France; and he may depend upon it, that in defence of constitutional liberty in Italy the French nation would rush to arms, and a French army would again water their horses in the Danube.

Pray exert all your persuasion with the Prince to induce him to authorise you to send us some tranquillising assurances on this matter. We set too great a value upon the maintenance of Austria as the pivot of the balance of power in Europe to be able to see without the deepest concern any course of action begun by her Government which would produce fatal consequences to her, and which would place us probably, against our will, in the adverse scale.

At the same time he was consistently using his influence to keep the Italian Governments in the constitutional path on which they appeared to have entered. Mr. Abercromby was our Minister at the Sardinian Court.

F. O.: February 12, 1848.

My dear Abercromby,—I send you a despatch which I had prepared before I received yours, which reached me this morning, stating that the Cabinet at Turin were deliberating about the grant of a constitution. I hope their deliberation will have ended affirmatively, and in that case our exhortations will apply only to the method of carrying their assent into execution. If they should have refused, you will then have to exert your eloquence in trying to persuade them and the King to reconsider and to reverse their decision. Arguments will not be wanting. If the King resolves to oppose himself to the wishes and demands of his subjects, he must be prepared for one of two courses. He must either abdicate or call in foreign aid. The first alternative would be unwise and unnecessary, and would, moreover, be like a man shooting himself to avoid a danger which might threaten him with death.

As to calling in foreign aid, we cannot believe that, with his

high and patriotic feelings, he would consent to hold his throne by means of French or Austrian bayonets, and to become thereafter the mere puppet of Austria or of France. It is possible, indeed, that he may have a more high-minded feeling on this subject, and that, having committed himself in some way or other against a Constitution, he may think it derogatory to his consistency now to accept one. It is needless to point out how untenable such a notion would be, and how futile any such pledge or any such former resolution ought to be deemed as an obstacle to prevent him from now performing a great and important duty, as Sovereign, towards the nation which Providence has committed to his charge.

From the first moment that one heard that the King of Naples had consented to a Constitution, it was easy to foresee that the rest of Italy must have one too.

To Sir George Hamilton, at Florence, he writes:—

I conclude that before this reaches you the question whether there is or is not to be a Constitution in Tuscany will have been decided; but pray do all you can to persuade the Government to yield with good grace to the wishes of the people, and upon no account whatever to think of calling in or of letting in the Austrians to coerce the subjects of the Grand Duke. The first thing of all is national independence, and nothing can make up for the loss of that.

The Revolution at Paris came, however, like a thunder-clap to scatter all the timid compromises and faltering concessions of kings, emperors, and grand-dukes. In France the blind obstinacy of a self-willed King, the corruption of the Government and governing classes, as illustrated by the Cubières-Teste and Petit scandals, and by the Praslin tragedy, the anti-Liberal and unpopular policy of the French Foreign Office, partly the result of estrangement from England caused by the 'Spanish Marriages;' these all had combined to bring to a climax discontent, which a long period of commercial and financial distress had greatly fomented: The different sections of malcontents agreed to unite on the basis of a demand for parliamentary reform. Banquets were organised in different parts of France, when exciting speeches were made, and complaints found audible

expression. The Assembly met on the 28th of December. Upon the Address arose a debate, which lasted twenty days, and during which Guizot and Duchatel¹ had in vain tried to make head against the attacks of Thiers, Lamartine, Billault, and De Toqueville. The Ministry kept a servile though a decreasing majority in the divisions which took place; but the victory lay with the others. The debate closed on the 7th of February. 'The war of words,' said the 'National,' on the 9th, 'is at an end. That of deeds is now to come.'

A political banquet, which had been originally fixed for the 19th of January in Paris itself, had been postponed in consequence of an interdiction by the police. On the day after the rejection of the amendment on the Address, the Liberal deputies met and determined to persevere in their design. The revived banquet was fixed for the 22nd, and was publicly announced. At this crisis Louis Philippe's obstinacy showed itself most disastrously. The death of his sister, the Princess Adelaide, a few weeks before, had removed his best counsellor. 'I never will consent to Reform,' he declared with cynical contempt for constitutional doctrine. 'Reform is another word for the advent of the Opposition!'

Vacillation, however, often hangs on the skirts of obstinacy. With Louis Philippe it was always so, and this occasion formed no exception. The Liberal chiefs were as anxious as the Government itself to avoid any violent collision. A compromise was agreed to, by which there was to be a procession, but no banquet. When it appeared likely that the multitude would be great, the authorities took alarm, again changed front, and, on the very morning of the 22nd, covered the walls of Paris with placards forbidding any assembly in the streets. The crowds, however, had collected, and all day thronged the central parts of the city. Their leaders had stayed away.

¹ Guizot was a brilliant orator, but neither a statesman nor a man of business. Duchatel had great aptitude, but was an idle man, and not an effective speaker, except on finance.

Lord Normanby sent Lord Palmerston the following record of his personal observations during these events :—

Paris: March 13, 1848.

There are some scattered incidents in the last days of Louis Philippe and his Minister which came within my personal observation, which I should like to take this early opportunity of collecting and recording, as they have their bearing upon the great political moral to be derived from the astounding catastrophe.

I ventured, in the middle of last year, to call your lordship's attention to the state of political feeling in the country, and to remark that nothing could save the dynasty of July but an immediate change of men, and measures of reform at once prompt and sincere. Not one measure of a conciliatory description was from that time even contemplated by the Government, and yet there was a moment when the very extent of the general discontent appeared to hold out hopes of a peaceful solution of the question. The danger had always been that the King, supported by a packed majority of the Chamber, would persevere to the last to resist the popular will, but this will had latterly acquired such an irresistible impulse that it had even found its way into the constitutional channels hitherto choked up by corruption. When one saw, in the course of the debates on the Address, the effect of public opinion in reducing even such a majority from 120 to 30, one had even hopes that a vote of the Chamber, by upsetting the Ministry, might preserve the throne. As I attended personally every one of these sittings, which lasted three weeks, I could observe that the decline of the numerical force of the majority was not so strong an indication as the changes in its tone. There was still a disposition on the part of many to prolong, for a short time, the existence of the Ministry, in order to avoid the probable dissolution of the Chamber, but during the whole of that discussion of unexampled length, there was hardly an independent member, or one not actually in office with the Government, who said one word in favour either of their foreign or domestic policy; and it was also remarkable that, often as M. Guizot had upon former occasions recovered himself from surrounding difficulties by the exercise of his extraordinary talent in the tribune, he never once, during the debates on the Address, made a single effective rally.

He heard, without an attempt at reply, the Spanish marriages stigmatised as a selfish and anti-national policy, amidst the cheers of his opponents, and without one dissenting murmur from that majority which had supported them last year. It was proved by the admission of his own Minister of War that at the time when he was proposing to Europe a mediation in Swiss affairs, he had smuggled, for the benefit of the Sonderbund, arms and ammunition out of the Royal Arsenal at Besançon, concealed in the shape of other merchandise, and with a false declaration to their own Customs. The only excuse he attempted of his Italian policy was to say that there could not be a thought of a Constitution in Italy for the next five or ten years, and this dictum was uttered on the very day the Constitution was proclaimed at Naples.

The miserable figure which the Government made during the whole of the debate was in no small degree caused by the profound sensation produced in the Chamber and in society by the incident with which it commenced. The personal integrity of M. Guizot had, next to his oratorical superiority, been the throne upon which his supporters had distinguished him from his fellows. That which was called '*l'affaire Petit*' was, therefore, calculated to make a great sensation, not so much from its individual importance as from the system which it showed up. M. Guizot was not so much injured by his evident participation in it as by the callous audacity with which he treated the matter.

M. Bertin de Vaux, a peer of France, and a part proprietor of the '*Journal des Débats*,' desired to procure a place for M. Petit, the husband of his mistress. As what M. Bertin desired was employment for M. Petit, and as M. Petit was not particular at what price his ambition was gratified, M. Guizot told M. Bertin de Vaux that, provided M. Petit would buy the resignation of a better place, he should himself possess a smaller one then vacant. This bargain was executed, but the exigencies of parliamentary corruption at that time pressing hard upon M. Guizot, he gave away, without reference to M. Petit, both the place he desired and that which he had bought, endeavouring to put him off with a promise of an early vacancy; but at this both M. Petit and his patron, M. Bertin de Vaux, were indignant, and the 60,000 francs which M. Guizot himself repaid M. Bertin de Vaux for M. Petit, as the price he had paid for the place, were obtained for that purpose out of the Secret Service Money. This was the real history of the first part of this affair, and yet M. Guizot had the effrontery to say from the tri-

bune that he was not personally acquainted with any of the details of the affair. There was not one of his majority who believed a syllable of this assertion, and how could they, as, when asked how then M. Bertin de Vaux came to assert in his letter that he had received the money *from him*, he was forced to remain silent?

It was under the general impression thus produced that the question of the banquet arose.

I have already, in former despatches, mentioned to your lordship the exasperation caused by the hostile phrases in the King's Speech. When, in addition to this, in assertion of the illegality of the banquets, the Minister of Justice made the astounding declaration from the tribune that every act that was not expressly permitted in the charter was thereby forbidden, the Opposition thought it necessary to make a striking demonstration in vindication of their rights.

The night before that appointed for the banquet I went to the Tuileries without knowing the decision of the Opposition deputies. As His Majesty had often volunteered to speak to me upon his own affairs, I thought it possible he might do so then, and I was prepared, if the occasion was thus offered, humbly to represent to His Majesty the danger, in the then state of the public mind, unnecessarily to provoke a collision in the streets. But I was told by one of the Government whom I met on the stairs that the Opposition had given up the banquet, and I found the whole Court in an ecstasy of delight, as if they had gained a great victory. The King spoke to me for some time with great animation, but never once alluded to the passing events. He adverted to our proposed diplomatic intercourse with Rome, to the difficulty of receiving a priest at St. James's in full canonicals; told a story of the Archbishop of Narbonne, who, in the days of his emigration, had got over this difficulty by going to George the Third in a court dress with a sword. I only allude to these trivial subjects of conversation because I found afterwards that the King had been studying effect to the last, and that he had said to those to whom he spoke immediately afterwards, 'I am very well satisfied with Lord Normanby to-night,' as if he had been speaking to me of the pressing concerns of the moment, and that I had approved the course of his Government.

The infatuation of the King during the whole of the debates on the Address was very remarkable. Several of the representatives of the smaller German Courts went to him with

letters of condolence on Madame Adelaide's death, and to some he said, 'Tell your master not to mind having popular assemblies; let them only learn to manage them as I manage mine; see the noise they are making now; I shall soon have them in hand again; they want me to get rid of Guizot; I will not do it. Can I possibly give a stronger proof of my power?'

Although the Government had forbidden the meeting, they kept no troops to overawe the mob. Rioting, therefore, began towards the evening of the 22nd, and troops were sent for during the night. On the 23rd a collision took place in front of the Foreign Office between the soldiers and the people. Lives were lost, and the Revolution was started. During the following night the Guizot Ministry resigned, and was succeeded by Thiers and Odillon Barrot. Marshal Bugeaud and General Lamoricière were placed in command of the troops and National Guard. The Marshal lost no time in securing the control of Paris, and daybreak of the 24th found the whole city in possession of the army. Had he been allowed to act as he had arranged, the insurrection would have been easily suppressed; but an order from the Palace to cease the combat and withdraw the troops sealed the fate of the Monarchy. Sore and disheartened, those of his soldiers who retired on the Tuileries made but a feeble resistance to the mob which broke in, while the King, after signing his abdication, was escaping with his family by a back door. The Duchess of Orleans forced her way to the Chamber of Deputies, and made a courageous effort to secure the throne for her son, the Comte de Paris, but all in vain. Thus in two short days the Monarchy was swept away, and the Provisional Government of a Republic substituted in its stead.

The news of these startling events arrived in England on the night of the 25th. As they reached the lobby of the House of Commons the murmurs of conversation spreading from the door right through the crowded benches caused the unparalleled spectacle of a complete, although informal, suspension of business

for several minutes, every member being engaged in close and earnest colloquy with his neighbour.

Lord Palmerston acknowledged the news as follows to Lord Normanby:—

F. O. : February 26, 1848.

I received at half-past eleven last night in the House of Commons your despatches of Thursday. What extraordinary and marvellous events you give me an account of. It is like the five acts of a play, and has not taken up much more time. Strange that a king who owed his crown to a revolution brought about by royal blindness and obstinacy should have lost it by exactly the same means, and he a man who had gone through all the vicissitudes of human existence, from the condition of a schoolmaster to the pomp of a throne; and still further that his overthrow should have been assisted by a Minister deeply read in the records of history, and whose mind was not merely stored with the chronology of historical facts, but had extracted from their mass the reasons of events and the philosophy of their causes.

I can give you but provisional instructions. Continue at your post. Keep up unofficial and useful communication with the men who from hour to hour (I say not even from day to day) may have the direction of events, but commit us to no acknowledgment of any men, nor of any things. Our principles of action are to acknowledge whatever rule may be established with apparent prospect of permanency, but none other. We desire friendship and extended commercial intercourse with France, and peace between France and the rest of Europe. We will engage to prevent the rest of Europe from meddling with France, which indeed we are quite sure they have no intention of doing. The French rulers must engage to prevent France from assailing any part of the rest of Europe. Upon such a basis our relations with France may be placed on a footing more friendly than they have been or were likely to be with Louis Philippe and Guizot.

The pacific intentions, however, of the Provisional Government began to be doubted, and a report got abroad that they were about to declare war against Austria at once, and also to annex Belgium on the invitation of the Republican party in that country. The ex-King was making for the coast, hoping to reach

England, and the British Government was taking steps to assist him in his flight.

F. O. : February 27, 1848.

My dear Normanby,—I send you a hundred sovereigns by this messenger, and will send a hundred more by the next. You must use your discretion about going away or staying. It is desirable that you should stay as long as you can do so with safety both to yourself and to the dignity of the country, because your presence protects British subjects ; and your coming away would be a measure of much import, and therefore of importance.

Your accounts of Friday night, received to-day, and the further reports that reach us, are fearfully ominous for the peace of Europe. A general war seems to be impending at the moment when we all were flattering ourselves that peace would last thirty years to come. One felt yesterday that the French army had till then counted for nothing in the events which had taken place in Paris, and that it was impossible that the French army should count for nothing in deciding the destinies of France. One therefore felt that it might be in the power of any popular general to march fifty or sixty thousand men into Paris, and decide matters according to his will, in spite of the armed mob or of the National Guard ; this thought seems also to have occurred to those who are for the moment at the head of affairs, and they seem to propose to send the army to attack the neighbours of France instead of letting it come into Paris to upset them. It remains to be seen whether the army will take this bait. One fears that it may. If this should be, the British Government will have to come to a grave and serious determination. We cannot sit quiet and see Belgium overrun and Antwerp become a French port ; and even a war in other directions will sooner or later draw us into its vortex.

We have taken such measures as are within our power to afford the means of coming over to such passengers as may come to the coast, including the persons to whom you alluded in your last.

Montebello says that he sent a message to the Duchess of Orleans on Thursday morning, which did not reach her, warning her not to rely on the Parliament, against whom, as much as against the King, the revolution was directed, but to take her son into the streets and throw herself on the National Guard. Perhaps if she had received this advice and acted upon it, things might have gone differently.

C. G. : February 28, 1848.

My dear Normanby,—I received at 11 o'clock this evening your very important despatches. All are important, but pre-eminently so your short note of yesterday reporting the pacific assurances made to you from the Provisional Government, and especially their resolution not to accept the incorporation even if offered. This is a most wise resolve ; for if they will look to the stipulations of the treaty finally concluded between the five Powers, Belgium, and the Netherlands, they will see that there are in it guarantees which would have a very awkward bearing upon any attempt by France to annex Belgium to its territory. In fact, the peace of Europe is now in the hands of the French Government, and with them rests the question of peace or war.

You will have received before this time my despatch desiring you to stay where you are till you receive other instructions, and authorizing you to hold such unofficial communications with the Government as may be necessary for the public service. Of course the French Government cannot expect that we should send you formal credentials to a Government professedly provisional and temporary, but we shall take no hostile step towards them, and shall not bring you away as long as they continue to maintain their authority, and to use it with moderation and for purposes of order. Whenever a permanent Government shall have been established, then will be the time for deciding as to renewed credentials ; and you know that the invariable principle on which England acts is to acknowledge as the organ of every nation that organ which each nation may deliberately choose to have. But it must be an organ likely to be permanent, for it would not be consistent with the dignity of England to be sending to her ambassador fresh credentials every ten days, according as the caprice of the people of Paris might from time to time change the form and substance of French institutions. I grieve at the prospect of a republic in France, for I fear that it must lead to war in Europe and fresh agitation in England. Large republics seem to be essentially and inherently aggressive, and the aggressions of the French will be resisted by the rest of Europe, and that is war ; while, on the other hand, the example of universal suffrage in France will set our non-voting population agog, and will create a demand for an inconvenient extension of the suffrage, ballot, and other mischievous things. However, for the present, *vive* Lamartine !

It was fortunate for the peace of Europe that a

Whig Cabinet and a Liberal Foreign Secretary were in office at this time. If there had been in London an illiberal and anti-democratic Cabinet, imbued with the maxims of Burke and the traditions of Pitt, a monarchical coalition against France might again have been formed. The friendly relations of England with France were of great service to the cause of peace. No less an authority than the King of the Belgians bore testimony to this at a later period in a letter to Lord Palmerston,¹ in which he said:—

I must take this opportunity to express to you my conviction that the acting together of England and France has been most useful, as it has facilitated to the French Government a system of moderation which it could but with great difficulty have maintained if it had not been acting in concert with England.

Lord Palmerston's great anxiety at this critical moment was to preserve peace by preventing any act hostile to the French Republic on the part of the Great Powers. On the other hand, he hoped by a speedy recognition of the new form of government in France to bring the legitimate influences of Europe to bear upon it. He writes to Lord Westmorland at Berlin, and to Lord Ponsonby at Vienna:—

F. O.: February 29, 1848.

My dear Westmorland,—I firmly believe Lamartine to mean peace and no aggression; it will be of importance, therefore, that the three Powers should not take any steps which might look like a threat of attacking France, or an intention to interfere in her internal affairs. The only thing to do is to wait and watch, and be prepared. As for us, whenever there is a settled Government established, we shall, according to our usual custom, acknowledge it by sending fresh credentials to our ambassador. But we should like to do this in concert with the other Powers; only we should not be able perhaps to wait for them if they were disposed to hesitate or demur when the proper time may come; and we may not think it expedient to wait till after the constituent Assembly shall have met. All men of

¹ January 23, 1849.

mark of all parties, including the Legitimists, are supporting Lamartine's Government as the only security at present against anarchy, conflagration, and massacre. It must be owned that the prospect of a republic in France is far from agreeable; for such a Government would naturally be more likely to place peace in danger than a monarchy would be. But we must deal with things as they are, and not as we would wish to have them. These Paris events ought to serve, however, as a warning to the Prussian Government, and should induce them to set to work without delay to complete those constitutional institutions of which the King last year laid the foundations.

F. O.: February 29, 1848.

My dear Ponsonby,—Here is a pretty to-do at Paris; it is plain that, for the present at least, we shall have a republic in France. How long it may last is another question. But, for the present, the only chance for tranquillity and order in France, and for peace in Europe, is to give support to Lamartine. I am convinced this French Government will not be aggressive, if left alone; and it is to be hoped that Apponyi and others will be allowed to remain in Paris till things take a decided turn. If a republic is decidedly established, the other Powers of Europe must, of course, give credentials addressed to that Government, or they will have to give billets to its troops. I have no time to write more, but nothing can be more positive, or, as I believe, more sincere than Lamartine's declarations of a peace policy, and you will observe that, by saying that France has not changed her place in Europe, he virtually acknowledges the obligations of existing treaties. He could not well have done so at present in more distinct terms.

I should advise the Austrians to come to a good understanding with Sardinia as to mutual defence if attacked, which, however, they are not at present likely to be. But if the Austrian Government does not mitigate its system of coercion in Lombardy and grant liberal institutions, they will have a revolt there; and if there shall be conflict in Lombardy between the troops and the public, and much bloodshed, it is to be feared that the French nation will break loose in spite of Lamartine's efforts to restrain them.

Lamartine now issued a very able circular or manifesto to the diplomatic agents of France. It deprecated any idea that the Republic of 1848 must necessarily

follow the warlike principles of 1792, but went on to declare that, in the eyes of France, the treaties of 1815 existed no longer as law, and that she would not look with indifference on any forcible attempt to repress the nascent aspirations of oppressed nationalities. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Clarendon on March 9 :—

Any Government which wished to pick a quarrel with France might find ample materials in this circular. But it seems to me that the true policy of Europe at present is, to say as little and do as little as possible, so as not to stir matters in France beyond their natural turbulence, and to watch events to be prepared for them. The circular is evidently a piece of patchwork put together by opposite parties in the Government, the one warlike and disturbing, the other peaceful and conciliatory. I should say that if you were to put the whole of it into a crucible, and evaporate the gaseous parts, and scum off the dross, you would find the regulus¹ to be peace and good-fellowship with other Governments.

There soon arose an occasion for testing the truth of this opinion. The Irish revolutionists, confident that they would get sympathy and aid from the French Republic, were sending over deputations to Paris; and at the interviews which they obtained Irish questions were very freely discussed. Lord Palmerston thought it well to speak out at once before much harm was done :—

F. O.: March 21, 1848.

My dear Normanby,—I have written you an official despatch about M. de Lamartine's allocutions to Irish deputations and his direct allusions therein to our internal affairs, such as Catholic Emancipation, Irish agitation, Repeal of the Union, and other matters, with which no foreign Government had any right to meddle. I wish you to convey to him, in terms as civil as you can use, that these speeches, and especially that to which my despatch refers, have given great offence in this country to many persons who very sincerely desire to see the most friendly relations maintained between England and France, and that if this practice of interfering in our affairs, and of giving in this

¹ The pure metal, which in the melting of ores falls to the bottom of the crucible.

manner direct encouragement to political agitation within the United Kingdom, shall continue to be persevered in by the French Government, a cry will soon arise in this country for the withdrawal of our embassy from Paris. This has already been suggested to me by many of the supporters of the Government as an appropriate mark of our disapprobation of the proceedings of the French Government in these matters.

This remonstrance was not without effect. A deputation, headed by Smith O'Brien himself, received from Lamartine an answer which must have dashed all their hopes. He told them that it was not 'convenient' for the French nation to intervene in the affairs of a country with which they were and wished to remain at peace. Lord Palmerston acknowledges the straightforward conduct of the French Foreign Minister:—

F. O.: April 4, 1848.

My dear Normanby,—Pray tell Lamartine how very much obliged we feel for his handsome and friendly conduct about the Irish deputation. His answer was most honourable and gentlemanlike, and just what might have been expected from a high-minded man like him.

I forgot in the hurry in which I have been living to tell you that I had Guizot and the Lievens to dinner on Sunday week last, with half-a-dozen people to meet them; but I took care that it should not be put into the paper. Nobody, I imagine, can suppose that there is any political sympathy between Guizot and me; we have been opposed to each other as public men, both as representing adverse systems of general political principles, and as acting upon conflicting views of international interest. But Guizot and I were upon very good terms personally while he was ambassador here; and he was particularly civil to me when I was at Paris two years ago. He is now in misfortune and adversity; and though I may agree with most other people in thinking that his own political errors have been the true causes of his present condition, yet it would, I think, have been ungenerous in me if I had not shown myself as sensible of his former civility to me as I should have done if he had come here under circumstances more fortunate for himself. I am sure that no reasonable Frenchman can find fault with those small attentions which are merely the expressions of personal feel-

ing, and which have nothing whatever to do with any political matters. I shall, on the same principle, have the Duchatels to dinner in a quiet and unostentatious manner; I saw a good deal of them on the Rhine, and they also gave us a very hospitable reception when we were at Paris.

In Italy the news of the French Revolution had a prodigious effect. Everywhere the aristocratic had to yield to the democratic party. Venice broke away from Austria, and proclaimed a Republic. Milan revolted, and compelled the Austrian troops to commence a retreat which only ceased beyond the Mincio. Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, resolved to embrace the cause of Italian independence, and to bring the regular forces of the Piedmontese monarchy to the aid of insurgent Lombardy. On March 25 his army crossed the Ticino and entered the Austrian territory. On March 31 Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Normanby:—

Our attitude with regard to what is passing in the north of Italy is that of passive spectators. Abercromby made no protest, though he urged all the arguments which suggested themselves to him against the advance of the Sardinian troops.

It may be questionable how far Charles Albert was justified by the rules of good neighbourhood in seizing an Austrian province; my own belief is that he could not help doing so, and as Europe is now undergoing great changes, I cannot myself regret that the establishment of a good state in Northern Italy should be one of them. As to your not always getting letters from me by every messenger who passes through Paris, never wonder at that nor think it extraordinary. Wonder rather when I am able to find time to write at all; I am sure you would if you saw the avalanche of despatches from every part of the world which come down upon me daily, and which must be read, and if you witnessed the number of interviews which I cannot avoid giving every day of the week. Every post sends me a lamenting Minister throwing himself and his country upon England for help, which I am obliged to tell him we cannot afford him. But Belgium is a case by itself, and both France and England are bound by treaty engagements in regard to that country, which it is most desirable for the repose of France and England that no events should call into active operation.

With Russia he wished to be on good terms, as the only State left erect amid the general downfall; although he frankly stated to the Government of the Czar that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Poland was entitled to a Constitution under the terms of the Treaty of Vienna; so he says to Lord Bloomfield at St. Petersburg:—¹

Assure Count Nesselrode that our feelings and sentiments towards Russia are exactly similar to those which he expresses to you towards England. We are at present the only two Powers in Europe (excepting always Belgium) that remain standing upright, and we ought to look with confidence to each other. Of course he must be aware that public feeling in this country runs strong in favour of the Poles; but we, the Government, will never do anything underhand or ungentlemanlike on those matters. I wish we could hope that the Emperor might of his own accord settle the Polish question in some satisfactory manner.

While all these conflicts were surging in Europe, and threatening to wipe out almost every line of the Treaty of Vienna, the British Foreign Office had, as may be supposed, plenty of work to engage its attention. Its policy at this crisis may be thus summarised:—

To maintain peace as long as possible, but to maintain it by exerting, and not by foregoing, English influence. To support the integrity and independence of Belgium so long as the Belgians were themselves willing to uphold it. To favour the development of German unity—whether in the shape of one or two German Powers—strong enough to make head against any attack from France or Russia. To advise Austria not to keep up a bloody struggle for the maintenance of the Lombard kingdom. Lastly, not to interfere in any way with the form of government in France, but not to slacken or part with any means of resistance should the French seek to relieve internal embarrassment by external aggression.

¹ To Lord Bloomfield. F. O., April 11, 1848.

England felt also in her home affairs the events in France, for they stirred up the revolutionary spirit, such as it was. The Chartists, with mad Feargus O'Connor at their head, prepared a demonstration for April 10, when they proposed, after meeting on Kennington Common, to march to the House of Commons with a monster petition. On the day named they were quietly informed by the police officers on the ground that they would not be allowed to cross the Thames. The whole affair ludicrously collapsed, although it had created serious alarm in London. Lord Palmerston reports the result as follows to our ambassador at Paris :—

F. O.: April 11, 1848.

Yesterday was a glorious day, the Waterloo of peace and order. They say there were upwards of one hundred thousand special constables—some put the number at two hundred and fifty thousand ; but the streets were swarming with them, and men of all classes and ranks were blended together in defence of law and property. The Chartists made a poor figure, and did not muster more than fifteen thousand men on the Common. Feargus was frightened out of his wits, and was made the happiest man in England at being told that the procession could not pass the bridges. The Chartists have found that the great bulk of the inhabitants of London are against them, and they will probably lie by for the present and watch for some more favourable moment.

Meanwhile, the result of yesterday will produce a good and calming effect all over this and the sister island. The foreigners did not show ; but the constables, regular and special, had sworn to make an example of any whiskered and bearded rioters whom they might meet with, and I am convinced would have mashed them to jelly.

Smith O'Brien surpassed himself last night in dulness, bad taste, and treason.

The speech here referred to was on the discussion of the ' Bill for the more effectual Repression of Treasonable Proceedings,' and was the last occasion on which Smith O'Brien appeared in the House of Commons previous to taking the field ! The contemptuous indignation with which he was received by the House

was overwhelming. In the next letter we get a very neat retort of Sir Robert Peel's, which shows him capable of humour when occasion offered.

F. O.: April 18, 1848.

My dear Normanby,—Lamartine is really a wonderful fellow, and is endowed with great qualities. It is much to be desired that he should swim through the breakers and carry his country safe into port. I conclude that he has escaped one danger by the refusal to naturalise Brougham; for it is evident that our ex-Chancellor meant, if he had got himself elected, to have put up for being President of the Republic. It is woful to see a man who is so near being a great man make himself so small.

We have just been sending up to the Lords from the House of Commons our Bill for the Security of the Crown. Peel made a good hit in the debate. Feargus O'Connor alluded to the possible case of Beelzebub being sovereign, and Peel said that in that case Feargus would certainly enjoy the confidence of the Crown. Hume, at the close of the debate, blamed us for not having put down the Convention,¹ which, he said, ought not to be permitted to go on, and which, he contended (though erroneously), comes within the prohibitive provisions of our existing laws.

What we hear from Ireland tallies with what you wrote me a few days ago, that there can be no decided and extensive outbreak till the potato and grain harvest is in, as men must eat to be able to fight. I trust we shall be able to keep them quiet after all.

Leopold, King of the Belgians, was all through his long and useful life one of Lord Palmerston's constant correspondents. His sagacity and liberal views won the respect of the English Minister, who was always ready frankly to interchange ideas with him. Since February, Paris had passed through a series of convulsions, and, at the moment when the following letter was written, the French Assembly, engaged in a struggle with the Socialists, exhibited the strange spectacle of a Legislature elected by universal suffrage deliberating under the protection of cannon pointed against its own

¹ Chartist Convention.

constituents. In Italy the tide had not yet turned in favour of the Austrians, and they were still entrenched in their lines beyond the Mincio. Lord Palmerston foresaw that their success, even if it did come, would be but temporary.

Carlton G.: June 15, 1848.

Sire,—I was much obliged to Your Majesty for the letter which I had the honour of receiving from Your Majesty some little time ago; and I am happy to have the opportunity which is thus afforded me of congratulating Your Majesty upon the continued tranquillity and stability of your kingdom. It would seem as if the storms which have shaken everything else all over the continent of Europe had only served to consolidate more firmly the foundations of Your Majesty's throne. As to France, no man nowadays can venture to prophesy from week to week the turn affairs may take in that unfortunate country. For many years past the persons in authority in France have worked at the superstructure of Monarchy without taking care of the foundation. Education and religion have been neglected, and power has now passed into the hands of a mob ignorant of the principles of government, of morality, and of justice; and it is a most remarkable fact in the history of society that in a nation of thirty-five millions of men, who have now for more than half a century been in a state of political agitation, which, in general, forms and brings out able men, and who have during that time been governed by three dynasties, there is no public political man to whom the country looks up with confidence and respect, on account of his statesmanlike qualities and personal character combined; and there is no prince whom any large portion of the nation would make any considerable effort to place as sovereign on the throne. The principle of equality seems to have been fully carried out in one respect, and that is that all public men are equally without respect, and all candidates for royalty equally without following.

As to poor Austria, every person who attaches value to the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe must lament her present helpless condition; and every man gifted with ever so little foresight must have seen, for a long time past, that feebleness and decay were the inevitable consequences of Prince Metternich's system of government; though certainly no one could have expected that the rottenness within would so soon and so completely have shown itself without. Lord Bacon says

that a man who aims at being the only figure among ciphers is the ruin of an age; and so it has been with Metternich. He has been jealous of anything like talent or attainment in individuals, and of anything like life in communities and nations. He succeeded for a time in damming up and arresting the stream of human progress. The wonder is, not that the accumulated pressure should at last have broke the barrier and have deluged the country, but that his artificial impediments should have produced stagnation so long.

I cannot regret the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. I do not believe, Sire, that it will diminish the real strength nor impair the real security of Austria as a European Power. Her rule was hateful to the Italians, and has long been maintained only by an expenditure of money and an exertion of military effort which left Austria less able to maintain her interests elsewhere. Italy was to her the heel of Achilles, and not the shield of Ajax. The Alps are her natural barrier and her best defence. I should wish to see the whole of Northern Italy united into one kingdom, comprehending Piedmont, Genoa, Lombardy, Venice, Parma, and Modena; and Bologna would, in that case, sooner or later unite itself either to that State or to Tuscany. Such an arrangement of Northern Italy would be most conducive to the peace of Europe, by interposing between France and Austria a neutral State strong enough to make itself respected, and sympathising in its habits and character neither with France nor with Austria; while, with reference to the progress of civilisation, such a State would have great advantages, political, commercial, and intellectual. Such an arrangement is now, in my opinion, Sire, inevitable; and the sooner the Austrian Government makes up its mind to the necessity, the better conditions it will be able to obtain. If Austria waits till she be forcibly expelled—which she will soon be—she will get no conditions at all.

I have the honour to be, Sire,
Your Majesty's most obedient humble Servant,
PALMERSTON.

Soon after the first successes of the Italians the Austrian Government asked for the 'good offices' of England.

Baron Hummelauer came from Vienna instructed to propose the erection of Lombardy into a separate duchy, with an Austrian prince, but under the suze-

rainy of the Emperor. Lord Palmerston told him that things had gone too far for that. He then said that he would recommend to his Government the abandonment of Lombardy on condition that she took on her shoulders part of the Austrian debt. Lord Palmerston replied that, with Venice already in Italian hands, neither Charles Albert nor his people would be satisfied with this, and suggested that a part at least of Venetia should be included. Baron Hummelauer then said that he would go back and submit this to his Government.

It was certainly a tribute to British influence that it should have been sought thus early by a Power which was not at any rate very well inclined to the man who represented England with foreign nations.

Prince Metternich had detested Canning, and nursed the greater part of his antipathy for the benefit of Canning's distinguished disciple. Prince Schwarzenberg, when he succeeded to Metternich's place, succeeded also to his prejudices, and brought at the same time a more passionate nature to bear. The consequence was that the spirit of Lord Palmerston's policy and proceedings towards Austria was entirely misunderstood by the Imperial Cabinet. The preservation of the Austrian empire was one of the leading considerations which bore upon his different projects for the settlement of the Italian question. Certainly, in 1848, he apprehended its downfall, but he only participated in the fears of every statesman in Europe, including the Austrians themselves. To concentrate her resources upon her own important territories appeared, in the summer of that year, the only way for Austria to extricate herself from her difficulties, and to save her Germanic crown.

In the following letters we find evidence of the general feeling at the time, shared by the Austrians themselves, that the independence of Lombardy was won. Lord Palmerston's suggestion as to the abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand only anticipated what took place some months later. The present Emperor,

at that time, 'the lad of sixteen or twenty,' mounted the throne, saved the Austrian empire, and has since shown himself a wise and patriotic ruler.

F. O.: April 21, 1848.

My dear Ponsonby,—I have, at the request of Dietrichstein,¹ instructed Abercromby to recommend to the Sardinian Government a suspension of arms, in order to give Count Hartig an opportunity of trying negotiation with the Milanese; but the success or failure of Abercromby's application will depend entirely upon the state of military operations at the time when my despatch reaches him; and, to say the truth, I have little expectation that his application will be successful, unless for the attainment of an armistice of a few days. Of course, the Sardinians and Lombards will consider the armistice as a pretence by which to gain time for the advance of Austrian reinforcements under Count Nugent. I have received your note stating the three degrees of arrangement which Hartig is authorised to propose. The first and second, I am quite sure, will not be listened to. Things have gone much too far to admit of the possibility of any future connection between the Italians and Austria. Either of those two first arrangements might have been received with thankfulness six months ago, but they now come too late. Whether the third will be agreed to or not, will probably depend on the turn which the war will have taken. If the Austrians still retain a strong military position, from which they could not be driven without much expense of time, blood, and money, the Italians may consent to buy them out; but even in this case there will most likely be a wide difference between what one party asks and what the other would give. If, on the other hand, the Austrians should be evidently losing ground when Hartig arrives, the chances are that the Italians will not consent to pay anything to Austria, and will only agree to give the Austrian troops a *lascia passare* for their retreat to their own homes. I certainly quite agree with you and your Austrian friend that Austria would be much better out of Italy than in it. Italy can never now be a useful possession for Austria. National antipathy has been so powerfully excited that Lombardy could be kept only by the sword, and that tenure would, under the most favourable circumstances, be very insecure, and would render the occupation far more expensive than valuable. I should say that the Austrians would be right in trying to

¹ Austrian ambassador in London.

drive a good bargain with the Lombards, provided they do not stand out too long, nor for terms over-high : anything would be better than a prolonged contest ; for that would infallibly bring the French into the conflict, and then Austria would have on her hands a war which every prudential reason should teach her not to provoke, though, of course, she would meet it stoutly if it came upon her unprovoked and without any reason.

On the whole, the conclusion to which I should come is, that the cheapest, best, and wisest thing which Austria can do, is to give up her Italian possessions quietly and at once, and to direct her attention and energy to organising the remainder of her coast territories, to cement them together, and to develop their abundant resources. But to do this there ought to be some able men at the head of affairs, and our doubt is whether there are any such now in office. First and foremost, what is the animal *implumis bipes* called Emperor ? A perfect nullity ; next thing to an idiot. What is the man who would succeed if the Emperor was to die ? A brother scarcely a shade better than the Emperor. Who comes next ? A lad of sixteen or twenty ; and what else he is, nobody seems to know ; but whatever he may become hereafter, he cannot now be competent to take any part in political affairs. If the next heir to the crown were a man of energy and capacity, I should say that the only way of saving Austria would be to persuade the Emperor to abdicate in favour of that successor ; and I presume that if the Emperor was told that he must abdicate, he would do as he was bid. But to do any good in this way would require three successive abdications, so as to set aside the present, the next, and the next but one Emperor, and thus to pave the way for the accession of the Archduke John, though I do not know that even then we should be in the regular line of succession. But everybody seems to agree that he is the best man, if not the only man, among them all. Now, three abdications are not easily obtained without a revolution ; even after the three glorious days of July there were only two, namely, that of Charles X. and that of the Duke of Angoulême. But the Archduke John might be brought forward and be placed in some situation of commanding influence. These are not times for standing upon ceremonies, and the Austrian empire is a thing worth saving. You cannot do amiss by suggesting this to any persons who may have influence in such matters.

And a few weeks later, in another letter, he says :—

How can an empire stand in these days without an emperor at its head? And by an emperor I mean a man endowed with intellectual faculties suited to his high station. A mere man of straw, a Guy Faux, like the present Emperor, may do very well in quiet times, when a Metternich, who never leaves his study, can govern a great country by his unopposed will, and can draw on, by his personal influence, various other Governments, despotic like his own, to pursue the same policy, to prevent all improvement, to stifle all symptoms of life among nations, and to enforce the stillness of death, and to boast that such a state of tranquillity is a proof of contentment and a guarantee for happiness. But the present year has dashed Europe abruptly in a far different condition. There is a general fight going on all over the Continent between governors and the governed, between law and disorder, between those who have and those who want to have, between honest men and rogues; and as the turbulent, the poor, and the rogues are in this world, though perhaps not always the most numerous, at all events the most active, the other classes require for their defence to be led and headed by intelligence, activity, and energy. But how can these qualities be found in a Government where the sovereign is an idiot? Pray, then, tell Wesselberg from me, but in the strictest confidence, that I would entreat of him and his colleagues to consider, for the salvation of their country, whether some arrangement could not be made by which the Emperor might abdicate, for which his bodily health might furnish a fair reason, while some more efficient successor might ascend the throne in his stead. I fear that his next brother is little better than he is; but could not the son of that brother be called to the succession? And though he is young, he yet could mount his horse, and show himself to his troops and his people, could excite some enthusiasm for his person as well as for his official station, and, by the aid of good Ministers and able generals, might re-establish the Austrian empire in its proper position at home and abroad. I am sure that Wesselberg will forgive the liberty I am taking, but the maintenance of the Austrian empire is an object of general interest to all Europe, and to no country more than England.

Whatever chance, however, the Italians may have had of being able to cope single-handed with the Austrians was thrown away by a want of cordial co-operation between their different forces. They soon lost all

the ground which they had gained. Complete victory crowned the efforts of Marshal Radetsky, and Milan surrendered on August 6.

The question of mediation between Austria and Sardinia had been under discussion between France and England previously to the great reverses sustained by the Sardinian troops. When their utter destruction seemed inevitable, and intelligence of the capture of Milan was daily expected, the French Government represented that nothing but an assurance that England would join in mediation could prevent them from marching to the assistance of the Sardinians;¹ and so urgent were they on this point, that Lord Normanby, before he received his instructions, found it indispensable, on the faith of a private letter from Lord Palmerston, to engage that England would concur. The instruction to this effect was sent to Lord Normanby on August 7, and with it were sent instructions to be forwarded to Lord Ponsonby and Mr. Abercromby in the event of the French Government agreeing to the basis of mediation laid down by Lord Palmerston. Even if the French Government had not concurred, the instructions were to be sent on, in order that those Ministers might tender the single mediation of England between the contending parties.

France, however, joined with England, and an armistice was concluded between the contending parties. Then ensued a long and infructuous negotiation. The object of Lord Palmerston was to persuade Austria, while retaining Venice, to give up Lombardy, and receive in money an equivalent for its loss.

F. O. : August 31, 1848.

My dear Ponsonby,—The real fact is that the Austrians have no business in Italy at all, and have no real right to be there. The right they claim is founded upon force of arms and the

¹ General Oudinot came to Paris for orders, and told Cavaignac that if he was not allowed to lead his army to Italy to assist Charles Albert, his army would go without him, and that many of his officers had already gone privately to offer their services.

Treaty of Vienna. The Treaty of Vienna they themselves set at nought when they took possession of Cracow, and they have never fulfilled their engagement to give national institutions and a national representation to their Polish subjects. They cannot claim the treaty when it suits their purpose, and at the same time, when it suits their purpose, reject it. Moreover, there was no guarantee in the Treaty of Vienna for any of its arrangements, except for those relating to Prussian Saxony and to Switzerland. But we offer them an equivalent for that which they are called upon to give up, and they get, therefore, a substitute for what the treaty assigned them.

As to their title founded on force, force may be employed to defeat it, and with just as much right.

But the people at Vienna think, perhaps, that force will not be so employed. If that is their opinion, the sooner they are undeceived the better. I know very well that Metternich and others here keep up an active correspondence with Germany, and no doubt amuse their correspondents at Vienna with all kinds of hopes and expectations of the support which Austria will receive on this Italian question from hence, and of the want of power in France to go to war. Wessenberg knows Metternich and England well enough not to be misled by these tales of emigrants. He well knows that private and personal intrigues can accomplish nothing here; and he will easily understand that Metternich will do no more than was Zuylen able to accomplish, nor even so much. Pray request him not to be misled on this point. And as to the interference of France, it will be given if Austria is stubborn; and if a French army enters Italy, the Austrians will be driven, not to the Mincio, or to the Adige, or to Piave, but clean over the Alps. I do not wish to see the French in Italy; there are a great many strong and weighty reasons why I should dislike it; but I would rather that they should go in than that the Austrians should retain Lombardy; and the people at Vienna may depend upon it that if, owing to their obstinacy, our mediation should fail, the French will enter Italy, and with the consent of England, and we shall not then be content with Hummelauer's Memorandum.

Providence meant mankind to be divided into separate nations, and for this purpose countries have been founded by natural barriers, and races of men have been distinguished by separate languages, habits, manners, dispositions and characters. There is no case on the globe in which this intention is more marked than that of the Italians and the Germans, kept apart

by the Alps, and as unlike in everything as two races can be. Austria has never possessed Italy as part of her empire, but has always held it as a conquered territory. There has been no mixture of races. The only Austrians have been the troops and the civil officers. She has governed it as you govern a garrison town, and her rule has always been hateful. We do not wish to threaten; but it is the part of a friend to tell the truth, and the truth is that Austria *cannot*, and *must not*, retain Lombardy; and she ought to think herself well enough off by keeping Venetia, if, indeed, that province is really advantageous to her. They will twit you at Vienna with Ireland, and say what should we reply if they were to ask us to give up Ireland; but the cases are wholly different. In Ireland the races are mixed, and almost amalgamated; and, at all events, the Celts are in Scotland, and Wales, and Cornwall, as well as in Ireland. The language is the same; for English is spoken all over Ireland, and the land, and wealth, and intelligence of the country is for the connection. None of this can be said of Italy in regard to Austria.

Time presses. The French are growing very impatient. We are holding them back, because we wish these things to be settled amicably; but they cannot be withheld much longer; and if the mediation is refused, some energetic decision will infallibly be taken. Exert yourself to the utmost to prevent a crisis, which must end in the humiliation of Austria.

North of the Alps, we wish her all the prosperity and success in the world. Events have rendered it unavoidable that she should remain, in some shape or other, south of the Alps, and as far west as the Adige. Beyond that line, depend upon it, she cannot stay.

Brussels, after many *pourparlers*, was fixed upon as the place of meeting for the mediation Conference. But Lord Palmerston writes to point out that at such a conference nothing but matters of detail could be settled. The principles must be conceded beforehand.

Brockton: * November 12, 1848.

My dear Ponsonby,—The true and real seat of the negotiation is Vienna, and, unless the Austrian Government agree to our proposed basis for an arrangement, I foresee no good to come out of the mediation; and as sure as fate Austria will find herself involved in a serious war before next Midsummer Day. It is totally and absolutely impossible that she can keep quiet

possession of the Italian provinces ; and all you hear at Vienna to the contrary is nothing but the *bon à dire* of the Metternich school, and is the result of the established practice of the disciples of that school, to go on asserting as facts that which they know to be false, but wish to be true, under the absurd notion that by frequent repetition falsehood may become truth. The only consequence of this system is, that those who act upon it and those who are misled by it govern their conduct upon entirely erroneous data ; and the results of such false policy are, that men like Metternich and Guizot meet in exile in London ; that sovereigns like Louis Philippe drink unwholesome water and sour small beer at Claremont, instead of champagne and claret at the Tuileries ; and that ancient empires like Austria are thrown into anarchy and confusion, and are brought to the very verge of dissolution.

I quite understand the drift and meaning of Prince Windischgratz's message to our Queen ; but pray make the Camarilla understand that, in a constitutional country like England, these things cannot answer ; and that a foreign Government which places its reliance upon working upon the Court against the Government of this country is sure to be disappointed.

Austria, however, was not in a temper either for reason or conciliation.

Broadlands : December 28, 1848.

My dear Abercromby,—I have received your letter with the Milanese paper enclosed in it. I am very glad that you prevented Campbell from taking any official notice of the attack upon me which that paper contains. All I should wish is that that attack should be circulated and read from one end of Italy, and from one end of Europe to another. As regards the Austrians, it shows that our Austrian policy has excited the old-womanish anger of some very small minds at Vienna ; and the idea of punishing us for our course by not sending an Archduke to London to announce the accession of the Emperor is truly characteristic of the State policy of European China ; one should be tempted to laugh at it outright if one did not feel grieved to see the destinies of a great empire in the hands of men who can conceive and boast of such a childish revenge. Ponsonby wrote me word that Schwarzenberg had announced to him that no Archduke would be sent, because they would not place a member of the Imperial family in contact with a person who had proved himself so great an enemy as I have shown myself to be of

Austria. I told Ponsonby in reply, that I am sincerely grateful to the Austrian Government for having spared me the trouble and inconvenience which, amid a heavy pressure of business, such a mission would have occasioned to me. I am almost afraid, however, from what I have since heard, that they have thought worse of their first determination, and that some Archduke is coming to us. As to the abuse of me and my policy in the newspaper of Milan, I look upon all it says, considering whence it comes, as a compliment; and if there is any truth in the saying, *Noscitur a sociis*, I feel much obliged to the writers for classing me with three of the most enlightened statesmen of the present day—Espartero, Reshid Pasha, and Mavrocordato. As to the warlike announcements of the Italians, they must, I fear, end in smoke or in defeat. I heartily wish that Italy was *più forte*; but weak as she is, a contest single-handed with Austria would only lead to her more complete prostration, and I doubt whether France is as yet quite ready to take the field in her support. I do not wish to see Italy emancipated from the Austrian yoke by the help of French arms, but perhaps it would be better it should be so done than not done at all; and if it were so done at a time when England and France were well together, we might be able to prevent any permanently bad consequences from resulting from it. But the great object at present is to keep things quiet; to re-establish peace in Northern Italy, and to trust to future events for greater improvements.

Austria never sent a plenipotentiary to Brussels. The mediation and the Conference fell to the ground. In the spring of 1849 the armistice came to an end, and the disaster of Novara sealed the fate of Italian independence for another ten years. The British Government, however, did not cease its efforts to obtain better terms for the conquered. There was the question of payment for the expenses of the war. This still offered an opportunity of being of service to the Italians.

The following letter was in reply to one from the Premier finding fault with a despatch as being too ‘dry and disparaging’ to Austria. Admiral Cecille was French Minister in London. The Russians were occupying the Principalities, in consequence of their intervention on the revolt of Hungary.

Broadlands : April 9, 1849.

My dear John Russell,—I merely repeat in my draft what Cecille said a few days ago. He said that, as a Frenchman and looking merely to French interests, he could not object to the heaviness of the proposed payment, because it would necessarily tend to weaken Piedmont and drive her into the arms of France ; but he thought it a measure as cruel and oppressive as it was for Austrian interests impolitic. I do not see why we should follow the Tory example, and abandon our friends merely because they have been unfortunate ; and if it is said that the Turin Government and Charles Albert made war against our advice and in defiance of common sense, it ought to be borne in mind that it is not Charles Albert nor the late Turin Government by whom the contribution is to be paid, and that the pressure of the infliction will fall upon those who had no share in the folly of which it professes to be the punishment. General recommendations of moderation will be of no avail ; if we want to produce any effect at Vienna, we must come to specific details.

There is no doubt that, as you say, the present moment is one full of danger ; but I should hope that a firm attitude on our part, assumed in conjunction with France, may avert any serious or permanent consequences. Austria seems to have paused in Italy, and not to have sent troops as yet to Florence and Rome. But there is evidently a close connection between Austria and Russia, not closer, however, than has existed at any time since the French Revolution of 1830 ; and we are so far better off than we have hitherto been, that there are only two Powers linked together instead of three, as there used to be, as Prussia has broken off and looks to be the leading Power of independent Germany instead of being the kettle tied to the tail of her two great military neighbours. When Minto was at Berlin, and wanted to know the policy and views of Prussia upon any great question, we used to be told that we must go and ask St. Petersburg and Vienna. That serfdom is now broken.

You say that we must either support France or court Austria. I believe that by the first course we may restrain France, and control both Austria and Russia ; by the second course, if pushed beyond civility, and carried to the extent of any sacrifice of truth, principle, or justice, we should lose France without gaining Austria, just as we should lose our supporters at home without conciliating a single Tory. Austria keeps hold on to

Russia for the present, as a bad swimmer keeps close to a good one. She has hard and heavy work to do in Hungary, Transylvania, and other provinces, and the Russian armies are at hand to help her if need be. We cannot outbid Russia in these matters; no fair words of ours can outweigh the fine divisions of the Autocrat. It is unfortunate for Austria and for Europe that the Austrian Government should place itself in this state of dependence upon Russia, because it disqualifies Austria from being hereafter a check upon Russian ambition and encroachment. 'Hold your tongue,' the Russians will say, 'and remember that we saved you from dismemberment and ruin.' Perhaps the Austrians may not, if they become strong, mind such reproaches; but still this sort of military assistance must be paid for one way or another. However, we must hope for the best; and if England and France are steady, I have no doubt we shall get the Russians out of the Principalities. Austria, be she ever so subservient to Russia, cannot submit to see her get possession of those military positions; and Russia, not knowing the full extent of the moral prostration of England as a European Power, would not lightly encounter the risk of being opposed by England, France, and Turkey united; and Turkey is now in a much more respectable condition as to her army and navy than she was in during the campaigns of 1828-29.

In August, Massimo D'Azeglio sent from Turin an acknowledgment of Lord Palmerston's aid to Italy in the negotiation.

Au moment où nous venons de conclure la paix avec l'Autriche, je manquerais à un de mes principaux devoirs, si, interprète des sentimens dont le Cabinet de S. M. est animé, je ne m'empressais de faire parvenir à Votre Excellence le tribut de notre vive gratitude pour le bienveillant appui que, dans le sincère intérêt qu'elle porte à l'Italie et surtout au Piémont, Votre Seigneurie a bien voulu nous prêter, durant le cours de nos longues et difficiles négociations. Le Roi et son Gouvernement, qui avaient invoqué cet appui avec une entière confiance, se plaisent à reconnaître que c'est principalement à son efficacité qu'ils doivent d'avoir obtenu des conditions meilleures, et telles que pouvaient les admettre la dignité et l'honneur toujours intacts du Piémont. L'assistance soutenue que nous avons rencontré de la part de V. S. a d'autant plus de prix à nos yeux,

qu'en réalisant l'espérance fondée que nous avions d'arriver avec son secours à ce résultat, elle nous a donné une nouvelle preuve de la constance et de la franche et loyale amitié qui unit, depuis tant de siècles, la Sardaigne et l'Angleterre, sa plus puissante et sa plus fidèle alliée.

Before the end of the session the leader of the Protectionist party in the Commons made a final effort to gain the sanction of the House to the principles of commercial policy which he had espoused. He accordingly moved for a Select Committee on the state of the nation. He asserted that distress and disgrace had been progressive since the accession to power of the Whig Administration. Sir Robert Peel warmly supported the Government.

C. G. : July 7, 1849.

My dear William,—Our session is drawing to a close, and will probably finish by the first week in August. After all the trumpeting of attacks that were to demolish first one and then another member of the Government—first me, then Grey, then Charles Wood—we have come triumphantly out of all debates and divisions, and end the session stronger than we began it. Our division this morning, on Disraeli's motion 'On the State of the Nation,' was 296 to 156—a majority of 140! on a motion declared to be a question of confidence or no confidence in the Government.

The French are by this time in Rome.¹ I send you despatches explaining our views on these matters. If you have an opportunity of mentioning them to the Neapolitan Ministers, take those despatches for your text, and say that it is impossible that the Pope can return to Rome—or even if he returned, that he could permanently maintain himself—unless he grants, or confirms rather, to the Romans the Constitution which he gave them last year; and the Neapolitan Government would be contributing usefully to the peace of Italy and would be promoting the interests of the Pope, if they were to concur with France in strongly urging the Pope to pursue such a course. It is by no means certain that he would be taken back by the Romans even on those conditions, but the probability is that

¹ Lord Palmerston once said, when asked for an illustration of the difference between 'business' and 'occupation,' 'The French undertook the occupation of Rome, but they had no business there.'

he would ; and it is almost a certainty that upon any other conditions he would be rejected.

If it should be impossible to bring the Pope and his subjects to terms, a very inconvenient state of things will arise. The French will never allow the Pope to be forced back unconditionally on the Romans ; some other independent Government must therefore be established at Rome, that would perhaps be a republic ; and a republic at Rome would be an inconvenient neighbour for the King of Naples. But for my part, I should not see any insurmountable objection to acknowledging such a Government, if the return of the Pope on the basis of a Constitution should be impossible. Colloredo has always said to me that the Austrians do not insist upon the unconditional return of the Pope. It seems quite clear that the Pope never can again be what he has been, and that his spiritual power will be much diminished by the curtailment or loss of his temporal authority. This is surely a good thing for Europe, both Catholic and Protestant, and if it ends in very much nationalising and localising the Catholic Church in every country, that alone will be a great point gained, and will be a material step in the progress of human society.

Lord Brougham was this session in one of his harassing moods, and had given notice of a motion in the House of Lords, expressive of regret that the Government had shown in its conduct of foreign affairs a want of friendly feelings towards the allies of Great Britain. Lord Palmerston availed himself of the notice given to press on the French their questionable conduct at Rome.

F. O.: July 16, 1849.

My dear Normanby,—The debate on Brougham's motion on Friday will turn chiefly on Italian affairs, and of course Sicily, Lombardy, and Rome will be the main topics on which Brougham, Stanley, and Aberdeen—the three witches who have filled the cauldron—will dilate. As to Sicily and Lombardy, our Peers will be at no loss what to say ; but the Roman affair is not so clear, and it would be very useful—not only for us, but, as it seems to me, for the French Government—if Lansdowne and whoever else may speak on our side from the Ministerial bench, were able to say something positive and definitive as to the intentions of the French Government.

The questions which will naturally be asked are : In what

character has the French army taken possession of Rome?—is it as conquerors of a city to be added to France? Of course not; that answer is easily given. Is it then as friends of the Pope, or as friends of the Roman people? This question it is hard to answer; and for us, unaided by the French Government, impossible.

My own belief is that the priestly and Absolutist party is beginning to prevail in the French Cabinet about the affairs of Rome, and that the French Government is preparing to re-establish the Pope, leaving it to his generosity (which is like the honour of Shakespeare's knight) to grant *de novo* to his subjects such reforms of the Gregorian abuses as he may on reconsideration think expedient; but that they, the French, and he, the Pope, are to concur with the Cardinals, the priests, the Austrians, the Neapolitans, and the Spaniards in deeming all that was done by the Pope last year as null and void. Now, such a course would be well enough for Schwarzenberg, Narvaez, Ferdinand of Naples, and Lambruschini, but it would be highly discreditable to the French Government.

Tocqueville may say, 'But if we propose conditions to the Pope, he will refuse them, and what are we to do then?—are we to remain for ever at Rome; or are we to go out, and let either the Austrians or Garibaldi in?' My answer would be, that if they who are in possession of Rome make the Pope and his Cardinals and the Austrian Government clearly understand that the Pope cannot come back except upon the before-mentioned conditions, the Pope will put his allocution of April 20 into a drawer, and will accept the conditions. But if he refuses: what then? Why, if I was the French Government, I would then say that I withdrew my interference, and should leave the Pope and the Romans to settle their disputes as they could; but that I would not allow Austria, or Naples, or Spain to exercise any interference either; and that, in withdrawing my troops from Rome, I would, if it was worth while, require from the Roman Municipality, or whatever the ruling authorities were, that no foreigners—that is to say, no persons not Italians—should be admitted to power within the city. I say not Italians, for it is pedantry to call men belonging to other parts of Italy 'strangers' at Rome.

But the French would say, 'The result of this would be the continuance of a republic at Rome.' Well, and what if it was? It would not be the first time that an Italian adopted a republican form of government; and it cannot be feared that the

modern republic of Rome would conquer Europe, like its ancient predecessor.

My own belief is that, sooner or later, Rome will become a republic, and that nothing but overruling and foreign military force can prevent such a result. There are mutually repelling properties between a reasoning people and an elective priestly Government. The Roman people have tasted too much of the spring of knowledge, both religious and political, during the last fourteen months—or, I may say, now nearly three years—not to be determined to ‘drink deep,’ and in the present state of Europe no human power can long prevent them from so doing. The Papal supremacy, both spiritual and political, has received an earthquake shake from which it never can recover, and all that can be done is to patch up the rent as well as circumstances permit, so that the fabric may last for a time; but there will be shock after shock, till it all crumbles to the ground. The Catholic Powers say to the Romans that they must submit to the worst and most anomalous Government in the civilised world, because they are Papists; the Roman people will ere long reply by saying, ‘We are no longer Papists; take your Pope and give him as sovereign to those who are Papists still.’

The Reformation in Europe was as much a movement to shake off political oppression as it was to give freedom to religious conscience, and similar causes are apt to produce similar effects.

F. O.: July 24, 1849.

My dear William,—We are finishing our session; the prorogation will be next Tuesday or Wednesday. We end it triumphantly in the Lords as well as in the Commons; and I individually leave off, as I began, with a personal victory, for the motion by Brougham last week was in fact aimed at me specially.¹

I had an opportunity on Saturday of paying off Aberdeen for his repeated and very ungentlemanlike attacks upon me. I just gave him enough to show him that, if I had thought it worth while, I could have given him more; and the House of Commons was quite with me, at least the members present.

This was in a debate on the Hungarian war. Several Liberal members took the opportunity of replying to speeches made in a reactionary spirit in the House of

¹ It was rejected by a majority of 12.

Lords. Lord Palmerston, in the course of his remarks, said:—

There are some persons who see in the relations of countries nothing but the intercourse of Cabinets. It is not as the ancient ally of England during war; it is not as the means of resistance in the centre of Europe to any general disturbance of the balance of power; it is as the form or symbol of resistance to improvement, political and social, that Austria has won the affections of some men in the conduct of public affairs. Sir, there are men who, having passed their whole lives in adoring the Government of Austria, because they deemed it the great symbol of the opinions which they entertained, at last became fickle in their attachment, and transferred their allegiance to the Government of France, because they thought that in that Government they saw an almost equal degree of leaning to the arbitrary principle, and because they, forsooth, suspected the Government of designs hostile to the interests of freedom. We have heard of persons of that sort making use of the expression *old women*.¹ Public men ought not to deal in egotism, and I will not apply to them the expression that has fallen from their own mouth. I will only say that the conduct of such men is an example of antiquated imbecility.

The following letter to Mr. Charles Murray, the Consul-General at Alexandria—though stating what is well known to all Englishmen as the rule of our public service—would astonish the great men of some other countries, where presents are regarded as a considerable source of official remuneration:—

F. O. : August 30, 1849.

My dear Murray,—In working up the chaotic arrear which accumulates during a session of Parliament, I have come upon your letter of the 10th May, in which you say that Ahmed Bey, the eldest son of Ibrahim Pasha, had intimated an intention of sending me some horses as a present. I hope no inconvenience will have arisen from my not having answered your letter sooner; but if he should mention his intentions to you again, I

¹ Lord Aberdeen, a few days before, in a laboured attack upon Lord Palmerston's policy, had said that Lord Minto had only been received by the King of Naples for the same reason that the 'old woman' of Syracuse 'acquiesced in the tyranny of Dionysius—lest the devil should come next.'

wish you to say that you will make known to me his kind intention, and that you are sure that I shall be much flattered by the intended compliment, and much gratified by the friendly feeling of which it is a proof; but that you know that it is a positive and invariable rule for British Ministers not to accept presents of any kind from anybody, and that, consequently, although there is nobody from whom I should be more gratified by receiving such a mark of goodwill, I should be obliged, as a matter of duty, to decline the present, and it is better, therefore, that he should let the matter drop.¹

There was one form of present, however, which his position did not forbid him to accept, and which, under the circumstances, was even more gratifying than a horse from a Pasha. Just before the end of the session he received a deputation of members of the House of Commons, who asked him to sit for a full-length portrait, to be given by them to Lady Palmerston, 'as a small memento of his great abilities, high honour, noble-minded independent policy, warm-heartedness, and worth.'

As soon as he gets out of town he sends his brother the local news, and an account of his country pursuits.

Brocket: September 23, 1849.

The present moment is the moment of reaction in Europe. The Revolutionists have had their swing; the tide is turned, and the Absolutists are for the time in the ascendant. But this state of things cannot last, and the Governments of Europe cannot finally settle down into the same practice of abuses and oppressions which was the real cause of the outbreaks of last year.

Here in England everything is quiet. Our harvest is good, and the potatoes not much diseased; trade and manufactures are rallying, and all interests tolerably well off. Cholera has been very active, and has been so spread over the country that hardly any place or town has been exempt from it. But it may almost everywhere be traceable to noxious effluvia, arising from accumulations of dirt and of animal and vegetable matter,

¹ The same rule applies to foreign 'orders.' Queen Elizabeth used to say that she would not allow 'her sheep to be tarred by another shepherd.'

choked-up drains, stinking sewers, and things of that kind ; and few persons have anywhere been attacked by it who have not been exposed to these operating causes. There were several cases at Romsey at the end of July and in the beginning of August, but none since, and they were almost all in Banning Street and in the hundred, where bad drainage, or rather no drainage at all, occasioned the presence of bad exhalations. Emily,¹ who like other ladies, is nervous about these things, had a disinclination to go to Broadlands till cholera shall be quite over. We were detained in London till the end of August by Lady Ashley's confinement, and since then we have been at Panshanger and here. It does not much matter to me where I am, as red boxes make almost all places equal. I am, however, very well, and yesterday managed to take four hours' partridge-shooting.

Broadlands: January 1, 1850.

Our shooting has been but indifferent, owing to a bad breeding season following upon two previous years of the same kind, together with a good poaching season at Romsey; but I have been able to get out three or four times with the hounds, which always does me more good than anything else.

Our session will begin the last day of this month. We shall, probably, have a sharp fire from the Protectionists at starting; but they can make no permanent or material impression either on the House or the country; and they are wholly unable to form a Government, even if the offer to do so could be made to them.

How do you get on with your demands on the Neapolitan Government for compensation for the merchants for losses during the civil war? We have given Parker instructions to go to Athens, when he leaves the seas of the Levant, and to back up Wyse in enforcing certain demands, which have been long pending before the Greek Government, for compensation for British subjects for various wrongs at different times done to them. When the account of Parker's visit to Athens reaches Naples, you may as well confidentially, and not in pursuance of instructions, but as the result of your own good wishes to avert disagreeable events from Naples, suggest to the Neapolitan Minister the possibility that Parker might receive orders to pay a similar visit to Naples for a like purpose; and that it might be as well for the Neapolitan Government to prevent

¹ Lady Palmerston.

this by doing with a good grace that which, in such a case, they might find it best policy to do, although with a bad grace, and with some derogation to the dignity of the King.

We shall come later on to the history of these demands upon the Greek Government, but the foregoing passage shows that the strong measures which Lord Palmerston felt himself bound to take at Athens were prompted not merely by wrongs endured there, but also by his conviction that, at many other points, the prestige of England would suffer, and difficulties would arise, if she allowed herself to be baffled in the East by a Power whose weakness was its strength, and duplicity its weapon.

CHAPTER IV.

WAR IN HUNGARY—QUESTION OF THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES.

THE revolution at Vienna had been quickly followed by a rising in Hungary. The civil war raged for many months, and success had attended the Magyars, so far as operations in the field were concerned. In her dire strait Austria had called in the aid of Russia. The Emperor Nicholas quickly responded with 150,000 men, seeking to justify his act in the face of Europe by considerations of safety for his own possessions. This intervention decided the contest, and Hungary lay prostrate at the feet of the two great military empires. The sympathies of men like Lord Palmerston were with the Hungarians, because, if they were revolutionists, they were so in the same sense as the men to whose acts, at the close of the seventeenth century, it is owing that the present Royal Family of England, happily for the nation, are seated on the throne of these realms. Hungary had long had its separate Constitution, Parliament, and laws. The crowns of Austria and Hungary had devolved upon one head, because the same person had by different and separate titles become, in order of succession, Sovereign of each of the two countries. The Emperor of Austria became King of Hungary by virtue of his coronation at Pesth, on which occasion he took an oath to observe and maintain its Constitution. The Austrian Cabinet wished entirely to destroy that Constitution, and incorporate Hungary with the aggregate mass of the empire. Whether this was or was not a good arrangement for the parties, the

Imperial Government had no right to impose it by force without endeavouring to obtain the consent of the Hungarian Diet. This is, however, what they did, and the Hungarians were fully justified in resisting force by force. Supposing that at the time of the union of Scotland and England, the English Government, instead of proposing a Treaty of Union and obtaining the legal consent of the Scotch Parliament, had issued an Order in Council summarily terminating their separate existence and functions. The Scotch would have resisted. If then the King of England had sent his army over the Border to subdue the Scotch, and, finding the task too hard for him, had ended by calling in the French to help him, the parallel would have been complete.

In the earlier part of the year Lord Palmerston had vainly attempted to mediate between the contending parties in Hungary, so as to avert the Russian intervention, of which he here chronicles the result:—

F. O.: August 22, 1849.

My dear Ponsonby,—We heard yesterday from Warsaw that which must be considered the conclusion of the war in Hungary. I must own I am glad that it is over, for though all our sympathies in this country are with the Hungarians, yet it was scarcely in the nature of things that they should be able, against such superior forces, to hold out long enough to compel the allies to treat with them on equal terms, and a prolongation of the war would therefore only have led to the same result after the slaughter of many more thousands of brave men on both sides, and after still greater devastation of the country, than has already taken place. Now is the time for the Austrian Government to redeem itself in the opinion of Europe: a just and generous use of the success which has been gained would re-establish Austria in public estimation, and would again place her in the front rank among the great Powers of Europe. If the Austrian Government listens to passion, resentment, and political prejudice, they will enlist against them every generous and just mind in the civilised world, and will lay the foundation for permanent weakness and decrepitude in the Austrian empire. I shall write to you officially in this sense in a day or

two ; but, in the meanwhile, shape your language to this effect. The thing evidently to be done is to re-establish the ancient Constitution of Hungary, with the improvements made in it last year, as to the abolition of feudal service, and exemption of privileged classes from public burthens, and to publish a real and complete amnesty. If Austria wishes for a legislative union with Hungary, it should be proposed in a legal way, like our unions with Scotland and Ireland, but I much fear that legislative assemblies are not in favour at present at Vienna : and yet such assemblies founded upon election by intelligence and property, and not by universal suffrage, are the only sure foundations of public order and permanent monarchy. It will be curious if the Emperor of Russia should take the Hungarians under his protection as against the Austrians, just as he protects the Danube Principalities against the Turks.

The fight between the master and the revolted subjects had not merely been a calm and strategical encounter : it had been a war of passion, bitter and ferocious. I quote the following letter to illustrate the warmth and strong sympathy of Lord Palmerston's character. He bounded like a boy at any cruelty or oppression. Many years later, during his second Premiership, at the time when the Federal General Butler outraged public opinion by proclaiming at New Orleans that ladies who showed discontent either by their dress or demeanour would be treated like women of the town, he sent to the American Minister an indignant letter of remonstrance so strong and outspoken that Mr. Adams refused to receive it, and ran off with it to the Foreign Office in the utmost consternation. The youthful impulse of indignation against a cowardly bully never died out with him. It survived even in his old age, the advent of which is too often accompanied by cynical indifference to the sufferings of others :—

Panshanger : September 9, 1849.

The Austrians are really the greatest brutes that ever called themselves by the undeserved name of civilised men. Their atrocities in Galicia, in Italy, in Hungary, in Transylvania are only to be equalled by the proceedings of the negro race in

Africa and Haiti. Their late exploit of flogging forty odd people, including two women at Milan, some of the victims being gentlemen, is really too blackguard and disgusting a proceeding. As to working upon their feelings of generosity and gentlemanlikeness that is out of the question, because such feelings exist not in a set of officials who have been trained up in the school of Metternich, and the men in whose minds such in-born feelings have not been crushed by court and office power have been studiously excluded from public affairs, and can only blush in private for the disgrace which such things throw upon their country. But I do hope that *you* will not fail constantly to bear in mind the country and the Government which you represent, and that you will maintain the dignity and honour of England by expressing *openly* and *decidedly* the disgust which such proceedings excite in the public mind in this country; and that you will not allow the Austrians to imagine that the public opinion of England is to be gathered from articles put into the 'Times' by Austrian agents in London, nor from the purchased support of the 'Chronicle,' nor from the servile language of Tory lords and ladies in London, nor from the courtly notions of royal dukes and duchesses. I have no great opinion of Schwarzenberg's statesmanlike qualities unless he is very much altered from what he was when I knew him; but, at least, he has lived in England, and must know something of English feelings and ideas, and he must be capable of understanding the kind of injury which all these barbarities must do to the character of Austria in public opinion here; and I think that, in spite of his great reliance upon and fondness for Russia, he must see that the good opinion of England is of some value to Austria; if for nothing else, at least to act as a check upon the illwill towards Austria, which he supposes, or affects to suppose, is the great actuating motive of the revolutionary firebrand who now presides at the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

You might surely find an opportunity of drawing Schwarzenberg's attention to these matters, which may be made intelligible to him, and which a British ambassador has a right to submit to his consideration. There is another view of the matter which Schwarzenberg, with his personal hatred of the Italians, would not choose to comprehend, but which, nevertheless, is well deserving of attention, and that is the obvious tendency of these barbarous proceedings to perpetuate in the minds of the Italians indelible hatred of Austria; and as the

Austrian Government cannot hope to govern Italy always by the sword, such inextinguishable hatred is not an evil altogether to be despised.

The rulers of Austria (I call them not statesmen or stateswomen) have now brought their country to this remarkable condition, that the Emperor holds his various territories at the goodwill and pleasure of three external Powers. He holds Italy just as long as and no longer than France chooses to let him have it. The first quarrel between Austria and France will drive the Austrians out of Lombardy and Venice. He holds Hungary and Galicia just as long as and no longer than Russia chooses to let him have them. The first quarrel with Russia will detach those countries from the Austrian crown. He holds his German provinces by a tenure dependent, in a great degree, upon feelings and opinions which it will be very difficult for him and his Ministers either to combine with or to stand out against.

The remedy against these various dangers which are rapidly undermining the Austrian empire would be generous conciliation ; but instead of that, the Austrian Government know no method of administration but what consists in flogging, imprisoning, and shooting. ‘The *Austrians* know no argument but force.’

As soon as Hungary was subdued, a joint demand was made upon the Porte by Russia and Austria to deliver up the fugitives who had sought safety at Widdin, within the Turkish frontier. Prince Radzivil and Baron de Titoff for Russia, and Count Stürmer for Austria, urged at Constantinople the surrender of these refugees, among whom were Kossuth and Zamoyski. The Sultan, however, firmly resisted this attempt to induce him to violate the laws of humanity by giving up to the vengeance of the conquerors those who had fled to his territory for refuge. As no threats could shake the resolution of the Ottoman Government, the ambassadors notified to the Porte the suspension of all diplomatic intercourse between their own Courts and that of the Sultan. Lord Palmerston determined to support the Sultan.

Carlton Gardens : September 29, 1849.

My dear Normanby,—I received yesterday afternoon, at Brocket, by a letter from Drouyn de Lhuys, the telegraphic

message announcing the breaking off of diplomatic relations by the Austrian and Russian Ministers at Constantinople. I am unable at present to send you anything but my own opinion of the matter. I am much inclined to think that this step of the two Imperialist Ministers is only an attempt to bully, and that if it fails, as it seems hitherto to have done, it will be disavowed or retracted by their Governments. But then it seems to me that the only way of bringing about that result is to give the Sultan the cordial and firm support of England and France, and to let the two Governments of Russia and Austria see that the Turk has friends who will back him and defend him in time of need. This might be done, first, by firm though friendly representations at Vienna and St. Petersburg, pointing out that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what has been required, and that, not being so bound, he could not have done it without dishonour. Secondly, we might order our respective squadrons in the Mediterranean to take post at the Dardanelles, and to be ready to go up to Constantinople if invited by the Sultan, either to defend Constantinople from actual or threatened attack, or to give him that moral support which their presence in the Bosphorus would afford. I feel the most perfect conviction that Austria and Russia would not, in the present state of Germany, Poland, and Northern Italy, to say nothing of only half-pacified Hungary, venture upon a rupture with England, France, and Turkey upon such a question as this. But all this is only my own personal opinion, and I cannot answer for the Broadbrims of the Cabinet; therefore do not, before you hear from me again, commit the Government to any opinion or to any course of action.

The Russian ambassador in London lost no time in calling on the Foreign Secretary. What took place is told in the following Memorandum :—

Carlton Gardens : October 2, 1849.

I had a conversation of some length this afternoon with Baron Brunnov. His object at first was to show that the best course for England and France to pursue was to remain perfectly quiet, to wait for events, and to trust to the moderation and good feeling of the Emperor to settle the matter amicably with the Sultan, without any injury to the independence of the Porte. In other words, to leave the Emperor time to frighten the Sultan into acquiescence.

I said I agreed with him that the affair is in itself of very slight importance, and that I could not but believe with him that the moderation and good feeling of the two Imperial Governments would lead them to respect the Sultan's repugnance to give up men who have thrown themselves on his protection; and that Austria and Russia would be satisfied with that security which they had a right to ask, and which the Sultan is ready to afford them, and which would be given by sending into the interior of Turkey such of the refugees as may have no means of supporting themselves, and by requiring those who are better off to leave Turkey and come to France or England. With regard to our doing nothing, I said we could not take that course, because the Turkish Government had officially asked us for help in their embarrassment, and we had determined to address a friendly representation in favour of the Sultan to the Austrian and Russian Governments. He said he hoped our representation would be carefully worded, in order that it might not do harm instead of good. That all men have their faults as well as their merits. That the fault of his Emperor is that he is very sensitive, and that anything like the language of menace might prevent him from doing what he might otherwise be disposed to do. I said that nothing of that kind would be sent; that we should express our hope, and the French Government would probably do the same, that the two Emperors would be satisfied with the removal of danger from their frontiers, and would not insist on the surrender of men whom they would not know what to do with when they got them. For it would not be supposed, for instance, that the Emperor of Russia could take any pleasure in shooting a cripple like Bem. Brunnow said it would be a pity that such representations should be made by England and France jointly or concurrently; that the joint action of the two would of itself have the appearance of something like menace. I said that this was the unavoidable result of the fact that the Porte had made application to the two Powers; but he should remember that this system of duality did not begin with us; that the two Imperial Governments have been jointly pressing and threatening at Constantinople, and the Sultan being hard driven by his two great, strapping neighbours, naturally looked about him to see where he could find two friends to come and take his part. That the two Imperial Ministers, no doubt from over-zeal, or from a wish to carry their point by a *coup de main*, and gain credit with their Governments, had gone probably further than they had been instructed to do, and had not only held very

high and threatening language, but had suspended their diplomatic intercourse, a thing of no real importance, but meant as a means of intimidation. I said that the two Imperial Governments were no doubt entitled to ask for the surrender of their respective subjects, though the Russian demand, being founded upon the events of the Polish war of 1832, and not upon the Hungarian war of 1849, was somewhat out of date; but that, on the other hand, the Sultan was entitled by his treaties to decline to surrender, and to prefer the other alternatives of either sending the refugees into the interior of his territory, or requiring them to leave Turkey. Brunnow entirely agreed with me in this interpretation of the treaty between Russia and Turkey. He said the Treaty of Kainardgi had, like all treaties between Russia and Turkey, been drawn up by the Russian negotiators, and that they had purposely and intentionally left a choice, because it was much more likely that Turks would fly to Russia than that Russians would fly to Turkey; and the Russian Government did not wish to be obliged to give up political refugees to be handed over to the bowstring. With men guilty of ordinary criminal offences the case was different, and the obligation more strict to give such persons up. Brunnow fully and distinctly admitted that the treaty, while it authorised the Emperor to demand surrender, equally authorised the Sultan to decline surrender, and to prefer the sending out of his country. And Brunnow's own opinion seemed to be that the Emperor would, or at least ought to, acquiesce in the Sultan's decision. But it must be borne in mind that his object was avowedly to persuade us to do nothing, and that he professed himself to be without communications from his own Government.

There was considerable opposition in high quarters to any interference on the part of England, but Lord Palmerston's colleagues acquiesced in his proposals, and he sends to Paris the decision arrived at.

F. O. : October 2, 1849.

My dear Normanby,—The Cabinet met to-day, and determined that the Sultan must be supported, and by all means and to all extent that may be necessary, and that for this purpose the co-operation of France must be sought. What we propose to do is that which I stated in my private letter a few days ago, namely, that a friendly and civil representation should be made

to the two Governments at Vienna and Petersburg, to express a hope that the two Emperors will not press the Sultan to do that which a regard for his honour and for the laws of hospitality and the common dictates of humanity forbid him to do, and which no engagement of treaty binds him to do ; and, that, at the same time, the two squadrons should move up to the Dardanelles, with orders to go up to Constantinople if invited so to do by the Sultan, either for his immediate defence, or to afford him moral support by their presence. Of course this decision involves a determination to go all further lengths that circumstances may render necessary ; and we trust confidently that we shall be able to rely entirely upon the co-operation of France, and also upon her being willing to be as moderate in the manner of making the first steps as she may be firm and determined as to ultimate results. I have seen the Turkish ambassador, who has written me a note asking the moral and material assistance of England. I have told him the decision of the Cabinet, and that we are going to enter into communication with the French Government on the matter. He says that the Turkish squadron in the Bosphorus, and the Turkish military force round Constantinople, are quite sufficient to secure Constantinople against any surprise by the fleet from Sebastopol.

I have since seen Brunnow, who professes to have heard nothing from Petersburg, and to know only what the papers report ; but he seems uneasy. He endeavours to represent the matter as one of small real importance. His object was to persuade me that we ought to take no step, but wait to see what the Emperor would do, or at all events to delay ; that is to say, he wants us to give the Emperor full time to bully the Sultan upon this question, as we let him do some months ago about the Wallachian occupation. I told him that the Cabinet has determined that representations should be made at Vienna and Petersburg, but that we should take care to make them in such a manner as not to justify any *mauvaise réponse*. I said that the threatening language and deportment of Radzivil, Titoff, and Stürmer had compelled the Porte to ask us for support, and that we could not under such circumstances abstain from friendly representations to the two Imperial Governments. I of course abstained from saying anything about squadrons or material assistance, but joined with him in considering it impossible that the Emperor should not be satisfied with the departure of his Poles from Turkey, observing that they must be very unreasonable men if they did not prefer France or England to Turkey as a residence.

He also communicates the decision to the English Minister at Constantinople, who had strongly urged the Turkish Government to remain firm.¹

Foreign Office: October 2, 1849.

My dear Canning,—As it is of importance to relieve you as soon as possible from anxiety in regard to the responsibility which you may think you have incurred by the advice which you have given the Porte, and as it is also essential not to lose an hour unnecessarily in relieving the Porte from its doubts as to whether it will find aid and support from its friends, I send you this private letter by a special messenger, to say that the Cabinet has to-day decided to give an affirmative answer to the application for moral and material support which the Turkish ambassador, by order of his Government, has presented to us. We are, therefore, going to enter immediately into communication with the Government of France, in order to settle the course of proceedings, assuming that which we cannot doubt, namely, that the French Government is willing and prepared to co-operate with us. What we mean to propose is, that the two Governments should make friendly and courteous representations at Vienna and Petersburg to induce the Imperial Government to desist from their demands, urging that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what is asked of him, and that to do so would be dishonourable and disgraceful. We mean to propose, at the same time, that the two Mediterranean squadrons should proceed at once to the Dardanelles, with orders to go up to the Bosphorus, if invited to do so by the Sultan, either to defend Constantinople from actual or imminent attack, or to give him the moral support which their presence would afford. I think it possible, however, that the admirals may already have gone up to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in consequence of the letters they will have received from you and

¹ 'If I had suspended my support for a moment, the Porte, I have no doubt, would have given way; and on almost any question but one involving such obvious considerations of humanity, honour, and permanent policy, I might have been inclined, while left to myself, to counsel a less dangerous course, in spite of reason and right. As it is, I have felt that there was no alternative unattended with loss of credit and character. The dishonour would have been *ours*, for everyone knows that even Reschid himself, with all his spirit and humanity, would not withstand the torrent without us, and France on almost every subject here follows in our wake, from the necessities of its position and in generous reliance on your policy.'—*Sir S. Canning to Lord Palmerston, Sept. 17, 1849.*

from Aupick. I think it, however, much better that the Porte should be advised *not* to send for the squadrons to enter the Dardanelles without real necessity. The example might be turned to bad account by the Russians hereafter; and it would be too much of an open menace, and the way to deal with the Emperor is not to put him on his mettle by open and public menace. In this affair we are trying to catch two great fish, and we must wind the reel very gently and dexterously, not to break the line. The Government have indeed resolved to support the Sultan at all events, but we must be able to show to Parliament that we have used all civility and forbearance, and that if hostilities ensue, they have not been brought on by any fault or mistake of ours. The presence of the squadrons at the outside of the Dardanelles, or in their neighbourhood, would probably be quite sufficient to keep the Sebastopol squadron at anchor or in port; and the Turks have besides some naval and military force at and about Constantinople sufficient to make a resistance till our squadrons could get up. We have steamers that could tow the line-of-battle ships. We have, I believe, six or seven liners: the French about the same number. The Russians, I believe, twelve or fourteen.

What I wish you to impress upon the Turks is that this communication is confidential, to keep up their spirits and courage; but that they must not swagger upon it, nor make it public till they hear it officially. From Brunnow's language, and I have also seen him since the Cabinet, I should infer the matter will be amicably settled.

He makes Austria understand no less clearly and emphatically that England is going to stand by the Sultan.

F. O.: October 6, 1849.

My dear Ponsonby,—I send you a despatch to be communicated to Schwarzenberg. We have endeavoured to make it as civil as possible, so as not to leave him any ground for saying that he cannot yield to threats. We make none; and in my verbal communications with Brunnow and Collaredo I have said nothing about our squadron being ordered up to the Dardanelles. But it is right that *you* should know and understand that the Government have come unanimously to the determination of taking this matter up in earnest, and of carrying it through. We have resolved to support Turkey, let who will be against her in this matter. It is painful to see the Austrian

Government led on in its blindness, its folly, and its passionate violence into a course utterly at variance with the established policy of Austria. If there is one thing more than another which Austria ought to do, it is to support Turkey against Russia; and here is Schwarzenberg, in his fondness for bullying the weak, co-operating with the Russian Government to humble Turkey, and to lay her at the feet of Russia.

But you understand these questions so thoroughly that you will no doubt have been able to lay before the Austrian Government and Camarilla the full extent of the mistake they are making. They are besides uniting England and France in joint action, which is not what Austrian Governments have hitherto been particularly anxious to do. I cannot believe that the two Governments will push this matter further. The rights of the case are clearly against them. Both Colloredo and Brunnov, though I beg they may not be quoted, acknowledge that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what is required of him. Metternich, I am told, says it is a great mistake.

What could Austria hope to gain by a war with Turkey, supported, as she would be, by England and France? Austria would lose her Italian provinces, to which she seems to attach such undue value, and she never would see them again. What she might gain to the eastward I know not; but perhaps she might not end by extending herself in that direction. At all events, I cannot conceive that, in the present state of Germany, it would suit Austria to provoke a war with England and France; and I do not think that such a war would be of any advantage even to Russia. Pray do what you can to persuade the Austrian Government to allow these Hungarians either to leave Turkey, if they are able to do so, or to remain in Turkey quietly. The leaders would of course pass on to other parts of Europe; the bulk of the emigrants might be settled somewhere in the interior of Turkey, and would make a useful colony.

There is a notion that Austria means to try to turn a penny by this transaction, and to call on the Turks to pay a large sum, which it suits the Austrian Government to say that these emigrants have carried away with them; but this dodge will not do, so pray try to persuade them not to attempt it.

The bold attitude of England and France soon produced its legitimate effect.

F. O. : October 23, 1849.

My dear Normanby,—I have a private letter to-day from Ponsonby, in which he says that the Austrian Government has distinctly declared that it does not mean to insist on the surrender of the Hungarian refugees, and that the Russian Government has no objection to this decision of Austria. But he says that he cannot as yet officially announce this decision. We hear from Warsaw that the Russians are indignant at the execution of the Hungarians who had given themselves up to the Russians, and that this feeling will probably make it more easy for Russia to desist from a demand which was made chiefly in support of Austria.

Brunnow's language has not altered. From the first he admitted that, although the treaty of Kainardgi gave Russia a right to demand the surrender, it equally gave Turkey a right to choose the other alternative. He asked me the other day, with what intention, and within what limits, our squadrons were to act? I said within the Mediterranean as at present ordered, and with the intention of giving comfort and support to the Sultan, who had been so vehemently threatened by their two men at Constantinople. That our sending one squadron up the Mediterranean was, for the Sultan, like holding a bottle of salts to the nose of a lady who had been frightened.

He asked whether it would not have been better to have waited for the answer from Petersburg. I said that in that case we might perhaps have been too late to prevent accidents which might have happened before our fleets had arrived. But I said that as long as our squadrons were in that part of the Mediterranean they could threaten nobody. If England and France had sent large fleets into the Baltic, then, indeed, Russia might have said, This must be intended for me; what does it mean? And I have desired Ponsonby to say that if our squadron had gone up the Adriatic, it might have been a threat against Austria. But our ships, where they are, threaten nobody, and only hold out to the Sultan assistance at hand in case of need.

An indirect benefit accrued from the action of our Government in this matter. The unanimity of public feeling elicited in its support, as soon as it had declared its intention of supporting Turkey to the full extent of going to war, had a great and excellent effect in Europe,

as showing that we were not quite so incapable of being moved to manly action as some speeches in Parliament and at peace congresses might have led people to suppose.

A cavil was now raised that we had violated the terms of a treaty by the presence of our fleet at the Dardanelles. Lord Palmerston controverts this.

F. O. : October 23, 1849.

My dear Ponsonby,—We are quite aware that the treaty of the Dardanelles of July, 1841, forbids foreign ships of war from entering either the Dardanelles or Bosphorus while the Porte is at peace. But that treaty does not prevent succour from being ready at hand, to help the Sultan in case war should come suddenly upon him. And the two Imperial Governments should remember that Stürmer and Titoff declared to the Porte that if the Turkish Government allowed a single man of the refugees to escape, it would be considered by *Austria and Russia as a declaration of war.*

Such a communication may not have been authorised, though, from the arrogant and insolent tone of the despatches from Schwarzenberg and Nesselrode, which were communicated to the Turkish Government, I am inclined to think it was ; but, at all events, such a communication having been made, there was evidently no time to be lost by those Governments which meant to defend Turkey against the two Imperial and imperious bullies.

Lord Palmerston, when he had undertaken the task, was not the man to leave it half-way to take care of itself. Even to please an ally he was not disposed to run the risk, however small, of having to begin all over again. He felt sure that he had won, but would leave nothing to chance.

F. O. : November 7, 1849.

My dear Canning,—I may, I think, now congratulate you upon the peaceful termination of the question about the refugees. Brunnow has just been with me, and says very quaintly, that it has from the first been raised to undue proportions, and that it ought to have been treated as an ‘*affaire de police, et non pas comme une affaire de politique.*’

The three demands, as we understand them, now are, 1st, the expulsion of the Poles from the Turkish territory; 2nd, the removal of the converted Poles to Diarbekir; 3rd, an engagement that the Porte should apply to foreign Governments, and specially to England and France, to consent that Russian subjects who may become naturalised or denizens in England or France should not thereby be exempted from being treated in Turkey according to their original nationality. The first condition is just what the Sultan proposed to do. The second seems as a temporary arrangement unobjectionable, it being always understood to be only temporary, and that these men are not to be kept for the rest of their lives at Diarbekir. To the third we shall probably not be found willing to consent: a foreigner acquires by naturalisation the character, and with it the rights, of a British subject; he acquires these by law, and I do not see how the English Government could undertake to withhold from any man the protection to which he has become legally entitled. Naturalisation would not give a Russian subject British rights in Russia, but it would do so in every other country; but this is a question to talk about, and not to be fought about. I therefore look on peace as secure, and as soon as we get the next despatches from you we shall send orders to Parker to return to his usual station. The French are impatient to get their ships back, in case they should want them against Morocco, where a petulant and self-sufficient consul of theirs has been trying to get up a quarrel with the Moors. I am glad their squadron has been out of reach; this may give time to settle the dispute peaceably. Buchanan, who has just come from Petersburg, says that the Russians in general are much nettled at the check which their Emperor has received in his Turkish policy, and that they say he will take some opportunity to pay us off; and the way in which they anticipate that this will be done, is by fomenting insurrections in Bosnia and elsewhere among the Christian subjects of the Porte; and even Brunnow cannot refrain from adverting to this, as a way in which Russia holds in her hands the good and evil destinies of the Turkish empire. The Turkish Government ought to be made well aware of this, and should lose no time in preparing measures to remove from the Christian subjects of the Porte all just cause of discontent, and should thus place the Sultan's throne upon a broad and solid foundation.

These late changes of Ministers in France will make no other change in the foreign policy of the country except to ren-

der it more conformable with the personal feelings and views of the President, and he is more disposed than some of his late Ministers were (though we have no great fault to find with them) to follow a course of foreign policy calculated to create community of views and action between England and France.

Broadlands : November 16, 1849.

My dear Canning,—The French are in a monstrous hurry to get their fleet back from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. But yesterday I received from Normanby a proposal from the President that we should give you and Aupick discretionary power to send away the squadron whenever and as soon as you should think their presence no longer necessary, and this was so reasonable a proposal that we at once closed with it.

Our own view is that it is desirable that our squadron should return towards Malta whenever its presence near the Dardanelles is no longer wanted ; but that it should stay where it is as long as its presence is of importance as a moral support for the Sultan. Whenever the Porte and the two Imperial Courts have come to an agreement upon the main points, the squadron might well come away ; but it would not do for us to bring it away while any material point was unsettled, and that we should thus have the appearance of leaving the Sultan in the lurch.

Moreover, it would not do that the Russian agents at Constantinople should have a pretence for saying that Russia had ordered our fleets off, and that as we had thus yielded to the demands of Russia, the Porte had better do so too, because experience in this instance would show her that though we might swagger at first, yet when it came to the point, we were sure to knock under, and that thus Turkey would always find us ready to urge her on to resistance, but backing out ourselves when Russia began to hold high language to us and to show us a bold front.

They would represent us as a barking cur that runs off with its tail between its legs when faced and threatened. We should thus lose all we have gained and most of what we had before.

You will, of course, not fail to bear all this in mind in using the discretionary authority now sent to you ; and though we shall be glad to find the presence of the fleet no longer necessary, it is better that it should stay there a week or a fortnight too long than that it should come away too soon.

If you should think the continuance of our fleet for a further time important and essential, and Aupick should, under his instructions, declare himself of opinion that the fleets are no longer necessary, and if he should make a great difficulty in coming round to your opinion, there would be no great harm done if you were to split the difference, and if the French fleet—which has been specially ordered to keep separate from ours—was to work its way towards Toulon, while ours remained a little while longer, cruising or anchoring in the Archipelago.

Broadlands : November 14, 1849.

My dear Normanby,—It would have been quite ridiculous and mean to have ordered back our ships at the bidding of Russia, and merely upon her assertion of what she had sent as an answer to the Porte. Great countries ought not to act with such precipitate levity, and should put some degree of method and deliberation in their conduct. We sent our fleet up to the Dardanelles to be ready to support the Sultan in case of attack, and in order that his knowledge that our fleet was there for that purpose might give him courage to hold his own in his negotiations with Russia. That negotiation had not yet reached Constantinople when our last accounts came away ; it would turn upon demands some of which the Porte might object to ; the bullying system might again be resorted to, if our ships came away before everything was settled, and their departure during the negotiation would be represented by the Russian agents at Constantinople as an abandonment of Turkey in deference to the remonstrances of Russia. We ought either never to have sent our fleet, or to keep it there till matters are settled. The French, however, are of course at liberty to do what they like with their own ; but they ought to have pointed out to them that the hasty retreat of their squadron will be represented by the Russians at Constantinople as a concession by France to Russia.

Of course, as you say, disappointed ambition will try to turn popular feeling against an English alliance which thwarts personal projects ; but we must deal with this as best we can. There is always some difficulty or other to be striven against in public matters, ‘For the current of politics doth seldom run smooth.’

With reference to our alleged infraction of treaty stipulations, Lord Palmerston writes :—

Broadlands : November 22, 1849.

My dear Canning,—Do not let Parker again anchor or enter within the outer castles of the Dardanelles; his doing so has a very bad effect; it is difficult to argue that it is not entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, and that therefore it is not a violation of the Treaty of July, 1841.¹ Nesselrode seems to have taken the matter quietly, and no wonder; for such a nibbling at our Dardanelles Treaty is just what the Russians would like to see us establish as a precedent, and they would not be slow to follow our example. The port regulation of the Turkish Government by which the anchorage within the outer castles is allotted for ships-of-war of all nations to wait in till they know whether they can be permitted to go up to Constantinople, can fairly and logically be applied only to such ships-of-war as may by permission go up to Constantinople; but those are only light vessels for the use of the embassies and missions, and that port regulation cannot be deemed to apply to a squadron of line-of-battle ships, which cannot, according to treaty, go up to Constantinople while the Porte is at peace: at all events, it is close shaving and nice steerage, and exposes us to a disagreeable discussion about words, and puts us to prove that being within the Straits is not entering the Straits; and that is not an easy demonstration to make good. If Parker is blown away from Besika Bay, let him go to Enos, or Jaros, or anywhere else where he may find shelter, never mind how far off; for wherever he goes he can always be back in time, and any attack of the Turkish territory by a Russian fleet or army is at present quite out of the question. We shall send you on in a few days our decision about the demands of the two Emperors. I should guess, from Brunnow's language to me to-day, that the Russian Government would be content to have the renegade Poles *éloignés* from the frontier, and made to reside—but not as prisoners—in Asia Minor; and Brunnow affected to treat very lightly the Austrian demand, representing that as a matter the Porte could easily dispose of if she had settled satisfactorily with Russia.

¹ The words of the treaty were: 'All ships-of-war of all nations coming to the Dardanelles are to stop and wait at the anchorage between the outer and inner castles till they know from Constantinople whether a firman will or will not be granted to allow them to proceed further on.'

When the two Powers were baffled in their demand for the surrender of the fugitive Poles and Hungarians, Austria substituted a request that Turkey should keep them in confinement, and not allow them to emigrate to any other country. The Sultan indeed had originally proposed something of the sort when their extradition was summarily demanded, although he had never offered to keep his captives at the good pleasure of a foreign Government, but only for a time, and at his own discretion. In the following letter Lord Palmerston protests against the Austrian demand.

F. O.: November 27, 1849.

My dear Ponsonby,—I have only time to write two lines before the post goes. You say you do not understand what the objections are which Canning alludes to as liable to be urged against the demand now made by Austria upon Turkey about the refugees. Those objections are, that it is unreasonable and incompatible with the dignity and independence of the Sultan that he should be made the gaoler of the Emperor of Austria, to take charge of persons whom the Austrian Government may consider politically dangerous; and that the performance of his duties as such gaoler should be subject to the superintendence of the agents of a foreign Power, and should continue until that foreign Power should consent to the cessation of his gaoler's duties. The Treaty of Bucharest does not give Austria a right to exact this servitude from the Sultan, and the duties of good neighbourhood do not require it at his hands. That which the Sultan is bound to do, is to prevent his territory from being made a place of shelter from whence machinations should be carried on to disturb the internal tranquillity of neighbouring States; but this obligation would be fully performed if the Sultan sends out of his dominions those subjects of foreign Powers who may justly be suspected of having intention so to abuse his hospitality. All, therefore, that Austria can require on the score of good neighbourhood—and this is more than by treaty she can demand—is that the Hungarian refugees should be sent out of Turkey; but to require that they should be detained and kept under restraint in Turkey is an unreasonable demand, and one which if Turkey were to comply with, it would do more harm to Austria in public opinion in Europe than could be counterbalanced by any conceivable

advantage to be derived from it. As to publications which these Hungarians might make in France or England, there are Hungarians enough come away to publish everything that can be said or revealed ; and as to the sympathy which Kossuth would excite here or in France, they may depend upon it that he will be a much greater object of interest while unjustly detained in Turkey than if he was living at a lodging in Paris or London. It is bad policy in the Austrian Government, as well as injustice. Pray endeavour to persuade them of this, and to prevail upon them to be content with the expulsion of these Hungarians.

I write you this, and desire you to do your best, though I hear from many quarters that you oppose instead of furthering the policy of your Government, and that you openly declare that you disapprove of our course. No diplomatist ought to hold such language as long as he holds his appointment. It is idle trash to say that we are hostile to Austria because we may disapprove of the policy of a Metternich or the cruelties of the Manning Administration which now governs Austria ; you might as well say that a man is the enemy of his friend because he tells that friend of errors and faults which are sinking him in the esteem of men whose good opinion is worth having.

And three days after to the same :—

F. O. : November 30, 1849.

The requirement of Austria about the Hungarian refugees is preposterous, and quite inconsistent with a due regard to the dignity and independence of the Sultan. It is as incompatible with the dignity of an independent Sovereign to make himself the gaoler for the State offenders of his neighbours as it would be for him to make himself purveyor for the executioner of that neighbour. Schwarzenberg, in his note of reply to Musurus, in pretending to quote what Musurus had said, put words into Musurus's mouth which Musurus did not use, and which materially alter the sense of the offered engagement. Musurus did not use the word 'Dorenavant ;' and he said nothing about the arrangement lasting as long as the Austrian Government might choose. But what a childish, silly fear this is of Kossuth. What great harm could he do to Austria while in France or England ? He would be the hero of half-a-dozen dinners in England, at which would be made speeches not more violent than those which have been made on platforms here within the last four months, and he would soon sink into comparative obscurity ;

while, on the other hand, so long as he is a State *détenu* in Turkey he is a martyr and the object of never-ceasing interest. As to any exposure which he might be able to make of the misdeeds of the Austrian Government, generals, and troops, there are others enough coming to England to lay bare to the public of Europe everything of that kind, and the detention of Kosuth would only infuse greater bitterness into the feelings with which such disclosures will be made. The Austrian Government, therefore, would do well, for its own sake and with a view to its own interest, to consent to the expulsion of the Hungarians from Turkey. But whether it consents or not, you may rely upon it that get away they will, by hook or by crook, and the Austrian Government will then cut a silly figure by being outwitted.

The contents of the following letter illustrate the imperious and sensitive character of the Emperor Nicholas, which, later on, came out so forcibly and painfully during the Crimean War. The audience, however, was given to the English ambassador a few days later; but it is probable that when Prince Menschikoff was sent to Constantinople in 1853, his Imperial master had not forgotten the mortification of 1849.

Broadlands: November 27, 1849.

My dear Bloomfield,—I have received your letter of the 8th, in which you say that the Emperor has not given you the usual audience on your return to your post, and that you have been privately informed that he means to see you only on public occasions. I am sorry for this, because I regret that these late Turkish affairs should have produced such an effect upon the Emperor's conduct towards the British representative at his Court, but still I scarcely think that it would be useful that the Queen should retaliate upon Brunnow. But, indeed, the habits of our Court scarcely leave room for retaliation. The Queen sees the foreign Ministers at levées, at concerts, and at balls, when all, or nearly all, are generally present, and about once a year she has the representatives of the principal Courts to dinner; but that would be later in the year, and by that time the Emperor may have altered his conduct towards you. We must make great allowances for the effect which a great political check must have produced upon the Emperor's mind; and his annoyance at so public a thwart-

ing is probably increased by the circumstance that it has been in some degree brought upon him by the injudicious zeal of Titow and Radzivil, who probably went beyond their instructions, and committed the Emperor further than he intended.

The mortification also is the greater because it has followed so quickly upon his great successes in Hungary, and has entirely dimmed the lustre of those successes; and, moreover, it must be galling to the lord and master of so many hundred thousand men and of near fifty sail of the line to be baffled by a squadron of seven sail of the line and by the time of the year. Our best course is not to take much notice of his ill-humour, and to try to bring him right again.

But though the Emperor will probably long remember what has happened, and will be long ready to take advantage of any opportunity to pay us off, yet when the Constantinople business is settled he will probably resume his usual cordiality, at all events in outward manner; and it may be some good long time before he may find an opportunity of giving us any serious embarrassment.

Nearly two years elapsed, however, before the Turkish Government could muster up courage to fly in the face of its powerful neighbour and liberate Kossuth with his companions. During this interval they were kept in honourable captivity at Kutayah. Much interest was taken in their fate, both in the United States and in England. Lord Palmerston writes to urge their release.

C. G.: February 10, 1851.

My dear Canning,—I have written you a despatch about Kossuth and his fellow exiles. I have made it as gentle as was possible; but pray let Reshid and Aali know privately that it is but a faint expression of the public feeling in this country on that subject.

You will have seen how the matter was noticed in the House of Commons in the debate on the Address; and I have representations coming in from large towns and small—from England, Scotland, and Wales.

There was last year great enthusiasm throughout the whole country in favour of the Sultan, because people here believed that the Turkish Government was animated by a generous and manly determination not to be the executioner or the gaoler of

either of the Emperors ; and it was that belief which led the country, from one end of it to the other—Whigs, Tories, Radicals—to applaud and back up the defiance which, by our advice and our squadron, we flung in the teeth of the two Imperial Governments. But the ground on which we took our stand is fast sinking under our feet, and the bright hopes which the nation entertained are rapidly fading away. The Sultan has certainly rescued the Poles and Hungarians from the rope and the bullet ; but he is making himself the degraded slave of Austria to consign the Hungarians to the lingering but not less certain doom of the prison.

I am ashamed of our protégés, the Sultan and his white-livered Ministers ; and you may tell the Ministers, confidentially but confidently, that if they go on in this way, not only not a squadron but not a cockboat would we, or could we, send in any case to their assistance, and the enthusiasm of last year is rapidly turning into contemptuous disgust at their servile consent to perform the most degrading office of turnkey for Prince Schwarzenberg.

In September the men were freed. Shortly afterwards a deputation from Islington that went to the Foreign Office, to congratulate Lord Palmerston on the event, caused some stir, owing to the language of the address and the tone of Lord Palmerston's reply. Among other things, he said that to gain the day 'much generalship and judgment had been required, and that during the struggle a good deal of judicious bottle-holding was obliged to be brought into play.' This simile, borrowed from the prize-ring, tickled the fancy of the public, and for many a day after, Lord Palmerston, drawn with a sprig in his mouth, figured in the pages of 'Punch' as the 'judicious bottle-holder.'

CHAPTER V.

GREEK AFFAIRS AND 'DON PACIFICO' DEBATE.

JUST as some unsightly knoll or insignificant stream has won imperishable fame by the accident of its crest or banks being the scene of a great battle, so did the name of a paltry adventurer become famous, in 1850, by its connection with a memorable debate. The fate of the Ministry as well as that of a Minister was involved, for the wrongs of Don Pacifico and the manner of their redress were only the battle-field on which a policy was attacked and bitter antagonisms fought out. The allied troops who led the attack were English Protectionists and foreign Absolutists. Victorious in their first onset among the Lords, they met with signal defeat in the House of Commons, after one of the most remarkable displays of eloquence and feeling that the walls of Parliament have witnessed.

Although the matters at issue were far wider than the narrow boundaries of Greece, it was round that centre that the contest principally raged; and it will be necessary, therefore, briefly to scan the ground-plan of the fight, and to recall the course of events which at last led the British Government to employ force.

Of all the races of Europe, none is more interesting than the Greek. It is singular to observe how many of its ancient characteristics have remained immutable amongst the varying misfortunes with which two thousand years have afflicted it. The same enterprising, speculative, and brilliant intellect which causes us to linger over the records of those three hundred years

that ennoble the history of the world is still alive, though scattered over the counting-houses and dispersed amidst the professional celebrities of Europe. It can hardly be denied that, amongst the men engaged in political affairs in Greece itself, have appeared gentlemen who, alike distinguished for their manners and their ability, might take place amongst the accomplished statesmen of their time. In the people are still found the virtues of industry and hospitality. But by a singular contrast, whilst the Greek nation might be esteemed and admired, the Greek Government never, during its varying vicissitudes, obtained or merited either esteem or admiration. The assassination of the illustrious citizen who had dedicated his life to her service;¹ the refusal to acknowledge as a debt the money which, in her most desperate need, was advanced to rescue her from despair, commenced a series of events that tarnished the lustre of a revolution which an undeniable right had sanctioned and an unquestioned heroism achieved. From the moment, in short, in which the agony of her glorious struggle was passed, and she had it in her power to realise the generous dreams of those whose hearts and hopes had accompanied her throughout it, Greece, or at least, the rulers of Greece, seemed bent on converting expectation into disappointment.

We have seen that, when the question of establishing Greek independence was being agitated, Lord Palmerston was amongst the first to feel the generous sentiments which animated the last days of Canning and Byron. Nor did his interest in the cause cease when it appeared triumphant. Although he did not accept the young Bavarian prince as a desirable candidate, he still entertained hopes that, aided by the counsels of Europe, he would be able to establish a government sufficiently just and stable to permit the fortunes of the country to grow up gradually under it. It was, perhaps, as a compliment to his patronage that

¹ Capo d'Istria.

it was determined that the newly-elected sovereign (aged 18) should land in his dominions from an English ship of war; and the vessel selected was the 'Bellerophon,' commanded by Captain Lyons. The naval profession at that time did not seem likely to offer those chances of distinction which the heroic in Captain Lyons' character would have preferred to any other. It struck him, then, that to be British Minister at a Court which was certain to concentrate on itself much of the attention of Europe, would be a desirable post; and with this idea before his mind, it is easy to conceive how he insinuated into the mind of King Otho the idea that he was precisely the man who, in such a situation, would be most agreeable and useful to him. A request was made in his behalf, and complied with.

By this transaction the King expected he had got a staunch supporter, and Captain Lyons a docile pupil. Both were soon disappointed, and very angry at being so.

It is no use disguising the fact, Captain Lyons, though a very good officer, and a very clever as well as agreeable man, was not a very good diplomatist.

The position was a false one, since each was likely to expect too much from the other. It was rendered more false by the character of the King being slow and cautious to a fault, and that of Captain Lyons being in the same degree hasty and impetuous. The King's natural counsellors were, moreover, Germans; and German statesmen could not be expected to entertain the same views of government that were likely to be entertained by English statesmen. Add to this, that as all Greeks who had the slightest pretension to places, expected to have them, there was certain, whatever party was in power, to be a strong party in opposition.

It has been the fashion of late years to consider, in the Foreign Office, that the country is made for the diplomacy, and not the diplomacy for the country; and that a Minister's duty is to see that so many thousands a year are divided with as much impartial indifference as possible, between so many gentlemen, who are pre-

sumed, by having passed certain examinations, to have acquired a claim on the fund.

A Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs being once asked why he did not appoint a very able and experienced diplomatist, then receiving a pension, to an important post that was then vacant, instead of another man much his inferior, replied, 'Your man has had his innings; it is another man's turn now!' It never struck the Minister that the question was not which man had been employed, but which was best for the public interest to employ. So an unthinking cry has been raised as to what is called 'a block in the service;' that is, as to pushing some men out of their places, and others into them, with a more rapid movement; and a Committee of the House of Commons once recommended that no Minister or Ambassador should be left more than five years in his post.

Yet anyone who has reflected on these subjects knows that the knowledge of most value in any profession, but especially in diplomacy, is that which you acquire daily, hourly, without being sensible that you acquire it, by practice and experience. It is quite true that a very clever man is more useful with a year's experience than a very stupid one with twenty years', for there are men so stupid that experience is thrown away on them. But take two men of equal ability, and the man who has been five years Minister or Ambassador at any place, is at least twenty times more fit for it than the man who has been wishing five years to be Minister or Ambassador at that place. It is not merely that one learns to do things better by habit in a particular calling—one learns what not to do.

Let us exercise but a little common sense. Would any great banking or mercantile house lay down, as a rule, to be always shifting its agents, and remove an agent who had been doing his business well at a particular place, to put another man, who perhaps had never seen the place, in his stead?

The folly of such a system is too apparent to need

proof; but if it were wanted, Captain Lyons was a capital instance of it. Captain Lyons was an active, able, ambitious, astute man; a man of the world, too: but he wanted experience in the business he had been plunged into, and consequently he was often firing off very big guns at very small affairs. Nevertheless, that his language and conduct in the main, as the representative of a State which had bestowed its countenance, given its assistance, and lent its money to Greece, were no more violent in their reprobation than circumstances fully justified, may be amply proved by the following exposition of the Finance Minister at Athens in 1846.

Gentlemen,—Some days ago you sent for me to give you some account of the state of our finances; and I excused myself on the plea of having just taken office. I now come down to this House to tell you that the finance department is in a complete state of disorganisation and paralysis: that no accounts exist either as to the revenue or the expenditure, and that it will be utterly impossible to furnish you with anything in the shape of a correct budget. In consequence of the dishonesty and incapacity of the public functionaries, the public accounts are in a state of chaos. All that M. Provilegio and others have told you respecting every honest man having been dismissed, and of the spoliation of the public money at Syra and elsewhere, is perfectly true. Millions are due to the State; and we do not know our debtors, as the revenue books have disappeared. This is the financial statement I have to make.¹

This was surely enough to account for all that could be thought of or said to the Government of Greece by the British Minister. But a diplomatist is frequently perched on the horns of a double dilemma. He strives by the courtesy and amiability of his personal relations to soften the character of official communications; and it is said of him, ‘You will never do anything with that man: he is too polite: they don’t believe him in earnest;’ or, on the other hand, he seeks, by a somewhat stern and severe manner, to give additional weight to the observations he is charged to make use of; and

¹ *Annual Register*, 1846, p. 303.

then the good-natured critic of the Foreign Office shrugs up his shoulders, and says, 'That fellow renders himself so cursedly disagreeable; who would do anything to oblige him, if he could help it?' However, the great crisis in Greek affairs took place not under the warlike *régime* of the naval captain, but under the mild one of the library philosopher.¹

When England, France, and Russia had brought Turkey to acknowledge the independence of Greece, the three Powers settled that the form of Government for the new kingdom should be a Monarchy; but England attached to her assent as an indispensable condition that it should be a Constitutional Monarchy. Consequently, when Prince Otho of Bavaria, then a minor, was called to the throne, the three Powers, on announcing the choice they had made, declared at the same time that constitutional institutions would be given by Otho as soon as he came of age. This declaration was ratified by the King of Bavaria, in the name and on behalf of his son, the young King of Greece.

This promise was not kept. The despotic Courts of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, naturally averse to constitutions, gladly availed themselves of the plea that the Greek was not yet ripe for representative government, in order to avoid pressing on Otho the fulfilment of his pledges. France kept aloof on the same ground, Guizot philosophising the while with his favourite simile, that if a six hundred horse-power engine is placed in a small skiff, it must tear it to pieces instead of moving it forward. England, therefore, stood alone in her remonstrances, and naturally incurred the dislike of those whom she considered that it was her invidious duty to reproach. In other matters, also, she was on the unpopular, while France, for her own objects, took the popular, side. Monsieur Guizot, in his *Memoirs*,² tries to distinguish in the following words between their respective attitudes:—

¹ Sir Thomas Wyse, who succeeded Lord Lyons.

² Vol. xii. p. 324.

Tandis qu'à Londres on acceptait l'indépendance de la Grèce comme une malencontreuse nécessité, nous n'acceptons à Paris que comme une nécessité fâcheuse les étroites limites dans lesquelles on resserrait cette indépendance.

But then he points the moral of his reflections by a very significant remark :—

Mais en repoussant toute tentative d'extension contre la Turquie, nous n'entendimes point interdire aux Grecs les grandes espérances.

Thus, while England saw well enough the difficulties which the Greeks would find in self-government, and considered the important matter was to urge them to learn the habits and practice of a Constitutional Monarchy, France, in order to retain a special influence, was secretly fostering hopes of future conquests and idealised glories.

On England, therefore, fell the burden of remonstrance against the evils of a constitution without free government, the fruit of which was licence without liberty. In the words of Lord Palmerston, the whole system grew to be full of every kind of abuse. Justice could not be expected where the judges were at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown. The finances could not be in any order where there was no public responsibility on the part of those who were to collect or to spend the revenue. Every sort of abuse was practised, from brigandage in the country to 'compulsory appropriation' in the capital itself, and the tyranny of the police was almost unbearable. To recall such a state of things is to provide some excuse for the English Minister at Athens, for the fact that a chronic ill-feeling existed between the two Governments, and prepared the way for an explosion. That explosion, as usually happens in such cases, was lighted at last by a very small match.

There were in every town of Greece a number of persons whom England was bound to protect—Maltese, Ionians, and others. It became the practice of this Greek police to make no distinction between them and

their own fellow-subjects. Compensation was from time to time demanded for many acts of violence to Ionians, but all in vain, till at length an outrage on the boat's crew of Her Majesty's ship *Fantôme*, and the cases of Mr. Finlay and Don Pacifico, exhausted Lord Palmerston's patience, and determined him to insist on an immediate compliance with his just demands. Mr. Finlay was a Scotchman, whose land was taken to round off the palace gardens at Athens, and no payment could be wrung from the appropriators. Unlike Frederick the Great, who pointed with pride to the mill in his grounds at Sans Souci as a proof that in his empire the rights of every subject, however humble, were respected, Otho could only show a heap of diplomatic notes and private petitions seeking justice, as a proof that in his kingdom it could nowhere be found.

M. Pacifico was a Jew, a native of Gibraltar, whose house was pillaged and gutted, in open day, by a mob headed by the sons of the Minister of War. While it was occurring no attempt was made by the authorities of Athens to protect him. During three years Sir E. Lyons and Mr. Wyse had pressed his claims for compensation without success. That some of his demands were extortionate there can be little doubt; but there can be even less doubt that he had been most grossly injured, and had a right to redress.

It was not without giving notice that Lord Palmerston determined to act. As long before as August 1847, he had written to Lord Bloomfield, our ambassador at Petersburg:—

No orders have as yet been sent to Parker to compel the Greek Government to comply with our various demands; but you should not conceal from Nesselrode and the Emperor that such orders must soon be sent, if Coletti does not render them unnecessary by voluntary compliance. There is not the slightest danger that Joinville should give Parker the trouble of giving him a passage to Portsmouth, because we are too palpably in the right to make it possible for France to oppose us by force of arms; and we are stronger than she is in the Mediterranean,

and therefore there is the best possible security for her good behaviour. Tell Nesselrode and the Emperor that if they think the enforcement of our demands would be injurious to the stability of Greece, an opinion which we in no degree share, the only way of preventing it is to persuade Coletti to do what we require, as the Greeks have ample means to pay us if they choose.

Monsieur Coletti, 'chef de Pallicares,' the crafty physician of Ali Pacha, and erewhile the adventurous chief of half-savage insurgents in Epirus, having been for eight years Greek Minister at Paris, had returned to Athens after the constitutional revolution in 1843, and was now Prime Minister. He was a fit subject for a pen such as Monsieur About's. His character is thus traced by Lord Palmerston:¹—

I have no doubt that Coletti would, as Wallenstein says, prefer France to the gallows, but I do not see why he should be reduced to that alternative. To be sure, St. Aulaire said to me the other day that Coletti was a necessary Minister, for that he is the chief and leader of all the robbers and scamps of Greece, and that if he was turned out of office, he would put himself at their head, and either make incursions into Turkey or ravage the provinces of Greece. To this I replied that it seemed an odd qualification for a Minister that a man was a robber by profession, but that I did not share St. Aulaire's apprehension of what might happen if Coletti was turned out, because if in that case he invaded Turkey he would probably be shot, and if he plundered Greece he would no doubt be hanged. But he will not be turned out; Otho loves him as a second self, because he is as despotic as Otho himself; and as long as a majority can be had for Coletti in the Chambers, by corruption and intimidation, by the personal influence of the King, and by money from France, Coletti will remain Minister. With this we cannot meddle; all we can insist upon is justice for our subjects and payment of the interest on that part of the debt which we have guaranteed. If we cannot get these things, we must have recourse to compulsion. If we do get them, we cannot interfere further; and I daresay Coletti will be wise enough to satisfy our demands, and not to drive us to extreme measures.

¹ To Lord Normanby, F. O., April 20, 1847.

As to Lyons, there has been a standing conspiracy against him for several years past among all his diplomatic colleagues, headed by the Greek Government. Lyons has been looked upon as the only advocate of constitutional government. Otho and Coletti wish it at the devil. Piscatory detests it, because the French Government think they can exercise more influence over Ministers and Courts than over popular assemblies; the Bavarian Minister has, like his King, been hitherto all for despotism; Prokesch, obeying Metternich, goes into convulsions at the very notion of popular institutions; the Prussian Minister has been told implicitly to follow the Austrian; and the Russian only dares support the Constitutional party when there is a chance of Otho being frightened away and of his making room for the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. All these gentlemen, therefore, combined to suppress all information as to the disorders and abuses going on in Greece, and united to run down Lyons.

Lord Palmerston at last notified formally to the English Minister at Athens that the end of British forbearance had arrived.

F. O.: December 3, 1849.

My dear Wyse,—I have desired the Admiralty to instruct Sir William Parker to take Athens on his way back from the Dardanelles, and to support you in bringing at last to a satisfactory ending the settlement of our various claims upon the Greek Government. You will of course, in conjunction with him, persevere in the *suaviter in modo* as long as is consistent with our dignity and honour, and I measure that time by days—perhaps by some very small number of hours. If, however, the Greek Government does not strike, Parker must do so. In that case you should embark on board his fleet before he begins to take any hostile steps, in order that you and your mission may be secure against insult. He should, of course, begin by reprisals; that is, by taking possession of some Greek property; but the King would probably not much care for our taking hold of any merchant property, and the best thing, therefore, would be to seize hold of his little fleet, if that can be done handily. The next thing would be a blockade of any or all of his ports; and if that does not do, then you and Parker must take such other steps as may be requisite, whatever those steps may be. I remember that at one time it was thought that a

landing of marines and sailors at some town might enable us to seize and carry off public treasure of sufficient amount. Of course, Pacifico's claim must be fully satisfied.

You should intimate to the Greek Government that although we do not this time come to levy the amount due to us on account of the Greek loan, yet we abstain from doing so in order to give them an opportunity of doing the right thing of their own accord; but that we cannot go on requiring the people of this country to pay fifty thousand a year to enable King Otho to corrupt his Parliament, bribe his electors, build palaces, and lay up a stock purse for evil times, which his bad policy may bring upon him.

The fleet arrived at Athens, but the demands made upon the Greek Government were not complied with. The French and Russian Ministers were furious at our prompt action, and did their best to spirit up the King of Greece to resistance.

F. O. : February 1, 1850.

My dear Normanby,—An agricultural speech of Granby enables me to leave the House and add a few lines to what I have already written to you about Greek affairs. I think you may put to Lahitte what a contrast there is between the conduct of English agents towards France and that of French agents towards England. The French representative in Morocco, partly out of his own head, and partly by instructions from home, made demands on the Morocco Government, some of which were unusual and some exaggerated, and which the Moorish Government was most unwilling to accede to. Our Consul-General, Mr. Hay, first spontaneously, and then by instructions from me, bestirred himself with as much zeal and activity as if the case had been one in which his own Government had been concerned, and by an infinity of trouble persuaded the Morocco Government to comply with the French demands, and thus saved France from the necessity of employing force to obtain redress. In Greece we have demands for redress which have been pending for years, and the neglect and refusal of which we have borne with most exemplary patience, and when at last we find it necessary either to abandon or enforce them, and not being able consistently with our duty to give them up, we send our fleet to support the demands of our diplomatic agent, we find the French Minister, faithful to the

course which French diplomacy has for years past pursued in Greece, encouraging the Greek Government to refuse, and thus doing all he can to drive us to the necessity of employing force to obtain redress. I must say that we have good ground for complaining of the ungrateful return which we receive for our good offices in aid of France.

As to the melodrama which you talk of, it seems to me to have been quite the right course. Our squadron arrived, and Parker would not have been justified in assuming beforehand that the demands, which Wyse was to repeat, would be refused. Parker, therefore, on his arrival saluted as usual, and with his officers paid his respects to the King before Wyse repeated his demands. This was in good taste and well judged, because it took off from his arrival the public appearance of a menace, and left the Greek Government at liberty to yield without the appearance of constraint.

I should have blamed Parker if he had come in with a swaggering air of threatening preparation, with his tompions out and his men at their quarters, so as to have made it impossible for Otho not to appear to be passing under the Caudine Forks. But French diplomacy has ever been bitterly hostile to us in Greece; and as the French Government has chosen to retain there its former diplomatic agent, the same spirit of petty jealousy and national enmity prevails in the French mission at Athens which we have had to lament and to cope with during the whole reign of Louis Philippe.

What is it the French object to as to our proceedings? We have demanded redress for wrongs committed towards our subjects; our demands have been long treated with neglect, silence, or refusals. We send at last our squadron to enforce them. Does not France act in a similar way in similar cases, only with far more violence and less justice? Witness her exploits at Tahiti and Sandwich Islands, where she, on false pretences, bullied the Queen of the first into a surrender of her independence and plundered the King of the other because he would not alter his tariffs on brandy and compel his Custom-house officers to learn French.

But we have all along been thwarted in Greece by the intrigues and cabals of French agents, who have encouraged the Greek Government to ill-use our subjects and to refuse us satisfaction, and of course Thouvenel is frantic that we have at last lost patience.

On the refusal of the Greek Government to accede

to our demands, the British admiral proceeded, according to his instructions, to lay an embargo upon certain vessels at the Piræus. Lord Palmerston thus communicates these proceedings to Drouyn de Lhuys, French Minister in London:—

C. G.: February 8, 1850.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,—Voici un extrait d'une dépêche de l'amiral Parker au Chevalier Baring, en date du 22 janvier.

The Greek vessels herein referred to (as having been detained) include, I believe, all that the Greek Government have in commission. The whole are of little value, and in the present temper of the Greek Government, supported, as it seems, by the counsels of the French Minister and of the Prussian chargé d'affaires, the mild measures hitherto adopted, I fear, are not likely to produce the desired compliance with our demands.

Je suis peiné de voir que l'action de la mission française à Athènes continue à nous être si hostile, mais du moins ceux qui nous forcent à des mesures de sévérité ne doivent pas nous en faire un sujet de reproches.

Mille amitiés,

PALMERSTON.

Je viens d'apprendre que M. de Thouvenel a appelé l'escadre française à Athènes; nous souhaitons rester bons amis, mais cela pourrait devenir sérieux.

Monsieur Thouvenel had called upon the French fleet to come to Athens. The admiral had, however, sufficient discretion to wait for further instructions from home. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Normanby:—

F. O.: February 14, 1850.

I have had despatches and letters from Wyse up to January 30. Thouvenel was continuing to pursue his system of reckless hostility, and doing all the mischief he could by stimulating Persiani to join him in improper notes to Wyse, and in encouraging Otho to refuse compliance with our demands. Thouvenel had written to the French admiral to come to Athens, of course to oppose our proceedings; but the admiral having more sense than the diplomatist, declined to do so without orders from home.

Some of the notes written by Thouvenel, and, at his sug-

gestion, by Persiani, are really laughably absurd and ridiculously impertinent. As an instance of the latter, he expresses his astonishment that Parker should have presumed to detain a Greek steamer before the eyes of the commander of a French corvette, which was actually lying in the Piræus at the time; and, as an example of the former, he protests against our getting compensation for wrongs done to British subjects, because he says the Greek Government is bound to apply the first produce of its revenues to the interest and sinking fund of the guaranteed debt, an engagement which the Greek Government has *never* fulfilled, which we should be glad if France would join us in compelling King Otho to fulfil, and which, if fulfilled, would still leave ample funds out of which our demands could be satisfied. This protest is really a burlesque. In the meanwhile the Greeks were beginning to understand the rights of the case, and when they saw us detaining the *Otho*, they said we were taking away the wrong one.

Parker had been obliged to begin reprisals on merchant ships, and he expected to have in that way sufficient value to cover our claims.

The surprise of Lahitte¹ that we were going on with reprisals is like the exclamation of the Neapolitans about the Austrian troops, 'Ma cè canone!' or the reply of the aide-de-camp sent out, when our troops first landed in Portugal, to see what the outpost firing was, who came back and said, 'Why, they are actually firing ball cartridge.' I think it not unlikely that Otho (for it all depends on him) may have given way before the French negotiation begins, but we cannot suspend our operations more than such time as may be reasonable to allow the French negotiator a fair opportunity to persuade Otho to give in.

Our case is good; our right indisputable; Greece is an independent State and responsible for the acts and misdeeds of her Government, and redress must be had. If the French are unreasonable and angry, I am sorry for it; but justice to our own subjects is a paramount consideration.

The French Government, finding we were in earnest, and that we were not to be intimidated by any action of the Powers at Athens, began to fear lest the matter should be settled without their having any share in it.

¹ Gen. Lahitte, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

They had, accordingly, offered their good offices. Lord Palmerston had accepted their offer, but only on the understanding that there was to be no discussion on the principle of our demands, and even on the amount only as to some of them.

Baron Gros was ordered to Athens by the French Cabinet as mediator. The blockade and reprisals were to be suspended during the continuance of his efforts to accommodate matters. Lord Palmerston writes to his brother :—

F. O. : February 15, 1850.

We accept the good offices of France in regard to Greece in the same way in which we did so in the case of Naples in 1840, to obtain for us satisfaction, but not to arbitrate about our claims. King Otho is the *enfant gâté de l'absolutisme*, and therefore all the arbitrary Courts are in convulsions at what we have been doing ; but it is our long forbearance, and not our precipitation, that deserves remark. The papers to be laid before Parliament will be ready in a day or two, and will show this. What has happened may serve as a hint to other Governments who turn a deaf ear to our remarks, and think to wear us out by refusals or evasions.

I conclude that by this time Parker will have got together Greek vessels enough belonging to the Government and to private individuals to be a sufficient security for payment of what is claimed. And, of course, we shall not let this security out of our hands till the money we claim is actually paid to the persons for whom it is demanded.

Political matters are looking well here. Our majorities in the two Houses have been decisive, and the measures we have brought in and announced seem to give satisfaction. There will be no change of Government this year, nor probably the next. Peel finds it impossible to discover a party who will accept him as leader to form a Government ; and Stanley, though he has a party as Opposition leader, is judged by them as by his own son, who says, ‘ My father is a very clever man, but he has no judgment, and would not do for a Minister of this country.’

And the same day to Mr. Wyse at Athens :—

Nothing could be better than the manner in which you and Sir William Parker have conducted the affair to which your

communications relate. You have both of you combined firmness, decision, and promptitude with all the moderation, forbearance, and courtesy compatible with the execution of your instructions. My despatches give you full instructions for the future. Baron Gros is, I believe, as good a choice as the French could have made, but he is a Frenchman, and of course an Othoist. I have purposely fixed no time for the duration of the suspension of reprisals, but you will put him on his honour to tell you when he has failed, if fail he should. Perhaps, however, he may succeed. All depends on his instructions. We accept good offices to procure a settlement of our demands, and not arbitration as to the amount of them. In fact, the only one which could admit of discussion in regard to its amount is that of Pacifico; but if his documents are right, as I believe them to be, his claim is as clear as the rest. We must have money, *toccante sonante*, and not promises to pay. Those promises would infallibly be broken, and we should have to begin all over again. The word of the Greek Government is as good as its bond, and the bondholders can tell us what that is worth. Besides, after the systematic violation of the article of the Treaty of 1832, as to applying the first proceeds of the revenue to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the debt, no confidence can be placed, even in a treaty engagement, if such should be offered to us. The plea of poverty cannot be listened to at a moment when fresh expenses, diplomatic and military, are without any necessity incurred.

Monsieur Thouvenel, however, did not cease from his active though secret opposition to the action of the British Government. Such an old diplomatist as Lord Normanby should hardly have required such a hint as the following :—

F. O. : February 22, 1850.

My dear Normanby,—One word more about Thouvenel and I have done with him. In your private letters and public despatches you argue that Thouvenel cannot have done certain things because *you are told* by the French Ministers that he has not reported having done so; or because you have had shown to you despatches in which he makes no mention of having done such things; or because you have seen or have heard of private letters written by him to his friends implying that he has pursued a different line of conduct. All I can say in reply is, that against these negative inferences I place the positive

assertions of our Minister and Admiral and the tone and substance of Thouvenel's own notes, which latter are quite irreconcilable with the statements in his private letters. But you are surely too good a diplomatist not to be aware that there are such things as private letters and public despatches written expressly that they may be shown, and you must, moreover, be aware that the mere fact that a foreign agent is said by his employer not to have mentioned that he did a particular thing, is no proof that he did not do it. Nesselrode stoutly asserted that Titow had never told the Turkish Government that the escape of any of the refugees would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Russia and Austria, but we are morally certain that such a declaration was made both by Titow and Stürmer. Thouvenel may be a very gentlemanlike man in private society, but that does not prevent his being a reckless intriguer in a political crisis, and there is nothing in the political habits of French diplomatists, especially of those of the Guizot school, that can render it improbable that he should be so.

A fortnight later, the same accounts arrive:—

F. O. : March 12, 1850.

I am somewhat afraid that when Gros gets to Athens, he will find France so engaged in support of the Greek Government that he will scarcely be able to disentangle himself from the meshes spread for him by Thouvenel ; but if he does not do so, his mission will be a failure. We have got, I imagine, vessels enough to make good our demands, and we shall certainly not let one of them go till we, or those on whose behalf we make our demands, have been paid in hard cash the amount of their just claims.

The Russian Government was not less hostile than France, although more decorous in its hostility. It had expressed its disapproval in a strongly-worded despatch. Lord Palmerston writes to the English Minister at St. Petersburg:—

C. G. : March 27, 1850.

We do not mind the Russian swagger and attempt to bully about Greece. We shall pursue our own course steadily and firmly, and we must and shall obtain the satisfaction we require. The amount of money which we demand is really so small that the bottleholders of Greece ought to be ashamed of

the rout they make about it. But it is not the money that makes the essential part of the case in their eyes; they are furious at seeing that the spoilt child of Absolutism, whom they have been encouraging on for many years past to insult and defy England, should at last have received a punishment from which they are unable to protect him. It is not the number of stripes that he has received which they care about, but the fact that we have laid our stick over his back and that they have not been able to prevent it. As to Nesselrode's mysterious hints of evil consequences which may follow if we continue to detain the Greek merchant ships, he may be assured that we shall detain them till we get paid, or rather till the persons for whom we make our demands shall have been paid, barring the Portuguese claims of Pacifico, which are matters for investigation, and may probably admit of considerable abatement. But the number of merchantmen detained has been much exaggerated, and does not, I believe, exceed forty, or, at the utmost, fifty.

The Russian ambassador having written to complain of the language of the 'Globe' and 'Morning Post' about the Emperor's acts and policy, Lord Palmerston's answer is as follows:—

F. O. : May 16, 1850.

My dear John Russell,—I return you Brunnow's letter. Any articles in the newspapers to which he alludes were drawn upon the Russian Government by the unprecedented publication of Nesselrode's despatch of the 17th March, and by the boastful threats made by the 'Times' newspaper as to what Russia would do to put a stop to our proceedings in Greece. This war of words is, no doubt, much to be deprecated, but the responsibility for any evils which it may produce must rest with those by whom it is begun. With regard to the Russian despatch, the feeling in this country has been but one, and that one universal; and I happen to know that a leading man among our opponents in Parliament said lately that he must withhold his approval of our conduct with regard to Greece until he knew whether we had answered it in a manner befitting the dignity of England.

Baron Gros was very dilatory, and by his conduct gave colour to the suspicion that he meant to fail in his good offices, trusting that the English Govern-

ment would not venture to renew the embargo, and that thus the whole matter would be transferred for consideration to London or Paris. It was gall and wormwood to the French and Russians that the negotiations should be going on at Athens, with the guns of the British fleet on the spot ready to support the Minister, and to coerce if all proposals were refused.

F. O.: May 7, 1850.

My dear Wyse.—Gros had, up to the date of your last received despatches, been perpetually trying to slide out of his character of organ of good offices, and to place himself in the position of arbiter. He was sent, under our acceptance of the good offices of France, to endeavour to prevail upon the Greek Government to agree to our demands, and his whole labour and exertions seem to have been directed to prevail upon you to give up, or greatly to modify, those demands. In short, he has acted as the avowed advocate of Greece; and I much admire the coolness with which, when asked by you whether, if you agreed to his required abatements, he could answer for the consent of the Greek Government, he replied that he could do no such thing. His game was first to beat you down as low as he could, and then to come back and to say that he could not bring the Greek Government up to that point, and that you must therefore come down lower still, or else he must go away. When Drouyn¹ has held this sort of language, and said that Gros would be obliged to renounce his task, I have always said, 'Well, what of it? so much the worse for the Greeks, that's all.' Drouyn, however, has behaved very well all along.

As to the claims of foreigners, Prussians or others, on account of the detention of their cargoes in Greek vessels, our answer would be, that a man who chooses to put his property on board a vessel belonging to another country must take his chance as to any difficulties into which that country may get with other Powers, and all the remedy which he can justly have is to get his cargo back again on proof that it really belongs to him. Last year, during the Danish hostilities against Germany, many of our merchants had cargoes on board German ships. Those ships were captured by the Danes, and the only remedy our merchants had was to prove ownership before the Prize Court at Copenhagen, and thus to get their goods delivered up to them.

¹ French ambassador in London.

While the convention with the French Government—which was to form the basis of their exercise of good offices—was being settled in London, matters were advancing at Athens. Baron Gros, after long and tedious negotiations, threw up his office as mediator, and thereupon Mr. Wyse renewed the embargo and seized anew several vessels. This at length brought the Greeks to terms, and they finally agreed to send a letter of apology for the affair of the *Fundana*, to pay a sum of 180,000 drachmas for *Finlay* and *Pacifico*, and not to aid or put forward any claims for compensation for the ships that had been detained, which were, in return, to be immediately released. This was a great triumph for Lord Palmerston. His resolution and calm persistency had attained the desired end, in spite of difficulties and opposition which might well have daunted a smaller man. But his troubles were not yet over. The French were beyond measure annoyed that the dispute should at last have been settled by our own means and not by their good offices. They tried to fix a quarrel upon England on the ground of breach of faith, in recurring to the employment of force without waiting for the result of their intervention. As Baron Gros had notified both to Mr. Wyse and to the Greek Government, two days before the renewal of hostilities, that his mission was at an end, this was an entirely baseless charge. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, however, was recalled from London: and General Lahitte, the French Foreign Minister, read a despatch in the Chambers in which he openly charged the British Government with duplicity. Anxious questions were put in both Houses of Parliament, and many thought we were on the verge of war.

Lord Palmerston knew better, and writes to Lord Normanby:—

F. O. : May 17, 1850.

It is clear that the French Government think a quarrel with us would be useful to them at home. In my answer in the House yesterday I purposely abstained from stating that

Drouyn was ordered back to Paris as a mark of dissatisfaction, because it would have been very improper in me to proclaim a difference which I hoped might be adjusted. Of course, Lahitte was at liberty, if he thought fit, to announce the terms of his own instructions to his own ambassador. It was not for me to do so unless I had intended to widen the breach.

C. G. : May 19, 1850.

Drouyn came to me on Tuesday, and I spent four and a half hours in going through the papers with him, and in explaining our course. On Wednesday he came back to me, and began by reading to me Lahitte's despatch. Nevertheless, we went on for a couple of hours going through some of the papers which we had not gone through sufficiently the day before. As he was leaving me he said he should start that evening, as the next day his Government would lay papers before the Assembly, and it was important that he should be able to communicate with his Government before the Chamber met. I said I thought he was quite right, and I begged him to give the substance of the explanations I had given him.

I further assured him that we never had intended any disrespect to the French Government, and did not think that we could be justly charged with having broken any engagement; and I said that, considering the many great and important interests, not merely English and French, but also European, which require that a good understanding should be maintained and a close connection kept up between England and France, I did earnestly hope that his Government would not set up a *querelle d'Allemand* between the two countries; but that the decision rested with them, as there were certain things which we could not do, and which they ought not to ask us to do. We parted with many friendly personal assurances mutually exchanged; though I by no means pretend to assert that on the points at issue I succeeded in satisfying him.

The best and shortest account of the matter of Drouyn's recall was given by the Duke of Wellington, at a party given at Lord Anglesey's, on Thursday evening, to celebrate his, Lord Anglesey's, birthday. When the Duke came in, several people flocked round him and asked him what he thought of the matter. His reply was, 'Oh, oh, it's all right; it's all nonsense!' I see clearly that there was a combined and conjoint operation, and that it was preconcerted somewhere, and by some of our good friends and allies, that Drouyn should receive his order to return on the Queen's birthday, and that

Brunnow and Cetto should send excuses and not attend my dinner on that day. All this was what the Americans would say 'cruel small,' and savours much of the strategy of the 'Tambour Major' of Paris, as I am told our old friend the Princess¹ is called. The Duke of Devonshire, when he heard, at his party on Wednesday evening, that Brunnow and Cetto had excused themselves from the dinner, said it was a proof how far democratic principles and feelings had spread, for that in former times no diplomatists would have been guilty of so great an impropriety. I have seen neither of them since.

The bolt has missed its aim, however, and people here pretty plainly understand the whole affair. I suppose that by this time the Parisians also begin to see through the millstone. However, those who meant to punish me have in one respect gained their object, for I cannot, in the present state of things, go down to Broadlands for the four days of Whitsuntide.

Lord Palmerston had now to exercise his diplomatic ingenuity in order to smooth over French susceptibility. He sought, therefore, some means of putting France forward as a successful mediator, and he managed it thus. There were some further claims of Pacifico's which were based upon the loss of papers which were his vouchers for certain demands upon the Portuguese Government. In the agreement with Mr. Wyse it had been arranged that a joint inquiry of the two Governments should ascertain whether they were well founded or not, and that meanwhile a deposit should be paid by the Greek Government. Lord Palmerston wished to propose to France, that, instead of a joint inquiry by the two Governments concerned, there should be arbiters and an umpire, to be named by the joint concurrence of the British, French, and Greek plenipotentiaries. There was besides, as we have seen above, an engagement entered into with Mr. Wyse that the Greek Government should not put forward or support any claims for compensation for the detention of ships. Lord Palmerston suggested that there should be substituted for this engagement the good offices of France,

¹ Princess Lieven, whose husband had been Russian ambassador in London.

who should advise the King of Greece neither to start nor to aid any such claims. The French Foreign Minister was, however, in no humour to be appeased.

C. G. : May 22, 1850.

My dear John Russell,—You will see that Lahitte, who, I take it, is pretty nearly the mere organ of Piscatory and Thiers, simply refuses our proposal, without giving reasons or proposing anything else. His view of the matter seems to be that ‘the quarrel is a mighty pretty quarrel as it stands, and it would be a pity to spoil it by explanation.’

But Normanby’s conversation with the President brings another question under the consideration of the Cabinet. Louis Napoleon would be satisfied, as I infer, if to the arbitration we added the restitution of the deposit, and this the Cabinet will have to consider to-morrow. The reasons for and against seem to me to be much as follows. In favour of it, may be said that the Parliament and the public would be glad of a settlement of the dispute, and would not examine very minutely the conditions of the arrangement; that they would not much like a prolonged estrangement between England and France, merely on account of the question as to the manner of settling the very doubtful claims of Pacifico in regard to his Portuguese documents, and they might not easily understand why we should face a quarrel with France rather than accept now a diplomatic security which we were willing to think sufficient on the 19th of last month. This would, probably, be the broad view of the matter taken by those who look only to the surface of things, and they are the majority here as well as elsewhere.

On the other hand, it must be owned that if, in order to appease the anger of the French Government (I do not say France, for I do not believe the French people care a straw about the matter), we return to Otho the deposit which he was compelled to place in our hands, the relanding of that sum from the British steamer in the Piræus will be looked upon in Greece and in Europe generally as an act of submission by England to France, as a *baisse de pavillon*, and that it will very much affect our moral position among the nations of the world; at least, this would be the tendency of the act as regards the impression to be produced upon those classes of men whom I have mentioned, who do not look below the surface of things, and who take only a broad view of affairs. France would be in some degree acting the part of the constable who comes up and

bids Griffin restore twenty pounds which he had compelled Pigsnull to lend him against his will.

Lord Palmerston was, however, equal to the occasion. He suggested that this objection would be obviated if the restitution of the deposit was accompanied by an engagement to adhere to their promises on the part of the Greek Government in the form of a convention to be signed in the presence of the French plenipotentiaries, who would thus indirectly act as guarantors of the undertaking. This ingenious device to save English honour while soothing French susceptibilities is a fair sample of one branch of the 'art of diplomacy.' It proved ultimately successful, but the next letter to St. Petersburg shows that there were meanwhile various agencies at work trying hard to keep the two nations apart:—

F. O. : May 24, 1850.

My dear Bloomfield,—I have been so busy fighting my battle with France that I have been obliged to put off for a time taking up again my skirmish with Russia, but I have written a short answer to Nesselrode's last long despatch about Greek affairs and a reply to Brunnow's protest, and you shall have them both by the next opportunity. I think we shall be able to come to an understanding with France, unless the French Government want to pick a quarrel with us, and if that is their intention, of course they can carry it into effect. This storm got up at Paris has had, however, a double object, first to knock me over, next to sever the connection between England and France. The Orleanist clique and Madame Lieven aimed at the first result; the Russian party, led and aided by Madame Lieven, calculated upon the second. There have been in London within the last week letters from Madame Lieven to friends of hers here, abusing me like a pickpocket, and full of indignation and disappointment that we did not send for Normanby the moment the French Government sent for Drouyn. She was unable to suppress her mortification that they had not succeeded in producing a decided rupture between the two countries. Of course, she and Kisseleff¹ hunt in couples, and we well know that Kisseleff's language at Paris

¹ Russian ambassador in Paris.

and Brunnow's at London are both of them adapted to the purposes of the Russian Government at each place.

All the accounts which come from Greece state that the Greeks complain, not of what we have done, but of what we have not done ; they say the English brought Otho, the English ought to have taken him away.

The French were delaying coming to a settlement knowing that the Opposition were stirring in England, and hoping to get some aid from the debates in Parliament. On June 17, Lord Stanley moved in the House of Lords the following resolution :—

That while the House fully recognises the right and duty of the Government to secure to Her Majesty's subjects residing in foreign States the full protection of the laws of those States, it regrets to find, by the correspondence recently laid upon the table by Her Majesty's command, that various claims against the Greek Government, doubtful in point of justice or exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece, and calculated to endanger the continuance of our friendly relations with other Powers.

Lord Stanley's fervid attack upon the conduct of the Foreign Secretary was supported with much energy by Lord Aberdeen and Lord Brougham. His motion was carried by a majority of thirty-seven ; and Lord Palmerston wrote next morning to Paris as follows :—

F. O. : June 18, 1850.

We were beaten last night in the Lords by a larger majority than we had up to the last moment expected, but when we took office we knew that our opponents had a larger pack in the Lords than we had, and that whenever the two packs were to be fully dealt out, theirs would show a larger number than ours.

When the Protectionists have thought that a defeat on any particular question in the Lords would make us resign, such as would have been the case with regard to the Navigation Laws, for instance, last year, they have carefully abstained from mustering their whole strength. Last night they felt confident that we should not go out on account of an adverse vote of the

House of Lords, and they brought up all their men, even the hospital invalids.

What the Commons may do remains to be seen, but I greatly doubt the Protection party there venturing to propose resolutions similar to those of the Lords. If they do, I think we know pretty well what the result would be.

Not only was no adverse motion made in the House of Commons, but, on June 24, Mr. Roebuck moved, as a reply to the vote of the Lords, the following resolution:—

That the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government have been regulated have been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country, and in times of unexampled difficulty to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world.

A debate of four nights' duration followed. On the second night Lord Palmerston rose, and in a speech of four hours long, which was a masterpiece of argument and of detailed reasoning, vindicated his whole policy.

He began by expressing his opinion that those by whose act the question had been brought under the discussion of Parliament had not conducted themselves with a sufficient sense of the gravity and importance of the issues involved.

For if that party in this country imagine that they are strong enough to carry the Government by storm, and to take possession of the citadel of office, or if, without intending to measure their strength with that of their opponents, they conceive that there are matters of such gravity connected with the conduct of the Government, that it becomes their duty to call upon Parliament solemnly to record its disapprobation of what has passed, I think that either in the one case or in the other that party ought not to have been contented with obtaining the expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought to have sent down their resolution for the consent and concurrence of this House; or, at least, those who act with them in political co-operation here should themselves have proposed

to this House to come to a similar resolution. But, be the road what it may, we have come to the same end; and the House is substantially considering whether they will adopt the resolution of the House of Lords or the resolution which has been submitted to them by my hon. friend the member for Sheffield.

Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well as the past. It lays down for the future a principle of national policy which I consider totally incompatible with the interests, with the rights, with the honour, and with the dignity of the country, and at variance with the practice, not only of this, but of all other civilised countries in the world. The country is told that British subjects in foreign lands are entitled to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to reside. The country is told that British subjects abroad must not look to their own country for protection, but must trust to that indifferent justice which they may happen to receive at the hands of the Government and tribunals of the country in which they may be.

Now I deny that proposition, and I say it is a doctrine on which no British Minister ever yet has acted, and on which the people of England never will suffer any British Minister to act. Do I mean to say that British subjects abroad are to be above the law, or are to be taken out of the scope of the laws of the land in which they live? I mean no such thing. I contend for no such principle. Undoubtedly, in the first instance, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of the land affords them when that law is available for such purpose. . . . It is only on a denial of justice or upon decisions manifestly unjust that the British Government should be called upon to interfere. But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their composition and nature, not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them.

I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance of a case in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a British subject to be simply amenable to the laws of the foreign country in which he happened to be. I am not going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia; nor of a country, the Constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands of the Sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where, not long ago, a decree was passed that any man who was found with concealed arms

in his possession should be brought before a court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot. Now, this happened. An innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial, accused under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife, which they denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the counsel for the prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no proof that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was in the place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant said, that such being the opinion of the counsel for the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence, and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court, however, nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against him, and the next morning the man was shot.

Now, what would the English people have said if this had been done to a British subject? and yet everything done was the result of a law, and the man was found guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country.

I say, then, that our doctrine is that, in the first instance, redress should be sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases where redress cannot be so had—and those cases are many—to confine a British subject to that remedy only would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive.

He then proceeded with a short sketch of English relations with the Greek kingdom and of the deplorable state of law, justice, and police in that country, and continued:—

We shall be told, perhaps, as we have already been told, that if the people of the country are liable to have heavy stones placed upon their breasts and police-officers to dance upon them; if they are liable to have their heads tied to their knees, and to be left for hours in that state; or to be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they swing, foreigners have no right to be better treated than the natives, and have no business to complain if the same things are practised upon them. We may be told this, but that is not my opinion, nor do I believe it is the opinion of any reasonable man. Then, I say, that in considering the cases of the Ionians, for whom we demanded reparation, the House must look at and consider what was the state of things in this respect in Greece; they must consider the

practices that were going on, and the necessity of putting a stop to the extension of these abuses to British and Ionian subjects by demanding compensation, scarcely indeed more than nominal in some cases, but the granting of which would be an acknowledgment that such things should not be done towards us in future.

In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say that they appear to me to have been dealt with elsewhere in a spirit and in a tone which I think was neither befitting the persons concerning whom, nor the persons by whom, nor the persons before whom, the discussion took place. It is often more convenient to treat matters with ridicule than with grave argument, and we have had serious things treated jocosely, and grave men kept in a roar of laughter for an hour together at the poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable habitation of another, at the nationality of one injured man, or the religion of another, as if because a man was poor he might be bastinadoed and tortured with impunity, as if a man who was born in Scotland might be robbed without redress, or because a man is of the Jewish persuasion he is fair game for any outrage. It is a true saying, and has often been repeated, that a very moderate share of human wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human affairs. But there is another truth, equally indisputable, which is, that a man who aspires to govern mankind ought to bring to the task generous sentiments, compassionate sympathies, and noble and elevated thoughts.

After relating the story of Finlay and Pacifico in some detail, he proceeded :—

M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious silence, it came at last to this, either that his demand was to be abandoned altogether, or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of enforcing the claim. ‘Oh ! but,’ it is said, ‘what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a Power !’ Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its evil acts ? Is it to be held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage, plunder in a country which is small and weak, you are to tell them when they apply for redress that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation ? Their answer would be that the weakness and smallness of the

country make it so much the more easy to obtain redress. 'No,' it is said, 'generosity is to be the rule. We are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we cannot give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of procuring it.'

But, it was urged, Pacifico is such a notorious scoundrel.

I say with those who have before had occasion to advert to the subject that I do not care what M. Pacifico's character is. I do not, and cannot admit, that because a man may have acted amiss on some other occasion, and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redress to a man because in some former transaction he may have done something which is questionable. Punish him if you will, punish him if he is guilty, but do not pursue him as a pariah through life.

He then entered on a long and lucid history of the various transactions already recounted, justifying both his action towards the Greek and his negotiation with the French Government.

Having thus disposed of the matter of Greece, he turned to the affairs of Portugal and Spain, about which he had been attacked by Sir James Graham, then member for Ripon. He pointed out that 'his little experimental Belgium monarchy,' as it had been sneeringly called, had been constituted by British intervention not dissimilar in kind from that employed in the former countries: that it had proved a secure and beneficial creation; and that he hoped for Portugal the same prosperity and happiness. He then went on:—

Portugal is now in the enjoyment of a Constitution, and practically it is working as well as under all circumstances, and considering how recently it has been established, could perhaps have been expected. 'Oh, but,' said the right hon. Baronet, 'you have Costa Cabral as Minister, and your object was to get rid of him.' Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond of attacking me either here or elsewhere, in this country or in

others, is, that they try to bring down every question to a personal bearing. If they want to oppose the policy of England, they say, 'Let us get rid of the man who happens to be the organ of that policy.' Why, it is like shooting a policeman. (Laughter, and cries of 'Hear, hear.') As long as England is England, as long as the English people are animated by the feelings, and spirit, and opinions which they possess, you may knock down twenty foreign Ministers one after another, but depend upon it no one will keep his place who does not act upon the same principles. When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of my functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the immediate cry is, 'Oh, it's all spite against this man, or that man, Count this, or Prince that, that makes you do this!'

After reciting the events in Spain which induced the British Government to interfere under the Quadruple Treaty, he added:—

If England has any interest more than another with reference to Spain, it is that Spain should be independent, that Spain should be Spanish. Spain for the Spaniards is the maxim upon which we proceed in our policy with regard to Spain. Much evil must ever come to this country from the fact of Spain being under the direction of other Powers. It is eminently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be in dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not, merely on that account, and without any offence to or from Spain herself, be at war with Spain also. We considered that the independence of Spain was more likely to be secured by a Government controlled by a representative and national Assembly than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting merely of the members who might form the Administration. Therefore, on grounds of strict policy, independently of the general sympathy which animated the people as well as the Government of this country towards Spain at that time, we thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and against the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful; the Carlist cause failed; the cause of the Constitution prevailed.

Very dexterous was the next part of his speech, in which, while apparently talking of France and Guizot, he drew an unmistakable picture of England and her

Foreign Minister. The House caught the portrayal at once, and showed their appreciation by loud applause.

However, sir, the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) says that these affairs of Spain were of long duration, and produced disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events of the greatest importance as regards another country, namely, France. He says that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish marriages there arose differences between England and France which led to no slighter catastrophe than the overthrow of the French Monarchy. This is another instance of the fondness for narrowing down a great and national question to the smallness of personal difference. It was my dislike to M. Guizot, forsooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages, which overthrew his administration, and with it the throne of France! Why, sir, what will the French nation say when they hear this? They are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of a sense of their own dignity and honour—what will they say when they hear it stated that it was in the power of a British Minister to overthrow their Government and their monarchy? (Much cheering.) Why, sir, it is a calumny on the French nation to suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to their Minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous, and a noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a foreign conspiracy had been formed against one of their ministers—(tremendous and prolonged cheering, which prevented the noble Viscount from concluding the sentence)—I say, that if the French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspirators were caballing against one of their Ministers, and caballing for no other reason than that he had upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and interests of his own country, and if they had thought that such a knot of foreign conspirators had coadjutors in their own land, why, I say that the French people, that brave, noble, and spirited nation, would have scorned the intrigues of such a cabal, and would have clung the closer to, and have supported the more, the man against whom such a plot had been made. If, then, the French people had thought that I, or any other foreign Minister, was seeking to overthrow M. Guizot, their knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting the purpose, would have rendered him stronger than ever in the post which he occupied. No, sir, the French Minister and the French Monarchy were overthrown by far different causes. And many a man, both in this country and elsewhere, would

have done well to have read a better lesson from the events which then took place.

Leaving, to use his own words, the sunny plains of Castille and the gay vineyards of France, he next betook himself to the mountains of Switzerland, and entered on an elaborate justification of the charges brought against him in connection with the civil war between the cantons. After that, in his own language again, travelling from the rugged Alps into the smiling plains of Lombardy, he pleaded his cause as follows :—

With regard to our policy with respect to Italy, I utterly deny the charges that have been brought against us of having been the advocates, supporters, and encouragers of revolution. It has always been the fate of advocates of temperate reform and of constitutional improvement to be run at as the fomenters of revolution. It is the easiest mode of putting them down ; it is the received *formula*. It is the established practice of those who are the advocates of arbitrary government to say, ‘Never mind real revolutionists ; we know how to deal with them ; your dangerous man is the moderate reformer ; he is such a plausible man ; the only way of getting rid of him is to set the world at him by calling him a revolutionist.’

Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this world. In the first place, there are those violent, hot-headed, and unthinking men who fly to arms, who overthrow established Governments, and who recklessly, without regard to consequences, and without measuring difficulties and comparing strength, deluge their country with blood, and draw down the greatest calamities on their fellow-countrymen. These are the revolutionists of one class. But there are revolutionists of another kind : blind-minded men, who, animated by antiquated prejudices, and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the current of human improvement until the irresistible pressure of accumulated discontent breaks down the opposing barriers, and overthrows and levels to the earth those very institutions which a timely application of renovating means would have rendered strong and lasting. Such revolutionists as these are the men who call us revolutionists. It was not to make revolutions that Lord Minto went to Italy, or that we, at the request of the Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our mediation between contending parties.

He then dealt successively with Lord Minto's mission to Italy, with the events in Sicily, and with the support given to Turkey in the matter of the Hungarian refugees, and ended as follows :—

I believe I have now gone through all the heads of the charges which have been brought against me in this debate. I think I have shown that the foreign policy of the Government in all the transactions with respect to which its conduct has been impugned has throughout been guided by those principles which, according to the resolution of the honourable and learned gentleman, ought to regulate the conduct of the Government of England in the management of our foreign affairs. I believe that the principles on which we have acted are those which are held by the great mass of the people of this country. I am convinced these principles are calculated, so far as the influence of England may properly be exercised with respect to the destinies of other countries, to conduce to the maintenance of peace, to the advancement of civilisation, to the welfare and happiness of mankind.

I do not complain of the conduct of those who have made these matters the means of attack upon Her Majesty's Ministers. The Government of a great country like this is, undoubtedly, an object of fair and legitimate ambition to men of all shades of opinion. It is a noble thing to be allowed to guide the policy and to influence the destiny of such a country; and if ever it was an object of honourable ambition, more than ever must it be so at the moment at which I am speaking. For while we have seen, as stated by the right hon. Baronet, the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side—while we have seen thrones shaken, shattered, levelled, institutions overthrown and destroyed—while in almost every country of Europe the conflict of civil war has deluged the land with blood, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, this country has presented a spectacle honourable to the people of England, and worthy of the admiration of mankind.

We have shown that liberty is compatible with order; that individual freedom is reconcilable with obedience to the law. We have shown the example of a nation in which every class of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which Providence has assigned to it, while at the same time every individual of each class is constantly striving to raise himself in the social scale—not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality,

but by persevering good conduct, and by the steady and energetic exertion of the moral and intellectual faculties with which his Creator has endowed him. To govern such a people as this is indeed an object worthy of the ambition of the noblest man who lives in the land, and, therefore, I find no fault with those who may think any opportunity a fair one for endeavouring to place themselves in so distinguished and honourable a position; but I contend that we have not in our foreign policy done anything to forfeit the confidence of the country. We may not, perhaps, in this matter or in that, have acted precisely up to the opinions of one person or of another; and hard indeed it is, as we all know by our individual and private experience, to find any number of men agreeing entirely in any matter on which they may not be equally possessed of the details of the facts, circumstances, reasons, and conditions which led to action. But, making allowance for those differences of opinion which may fairly and honourably arise among those who concur in general views, I maintain that the principles which can be traced through all our foreign transactions, as the guiding rule and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as deserve approbation. I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict which this House, as representing a political, a commercial, a constitutional country, is to give on the question now brought before it—whether the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been conducted, and the sense of duty which has led us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow-subjects abroad, are proper and fitting guides for those who are charged with the government of England; and whether, as the Roman in days of old held himself free from indignity when he could say, '*Civis Romanus sum*,' so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong.

As Lord Palmerston sat down the House greeted him with loud and prolonged cheers, echoing, as it seemed, by anticipation, the words extorted later on in the debate from his generous antagonist, Sir Robert Peel, when he declared, 'It has made us all proud of him.' This, as is well known, was Peel's last appearance in the House. He was killed next day by a fall from his horse.

Towards the early dawn of the fifth day of discussion a division of 310 against 264 gave a majority of 46 in support of his conduct of foreign affairs. In the following letters he announces the result to his correspondents:—

F. O. : June 29, 1850.

My dear Normanby,—Our debate in the House of Commons finished at near four o'clock this morning, and we had about the majority which we had reckoned upon; our calculation fluctuated between forty and fifty. Our triumph has been complete in the debate as well as in the division; and, all things considered, I scarcely ever remember a debate which, as a display of intellect, oratory, and high and dignified feeling, was more honourable to the House of Commons.

John Russell's speech last night was admirable and first-rate; and as to Cockburn's,¹ I do not know that I ever, in the course of my life, heard a better speech from anybody, without any exception.

Gladstone's was also a first-rate performance, and Peel and Disraeli both spoke with great judgment and talent with reference to their respective positions.

But the degree of public feeling which has been excited out of doors upon the matters on which the debate and division turned is most remarkable, and would have led to very strong manifestations if the result of the division had been to throw the Government into the hands of our opponents.

C. G. : July 8, 1850.

My dear William,—You will have seen before this time how completely the House of Commons have reversed the petulant and factious and foolish vote of the House of Lords, but you cannot appreciate from newspaper reports, nor know from newspaper columns, the admirable and enthusiastic spirit displayed on this matter by the majority of the House of Commons, and by all the leading county papers, and by the nation at large. The attack on our foreign policy has been rightly understood by everybody, as the shot fired by a foreign conspiracy, aided and abetted by a domestic intrigue; and the parties have so entirely failed in the purpose, that instead of expelling and overthrowing me with disgrace, as they intended and hoped to do, they have rendered me for the present the most popular Minister that for a very long course of time has held my office.

¹ Now Lord Chief Justice of England.

The speech I had to make, which could not be comprised within a shorter time than from a quarter before ten to twenty minutes past two, was listened to very patiently and attentively by the House, and has had great success with everybody.

Two hundred and fifty members of the Reform Club have invited me to a dinner next Saturday to celebrate my victory, and if we had not thought it better to limit the demonstration to a small scale, the dinner would have been given in Covent Garden Theatre, and would have been attended by a thousand people.

I myself, the Government, and the country are much indebted to the Burgraves and to Stanley. But the House of Lords has been placed in an unfortunate position, and Stanley has not raised his reputation as a statesman.

Peel's death is a great calamity, and one that seems to have had no adequate cause. He was a very bad and awkward rider, and his horse might have been sat by any better equestrian; but he seems, somehow or other, to have been entangled in the bridle, and to have pulled the horse to step or kneel upon him. The injury to the shoulder was severe but curable; that which killed him was a broken rib, forced by great violence inwards into the lungs.

Immediately after this successful combat the portrait of Lord Palmerston, by Partridge, which was so well known in later years to the frequenters of Cambridge House, where it hung on the staircase, was presented to Lady Palmerston by a hundred and twenty members of the House of Commons. They added to it a written address, expressive of 'their high sense of his public and private character, and of the independent policy by which he maintained the honour and interests of his country.'

It was altogether a great triumph for Lord Palmerston. 'His speech,' according to the testimony of Sir George Lewis,¹ 'was an extraordinary effort. He defeated the whole Conservative party, Protectionists and Peelites, supported by the extreme Radicals, and backed by the "Times," and all the organised forces of foreign diplomacy.'

¹ Sir G. Lewis to Sir E. Head, page 227 of 'Letters.'

Every element of hostility and of pent-up animosity which had been long gathering against him were on this occasion brought into one focus, but he only expanded the more instead of shrivelling under the burning-glass. He vindicated both with courage and, as we have seen, with eloquence all his actions at the Foreign Office, as being dictated solely by his care for the position and well-being of his country, and stamped himself upon the minds of the English people, according to Lord John Russell's long-remembered words, as emphatically and in a special sense, a *Minister of England*.

CHAPTER VI.

LETTERS—GENERAL HAYNAU AT BARCLAY'S BREWERY—ECCLESIASTICAL TITLES BILL—NATIONAL DEFENCES—MR. GLADSTONE'S LETTERS ABOUT NEAPOLITAN PRISONS—IONIAN ISLANDS—DEFENCE IN PARLIAMENT—QUESTION OF 'HOLY PLACES.'

WHILE still detained in town by the arrears of the session of 1850, he sends to his brother a report of his own position and of the state of parties. His estimate of Lord Aberdeen's capacity for the Premiership was destined to be tested within two years.

C. G. : September 1, 1850.

I have been more entirely swamped by business during the whole of this last session of Parliament than I ever was at any former time, and I have not even yet been able to work up the arrear of various matters which has accumulated by the regular overflowing of almost every day. But I have no reason to find fault with the session, for it has left me at its close in a very satisfactory and gratifying position. I have beaten and put down and silenced, at least for a time, one of the most widespread and malignant and active confederacies that ever conspired against one man without crushing him. But I was in the right, and I was able to fight my battle; and John Russell and my colleagues behaved most handsomely and honourably, and my triumph has been in proportion to the magnitude of the struggle. The death of Louis Philippe delivers me from my most artful and inveterate enemy, whose position gave him in many ways the power to injure me; and though I am very sorry for the death of Peel, from personal regard, and because it is no doubt a great loss to the country, yet as far as my own political position is concerned, I do not think that he was ever disposed to do me any good turn. It is difficult to say what effect his death will have on the state of parties in Parliament. He had not much of a following latterly, though the men who

still stuck to him, such as Goulbourn, Robert Clive, Cardwell and Banks, and the like, were the most respectable of the party. Perhaps Sidney Herbert, or Aberdeen, or Gladstone may set up for leader of the Conservative Free Traders, or the Free Trade Conservatives; and perhaps Stanley may invite a junction with him by some compromise about putting off Protection. I have been told by a person who had it from Stanley himself, that during the time when a change of Government was expected, Aberdeen said to Stanley that in that case he, Aberdeen, would be commissioned by the Queen to form a Government! This would have been a curious dish to set before a Queen! On the whole, I rather am inclined to think that the Government is made stronger by the events of last session, and that we may look forward to getting successfully through the session of next year.

I made acquaintance lately with a Sicilian Princess—Montevoyo, I think, she calls herself—a widow, and one of the ladies of the Queen of Naples. She spoke highly of you; but then I must add she spoke also highly of the King of Naples, which makes her praise of less value.

What Lord Palmerston, a wise friend to Turkey, thought and said about it, is still of so much interest that I here quote three or four letters on its affairs written about this time. They at any rate show that she has not continued to sink for want of warning. She was at the time contemplating her first loan, and Lord Palmerston's prognostications addressed to Sir Stratford Canning proved very correct.

C. G. : August 7, 1850.

My dear Canning,—I am sorry to hear so indifferent an account of 'progress' in Turkey as that which your letter of July 19 contains. I will exhort through the ambassador here. But how is it supposed that a foreign loan would help the Porte? Would not such a loan add, by the amount of its interest and sinking fund, to the burthens of the State? and would there not be a danger that a large part of it would somehow or other find its way into the pockets of private individuals? As to Douad Pasha, or Douad Effendi, he has, I think, lost all power of doing mischief here, and perhaps that may be the reason why he tarries in the East; or maybe he thinks that, as the wise men are said to have come from thence, he may pick up there some of that wisdom which he so much

lacks. But the Arabs have a proverb which says you may send a jackass to Mecca, and he will come back a jackass still.

Lord Palmerston's 'exhortation' was as follows:—

Broadlands: September 24, 1850.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,—Permettez que je vous renouvelle par écrit la prière que je vous ai faite verbalement pour vous engager à tirer l'attention la plus sérieuse de votre Gouvernement au memorandum que Sir S. Canning a présenté au Sultan; je voudrais y ajouter la demande que votre Gouvernement veuille bien prendre en considération des observations que le Colonel Rose¹ a faites au sujet de votre armée, et que Sir S. Canning aura déjà soumises au grand vizier.

Pardonnez-moi si j'ai l'air de m'ingérer dans des affaires qui ne me regardent pas, et croyez bien que ce que je dis, je le dis uniquement dans l'intérêt du Sultan et de son Empire. L'Empire Ottoman n'est pas encore en état de maintenir son indépendance, et de défendre son vaste territoire contre les ennemis qui le menacent sans l'aide et l'appui de temps en temps de la Grande-Bretagne. Le Gouvernement Anglais a le sincère désir et la ferme intention de vous donner toujours dans des momens de difficulté l'appui dont vous aurez besoin. Mais le Gouvernement anglais le peut agir qu'en autant qu'il est soutenu par le Parlement et par l'opinion publique; et ces soutiens nous manqueraient si nous ne pouvions pas démontrer que le Gouvernement Ottoman a fait tous les efforts en son pouvoir pour mettre toutes les branches de l'administration de la Turquie dans le meilleur état possible, et n'a rien omis qui pourrait contribuer à mettre la Turquie en état de se défendre en développant toutes les grandes ressources naturelles dont la Providence l'a douée.

Jusqu'à présent il faut l'avouer ceci ne peut pas se dire. Votre Gouvernement a eu sans doute à lutter contre maints obstacles; mais pour accomplir de grands résultats il faut de grands efforts, et de la détermination, et de la persévérance.

A Constantinople on chancelle, on hésite, on s'arrête. Mais le moment actuel est favorable pour faire des réformes et des améliorations. Le proverbe anglais dit qu'il faut faire le foin pendant que le soleil luit. Il faut réparer sa maison pendant qu'il fait calme, afin d'être en mesure contre l'ouragan.

Les points principaux que je voudrais signaler comme demandant l'attention *pratique* de votre Gouvernement sont :

¹ Now Lord Strathnairn.

Une perception plus exacte du revenu, sans exiger de qui que ce soit plus qu'il ne doit payer ; et cessation du système par lequel on afferme la collection des impôts.

Economie dans les dépenses, choisissant d'abord les dépenses nécessaires et remettant ce qui ne l'est pas.

Par conséquent ne perdant pas de temps à construire des Routes de Commerce, des fortifications pour le Bosphore, à réparer les forteresses sur la frontière, à établir des ouvrages pour la défense de la capitale.

L'administration de la justice devrait être sans reproche ; on prétend que maintenant cet état de choses n'existe pas, et les preuves en sont nombreuses.

Toute distinction politique et civile entre les différentes classes des sujets du Sultan par raison de différence de religion devrait être abolie, afin que le Sultan puisse devenir également le Souverain de toutes les populations qui habitent son Empire.

Quant à l'armée il paraît que l'artillerie est excellente, les hôpitaux admirables ; mais que l'infanterie est susceptible d'améliorations, et que la cavalerie en a grand besoin. Que les cavaliers ne sont pas bien armés, ayant quitté une excellente épée qu'ils avaient autrefois pour en prendre une assez mauvaise, et qu'en général ils ne sont pas fort adroits dans le maniement ni de l'épée ni de la lance.

Bon voyage. Je vous souhaite personnellement tout le bonheur possible, et je fais des vœux pour que votre pays attienne une prospérité rapide et avec cela solide.

Mille complimens,

PALMERSTON.

S. E. Mehemet Pasha.

Broadlands : September 24, 1850.

My dear Canning,—I have just taken leave of the Turkish ambassador, who starts on Thursday for Constantinople. I took the opportunity of requesting him to impress upon his Government the necessity of improvement and reforms, and of putting an end to the prevalent system of corruption and injustice ; and I begged him to recommend strongly to the attention of his Government the Memorandum which you had given to the Sultan. There is obviously a great deal wanting to be done in every way and in every branch of administration to bring Turkey into line with other Powers, and to put her into a condition to defend herself. But much has already been accomplished, perhaps more than ever yet was done in the same space of time in any country in which there was so much

room for improvement; and I am not discouraged, therefore, by the apparent slowness of progress, but only encouraged to urge them on to further advance. It may be true that much of what has hitherto been done exists more in regulations and orders than in actual execution; but one ought not to undervalue the worth of rules, and laws, and institutions, even when they are not practically acted upon to the extent of their letter and spirit. As long as forms remain they are a fixed point to refer to; and as men improve and opinion grows more powerful, those forms become more and more the guide for conduct and events, and that which at first is only theory in course of time is converted into practice.

As to foreign officers in the Turkish service, such men would necessarily impart to the Turkish officers notions and knowledge that would be very useful; and the mere fact of Christians serving in this way in the Turkish army would have its effect in breaking down that exclusive and fanatical feeling which is represented as a bar to the admission of Christian subjects of the Porte to situations of military command.

Why does the Turkish Government not get some Prussian instructors for their cavalry? The Prussian cavalry is excellent, and, indeed, the Turkish infantry could not be drilled and organised upon a better model than that of the Prussian service.

I remember at the reviews in 1817 or 1818 of the armies of occupation in France, the Duke of Wellington being asked which he thought the best army; the Austrian, the Russian, or the Prussian. His reply was: 'To say which are the best troops is to say a great deal more than I will take on myself to affirm; but I will tell you which of the three I should like best to command in action. I should decidedly prefer the Prussians; they are the handiest, the best organised, and the most intelligent.'

Lord Palmerston was always especially emphatic in his declarations that it was necessary for the prosperity of Turkey that her Christian population should be placed and treated on a footing of absolute equality with the Mussulman. He urges it in the foregoing communication to Mehemet Pasha, and a year later he repeats it to M. Musurus, in reply to a note expressing the ambassador's regret at the events which caused Lord Palmerston's retirement from the Government. The letter is dated December 30, 1851, and runs as follows:—

Agréez, je vous en prie, mes remerciements les plus sincères de votre aimable lettre, et soyez persuadé que, quelle que soit la position politique dans laquelle je pourrai me trouver, je serai toujours fidèle aux principes qui me font voir un intérêt non-seulement Anglais, mais Européen dans l'indépendance et le bien-être de l'Empire Ottoman, et vous connaissez bien mon intime conviction que la prospérité de cet empire ne reposera jamais sur une base vraiment solide tant que les sujets chrétiens du Sultan ne sont pas placés sur un pied d'égalité devant la loi avec les sujets de la religion Musulmane.

I add also a passage from a letter to Sir Stratford Canning:—

Ought not this consideration to show the Turkish Government how important it is that they should lose no time in removing all civil and political distinctions between Mussulmen and Rayahs? I pressed this yesterday on the Turkish ambassador, and represented that, at present, the Sultan not only deprives himself of the use of his left arm, but runs constantly the risk of being himself belaboured by it. Mehemet Pasha acknowledged the justice of the remark.¹

An attack upon General Haynau by the men of Barclay's brewery gave Lord Palmerston some trouble in the autumn of this year. General Haynau, an Austrian general, who had won an evil reputation in the Hungarian war for great cruelties and alleged flogging of women, came to London and went to visit the premises of Barclay and Perkins. As soon as his presence was known, a number of draymen came out with brooms and dirt, shouting out, 'Down with the Austrian butcher!' He fled with the mob at his heels, and took refuge in a public-house by the river-side, till the police came to his rescue and took him away in a police-galley to a place of safety. The following letter about it is to Sir George Grey, who was then Home Secretary:—

Broadlands: October 1, 1850.

My dear Grey,—Koller² is very reasonable about the Haynau matter, and I believe that Schwarzenberg makes his

¹ To Sir Stratford Canning, F. O., October 11, 1849.

² Austrian ambassador.

move more to satisfy the feelings of the Austrian army than from any interest he himself takes about Haynau, who is in disgrace with the Austrian Government, and has been much blamed in Austrian society at Vienna for his atrocities.

I told Koller that it is much better that no prosecution should take place, because the defence of the accused would necessarily be a minute recapitulation of all the barbarities committed by Haynau in Italy and Hungary, and that would be more injurious to him and to Austria than any verdict obtained against the draymen could be satisfactory.

I must own that I think Haynau's coming here, without rhyme or reason, so soon after his Italian and Hungarian exploits, was a wanton insult to the people of this country, whose opinion of him had been so loudly proclaimed at public meetings and in all the newspapers. But the draymen were wrong in the particular course they adopted. Instead of striking him, which, however, by Koller's account, they did not do much, they ought to have tossed him in a blanket, rolled him in the kennel, and then sent him home in a cab, paying his fare to the hotel.

Metternich and Neumann strongly advised him, as he passed through Brussels, not to come to England at present; and Koller tried to persuade him to cut off his long yellow moustaches. But he would not shave, and he professed to think that his presence in England could turn public opinion in his favour.

I explained to Koller that the people of this country treat with respect, and even with kindness, their bitterest political enemies when duty or necessity brings them here. Buonaparte received no insult at Plymouth, Soult was received with enthusiasm, Metternich, Louis Philippe, and Guizot with courteous and kind hospitality; but Haynau was looked upon, no matter wrongly or rightly, in the same light as the Mannings and Tawell, and he ought to have had a couple of policemen to go about with him to protect him from the honest indignation of the mob. The Austrian Government, however, think that the proceedings at Barclay's were got up by a Dr. Trencke, formerly editor of a Liberal paper at Vienna, now an exile here, and employed as a clerk in Barclay's establishment.

The rivalry between Austria and Prussia for the leadership of Germany was complicating matters in that country. On the question of the entrance of

Austria into the German confederation, France and England had initiated an understanding. Both Governments feared the effect that might be produced on the relations of the Great Powers by the carrying out of the Austrian plan.

Lord Palmerston had been engaged during the year in a tedious and vain mediation between Denmark and Prussia about the interminable Sleswig-Holstein dispute. The details of all these events are no longer of interest; but the contents of the following letter foreshadow the events of 1866:—

F. O. : November 22, 1850.

My dear Cowley,—German affairs are indeed come to a state of chaos. The only thing that seems pretty clear is, that all parties are more or less in the wrong. But Prussia seems to bear away the palm in this respect. Her course has been, indeed, dishonest, inconsistent, and irresolute and weak. In regard to the Sleswig-Holstein question, she has throughout acted with the greatest duplicity and bad faith; in regard to German affairs, her only object from beginning to end seems to have been her own aggrandisement, which, at moments when much was within her grasp, she had not courage or steadiness successfully to pursue. Her partisans try to make out that the contest between her and Austria is a struggle between constitutional and arbitrary government; but it is no such thing, it is only a conflict between the two leading Powers in Germany as to which should be politically preponderant. We should have had no objection to see Prussia take the first place; on the contrary, a German Union, embracing all the smaller States, with Prussia at its head, and in alliance with Austria as a separate Power, would have been a very good European arrangement; but when the empire was offered to Prussia, the King shrank from the hazardous position thus proposed to him, and declined to accept it till he should be asked to do so by the Sovereigns. That decided the question, for it was pretty certain that the Sovereigns would never trouble him with such a request. But the empire having been thus negatived, Prussia ought to have taken at once the only other possible course, and to have come to an agreement with Austria for reconstructing the German confederation on the principle of the treaty of 1815, with such modifications as the establishment of parliaments in Prussia and Austria and

all the other States might render necessary. Instead of this, Prussia went on pottering about an Erfurth Union, which never could end in anything but smoke, and then she chose deliberately to expose herself to the humiliation of being obliged by military threats to retreat step by step from all the positions she had taken up in regard to almost all pending affairs. All this is lamentable, and is a fresh proof that honesty is the best policy. What Austria means to do remains to be seen. The Austrians declare that they mean to have a Parliament of their own, and not to put down constitutional government in any other country. We shall see. In the meanwhile enormous armies have been put into the field on both sides just as winter is setting in, and without any intelligible question to fight about. The only thing that both sides ought immediately to do is to send these useless soldiers home to their stoves and provision stores. In the meanwhile, Russia on one side and France on the other, notwithstanding their fair professions, must be inwardly chuckling at seeing Germany come down in so short a time from *Einheit* to intense exasperation and to the brink of civil war.

The Papal aggression and the passing of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was now occupying public attention. Lord Palmerston expounds his views of the question to his brother.

C. G.: January 27, 1851.

During the month at Christmas that we spent at Broadlands I broke loose, and, instead of working all day long in my north room and only rushing out at sunset, as I did in September and October, I took a fling, and went out several days hunting and shooting in the fine of the early day, coming home, of course, for work earlier than if I had been only a sportsman.

Public affairs are going on as well as they can ever at any time be expected to do. Food has been abundant and cheap, the labouring classes fully employed, and in all respects better off than they have been for a very long period of time. Poor rates are greatly reduced, and though farmers complain, and rents have been generally lowered, yet, all things considered, neither the owners nor the occupiers of land have any great cause to complain. The cheapness of all things makes up in some degree for small diminutions of income. In Ireland, too, things are looking better, and rent is not that absolutely

unknown quantity which it has been for some years past. The revenue has been productive, and we shall have a surplus of about two millions. This will not, however, enable us to take off the income tax, which will expire this year, and which we must propose the renewal of. This will produce some troublesome debates, but I have no doubt of its being carried; we shall be assisted in carrying it by many who want particular taxes taken off, which cannot be repealed or modified if the income tax is not renewed, because in that case, instead of a surplus to scramble for, there would be a deficit to provide for. The income tax produces upwards of five millions.

The Papal aggression question will give us some trouble and give rise to stormy debates. Our difficulty will be to find out a measure which shall satisfy reasonable Protestants, without violating those principles of liberal toleration which we are pledged to. I think we shall succeed. But all the newspaper stories of divisions in the Cabinet on this or any other question are pure inventions, wholly devoid of any foundation. The Pope, I hear, and the people about him by whom at present he is guided, affect to treat lightly the excitement which his measures have produced in this country, and they represent the clamour as a thing got up by the Church—a parson agitation. They deceive themselves; the feeling is general and intense all through the nation, and the sensible Catholics themselves lament what has been done.

The thing itself, in truth, is little or nothing, and does not justify the irritation. What has goaded the nation is the manner, insolent and ostentatious, in which it has been done. The Catholics have a right to organise their church as they like; and if staff officers called Bishops were thought better than staff officers called Vicars Apostolic, nobody would have remarked or objected to the change if it had been made quietly and only in the bosom of the Church. But what offended—and justly—all England was the Pope's published Allocution and Wiseman's announcement of his new dignities. The first representing England as a land of benighted heathens; the second proclaiming that the Pope had parcelled out England into districts—a thing that only a Sovereign has a right to do—and that he, Wiseman, and others were sent, and to be sent, to govern those territorial districts, with titles belonging thereto. This could not and would not have been done or attempted in any other country without the consent of the Government.

The Pope or his advisers pretended at first that they had

the consent of the English Government, through Minto, in November, 1847—*three years ago*; but they were soon driven out of that assertion; and then Wiseman brought it down to a mere statement that the intention was made known to Minto in 1847, and that he said nothing and made no observation.

Now even this did not take place; and if it had, in a matter of such importance, silence cannot be construed into consent. Moreover, Minto was at Rome upon quite another matter, and had no instructions on this subject; and if the Pope wanted the consent of the English Government, he should have asked for it; and not having asked for it or obtained it, he should not quote it as a justification of his course. He might in the three years have asked the question; and there was one opportunity specially of doing so, for in August, when Wiseman was on the point of setting out for Rome to settle all these matters, he wrote to ask an interview with John Russell, and was with him more than half an hour; that was the time to have ascertained from the head of the Government himself what would be thought of the cut-and-dry measure; but not a word did Wiseman say on the matter, and his excuse for his silence now is that he did not then think the measure likely to be so immediate. But he must have thought it as near as the Pope is supposed to have thought it in November 1847, when he pretends to have spoken to Minto about it (which, however, he did not); and so far from Wiseman not supposing the measure to be near, we know full well that the Pope's excuse, as put forward, is that Wiseman pressed the measure upon him, said he knew England and the English people, and would be answerable that it would go off smoothly.

We must bring in a measure; the country would not be satisfied without some legislative enactment. We shall make it as gentle as possible. The violent Protestant party will object to it for its mildness, and will endeavour to drive us further. The Pope might help us to resist that pressure if he would do certain things that would allay public feeling. For instance, if he would disclaim any pretension to govern by his bishops any but the Catholics in the districts to which those bishops are appointed. It sounds almost childish to suggest such a truism; but many people, forgetting that he can no more claim jurisdiction or authority over Protestants than over the winds and waves or the tides of the ocean, and looking to the words of the Allocution and of Wiseman's announcements, imagine that he does, and some public disclaimer would be useful. Again, offence has been taken at the territorial titles.

These are unnecessary. Instead of appointing an Archbishop of Westminster, and Bishops of this or that place, the Pope might have appointed Archbishops and Bishops for the governance of the *Roman Catholics* (the word *Roman* is essential) in Middlesex, Hertfordshire, &c., as the case might be, their episcopal locality for titles continuing to be places in *partibus infidelium*. These two measures, if adopted by the Pope, would go far to allay the storm and restore harmony between Protestant and Catholic. But what would complete the calm would be his writing to Wiseman to say that he would not go on without his personal advice at Rome. The departure of the Cardinal would be the pledge of restored peace. If you should have an opportunity by chance of meeting the nuncio, you might throw out these suggestions; not as demands made by the English Government; not as a commission given you from hence to be executed, but as what you know to be, and what you know in consequence of communications made to you from hence; and you may say that what you tell him is quite private and confidential, to be made known by him to his Court or not, as he may think best, but that you throw out the suggestion in the most friendly spirit, and that you know that the British Government are most desirous of maintaining for the Roman Catholics in the Queen's dominions all the freedom and civil and political rights which existing laws have conferred upon them.

Lord Palmerston was always very earnest in his view of the necessity for England being strong in her home defences on land as well as by sea. Sir John Burgoyne had, in May 1850, written a Memorandum which called attention to our deficiencies in this respect. Lord Palmerston sends it to the Premier with the following observations:—

I send you, to keep and ponder over at your leisure, a copy of a Memorandum on our want of national defence, drawn up by Sir John Burgoyne, and lent to me some months ago by Lord Anglesey. It is worth reading, though it is only a repetition of the opinions entertained and expressed by all men who know what war is, either by sea or by land. But I am well aware that it is almost as difficult to persuade the people of this country to provide themselves with the means of defence as it would be for them to defend themselves without those means,

and that although our internal condition may still be the 'envy of surrounding nations,' yet we have neither

'Hearts resolved nor hands prepared,
The blessings we enjoy to guard.'

He also writes to Sir Charles Wood, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, about fortifications:—

C. G.: January 22, 1851.

My dear Wood,—I am glad to hear that you mean to take £8,000 for going on with the fortifications at Pembroke, in addition to what is to be taken for the detached outworks at Portsmouth; but could you not take a sum, however small, to make a beginning, for similar defences at Plymouth? Burgoyne will tell you that Plymouth Dockyard is, if possible, still more exposed than the Portsmouth yard to be destroyed by shells from a small force landed in its neighbourhood. If 8,000 or 10,000 men were landed at Whitesand Bay, or anywhere thereabouts, they might establish mortar batteries on shore opposite Plymouth yard without, I believe, being under fire from any existing work. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon bristle with guns, and are secure against any attack by sea or land. Our yards, full of valuable materials, and containing the elements of our naval defence, are now indeed pretty safe from any attack by sea, but still at the mercy of an enemy on the land. The French proverb says, '*C'est l'occasion qui fait le larron*;' and the more the French shall see that our most important points are safe against a surprise, the greater will be our chances of continued peace. A session of Parliament is always full of unforeseen and unforeseeable accidents; and it would be a good thing, in the event of our official life being unexpectedly cut short, that we should leave behind us indisputable proofs that we had made at least beginnings for the full protection of all our great dockyards.

C. G.: January 24, 1851.

As to Head's¹ book, I own I think it contains matter deserving of the most serious consideration of every Englishman, and more especially of all those who are charged with the destinies of the country. I mean those parts of his book which detail the aggressive means of Powers who may become hostile, and the slenderness of our own means of defence, together with the ruinous effects of even the temporary occupation of the

¹ Sir Francis Head.

country by a foreign army. As to his remedy, the amount of standing army which he proposes is not to be attained; but I hold that no Government will have done its full duty to the country which has not organised some dormant but partially trained force, of the nature of a militia or *landwehr*, which could be called out under arms in a fortnight or three weeks to the aggregate number of one hundred thousand in the two islands upon the first breaking out of a war. Every other country that deserves to be called a Power has this kind of reserve force—France, Austria, Prussia, the United States. Russia has it not, but merely because she keeps up a war establishment in time of peace; though she, too, has in time of peace part of her regular army on furlough. England alone, with a peace establishment inadequate for the defence of the country against invasion, has no means of increasing her defensive garrison on the outbreak of a war except by the tardy process of voluntary enlistment into the line, or the equally slow operation of passing a Bill to repeal the Act suspending the ballot, going through the tedious and complicated operation of a ballot, of assembling, clothing, arming, officering, and training an army of men who never handled a musket or fixed a bayonet. Then we are told that in a moment of crisis the nation would rise *like one man*—a mere bitterly sarcastic truism; for a nation armed, as the English would be, with broomsticks and pitchforks, would be against a disciplined army about as formidable as *one man* would be.

On May 1 the Great Exhibition of all Nations was opened in Hyde Park. Lord Palmerston went to the ceremony, and gives an account of the scene. England was still full of refugees, cast upon her shores by continental revolutions, and their presence had inspired those who were responsible for the maintenance of order with some anxiety.

C. G.: May 2, 1851.

My dear Normanby,—Many thanks for your friendly good offices about 'La Patrie.' Such articles, however intrinsically silly, ought certainly not to appear in newspapers known to be in partial communication with the Government; but Léon Faucher has, I know, always had a dislike to me, or at least to my particular doings; and as to Guizot, I make allowances for and forgive the rancour of his feelings toward me. Winners can not only laugh, but pardon.

But yesterday is the topic of thought and of word with everybody in London. It was indeed a glorious day for England; and the way in which the royal ceremony went off was calculated to inspire humility into the minds of the representatives of foreign Governments and to strike despair into the breasts of those, if any such there be, who may desire to excite confusion in this country. There must have been nearer a million than any other number of people who turned out to post themselves as they could to see some part of the show; and Mayne, the head of the police, told me he thought there were about thirty-four thousand in the glass building. The Queen, her husband, her eldest son and daughter, gave themselves in full confidence to this multitude, with no other guard than one of honour and the accustomed supply of stick-handed constables, to assist the crowd in keeping order among themselves. Of course there were in reserve, in proper stations, ample means of repressing any disorder if any had been attempted; but nothing was brought out and shown beyond what I have mentioned; and it was impossible for the invited guests of a lady's drawing-room to have conducted themselves with more perfect propriety than did this sea of human beings.

The royal party were received with continued acclamation as they passed through the parks and round the Exhibition House; and it was also very interesting to witness the cordial greeting given to the Duke of Wellington. I was just behind him and Anglesey, within two of them, during the procession round the building, and he was accompanied by an incessant running fire of applause from the men and waving of handkerchiefs and kissing of hands from the women, who lined the pathway of march during the three-quarters of an hour that it took us to march round.

The building itself is far more worth seeing than anything in it, though many of its contents are worthy of admiration. You ought to contrive to run over to take a look at it before its final close.

Though this first day of the campaign has passed off so well, of course we shall have to keep a watchful eye during the whole four months upon those who might be disposed to take advantage, for purposes of mischief, of the congregation of foreigners in London; but with the means we have of making such people pay dearly for any such attempt, I do not entertain any apprehension as to the result of any schemes they may plan.

The Ministry had been in rather a tottering con-

dition for the last twelvemonth. Lord Palmerston's triumph on the Greek debate had acted as a decided tonic, but still its health was feeble. On February 13, it had a majority of only eleven against a Protectionist motion of Mr. Disraeli's; and a week later it was defeated on a motion for the extension of the county franchise. Accordingly, on February 22, Lord John Russell resigned. Lord Stanley tried in vain to form a Ministry. Lord John in vain tried to form a coalition with the Peelites; so it ended in the Whig Ministry coming back just as it was before, though only to survive for one more year—the usual fate of Cabinets which come back after a defeat. Lord Palmerston says to his brother :—

C. G. : April 3, 1851.

All things, politically, are looking tolerably well, and I think we may reckon ourselves pretty secure of remaining in office till next year. It would be ridiculous for us to resign now, after the failures to form another Government, unless the House of Commons were to pass a vote of censure or a resolution of no confidence, and that they are not likely to do. We may have some changes forced upon us in our financial arrangements for the Budget; but that will not much signify. I see the Roman papers exulted greatly at our fall; they will have learnt soon afterwards the melancholy news of our restoration. Gladstone and Molesworth are full of the abominable tyranny exercised by the Neapolitan and Roman Governments. Gladstone says the Neapolitan is a *Governo infernale*, and that, as a gentleman and a Christian, he feels it his duty to make known what he has seen of its proceedings. Both of them say that they were wrong last year in their attacks on my foreign policy; but they did not know the truth. This is satisfactory as far as I am concerned, though very unsatisfactory as regards the state of Italy.

Our Papal Aggression Bill will be carried in spite of the opposition of the Irish members, who are driven on by the influence of the priests over the Irish electors. But the feeling in England against the Catholics is deep, strong, and general, and what the Pope and his priests have lately done has materially injured the Catholic cause. All these exposures,

moreover, about Miss Talbot and Mr. Carré have tended to throw great discredit on the Catholic priesthood.¹

I went one day to hear Gavazzi's harangue against the abuses of the Catholic Church. He spoke in Italian for an hour and a half to several hundred hearers, with much eloquence and effect.

Soon after this, two letters, addressed to Lord Aberdeen by Mr. Gladstone on the subject of the State prosecutions and the State prisons of the Neapolitan Government, were published in the form of a pamphlet. The effect produced by these letters was very great. The high character and position of the author gave authority to his narrative of facts, attested as they were by personal observation. He asserted that vast numbers of innocent and untried men were confined in the prisons of Naples for alleged political offences under circumstances of great barbarity. Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons, paid an emphatic tribute to the course taken by Mr. Gladstone. He added that, concurring with the author of these letters that the influence of public opinion in Europe might have some effect in setting such matters right, he had sent copies of the publication to the British Ministers at the various Courts of Europe, directing them to give copies to each Government.

When the Neapolitan envoy in London saw the account of what Lord Palmerston had said in the House about the Gladstone letters, he wrote forwarding a pamphlet which had been written to order by a Mr. Macfarlane, in reply to Mr. Gladstone, and requested Lord Palmerston to send it round also to the several

¹ 'The feeling is more political than religious. The people of this country bear with great composure mere differences in religious opinions. They are too much accustomed to such differences among Protestants themselves to look with any hatred on such differences when exhibited between Protestants and Catholics; but the English nation are deeply impressed with the feeling that Catholic ascendancy and civil and political freedom are incompatible. The history of their country teaches them that opinion, and it is that chord which has been made to vibrate from one end of the land to the other.'—*Lord Palmerston to Mr. Shiel, April 3, 1851.*

European Courts. Lord Palmerston declined being accessory to giving circulation to a document which he characterised as 'only a tissue of bare assertion and reckless denial, mixed up with coarse ribaldry and commonplace abuse of public men and political parties.' He then added, that as Prince Castelcicala had addressed him on the subject, he felt compelled to say that—

Mr. Gladstone's letters to Lord Aberdeen present an afflicting picture of a system of illegality, injustice, and cruelty, practised by the officers and agents of the Government in the kingdom of Naples, such as might have been hoped would not have existed in any European country at the present day; and the information which has been received upon these matters from many other sources leads, unfortunately, to the conclusion that Mr. Gladstone by no means overstated the various evils which he describes. But Mr. Gladstone's letters were evidently written and published not, as the pamphlet which you have sent me insinuates, in a spirit of hostility to the King of Naples, or with feelings adverse to the parliamentary and monarchical constitution which his Sicilian Majesty has granted to his subjects, and has confirmed by his royal oath. Mr. Gladstone's object seems, on the contrary, to have been the friendly purpose of drawing public attention to, and of directing the force of public opinion upon, abuses which, if allowed to continue, must necessarily sap the foundations of the Neapolitan monarchy, and prepare the way for those violent revulsions which the resentments produced by a deep sense of long-continued and wide-spread injustice are sure sooner or later to produce. It might have been hoped that the Neapolitan Government would have received those letters in the spirit in which they manifestly were written, and would have set to work earnestly and effectually to correct those manifold and grave abuses to which their attention has thus been drawn. It is obvious that, by such a course, the Neapolitan Government would do more to frustrate the designs of revolutionists, and to strengthen the monarchical institutions of their country, than could be effected by the most vigorous proceedings of the most vigilant Minister of Police.

While he thus addressed the Neapolitan Minister, he wrote as follows to his brother:—

Broadlands : September 7, 1851.

Your account of the effect produced by Gladstone's pamphlet is highly interesting and curious. The Neapolitan Government will not have been much pleased and edified by my answer to Castelficala about Macfarlane's pamphlet, nor would they be much gratified if they were to receive a collection of all the articles which have appeared on this subject in the various newspapers in England and in Germany.

I still hope that the discussion may do some good and excite some shame in their minds ; one might almost hope it would work some change in their conduct.

The French, as you say, defend as well as they can the Neapolitan Government ; but they every now and then let out things which undermine their defence. Walewski told Milnes the other day, as a proof of the goodness of heart of the King of Naples, that at his, Walewski's, request the King had at one time promised to set free three hundred prisoners against whom no charge or no proof had been established. 'How grateful [said Milnes] these men must have been ; did they not come to thank you for their release ?' 'Why [said Walewski], you see, after the King had made the promise, the chief of the police came to him and said that if the men were set free, he could not answer for the King's life ; and so you see the men were not set free.'

I sent you a copy of my answer to Castelficala to be given to the Neapolitan Government, because I thought that my friend the Prince would probably not send them exactly a correct copy, but would probably leave out the words about the King's oath.

This 'answer to Castelficala' was kept back from the King by his Ministers. Lord Holland, writing from Naples, about two months afterwards, says :—¹

The Ministers keep back from the King any despatches that are disagreeable. He had only heard of your answer to Castelficala, but had never seen it till last Wednesday. It had only been described to him as '*une della solite impertinenze di Lord Palmerston*'—one of his usual impertinences ! Sabatelli read it to him ; it made a deep impression on him, and he said that it was a most important and '*bien redigé*' document.

To his brother, still British Minister at Naples, he again writes about Neapolitan affairs.

¹ Lord Holland to Lord Palmerston, October 13, 1851.

Brocket : November 6, 1851.

What a picture you give of the state of things in Naples ! Can such a condition of things last ? But the French—at least the society of Paris—are all for the Neapolitan Government, but only out of general spite and hatred to us ; and a cousin of Gladstone's was blackballed the other day at a club in Paris because he bore the same name as the writer of the letters to Aberdeen.

As to Castalcicala's recall, I am neither glad nor sorry. He is a vulgar, coarse-mannered man ; but I do not suspect him of political intrigue beyond a certain average amount, and he gave me no trouble. As to Casini, we shall probably be able to keep him in order ; and I believe it is rather useful than not that ultra Tories of other countries should be sent here ; it generally has the effect of somewhat modifying their violence.

Kossuth's reception must have been gall and wormwood to the Austrians and to the Absolutists generally. His reception would probably have been much better if he had not published or written that absurdly violent production at Marseilles. But it has been remarked that at none of the meetings which have been held to greet him have any gentlemen appeared except Dudley Stuart, and, on one occasion, John Abel Smith. He is going to the United States on the 14th ; and I believe that, after remaining there some little time, he intends to return here. But perhaps he may stay there longer than he now proposes to do, for his avowed Republican theories of government will find more sympathy there than here.

We have unpleasant accounts from the Cape ; but these are only small and partial checks, and Sir Henry Smith, when he wrote last, said that as soon as the reinforcements then on their way should have reached him, he should be quite able to deal with the Caffres, and he would get a battalion more than he expected. Still, however, this war costs us some valuable lives, and will absorb a large part of our surplus revenue.

I do not see any rock ahead which is likely to wreck the Government ; we shall have some difficulty, perhaps, about the extension of suffrage next session, but I understand, privately, that Lord Derby finds himself so liable to repeated attacks of gout, that he begins to be less desirous than he used to be to become Prime Minister. Perhaps also the possession of a large estate gives him as much employment as he wants, and he may think it enough to be able to make flashy speeches now and then in the House of Lords.

I fear that Panizzi will not have been able, even with the assistance of Aumale, to persuade the King of Naples to change his system towards his wretched subjects. Really, such sovereigns as those who rule over Naples and Greece are enough to make men Republicans.¹

The Ionian Islands had recently received a new and more liberal constitution. With the enlarged opportunities for agitation thereby acquired the Ionian Parliament had become unmanageable, and attempted to pass a resolution in favour of annexation to Greece. Sir Henry Ward, the British Commissioner, had much trouble in keeping matters quiet. Lord Palmerston corresponds with him on the subject, and favours the retention of Corfu, whatever might be done with the other islands. He naturally saw that it would be useless to hand over Corfu to any great Power that was not a great maritime Power. Hence, when on one occasion the question was raised of giving it to Austria, he summarised his opinion by saying, ‘To give Corfu to Austria would be like entrusting a duckling to a respectable old hen.’

Broadlands: December 26, 1850.

My dear Ward,—I have received yours of the 13th, with the copy of the resolution for union with Greece. If we wished really to punish the Ionians, we should grant this request and hand them over to the constitutional Government of King Otho. But this would be too severe a chastisement upon a nation for the sins of a few. There is, as you probably well know, a foolish and pedantic notion among some of the clerks in the Colonial Office that it would be better to *get rid* (as they term it) of the Ionian Islands. This notion was, I believe, first taken up by Stephen,² an excellent and very learned, but exceedingly wrong-headed, man. My opinion is very different. I consider Corfu as a very important position for Mediterranean interests, in the event of a war, and I hold that it would be a great act of folly for us to give it up. It could not be kept permanently by any Power that was not strong at sea, and it

¹ This reminds one of Madame de Coigny, who, when asked by the Prince of Wales (afterwards George IV.), ‘Pourquoi donc êtes-vous si démocrate?’ replied, ‘Mais c’est que j’ai vécu tant avec des princes.’

² Sir James Stephen.

would therefore, sooner or later, fall into the hands of Russia or France, to neither of which it could belong without much damage to us.

And, a little later on, to the same:—

F. O. : February 18, 1851.

You will have no visit from a Russian fleet this year. We are on the best possible terms with Russia, and she will do nothing openly to disoblige us. I should even doubt her being the instigator of the disturbances which give you trouble, though it would be quite in keeping with her standing policy to have fomented them by money and intrigues. But just at the present time I think Austria is more likely to have done us an ill turn.

Schwarzenberg and the Vienna Camarilla, Archduchess Sophia, and others, hate us with the bitterest hatred for the part which the English Government, Parliament, and people have taken during the last three years about Italy, Hungary, and Germany, and these worthies would be glad to revenge themselves for our sympathy in favour of their insurgents, by creating insurrection anywhere and anyhow against British authority; and though the Austrian Government is nearly bankrupt, yet, like other spendthrifts, it can always bring out money for its *menus plaisirs*.

About the plots which were going on, he says to the High Commissioner:—

C. G. : November 19, 1851.

These conspirators may be confident—as all conspirators are apt to be—that the day of their triumph is approaching; so say the French Red Republicans in England; but those days of triumph will recede as time advances, just as the mirage of the desert retires before the slow march of the caravan. It is well, however, to be on our guard, for it is only over-confidence and apathy in governors than can give such ragamuffins a chance of success. I am amused at the notion that I am to be accused of having excited and paid for the recently attempted inroad upon the Ionian Islands. I remember to have heard that, in former times at Cambridge, it was the fashion for the young men to *mob* each other's rooms, that is, to turn everything topsy-turvy; and one foolish fellow got drunk and mobbed his own rooms, not being able to get at a friend's. I am still, however, sober enough not to play such pranks with our own house. I daresay the Greek Government is very angry with me for having shown

them up about robbery to all the Governments of Europe, and no doubt they have had admonitions even from those Governments which pretended to us that they would not and could not meddle in the matter. The more angry they feel, however, the more likely it is that they will bestir themselves to improve matters; still, I fear that as long as Otho sits like an incubus on the Greek throne, no Greek progress will be made in that career of improvement which the Greek nation is destined ultimately to run.

For my part, I should not object to an arrangement by which Corfu should be annexed to the British Empire and the other islands added to Greece. Corfu is an important military and naval post, and ought never to be abandoned by us; the other islands might go to Greece without inconvenience, I should think, to us, though at present such a transfer would be attended with much inconvenience to them. No such arrangement, however, could be made without the formal concurrence of all the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna, by which the Seven Island State was placed under our protection; and it is not very likely that France, Austria, and Russia would consent to give us Corfu; and perhaps Russia would not fancy any addition to the Greek State, though she may like to keep up a disturbing agitation in the Ionian Islands. All this, however, is a speculation in the clouds; but whenever you write to me again, let me know what you think of it.

Lord Palmerston, however, modified his views later on, and, in 1862, cordially agreed to hand over all the Ionian Islands to the new kingdom of Greece if the Greeks would choose a king approved of by England, which they accordingly did. The neutrality of the islands was, however, to be declared by the Great Powers, and the fortifications of Corfu demolished, both of which conditions were observed.

Meanwhile things in France were hurrying to a crisis: Lord Palmerston watching the game, and not concealing his preference for the cause of the President.

C. G. : November 20, 1851.

My dear Normanby,—Your accounts of what is passing in Paris are very full and satisfactory as conveying all details. Satisfactory as to details which they announce is another thing. But it seems to me that Louis Napoleon is master of the field

of battle, and will carry the day. I have always thought that such a result would be the best thing both for France and for England. There is no other person at present competent to be at the head of affairs in France; and if Louis Napoleon should end by founding a dynasty, I do not see that we need regret it, as far as English interests are concerned. The family of Bourbon have always been most hostile to England, and those members of that family who have owed us the greatest personal and political obligations have, perhaps, in their hearts hated us the most. What should we gain by substituting Henry V. or the Orleans family for the race of Buonaparte? At all events, I say of Louis Napoleon *laudo manentem*. If he should fall, we should of course endeavour to be on equally good terms with those who, after him, might be the official organs of the French nation; but we have no wish to see him fall. If success is any test of measures, he has not as yet played his cards ill; and some of the things which he has done, and which have been represented as mistakes, have perhaps contributed to his success. *Je marche, suivez-moi* was certainly a good declaration, and showed that he knew the faintness of heart of those who were trying to overthrow him. If the Bourgraves would fairly say they want to re-establish a monarchy, one might wish them success; but they do not seem to be ready for that, and yet they want to overthrow that which, in the present state of affairs, seems the next best thing to a monarchy, and the only thing calculated to give any chance of order.

During the session of 1851 Mr. Cobden renewed his motion, having for its object a pacific understanding among nations, by a mutual reduction of armaments. Lord Palmerston took occasion in this debate to vindicate himself from the charge of being a promoter of war and an enemy to peace.

He said that, however little he might think the method by which Mr. Cobden endeavoured to give effect to his principles the best calculated to attain the end he proposed, he subscribed implicitly to the general tendency of his views. He first, however, claimed some credit for the results of his own policy.

I trust the part it has been my lot to take in administering one department of the affairs of this country has shown that there has been nothing in my conduct in any degree inconsistent

with the opinions I am now professing ; for however much it may be the fashion with some persons, in that easy, colloquial, jaunty style in which they dismiss public matters, to declaim against modern diplomatic and international intermeddling, yet at least I can appeal to facts. I can appeal to the fact that during the considerable period for which I have been responsible for the conduct of the foreign relations of this country, though events have happened in Europe of the most remarkable kind, and attended with great commotions of public feeling, and great agitation in the social and political system of the Continent—although during that period events have happened which have brought the interests of England, I will not say into conflict, but into opposition to the interests of other great and powerful nations, yet, at least, the fact is that we have been at peace ; and that not only has peace been preserved between that country and other nations, but there has been no international war of magnitude between any of the other great Powers of Europe. If, then, on the one hand, we are taunted with perpetually interfering and meddling in the relations of other countries, we ought at least, on the other hand, to have the credit of the fact that that interference and intermeddling have been accompanied by the continuance of peace. It is too bad that we should be accused, on the one hand, of interfering constantly in the transactions of other countries, and at the same time that we should be denied the credit of those results which accompanied that course of policy.

But now a cloud, no bigger at first than a man's hand, was growing on the horizon ; but, small as it was, it was fated to burst eventually into the Crimean War. So fully recorded are all the details of the dispute, of which Lord Palmerston notes the commencement in the following letter, that they need not be repeated here ; but it may be well just to recall their outline. France had in 1740 obtained from the Sultan 'capitulations' securing to the Latin Church in Palestine certain privileges in connection with the Holy Shrine. Since that date the Greeks, supported by Russia, had obtained firmans granting them advantages in derogation of the Latin capitulations. These firmans had been long acquiesced in. Suddenly, for no apparent cause, the French ambassador at Constantinople, M. de Lavallette,

was instructed to demand that the grants to the Latin Church should be strictly executed. This was impossible, without annulling some of the privileges of the Greek Church. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ!*—Which of the two sets of monks at Jerusalem should have the keys of certain doors; and whether the Latins might have a cupboard and a lamp in the tomb of the Virgin! Such were the questions which convulsed diplomacy on the Bosphorus, and, in the opinion of the French ambassador, justified his threats of force. It is thus clear that the first step was taken by France.

Lord Palmerston tries a little oil for the troubled waters:—

C. G.: November 25, 1851.

My dear Normanby,—I was in hopes, from the manner in which Walewski had spoken of this Church question between the French and Russians in Turkey, that the French Government took a quieter view of it than seems to be the case. Walewski agreed with me that *le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*, and that it would be very unwise for France in the present critical and unsettled state of affairs all over Europe to get into a quarrel with Russia and Turkey about a matter in itself of such very trifling importance; and he quite admitted that Lavallette had gone much too far, and he seemed to agree with me that this is a discussion which might prudently be adjourned, and be allowed, in the Turkish fashion, to sleep till a fitter season. As to the merits of the case, I am not able to state or form an opinion, for Stratford Canning has kept studiously aloof from the discussion, and has only from time to time explained the general outline of the points at issue. But the broad way in which you put it to the President is the just way to look at it. Here are a few Catholics in Turkey, and many millions of Greeks; here is a colossal power close on the Sultan's back, and here is France a long way off; here are fourteen or fifteen Christian churches in Asia Minor, of which the greater number are in the possession of Greek Christians and the smaller number in the hands of the Catholics; and the French Government insists that the Sultan shall, by making a half-and-half distribution of these holy places between Greeks and Catholics, give a division unequal as with reference to the relative numbers of the two Christian communities, disgust a large body of his own subjects, and offend a powerful neighbour

who can plague and annoy him in a hundred ways and places beyond the reach of France to protect him. This seems an unreasonable course to pursue, unless really the object in view were of essential national importance; but if I mistake not, there can be but very few Frenchmen locally interested in this matter; the few who are in the Levant must be chiefly monks in some convents—men who have abandoned their own country and never think of returning to it. The real object which the President has in view must of course be to get favour with the Catholic clergy in France; but he should seriously consider whether he is not paying too dear for that addition of favour from them by engaging France in a great quarrel about so small a thing. But suppose he goes on and sends a fleet to the Dardanelles, what is that fleet to do? It must either blockade the Dardanelles or force them and make its way up to Constantinople, in order to give the law at the cannon's mouth at the Seraglio point. Now a blockade of the Dardanelles is, of course, a very easily accomplished thing. The French fleet would take up its position within the outer castles in Barber's Bay, where Parker anchored, and it could there effectually prevent any vessel from going up or coming down. But the maritime trade up and down those straits communicating with the Danube, with Odessa, with Taganrog, and with Trebizond is a matter of most important interest to many nations of Europe, and especially to us English; and an interruption of that trade, without any real and adequate necessity, would raise an immense outcry against France all over Europe and even in America, for it must be borne in mind that such a blockade would differ essentially from blockades in general. In ordinary cases, when you blockade a port, you blockade that port, and that port or country only; but here the blockade would apply, not merely to Constantinople and Turkey in Asia, but to the southern ports of Russia and to the Danube-bordering countries; and if the French should find themselves obliged—as probably in point of justice and international right they would be—to let the Russian flag pass and repass, then the blockade of the Turkish ports would of course be reduced to a nullity. But, supposing they were to try to force the Dardanelles, that would be an operation not to be performed without much loss if attempted by ships alone. The batteries have been greatly strengthened of late years, and the wind and current downward to the Mediterranean generally expose ships going upwards to long-continued fire from the land batteries.

They might send also a land force to disembark and take the batteries, but that would make the operation one of time.

In the meanwhile the Russians would not be idle, and somehow or other they would probably contrive to send succour to the Sultan; and if it should so happen that, by reason of any of these obstacles and resistances the attempt should fail, the French Government would have lost caste in Europe and would have made itself ridiculous; and, moreover, the French Government would have done more than Russia unaided could do in half a century to counteract and upset the policy which England and France have hitherto pursued in regard to Turkey—a policy the great object of which has been to foster the independence of Turkey and to get her out of the hands and influence of the Russian Government.

He then proceeded to offer the mediation of England to compose the quarrel—not as a partisan of either side, but as a sincere well-wisher to all three powers, and as an earnest promoter of peace on earth. But a few days later he finds that Russia was not in a humour for ‘good offices.’¹

I see, by despatches lately received from Stratford Canning, that the question about the churches in the Levant is still under discussion and consideration at Constantinople, and that there could be no pretence at present for any violent proceeding on the part of France. But from a little conversation I have had on the subject with Brunnow, I am inclined to think that Russia would not be disposed to accept our good offices if they were tendered. The Turkish Government, Canning says, seems rather to lean to the side of France. But really and truly this is a quarrel fitter for times long gone by than for the days in which we live.

Although after the *coup d'état* at Paris the French pressure was violently renewed, in the meanwhile, on the eve of the blow and in the uncertainty of its result, the Turk was left free to act for himself by the temporary removal of the instrument of coercion.

C. G. : December 1, 1851.

My dear Canning,—Lavallette may represent his going away on leave of absence as a mark of the displeasure of the French

¹ To Lord Normanby, November 28.

Government at the conduct of the Porte on the question about the holy buildings, but I happen to know that he has had leave of absence sent him because the French Government thought he had gone too far, and they considered his temporary absence on leave as likely to be the best way of letting the question drop down into its proper proportions. Say nothing about this unless you find Reshid frightened, and then you may whisper it gently and secretly into his ear.

But official mediation, though it may frequently succeed in modifying public demands and political objects, cannot equally influence personal aims and ambitions. After the crisis at Paris an Emperor in France confronted an Emperor in Russia. The first had to vindicate his newly-won position in the eyes of Europe and of his own country. The second had a long score of checks to wipe out, which to his violent temperament had been most galling. It was not likely that under such circumstances the questions at issue would be allowed to drop. Before, however, they had ripened into a war in which England was involved, Lord Palmerston, as we shall now see, had been driven from the direction of our external affairs.

CHAPTER VII.

REMOVAL FROM THE GOVERNMENT—EXPLANATIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Cassio, I love thee,
But never more be officer of mine—*Othello*, Act. II. Sc. 3.

WE now arrive at a critical period in the lives of two of the most eminent statesmen of their day. Lord John Russell, from the traditional recollections of his family, from the course of his own studies, and from the tendency of his own opinions, was the statesman whom the Liberal party of his own time most trusted in domestic affairs. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, from long experience, decided character, and enlarged views, enjoyed the confidence of the same party in foreign affairs.

Both statesmen were said to have their faults; and now and then a portion of their general followers broke off from one or from the other. But, on the whole, taking each in his own specialty, there were no men in the country to match them; and they had hitherto, though not always agreeing, stood firmly together. But circumstances had of late tended to dissolve this union. Lord John Russell, not only as Prime Minister, but as leader of the Liberal party, felt himself to be invested not only with great authority, but great responsibility, and was not unfrequently reproached by some of his colleagues, who, without considering our foreign policy in its general aspect, were prone to criticise its details, for allowing the Foreign Office too much

¹ To Lord Normanby, November 28.

independence. On the other hand, Lord Palmerston, who had acquired a complete mastery over the business of his department, who always acted on a thorough conviction that his views were undeniably right, and who refrained from any interference in the internal policy of the country, was disposed to think that very great latitude within the sphere of his own attributes should be allowed to him. His notion was that a Foreign Minister ought to be strictly bound to pursue the policy of the Cabinet he belonged to, but that he ought to be left free to follow out that policy in the ordinary details of his office, without having every despatch he wrote submitted to criticism and comment. There is this, moreover, to be said, that whereas in home affairs nothing important is done without the decision of a Cabinet, and the leader in Parliament has only to explain the resolutions of the Cabinet, in foreign affairs a Minister is called upon every day of the week and at any time to write and speak to foreign Governments, or their representatives, on current business. If he could not do this with a certain degree of promptitude and freedom, he would lose all weight and influence with his own agents and with the agents of other Powers.

If, then, there is to be a Minister of Foreign Affairs fit for his post, he must have the thorough confidence of the Premier, and act as if he had it.

Lord Palmerston especially required this; first, because he held an important post in a Whig Cabinet, not being a Whig; and, second, because his policy—that of constantly maintaining the dignity, power, and prestige of England unimpaired—was not only one of constant attention, but, necessarily, of constant action.

Nor was this all: Lord Palmerston had not merely to satisfy Lord John Russell, he had also to satisfy the Sovereign under whom Lord John held his appointment. Foreign policy is that policy in which Sovereigns, who are thus brought into competition with their equals, take the most interest. The Prince Consort, with whom Her Majesty lived on such terms of confidence as ren-

dered her application to him on questions of importance a matter of course, was not only a Prince of considerable ability, but one who gave a minute and scrupulous attention to any business on which he was consulted. He was naturally slow and cautious of judgment; and although his opinions were conscientiously and entirely directed towards English objects, he had not entirely an English mind; and in a German gentleman (Baron Stockmar) much in his confidence, and who deserved, from his great knowledge and abilities, to be so, he had for adviser a man who, though well qualified to have taken a place amongst the first statesmen in Europe, was clearly no admirer of popular or Parliamentary control over foreign affairs, which he regarded as the special concerns of royal and imperial minds.

Sufficient has thus been said to show that the royal authority was likely to be exercised in our foreign relations, and that the decided views which Lord Palmerston was accustomed to form or be disposed at once to carry out, and the strength of the language in which he often embodied those views, jarred at times with the disposition towards more consideration and deliberation at Windsor. More caution, more deliberation was required of him; and, in fact, Lord John Russell, with a double view, I am quite ready to suppose, of paying due deference to the Crown and of serving his colleague, made Lord Palmerston a communication in 1850 to this effect. Such restrictions could not be agreeable to the person on whom they were imposed, and, though conformable with the spirit of our Constitution, were hardly compatible with the prompt and practical despatch of business which every day was complicating and increasing, and which frequently required for a successful issue the transmitting of an immediate reply. During the discussions about the Spanish marriages Lord Palmerston lost three weeks in answering a communication from Guizot, by having to send drafts backwards and forwards while the Court was moving about in a cruise on the Western Coast.

Guizot, in his subsequent notes and despatches, was always throwing this delay in his face ; but his tongue was tied, and he was obliged to accept the rebuke in silence.

It is not necessary to discuss here the exact constitutional position of the Crown in these matters, because that was not really at issue on the occasion to which reference is about to be made. It will suffice to emphatically repudiate the doctrine which has been recently approved in certain anonymous quarters, that the Head of the State is entrusted in a special manner with the decisions upon foreign affairs, and to claim for a free people a voice in their foreign equally as in their domestic concerns. But much has also been said and written lately about the share which the Sovereign takes, or ought to take, in the daily conduct of our foreign negotiations. The truth is that, with a pliant minister and under ordinary circumstances, the Crown has very great opportunities for impressing upon foreign affairs that tone and direction which it, for the moment, desires. Even when an important difference between Crown and Cabinet on a question of general policy has disappeared, by the former yielding to the representations of the latter, there still remain to the Sovereign many ways of influencing the course of negotiations in accordance with his original views. Draft despatches, embodying the Cabinet policy, must be sent to him for approval. They may be returned accompanied by objections to such and such passages, as not fairly representing the decisions arrived at—by complaints of one paragraph as being too strong—while another is pronounced too weak. The Cabinet may be scattered, as, indeed, it always is during a portion of the year ; or, if all its members are at hand, still the occasion may not be deemed by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary sufficiently grave to warrant the issue of a summons. The peccant paragraphs are accordingly recast and a doubtful instead of a clear and strong expression of opinion or intention is transmitted

to the foreign Court. Nor is this all: the Secretary of State, in such a supposed case, knows when preparing his draft that it is about to be submitted to a hostile critic—hostile, I mean, in the sense of being adverse to the policy of which he is the exponent—a critic moreover who must be heard and answered, not one who can be met by real or simulated indifference. He begins, therefore, insensibly by a compromise, and prepares, subject to further modification, an already modified version of the views of his Government. How great an influence may be exercised by means of this censorship will be evident to any person conversant with diplomatic language, and therefore aware of the important difference which even a slight alteration may imply.

Now, it is not contended that, on the whole, within its proper limits, the existence of this warning and criticising power, outside of party ranks, is otherwise than beneficial—especially as a good Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is one of the rarest of our various political species. It is, however, certain that to Lord Palmerston, conscious of his knowledge and patriotism, earnest and eager in his aims, and thoroughly confident that his ways of attaining the end proposed were the surest, the delays and obstacles not unfrequently thus placed in his way were most irksome; and in the ardour of the chase he was too often tempted to leap the gate sooner than lose the time necessary to stop and open it. It must also be remembered that he had, off and on, held the seals of the Foreign Office for a long term of years, during the greater part of which he had been accustomed to be left very much alone. He was, indeed, already a veteran in foreign administration at the time when his two able German critics first appeared on the scene. But, whatever opinion may be formed as to his independence and promptness of action, his motives at any rate must be admired, and it is not possible for anybody who was acquainted with his character to clothe it with any colour of disrespect for the Crown.

There had, however, been friction—and its natural effects, though as yet latent, were undoubtedly still at work, when there suddenly occurred a new and important phase in the neighbouring kingdom. Prince Louis Napoleon, who had been elected President of the French Republic, was in a position that threatened new and serious complications in that country, remarkable, during the last hundred years, for its vicissitudes. This Prince, at the time of his election, did not pass in England, where he then resided, for having any superior ability, nor, as it has been said, had he acquired such a reputation with leading men in France. None had been willing to connect their fates with his. M. Odillon Barrot and M. de Tocqueville were the only two men of any reputation who had served under him, and both of these told their friends that it would be impossible to serve him long, because they knew they could not satisfy his ambition. M. de Tocqueville had been willing to make a compromise, and would have conceded the presidency for life, and a revenue, say, for that position, though inferior, doubtless, to the civil list of an emperor.

The Prince himself had, possibly, at first no fixed idea but that of governing France with as much power as it would accord him. That which, according to report, was said of him by his cousin at the time of his greatest prestige is probably near the truth. ‘For a time the world thought my cousin an idiot; now they think him a genius. He was not an idiot, and is not a genius.’ He was not a great man, but he had a fair idea of what a great man should be; and he could in certain situations play the part of one. But, at all events, his talents, whatever they were, had no clear development in any visible direction. His conversation, simple and natural, was in no wise striking. He could not sustain an argument; and his written composition, which was certainly remarkable, appeared so much above the capacity he had otherwise evinced that he did not get credit for it. His unsuccessful attempts to make in-

surrection during the reign of Louis Philippe had created too high an opinion of his spirit of enterprise, and too low a one of his intellect.

None or few of the thinking classes then either in France or England considered his reign otherwise than ephemeral; and the longer his power continued, the more impatient those who thought they could cut it short when they pleased became of it. This impatience had of late visibly increased. The Assembly had boldly set itself up as his rival, and he had at last found it impossible to name a Parliamentary Ministry.

Lord Palmerston, as far back as January 24, in a letter to Lord Normanby, had given his views of what Louis Napoleon's course should be in such a contingency. He wrote:—

If I was the President I should not trouble myself as to whether the Assembly supported my Ministers or not, whether they censured or approved them. I should say to the Assembly I cannot get rid of you and you cannot get rid of me, and your censures do not change my opinions of my own conduct. For that conduct I am not answerable to you (as long as I keep within the law), but to France. My Ministers are acting by my instructions, and they are responsible to me and not to you. If you reject good laws which I propose to you, yours be the blame. If you will not vote money to keep up an army, navy, and civil government, let the nation call you to account for thus betraying your country; but that which I will not do is to appoint Ministers who shall be your instruments and not mine.

The analogy of our Constitution in regard to the relation of Ministers to Parliament and to the Crown does not hold good as to the position of the French Ministers. The Constitutions of the two countries are wholly different.

The Assembly met after the recess in November of 1851. The crisis arrived on December 2, when the leading members of the Opposition were arrested in their beds, and a purely military rule was established pending an appeal to universal suffrage as to the future government of France.

On December 3, Count Walewski, the French ambassador, called upon Lord Palmerston to inform him of what had taken place, and in the course of conversation Lord Palmerston expressed the view which he held as to the necessity and advantage for France and Europe of the bold and decisive step taken by the President.

The following Memorandum, written several years later, shows that he was well aware what was going on at this moment in England as well as in France among those who were seeking to cut short Napoleon's term of power:—

*Memorandum of certain Circumstances connected with the
Coup d'état.*

The *coup d'état* took place on Tuesday, December 2, 1851, and was known in London by the next day. On Wednesday, the 3rd, Mr. and Mrs. ——— dined with us in Carlton Gardens, and told me that they had been down to Claremont on the preceding Friday to visit the Queen Amelie; that they found the ladies of the French Court in a great bustle; and that they told Mrs. ——— as a great secret that they were making up their paquets, as they expected to have to go to Paris at the end of the then next week, that is to say, at the end of the week in which the *coup d'état* took place.

On the Sunday following, that is to say, on December 7, Mr. Borthwick, editor of the 'Morning Post,' came to me. He said he had a communication to make to me which it might be important for me to receive, and which he considered himself at liberty to make. He said that the day before, that is, on Saturday the 6th, General de Rumigny, attached to the French Court, had come to him and said that as he, Mr. Borthwick, had been civil and attentive to the ex-Royal Family, he (General Rumigny) had been desired to say to him that, if it would be useful to his paper, he should have daily accounts of the military operations that were about to commence in the north of France; that the Prince de Joinville and the Duc d'Aumale were gone to Lille to take the command of troops to act against the President; that the Royal Family had endeavoured to dissuade the Prince de Joinville from this step, but in vain; and that, finding him determined on doing so, the Duc d'Aumale had said, 'My brother is a sailor, he knows nothing of military

operations ; I am a soldier, I will go with him and share his fate and fortune.' Mr. Borthwick said he had declined the offered communications, as he did not wish his paper to be considered the organ of the Orleans family ; and as the communication had not been made to him under the condition of secrecy, he came at once to tell me of it.

I immediately wrote to Sir George Grey, then Home Secretary, to ask him to make inquiry through the detachment of police stationed at Claremont for the protection of the ex-Royal Family, to know whether all the French princes were there, that is to say, those who were in England. I said that General de Rumigny or Borthwick must have made a mistake in naming D'Aumale, because he was then at Naples, and it must be the Duc de Nemours who had gone with Joinville.

In the course of the afternoon I received from Sir G. Grey a report that both Nemours and Joinville were still at Claremont. That Joinville had been several times in London in the course of this week, and was that day at Claremont. That Joinville had been very ill for several days, and had been confined to his room, and nobody had seen him but his medical attendant, who visited him twice a day. This report at once showed that Joinville was off, as I afterwards heard was the case. He went as far as Ostend, but found that the attempt would not succeed, and he came back again. I believe the garrison of Lille had been changed. This confirmed the story as to Joinville, but left unexplained the statement as to D'Aumale. But some days afterwards I received a letter from my brother, Minister at Naples, written before the news of the *coup d'état* had reached Naples, saying that the Duc and Duchesse d'Aumale had received alarming accounts of the health of the ex-Queen of France, and that in consequence thereof the Duke had suddenly set off for England. That two days afterwards the Duchesse d'Aumale had received better accounts, and she regretted that her husband had not waited a day or two longer, as he would then have been spared a fatiguing journey in the depth of winter.

This statement confirmed the whole of General de Rumigny's story, for D'Aumale had evidently, by preconcerted arrangement, left Naples to meet Joinville on a given day at a given place ; and this proved that there had been a plot long proposed for an attack upon the President.

About a fortnight or three weeks afterwards Count Lavradio, the Portuguese Minister in London, went to Claremont

to visit the Princesse de Joinville, who is a Brazilian, and he said he found her *toute explorée* at the turn of affairs in France, and that she said it was most afflicting : *et pour moi qui devoit être à Paris le 20 !*

All this clearly proves that if the President had not struck when he did, he would himself have been knocked over.

P., 29-9, 1858.

On the same day as his conversation with Count Walewski Lord Palmerston wrote privately to Lord Normanby as follows :—

C. G. : December 3, 1851.

Even we here, who cannot be supposed to know as much as people at Paris did about what was going on among the Bourbonists, cannot be surprised that Louis Napoleon struck the blow at the time which he chose for it ; for it is now well known here that the Duchess of Orleans was preparing to be called to Paris this week with her younger son to commence a new period of Orleans dynasty. Of course the President got an inkling of what was passing, and, if it is true, as stated in our newspapers, that Changarnier was arrested at four o'clock in the morning in council with Thiers and others, there seems good reason to believe, what is also asserted, that the Burgraves¹ had a stroke prepared which was to be struck against the President that very day, and that, consequently, he acted on the principle that a good thrust is often the best parry. I have reason to think, because I have heard it from several quarters, that the President has been sometimes led to infer, from your social intimacy with the Burgrave party, that your political sympathies were more directed towards them than towards him. Of course a Minister or Ambassador cannot be expected to adapt his social relations to the party jealousies of the Government to which he is accredited, but if it so happens that personal friendships and private and social intimacies lead him into frequent communication with persons who are hostile to the Government, it is the more necessary for him to take care to destroy in the mind of the Government any misapprehension which this circumstance might give rise to ; and I have no doubt that you have been careful to do so. As to

¹ The majority, comprising Thiers, Tocqueville, Odillon Barrot, and others, in the Assembly. It was a nickname, taken from the title of a play by Victor Hugo, in which a similar party was represented.

respect for the law and Constitution, which you say in your despatch of yesterday is habitual to Englishmen, that respect belongs to just and equitable laws framed under a Constitution founded upon reason, and consecrated by its antiquity and by the memory of the long years of happiness which the nation has enjoyed under it; but it is scarcely a proper application of those feelings to require them to be directed to the day-before-yesterday tomfoolery which the scatter-brained heads of Marrast and Tocqueville invented for the torment and perplexity of the French nation; and I must say that that Constitution was more honoured by the breach than the observance.

It was high time to get rid of such childish nonsense; and as the Assembly seemed to be resolved that it should not be got rid of quietly and by deliberate alteration and amendment, I do not wonder that the President determined to get rid of them as obstacles to all rational arrangement.

If, indeed, as we suppose, they meant to strike a sudden blow at him, he was quite right on that ground also to knock them down first.

I find I have written on two sheets by mistake; the blank leaf is an appropriate emblem of the present state of the French Constitution. It is curious that such a nation as the French, after more than sixty years of political struggle and five revolutions—counting the assumption of power by Napoleon as one—should at last have arrived at a point where all Constitution is swept away, and where they are going to give a practical example of that original compact between the people and the ruler which is generally considered as an imaginary illustration of a fanciful theory.

One of Lord Palmerston's difficulties was the ill-disguised hostility of the British ambassador to the French President, which Lord Palmerston had to rebuke in terms which were naturally distasteful to Lord Normanby. The Government, indeed, at the request of the President, were obliged to recall him shortly after.

Count Walewski very naturally communicated at once to the French Foreign Office the tenor of what Lord Palmerston had said to him. Meanwhile Lord Normanby had applied for instructions as to his future conduct, and received the following official reply:—

Foreign Office : December 5, 1851.

My Lord,—I have received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch of the 3rd instant, requesting to be furnished with instructions for your guidance in the present state of affairs in France.

I am commanded by Her Majesty to instruct your Excellency to make no change in your relations with the French Government.

It is Her Majesty's desire that nothing should be done by her Ambassador at Paris which could wear the appearance of an interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France.

I am, &c.,

PALMERSTON.

Lord Normanby hastened to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to communicate to him the tenor of this despatch. M. Turgot, who had been piqued, as Louis Napoleon himself had been, at the hostile language held by the English representative, replied tartly that such a communication was unnecessary, as M. Walewski had already informed him that Lord Palmerston entirely approved of what the President had done. This statement Lord Normanby reported home in the following despatches, to which I append two side-notes which appear in Lord Palmerston's handwriting, and his despatch of December 16, pointing out the unreasonable character of Lord Normanby's complaints:—

Paris : December 6, 1851.

My Lord,—I this morning received your Lordship's despatch of yesterday's date, and I afterwards called on M. Turgot, and informed him that I had received Her Majesty's command *to say* that I need make no change in my relations with the French Government in consequence of what had passed. I added that if there had been some little delay in making this communication, it arose from some material circumstances not connected with any doubt on the subject.

M. Turgot said that delay had been of less importance as he had two days since heard from M. Walewski that your lordship had expressed to him your entire approbation of the act of the President, and your conviction that he could not have acted otherwise than he had done. I said I had no

knowledge of any such communication, and no instructions beyond our invariable rule to do nothing which should have the appearance of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of France, but that I had often had an opportunity of showing, under very varied circumstances, that whatever might be the Government here, I attached the utmost importance to maintaining the most amicable relations between the two countries. I added that I was sure, had the Government known of the suppression of the insurrection of the Rouges at the time I had heard from them, I should have been commissioned to add their congratulations to mine.

I have thought it necessary to mention what was stated about M. Walewski's despatch because two of my colleagues here mentioned to me that the despatch containing expressions precisely to that effect had been read to them in order to show the decided opinion which England had pronounced.

I have, &c.,
NORMANBY.

Paris : December 15, 1851.

My Lord,—In my despatch of the 6th instant, notifying my communication of my instructions to M. Turgot, I reported that his Excellency had mentioned that M. Walewski had written a despatch in which he stated that your Lordship had expressed your complete approbation of the course taken by the President in the recent *coup d'état*. *I also reported that I had conveyed to M. Turgot my belief that there must be some mistake in this statement, and my reasons for that belief.*

But as a week has now elapsed without any explanation from your Lordship on this point, I must conclude M. Walewski's report to have been substantially correct.

That being the case, I am perfectly aware that it is beyond the sphere of my present duties to make any remark upon the acts of your Lordship, except inasmuch as they affect my own position. But within these limits I must, with due deference, be permitted to observe, that if your Lordship, as Foreign Minister, holds one language on such a delicate point in Downing Street, without giving me any intimation you had done so—prescribing afterwards a different course to me, namely, the avoidance of any appearance of interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France—I am placed thereby in a very awkward position.

If the language held in Downing Street is more favourable to the existing order of things in France than the instructions on which I am directed to guide myself upon the spot, it must be obvious that by that act of your Lordship's I become subject to misrepresentation and suspicion in merely doing my duty according to the official orders received through your Lordship from Her Majesty.

All this is of more importance to me, because, as I stated before, several of my diplomatic colleagues had had the despatch read to them, and had derived from it the conviction that, if accurately reported, your expressions had been those of unqualified satisfaction.

I have, &c.,
NORMANBY.

Foreign Office : December 16, 1851.

My Lord,—I have received your Excellency's despatch of the 15th instant, referring to the statement made to you by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of your communicating to his Excellency the instructions with which you have been furnished by Her Majesty's Government for your guidance in the present state of affairs in France, and I have to state to your Excellency that there has been nothing in the language which I have held, nor in the opinions which I have at any time expressed on the recent events in France, which has been in any way inconsistent with the instructions addressed to your Excellency, to abstain from anything which could bear the appearance of any interference in the internal affairs of France. The instructions contained in my despatch of the 5th instant, to which your Excellency refers, were sent to you, not in reply to a question as to what opinions your Excellency should express, but in reply to a question which I understood to be, whether your Excellency should continue your usual diplomatic relations with the President during the interval which was to elapse between the date of your Excellency's despatch of the 3rd instant and the voting by the French nation on the question to be proposed to them by the President.

As to approving or condemning the step taken by the President in dissolving the Assembly, I conceive that it is for the French nation, and not for the British Secretary of State or for the British Ambassador, to pronounce judgment upon that event; but if your Excellency wishes to know my

own opinion on the change which has taken place in France, it is that such a state of antagonism had arisen between the President and the Assembly that it was becoming every day more clear that their co-existence could not be of long duration ; and it seemed to me better for the interests of France, and, through them, for the interests of the rest of Europe, that the power of the President should prevail, inasmuch as the continuance of his authority might afford a prospect of the maintenance of social order in France, whereas the divisions of opinions and parties in the Assembly appeared to betoken that their victory over the President would only be the starting-point for disastrous civil strife.

Whether my opinion was right or wrong, it seems to be shared by persons interested in property in France, as far at least as the great and sudden rise in the Funds and in other investments may be assumed to be indications of increasing confidence in the improved prospect of internal tranquillity in France.

I am, &c.,
PALMERSTON.

These despatches, however, of the English ambassador came in due course before the Queen and the Premier ; and Lord John Russell, on the 14th, called the Foreign Secretary to account for what he appeared to have said in the matter. Lord Palmerston answered by a detailed exposition of his view of the whole affair, and gave the grounds on which he had formed his opinion.

Carlton Gardens : December 16, 1851.

My dear John Russell,—I return you the Queen's Memorandum and the despatch from Normanby to which it relates. To say that I expressed entire approbation of what the President had done, and that I stated my conviction that he could not have acted otherwise than he had done, is giving a high colouring to anything that I may have said to Count Walewski on the 3rd instant, the date, apparently, of his despatch to Mons. Turgot ; but it must be borne in mind that Normanby writes his recollections of what Mons. Turgot said to him ; that Mons. Turgot spoke to him, apparently somewhat piqued at the delay of his communication, and also from recollection, and that it was natural that Count Walewski in writing his

despatch should colour highly what anybody about whom he wrote had said to him on the events of the preceding day. But the opinion which I entertain of this grave and important matter, and which, no doubt, I expressed is, that so decided an antagonism had grown up between the President and the Assembly that it was to be foreseen that they could not long coexist, and that each was planning the overthrow of the other—either meaning aggression or believing that their course was only self-defence: there are circumstances which seem to countenance the supposition that the Assembly intended in the course of that very week to have struck a blow at the President, and to have deprived him of his position. Now, as between the President and the Assembly it seems to me that the interests of France, and, through them, the interests of the rest of Europe, were better consulted by the prevalence of the President than they would have been by the prevalence of the Assembly; and the great rise which had taken place in the French Funds from 91 to 102, together with the sudden spring which has been made by commerce in general, seem to show that the French people in general are of the same opinion, and that what has happened has inspired the nation with a feeling of confidence which they had not before.

Indeed, to account for this we have only to look at what each of the two parties offered to France as the result of their victory over the other party. The President had to offer unity of authority and of purpose and the support of the whole army against the anarchists for the maintenance of order. The Assembly had to offer immediate division among themselves, a division in the army, and, in all probability, civil war, during which the anarchists would have had immense opportunities and facilities for carrying their desolating schemes into execution. If the Assembly had had any acceptable ruler to propose to the nation instead of Louis Napoleon they might, with their opinions and preferences, have been acting as true patriots by overthrowing the President. But there were scarcely more than three alternatives which they could have proposed. First, Henry V., who represents the principle of Legitimacy, and who has a devoted and a considerable party in France; but that party is still a minority of the nation, and a minority cannot govern the majority. Secondly, they might have proposed the Comte de Paris, but he is only about twelve years old; and a six years' minority with a regency, and with Thiers as the Prime Minister, was not a proposition which a nation in the state in

which the French are was at all likely to accept. Thirdly, they might have offered the Prince de Joinville as a President, or three of the generals as a commission of government, but neither of these arrangements would have been acceptable to the whole nation. The success, then, of the Assembly would, in all human probability, have been civil war, while the success of the President promised the re-establishment of order.

This bitter antagonism between the President and the Assembly was partly the consequence of the arrangements of 1848, and partly the result of faults on both sides, but chiefly on the side of the Assembly.

It may safely be affirmed that a long duration of a centralised, as contradistinguished from a Federal Republic, in a great country like France, with a large standing army, and the seat of government not in an unimportant place like Washington, but in a great capital which exercises almost paramount influence over the whole country, is a political impossibility, let the arrangement of such a Republic be ever so well or so wisely constructed.

But the arrangements of 1848 greatly increased that general impossibility, and, indeed, the work of Messrs. Marrast and Tocqueville would more properly be called a dissolution than a Constitution, for they brought the political organisation of France to the very brink of anarchy.

Not to more than mention, among other defects, that there were two great Powers, each deriving its existence from the same source, almost sure to disagree, but with no umpire to decide between them, and neither able by any legal means to get rid of the other—not to dwell upon that, the question in regard to which the rupture took place was sure to bring about sooner or later collision, and probably violence.

The Constitution contained a regulation that the same person should not be twice running elected as President; that is to say, that at the end of the first and of each successive term of Presidentship the French nation should not be allowed to choose the person whom they might prefer and think fittest to be at the head of their Government. Now, there seemed every reason to expect that the vast majority of the nation would re-elect Louis Napoleon, and the great majority of the *Conseils-Généraux* petitioned that the Constitution might be altered, meaning specifically in this respect. But another regulation of 1848 interfered. A certain proportion of the Assembly was required to give validity to a resolution that the Constitution

should be revised, and this majority the Assembly did not give. It had been generally expected that the actual conflict would be put off till May of next year, but the measures of both parties brought it on sooner.

The proposal of the President to restore universal suffrage was evidently intended for the purpose of securing for him such an overwhelming number of votes, that the Assembly would not have set his election aside. The Assembly tried to parry this by various schemes, either projected or actually put forward. One plan was a law attaching punishment to any elector who might vote for an ineligible candidate; but this, I believe, was not actually brought forward. Another was what was called the Questeur proposal, which went to place a portion of the army under the orders of the Assembly. This, indeed, was negatived, but it showed what its proposers intended. Then came the proposal to declare it high treason in an existing President to take any steps to procure his re-election—a law which, if it had passed, would obviously have placed the President at the mercy of the Assembly, unless he could rely upon a sufficient portion of the army to fight against that part of it which might go over to the Assembly. It is said, with what truth I cannot tell, that it was the intention of the leaders of the majority of the Assembly, if that law had been carried, immediately to have arrested within the walls and on the spot such of the Ministers as were members, among whom was the Minister of War, and to have also endeavoured to send the President to Vincennes, so far as I know; at least it was told to me on the Tuesday or Wednesday that those who were about the Royal Family at Claremont expected something which they considered favourable to their interests to happen at Paris before the end of that week. I mean that this expectation had been expressed in the course of the week preceding the 2nd of this month.

It seems to me, then, it is fair to suppose that Louis Napoleon may have acted from mixed motives. There is no doubt that he was impelled by ambition, and by a rooted belief which he is well known to have entertained from a very early age, that he was destined to govern France. But he may also have felt that, in the present deplorable state of society in France, he was much more capable of promoting the interests of the country than his antagonists were; and a man even with less personal ambition might, in his situation, have thought *salus Reipublicæ suprema lex*.

His justification will, no doubt, very much depend upon the degree of proof which he may be able to adduce that he was acting at the moment in self-defence, and was only anticipating an impending blow, and also upon the use which he may make of the ascendancy which he has acquired.

I do not agree with the opinion which I understand Macaulay has expressed in a letter to Lord Mahon, that the French nation are only fit for military despotism; nor can I believe that any Government which is not what we mean by the term Constitutional, can have a long duration in France.

I have said nothing of the events of Thursday and Friday, but there can be but one feeling as to the wanton destruction of life which the soldiers appeared to have inflicted on the people of Paris.

To this came a reply that the question at issue was not the grounds for the judgment he had formed, but whether he ought to have given any opinion without previously consulting the Cabinet and taking the orders of the Sovereign. Lord Palmerston rejoined that the opinion given by him was given as his own and in an unofficial conversation, and that it in no way fettered the action of the Government; that if it were laid down that a Secretary of State was to express no opinion on passing events in conversing with foreign Ministers, except as the organ of a previously-consulted Cabinet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar personal intercourse which is so useful for the maintenance of friendly relations with foreign Governments. This did not satisfy the Premier, who, in the following letter, ended the debate by a very summary decision:—

Woburn Abbey: Dec. 19, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,—I have just received your letter of yesterday. No other course is left to me than to submit the correspondence to the Queen, and to ask Her Majesty to appoint a successor to you in the Foreign Office.

Although I have often had the misfortune to differ from you in minor questions, I am deeply convinced that the policy which has been pursued has maintained the interests and the honour of the country.

I remain, yours truly,
J. RUSSELL.

To soften the blow, however, he immediately afterwards made a proposal almost comical in its character, and offered to Lord Palmerston the viceregal dignity at the Court across the Irish Channel. This was of course civilly declined, but the retort which such a communication afforded to one who had been charged with conduct both imprudent and indecorous was too good to be neglected.

Broadlands : Dec. 23, 1851.

My dear John Russell,—I have received your letter of yesterday ; I cannot, however, allow our correspondence on this matter to close without saying that I do not admit your charge of violations of prudence and decorum, and I have to observe that that charge is refuted by the offer which you made me of the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, because I apprehend that to be an office for the due performance of the duties of which prudence and decorum are qualities which cannot well be dispensed with.

That the dismissal of Lord Palmerston sooner or later was an event which had been long contemplated, is evident from the following letter of the Prince Consort to the Prime Minister published in Martin's 'Life of the Prince Consort,' vol. ii. p. 418 :—

Windsor Castle : Dec. 20, 1851.

My dear Lord John,— . . . It was quite clear to the Queen that we were entering upon most dangerous times, in which military despotism and red republicanism will for some time be the only powers on the Continent, to both of which the constitutional monarchy of England will be equally hateful. That the calm influence of our institutions, however, should succeed in assuaging the contest abroad must be the anxious wish of every Englishman, and of every friend of liberty and progressive civilisation. This influence has been rendered null by Lord Palmerston's personal manner of conducting the foreign affairs, and by the universal hatred which he has excited on the Continent. That you could hope to control him has long been doubted by us, and its impossibility is clearly proved by the last proceedings. *I can therefore only congratulate you, that the opportunity of the rupture should have been one in which all the right is on your side.*

The Cabinet was summoned on the 22nd to receive the news of Lord Palmerston's dismissal and the appointment of Lord Granville in his stead. Lord Palmerston, meanwhile, was silent except to his most intimate friends, for, as he said to Lord Broughton, 'When a man resigns, he is expected to say why; when he is removed, it is for others to assign reasons.'

But no reason was assigned and the public had to wait for the meeting of Parliament. Meanwhile the long-cherished hostility of certain foreign Courts and Governments found vent in notes of exultation at the fall of the man who had so long occupied a position of antagonism towards them. All over Europe the result was regarded as a triumph for the absolute and a blow for the Liberal cause.

From the British embassy at Vienna, Mr. Murray wrote to a friend:—

Lord Palmerston's retirement is received with the most profound regret by the Liberal party in Austria, who look upon it as the utter annihilation of their hopes. It will hardly be believed that these arrogant fools here actually think that *they* have overthrown Lord Palmerston; and the vulgar triumph of Schwarzenberg knows no bounds. Not content with placarding the news with lying comments of all sorts, and despatching couriers into the provinces to circulate the most monstrous fictions about the 'Victory of Austrian Policy,' his bad taste has actually gone far enough to make him give a ball in consequence. I believe if an earthquake had swallowed up England, Queen, Lords and Commons, Constitution, Free Press and all, it would not have created more sensation than this sudden and strange change in the English Cabinet.

We must recall the German doggrel, in vogue at the time, if we wish to understand the excited feelings of the moment:—

Hat der Teufel einen Sohn,
So ist er sicher Palmerston.

Some mad enthusiasm might be forgiven at the prospect of getting rid of the devil's son!

From Madrid Lord Howden at once sent in his resignation to Lord Granville, alleging that he could no longer be of any use there, as 'the retirement of Lord Palmerston either actually is, or most certainly will be, believed to be a direct concession to the reactionary spirit which is riding rough-shod over the world, and which is nowhere more to be apprehended than in Spain.'

It was the same everywhere abroad.

At home the feeling of astonishment overcame for the moment every other feeling: an astonishment not confined to the general public, but extending even to some of his colleagues. Lord Palmerston received letters from all sides expressing regret and asking for explanation. He contented himself with acknowledging their sympathetic communications. I shall only quote one letter addressed to him on the subject, and that is one from Lord Lansdowne:—

Bowood : December 20.

My dear Palmerston,—I cannot resist the *désire* I feel to write to you, and give some expression to the deep concern I feel at the event which has just occurred, of the probability of which I was only made aware the day before the last Cabinet, by two letters from J. Russell, which, owing to the accident of my being absent from home, reached me at the same time, when there appeared to be no reason left for further and more satisfactory explanation.

I have felt this concern the more deeply because I am perfectly convinced there was and is no difference in the Cabinet with respect to the neutral position to be maintained in French affairs, and because I have felt inclined from the first to the same individual opinion, the grounds of which you stated in your letter to J. Russell, as to the necessity of a *coup d'état* by *one* person to give France any chance of a peaceable future, though I wish such opinions had not been expressed to an ambassador, apparently not very well disposed to receive them, without having been previously communicated to J. Russell and to the Queen, knowing as I long have known the extent of susceptibility which prevailed in that quarter on these matters, and greatly lamented, and which I have unsuccessfully laboured to combat.

What I chiefly wish, however, to say to you on this occasion is, that not only have I approved of every essential act during your administration of foreign affairs at the time, but that there is not one with respect to which upon subsequent reflection I could wish to recall my approbation. Your policy will never, while you live, want the ablest of all defenders, but whether in or out of office (and J. Russell is well apprised upon what a slender thread my own tenure of office now hangs), I can never hear it impugned in public or in private without expressing my conviction and admiration of its great ability, and real consistency with the interests, and, above all, the honour of the country.

Yours sincerely,
LANSDOWNE.

The following letter to his brother gives, in Lord Palmerston's own words, a full story of the whole matter:—

Broadlands: Jan. 22, 1852.

I have not been able to write to you sooner except by the common post, and I did not like to send you details by that conveyance. The history of my dismissal is short and simple. I had, like all the rest of the world, long considered the French Constitution of 1848 as one that would not long work, and as an arrangement which approached to the very verge of anarchy. The course pursued by the Assembly—and more especially after its meeting in the beginning of November—showed that a conflict between that body and the President was inevitable; that there was no way out of the difficulty in which France was placed except by some act of violence against the law and Constitution; and it seemed to me better that in such a conflict the President should prevail over the Assembly, than that the Assembly should prevail over the President. Therefore when the *coup d'état* took place, and Walewsky came to me on the Tuesday (December 3) to tell me of it, I expressed to him these opinions. The President could offer to France settled government, with order and internal tranquillity; the Assembly had no eligible candidate to offer in the room of the President. Henry V. had only a minority with him, and could not with that govern the majority of the nation. The Comte de Paris is only about twelve years old, and France could not now accept a regency of six or eight years' duration, with a foreign and Protestant princess as Regent, and Thiers as Prime

Minister. The Triumvirate of the Generals Cavaignac, Changarnier, and Lamoricière would be military despotism; and Joinville as President would be a political solecism. Any one of these arrangements would have been civil war and local and temporary anarchy; and the Assembly had nothing else to offer. Walewsky wrote on the 3rd a private letter to Turgot, giving him an account of what I had said, the sum and substance of which was, that I thought that what the President had done the day before was the best thing for France, and, through France, for the rest of Europe. On the 3rd, Normanby, who had for some time been on very bad personal terms with the President, wrote a despatch to ask whether in consequence of what had happened, he should alter in any way his relations with the French Government. On the 5th I sent him a despatch, saying that he was to make no change in his relations with the French Government, nor to do anything which would wear the appearance of any interference in the internal affairs of France. He received this despatch on the 6th, and went immediately to Turgot to tell him of it—a step wholly unnecessary, because all he was told to do was to make no change in his relations with the French Government. Turgot, who was nettled at the existence of any doubt on the subject, said that the communication was unnecessary, as he had two days before received an account from Walewsky, saying that I had entirely approved what the President had done, and thought he could not have acted otherwise. This despatch having been read by the Queen and John Russell, the latter wrote to me to say that he hoped I should be able to contradict that report of what I had said. To this I replied that the particular expressions ascribed to me were rather a highly-coloured version of what I had said, but that it must be remembered that Normanby reported what Turgot had said to him verbally; that Turgot stated from memory what Walewsky had written in a despatch or letter received two days before; and that Walewsky gave the impression which he had derived from our conversation, but not the particular words which I had used. But I stated to John Russell, at considerable length, my reasons for thinking that what had been done was the best thing for France and for Europe.

To this John Russell replied that I mistook the point at issue between us. That the question was not whether the President was or was not justified in doing what he has done, but whether I was justified in expressing any opinion thereupon

to Walewsky without having first taken the opinion of the Cabinet on the matter. To this I answered that his doctrine so laid down was new, and not practical. That there is a well-known and perfectly understood distinction in diplomatic intercourse between conversations which are official and which bind Governments and conversations which are unofficial and which do not bind Governments. That my conversation with Walewsky was of the latter description, and that I said nothing to him which would in any degree or way fetter the action of the Government; and that if it was to be held that a Secretary of State could never express any opinion to a foreign Minister on passing events, except as the organ of a previously-consulted Cabinet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar intercourse which tends essentially to promote good understanding between Ministers and Governments.

John Russell replied to this that my letter left him no alternative but to advise the Queen to place the Foreign Office in other hands; but he offered me the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, or any other arrangement which I might prefer. Of course, having been so cavalierly sent to the right-about, I told him there were obvious reasons which prevented me from availing myself of his offers, and that I only waited to learn the name of my successor to give up the seals. John Russell distinctly narrowed down the ground of my dismissal to the fact of my having expressed *an* opinion on the *coup d'état* without reference to the nature of that opinion, Johnny saying that that was not the question. Now, that opinion of mine was expressed in conversation on Tuesday, the 3rd; but on Wednesday, the 4th, we had a small evening party at our house. At that party John Russell and Walewsky were, and they had a conversation on the *coup d'état*, in which Johnny expressed his opinion, which Walewsky tells me was in substance and result pretty nearly the same as what I had said the day before, though, as he observed, John Russell is not so *expansif* as I am; but, further, on Friday, the 6th, Walewsky dined at John Russell's, and there met Lansdowne and Charles Wood; and in the course of that evening John Russell, Lansdowne, and Charles Wood all expressed their opinions on the *coup d'état*, and those opinions were, if anything, rather more strongly favourable than mine had been. Moreover, Walewsky met Lord Grey riding in the Park, and Grey's opinion was likewise expressed, and was to the same effect. It is obvious that the reason assigned for my dismissal was a mere pretext, eagerly caught

at for want of any good reason. The real ground was a weak truckling to the hostile intrigues of the Orleans family, Austria, Russia, Saxony, and Bavaria, and in some degree also of the present Prussian Government. All these parties found their respective views and systems of policy thwarted by the course pursued by the British Government, and they thought that if they could remove the Minister they would change the policy. They had for a long time past effectually poisoned the mind of the Queen and the Prince against me, and John Russell giving way, rather encouraged than discountenanced the desire of the Queen to remove me from the Foreign Office.

In the meanwhile the papers, having but little to discuss, have all over the country—both London and provincial papers—been full of my removal; and the general tone has been highly complimentary to me, and far from agreeable to John Russell. This, of course, has much annoyed him; and I think, if known by the Court, must afford them matter for reflection.

The general opinion is that the Ministry will not stand long after the meeting of Parliament. Indeed, it is likely that they will be wrecked upon the Reform Bill. At all events, it is scarcely probable that they should get through the session without some defeat which would lead to their resignation. In that case the Queen would send for Lord Derby, who would probably be able to form a Government even without the Peelites; but they would most likely join him. However, all these things are matters of speculation.

Parliament met on February 3. Immediately after the speeches of the mover and seconder of the Address were concluded, the Prime Minister was asked to explain the reason for Lord Palmerston's removal from office. Lord John Russell began by saying:—

It will be right that I should first state to the House what I conceive to be the position which a Secretary of State holds as regards the Crown in the administration of foreign affairs, and as regards the Prime Minister of this country. With respect to the first, I should state that when the Crown, in consequence of a vote of the House of Commons, places its constitutional confidence in a Minister, that Minister is, on the other hand, bound to afford to the Crown the most frank and full detail of every measure that is taken, or to leave to the Crown its full liberty, a liberty which the Crown must possess,

of saying that the Minister no longer possesses its confidence. Such I hold to be the general doctrine. But as regards the noble lord, it did so happen that in August, 1850, the precise terms were laid down in a communication on the part of Her Majesty with respect to the transaction of business between the Crown and the Secretary of State. I became the organ of making that communication to my noble friend, and thus became responsible for the document I am about to read from.

I shall refer only to that part of the document which has reference to the immediate subject :—

‘The Queen requires, first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction.

‘Secondly, having once given her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister. Such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that Minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and the foreign Ministers before important decisions are taken based upon that intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches in good time, and to have the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off. The Queen thinks it best that Lord John Russell should show this letter to Lord Palmerston.’

I sent that accordingly, and received a letter in which the noble lord said :—

‘I have taken a copy of this Memorandum of the Queen, and will not fail to attend to the directions which it contains.’

Lord John Russell then proceeded to remark that—

The first important transaction in which Lord Palmerston had taken part since the end of the last session of Parliament was the reception of a deputation of delegates from certain metropolitan parishes respecting the treatment of the Hungarian refugees by the Turkish Government. On this occasion he (Lord John Russell) thought that his noble friend had exhibited some want of due caution; but he gave him the credit of supposing that this was through an oversight.

The next occasion to which he thought it necessary to refer related to the events which had taken place on December 2, in France.

The instructions conveyed to our ambassador from the Queen's Government were to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of that country. Being informed of an alleged conversation between Lord Palmerston and the French ambassador repugnant to these instructions, he (Lord John) had written to that noble lord; but his inquiries had for some days met with a disdainful silence, Lord Palmerston having meanwhile, without the knowledge of his colleagues, written a despatch to Lord Normanby, in which he, however, evaded the question whether he had approved the act of the President. The noble lord's course of proceeding in this matter he considered to be putting himself in the place of the Crown, and passing by the Crown, while he gave the moral approbation of England to the acts of the President of the Republic of France, in direct opposition to the policy which the Government had hitherto pursued.

Under these circumstances, he (Lord John Russell) had no alternative but to declare that, while he was Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston could not hold the seals of office; and he had assumed the sole and entire responsibility of advising the Crown to require the resignation of his noble friend, who, though he had forgotten and neglected what was due to the Crown and his colleagues, had not, he was convinced, intended any personal disrespect.

Lord Palmerston then rose, and the following is a report of what he said:—

He should be sorry if the House and the country should run away with the notion which Lord John Russell seemed to entertain, that he had abandoned principles. He concurred in Lord John's definition of the relations between the Foreign Minister and the Crown, and he contended that he had done nothing inconsistent with these relations. With reference to the deputation on the subject of the release of the Hungarian refugees, he had thought it to be his duty to receive it. He had repudiated certain expressions contained in the address, and he had said nothing upon that occasion which he had not uttered in that House and elsewhere. He then entered into a lengthened statement of the transactions in reference to the *coup d'état* in France, which had been represented by Lord John Russell as forming the groundwork of his removal from office. After recounting the interview with Count Walewsky on Decem-

ber 3, he said that on that same day Her Majesty's ambassador at Paris wrote a despatch to ask what instructions he should receive for his guidance in France during the interval before the vote of the French people on the question that was to be proposed to them, and whether in that interval he should infuse into the relations with the French Government any greater degree of reserve than usual.

I took [Lord Palmerston proceeded to say] the opinion of the Cabinet on that question, and a draft of that opinion was prepared and sent for Her Majesty's approbation. The answer could only be one in consistence with the course we had pursued since the beginning of the events alluded to, and was such as the noble lord has read. Her Majesty's ambassador was instructed to make no change in his relations with the French Government, and to do nothing that should wear the appearance of any interference with the internal affairs of France. There was no instruction to communicate that document to the French Government; it simply contained instructions, not in fact what the English ambassador was to do, but what he was to abstain from doing. The noble lord, however (the Marquis of Normanby), thought it right to communicate to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of that document, accompanying his communication with certain excuses for the delay, which, however, did not rest with that noble marquis, as his despatch to the English Government was dated December 3. The French Minister stated that he had nothing to complain of with respect to the delay, and the less, indeed, because two days before he had received from the French ambassador in London a statement which the noble lord (Lord John Russell) has read, viz., that I entirely approved of what had been done, and thought the President of the French fully justified. That was a somewhat highly-coloured explanation of the result of the long conversation we held together. Those particular words I never used, and probably the French ambassador never would have conceived it consistent with the dignity due to his country to ask the approval of a Foreign Secretary of State. Consequently the approval was not given, and was not asked. When the Marquis of Normanby's despatch reached my noble friend (Lord John Russell), he wrote to say he trusted that I could contradict that report. There was, as he has stated, an interval between the receipt of the noble lord's letter and my answer. The noble lord's letter was dated the 14th, and my answer the 16th. I was at the time labouring under a heavy pressure of

business, and wishing fully to explain the opinion I expressed, it was not until the evening of the 16th that I was able to write my answer. The noble lord got it early next morning, on the 17th.

This letter has already been given above as well as the history of the correspondence which ensued, and Lord Palmerston's claim for the unfettered action of a foreign secretary. He then continued:—

Now, I expressed this opinion to which the noble lord has referred to the French ambassador on December 3; but was I the only member of the Cabinet who did thus express an opinion on passing events? I am informed that on the evening of that very day, and under the same roof as I expressed my opinion, the noble lord at the head of the Government, in conversation with the same ambassador, expressed his opinion. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) I cannot tell what that opinion was, but from what has fallen from the noble lord this evening, it may be assumed that that opinion was not very different even from the reported opinion which I am supposed to have expressed. Was that all? On the 5th, and in the noble lord's own house, I have been informed that the French ambassador met the noble lord, the President of the Council, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The noble lord again expressed an opinion, and the President of the Council and the Chancellor of the Exchequer also expressed an opinion. (Cheers and laughter.) And be it remembered that the charge is not the nature of the opinion, for the noble lord distinctly told me, 'You mistake the question between us. It was not whether the President was justified or not, but whether you were justified in expressing an opinion on the matter at all.' I believe that the noble lord, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, did also, in those few days, express an opinion on those events; and I have been informed also that the then Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and now the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, also expressed his opinion. Then it follows that every member of the Cabinet, whatever his political avocations may have been, however much his attention may have been devoted to other matters, is at liberty to express an opinion of passing events abroad; but the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose peculiar duty it is to watch those events, who is unfit for his office if he has not an opinion on them, is the only man

not permitted to express an opinion; and when a foreign Minister comes and tells him that he has news, he is to remain silent like a speechless dolt or the mute of some Eastern pacha. (Cheers and laughter.) Now I am told, 'It is not your conversation with M. Walewsky that is complained of, but your despatch to the Marquis of Normanby.' What had I stated in that despatch in reference to which a great parade has been made, as if I had been guilty of breach of duty to the Crown and of my obligations to the Prime Minister, in sending it without previously communicating with the noble lord? No man can lay down the matter more strongly than I have in reference to the obligations of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I have always admitted, that if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sends a despatch of importance to an ambassador abroad without ascertaining the opinion of the Prime Minister of the Crown, he is guilty of a breach of duty. But there are many cases in which it is perfectly well known that he is only expressing the opinion of the Government, and inconvenience might arise from delay.

Lord Palmerston then concluded his statement by maintaining that it was a misrepresentation of the fact to say that he had given instructions to Lord Normanby inconsistent with the relations of general intercourse between England and France. It was no instruction at all. He did not profess to give the opinion of the Government or that of England. It was his own opinion, and whether right or wrong, it was shared by numbers in France. Therefore the charge made against him by Lord John Russell, founded on this despatch, had no foundation either in justice or in facts.

He resumed his seat with the House only partially with him. The attack had been very vigorous: his defence had been incomplete. The motives that actuated him in his comparative reserve may be gathered from the following details as to these events, which he gave in a letter to Lord Lansdowne,¹ relating a conversation with the Duke of Bedford in October, 1852.

The reason assigned by John Russell, in his letters to me, for his abrupt dismissal of me, was an opinion which I had ex-

¹ Dated Broadlands, October 1852.

pressed to Walewsky about the President's *coup d'état*, in a morning conversation at my house, the day after that event had happened—that opinion being to the effect that the President had acted in self-defence, and that what he had done was, in the circumstances of the case, the best thing for France. Now, I said to the Duke, in regard to the validity of that ground, I have only to repeat to you what Count Walewsky told me, either the day (or two days) before the matter was discussed in the House of Commons.

Count Walewsky then said to me that he had the day before had with John Russell a conversation which concerned me, and which he thought it right to report to me. He said that Lord John had sent for him, and had said he wished to ask him a question. He had been told that Count Walewsky had said that he, Lord John, had expressed to him, Count Walewsky, in regard to the *coup d'état*, opinions similar in substance and effect to those which had been expressed to him by me, and he wished to know if that report was true. Count Walewsky said that his reply to Lord John was, that that report was perfectly true; that it was true that he had said so, and that what he had said was true. He told Lord John that he, Lord John, had upon two occasions expressed such opinions. The first occasion was on the evening of Wednesday, the 3rd of December, the same day in the morning of which I had expressed to him, Count Walewsky, the opinion which he, Lord John, had found fault with. That he, Count Walewsky, had that evening met Lord John at a party at Lady Palmerston's, and that then and there Lord John had spoken of the event of the day before in terms similar to those used by me in the morning. The second occasion was the Friday following, when he, Count Walewsky, dined with Lord John, and met there some other members of the Cabinet, and that evening, said Count Walewsky to Lord John, 'upon that very sofa' (pointing to one in the room), 'you expressed opinions if anything stronger than what Lord Palmerston had said to me on the Wednesday; and whereas I had contented myself with reporting what Lord Palmerston had said in a private letter to Monsieur Turgot, I made what you had said the subject of an official despatch.' Count Walewsky said to me that after this Lord John asked him whether he had told all this to me; and Count Walewsky said that, having recently passed a day at Broadlands, he had talked over with me the circumstances connected with my dismissal from office, and that he had stated to me all that he had then repeated to Lord John.

‘But,’ said Lord John, ‘does Lord Palmerston mean to say all this in the House of Commons?’ ‘Of that,’ said Count Walewsky, ‘I know nothing.’

I may here observe that I stated in my speech in the House of Commons the general result of this communication made to me by Walewsky; but I did not like to be too precise, or to go into details, out of delicacy to Count Walewsky, though he would have had no objection to my making the assertion on his authority.

I then observed to the Duke of Bedford that the ground on which Lord John Russell had, in his letters to me, placed my dismissal, even if it had had any intrinsic validity, which it had not, was destroyed by this statement, which showed that I had done and said no more than John Russell himself had said and done. But I went on to say to the Duke that I had still further to complain of the manner in which John Russell had made his statement in the House of Commons; for that, finding his original ground, as put forward in his letters to me, thus rendered untenable, he had, in his speech, adopted another ground, and had put my dismissal partly on the ground—first, that I had taken two days more than I ought to have taken to answer a demand for explanation made to him by the Queen, and sent on to me; and, secondly, on the ground that, by sending a despatch to Normanby without previously sending the draft to the Queen, I had incurred the penalty of dismissal, intimated by the Queen’s Memorandum of August 1850, as likely to be the result of such an omission. I said to the Duke that the Queen’s demand for explanation as to what I had said to Count Walewsky came to me from John Russell at a moment when I was overwhelmed with pressing office business, thrown into arrear by my time having been occupied by a succession of Cabinet meetings; that the explanation to be given by me was necessarily a long one; that, in order to write it, I had to sit up one night till half-past four in the morning, having put a messenger under orders to take it down to Woburn in an office-box by the first train of the next day; and that in the box which contained my explanation I put a short note, saying that it was then half-past four in the morning, that I could not sit up any longer to take a copy of my paper, and that I begged that John Russell would at his leisure either send me a copy of it or let me have it again, that I might copy it. ‘Well,’ said I to the Duke, ‘if John Russell thought that the Queen would consider the two or three days’ delay in the transmission of my reply to her inquiry as disrespectful

to her, what was it his duty to do when my explanation reached him? Why, of course, to send it off immediately to Osborne, where the Queen then was. But what did he do? Why, that very afternoon he quietly sent my paper back to me, that I might take a copy of it; and he added that when I returned it to him he would transmit it to the Queen, with a copy of the answer which he intended to write to it. Thus interposing a further delay of at least three days, in addition to the previous delay which he made the subject of complaint against me.'

Then I said to the Duke that I thought it was unhandsome by me, and very wrong by the Queen, for him, John Russell, to have read in the House of Commons the Queen's Memorandum of August 1850, hinting at dismissal. In regard to the Queen, he was thus dragging her into the discussion, and making her a party to a question which constitutionally ought to be, and before Parliament could only be, a question between me and the responsible adviser of the Crown; and I said that this mention of the Queen as a party to the transaction had given rise to newspaper remarks much to be regretted, and which the Prime Minister ought not to have given an occasion for.

I said that, as regards myself, the impression created by his reading that Memorandum was, that I had submitted to an affront which I ought not to have borne; and several of my friends told me, after the discussion, that they wondered I had not sent in my resignation on receiving that paper from the Queen through John Russell. My answer to those friends, I said, had been, that the paper was written by a lady as well as by a Sovereign, and that the difference between a lady and a man could not be forgotten even in the case of the occupant of a throne; but I said that, in the first place, I had no reason to suppose that this Memorandum would ever be seen by, or be known to, anybody but the Queen, John Russell, and myself; that, secondly, my position at that moment, namely, in August 1850, was peculiar. I had lately been the object of violent political attack, and had gained a great and signal victory in the House of Commons and in public opinion: to have resigned then would have been to have given the fruits of victory to adversaries whom I had defeated, and to have abandoned my political supporters at the very moment when by their means I had triumphed. But, beyond all that, I had represented to my friends, by pursuing the course which they thought I ought to have followed, I should have been bringing for decision at the bar of public opinion a personal quarrel between myself

and my Sovereign—a step which no subject ought to take, if he can possibly avoid it; for the result of such a course must be either fatal to him or injurious to the country. If he should prove to be in the wrong, he would be irretrievably condemned; if the Sovereign should be proved to be in the wrong, the Monarchy would suffer.

This resort to the Memorandum of August 1850, for the purposes of debate in the House of Commons, gave Lord John Russell an unexpected success in the discussion. It was an unfair advantage, because, as we see from the foregoing letter, Lord Palmerston considered his tongue to be tied in the matter. In consequence the general impression on the House was, no doubt, for the moment, unfavourable to Lord Palmerston. In a reminiscence of this debate which Lord Dalling left behind him, the scene is described as follows:—

I happened to be under the gallery on the night in which Lord Russell made his explanations.

His speech certainly was one of the most powerful I ever heard delivered. It was evidently intended to crush an expected antagonist, and, by the details into which it went, took Lord Palmerston completely by surprise. I listened to his reply with the more affectionate interest, since he was kind enough to mention my own name with praise; but I felt, and all his friends felt, that it was feeble as a retort to the tremendous assault that had been made on him.

I remember Mr. Bernal Osborne coming to the bench where I was sitting, and expressing to me a regret similar to that which I felt myself; and I think it was the night after, in debate, that, meeting Mr. Disraeli on the staircase of Ashburnham House, which was then the Russian embassy, he said in his peculiar manner, '*There was a Palmerston!*'

'Palmerston is smashed,' was, indeed, the expression generally used at the clubs; but it did not in the least convey the idea that Lord Palmerston had formed of his own position.

I must say, in truth, that I never admired him so much as at this crisis. He evidently thought he had been ill-treated; but I never heard him make an unfair or irritable remark, nor did he seem in anywise stunned by the blow he had received, or dismayed by the isolated position in which he stood.

I should say that he seemed to consider that he had had a quarrel put upon him, which it was his wisest course to close by receiving the fire of his adversary and not returning it.

He could not, in fact, have gained a victory against the Premier on the ground which Lord John Russell had chosen for the combat which would not have been more permanently disadvantageous to him than a defeat. The faults of which he had been accused did not touch his own honour nor that of his country. Let them be admitted, and there was an end of the matter. By-and-by an occasion would probably arise in which he might choose an advantageous occasion for giving battle, and he was willing to wait calmly for that occasion.

It came soon enough.

CHAPTER VIII.

FALL OF THE RUSSELL ADMINISTRATION—LORD DERBY'S GOVERNMENT—DISSOLUTION—SPEECHES AT TIVERTON AND LEWES—LETTERS—DEFEAT OF THE DERBY CABINET.

Your power and your command are taken off,
And Cassio rules in Cyprus.—*Othello*, Act V. Sc. 1.

IN February Lord J. Russell brought in a Militia Bill which was intended to develop a local militia for the defence of the country. Lord Palmerston at once expressed his dissatisfaction at the form of the measure, and in committee on the Bill moved as an amendment to omit the word 'local,' so as to constitute a regular militia, which should be legally transportable all over the kingdom, and so be always ready for any emergency. This he carried against the Government by a majority of eleven, and the Russell Administration came to an end. The event created little wonder, as the progressive feebleness of the Cabinet, since one of its strongest members left it, had for some time prepared the public mind for a change. We have, however, Sir George Lewis's testimony¹ that the division on the amendment was a surprise, and that Lord Palmerston himself did not wish to turn out the Government; but the cup being full, a little movement was sufficient to make it run over. Lord Derby formed a Government, after having invited the co-operation of Lord Palmerston, who thus writes to his brother:—

¹ Sir G. Lewis to Sir E. Head. 'Letters,' p. 251.

C. G.: February 24, 1852.

I have had my tit-for-tat with John Russell, and I turned him out on Friday last. I certainly, however, did not expect to do so, nor did I intend to do anything more than to persuade the House to reject his foolish plan and to adopt a more sensible one. I have no doubt that two things induced him to resign. First, the almost insulting manner towards him in which the House, by its cheers, went with me in the debate; and, secondly, the fear of being defeated on the vote of censure about the Cape¹ affairs which was to have been moved to-day. As it is, the late Government have gone out on a question which they have treated as a motion, merely asserting that they had lost the confidence of the House, whereas if they had gone out on a defeat upon the motion about the Cape, they would have carried with them the direct censure of the House of Commons. Lord Derby has formed his Government solely out of his Protectionist party—none of any other party would join him. He made me on Sunday, immediately after he had seen the Queen, a very civil and courteous offer to join him, but of course it was impossible for me to do so on account of my entire difference with him on the question of imposing a duty on the importation of corn even if there had been no other reasons, but there are many other reasons against it. The House is adjourned till Friday, and then it will probably adjourn again for ten days to allow time for the new Ministers to be re-elected. They are not going to dissolve immediately, but will do so as soon as the Estimates are voted and the Mutiny Bill passed. I cannot conceive that such a Government can stand long, or can even get a majority by a fresh general election.

And to his brother-in-law, Mr. Laurence Sullivan, he writes the same day:—

Lord Derby invited me to join him, but as he said that his adherence to or abandonment of protective duties on corn was to depend on the result of the next general election, that announcement created a preliminary obstacle which rendered all further discussion as to any other points needless. I could not, however, have joined him even if that objection had been removed, because his Government was not to be formed upon any broad principle of a general union of parties, but he meant me to come in singly; and the office of all others which he had

¹ The Caffir war of 1851.

intended to propose to me was that of Chancellor of the Exchequer, which is, of course, departmentally subordinate to the First Lord of the Treasury. I do not mean to say that, irrespective of the question of Protection, I should have been much disposed to join him in any case; but if his Government had been framed on a comprehensive principle, and Protection had been thrown overboard, the matter would have required consideration.

Ministers brought in and carried their own Militia Bill, which Lord John Russell opposed, but which was strongly supported by Lord Palmerston on the second reading. In the following letters he describes with an accurate forecast the position of affairs; but it is curious to notice that Lord Aberdeen, who was to be Prime Minister within eight months, is not even mentioned as a possible choice:—

Carlton Gardens: April 30, 1852.

My dear William,—It is a long time since I wrote to you, but one finds one's time nearly as much occupied out of office as in; there are so many things one has been obliged to leave undone during a five years' incessant Downing Street toil. But I am gradually getting through a mass of accumulated confusion. I am, however, a member of a committee on ventilation, which takes up much of my mornings, in addition to House of Commons attendance in evenings.

Our new Government gets on pretty well; Disraeli has this evening made a good financial statement. His speech of two hours was excellent, well arranged, clear, and well delivered, but it made out the complete success of the financial and commercial measures of the last ten years, of the Peel and of the Whig Administrations, which, while they were in progress and under discussion, he and Derby were the loudest to condemn. He was vociferously cheered by Liberals and Peelites, but listened to in sullen silence by the supporters of the Government. His only proposal is that the income tax, which expired on the 5th of this month, shall be continued for one year longer, to give the Government time to consider what permanent system they will propose; but he has entirely thrown over the idea of import duty on corn, or, in other words, the principle of Protection. Opinions differ as to the probable duration of the session, but the chances are that the

dissolution will not be till the end of June. I do not see that we need care much when it may be, now that by general consent it is agreed that the new Parliament is not to meet till November. The only inconvenience of delay is that people are put to trouble and expense by the measures necessary to guard against contests. In the meantime it is a real public advantage that the Tory party has come into office, and has had an opportunity of seeing and learning and judging as responsible Ministers many things of which in Opposition they had very imperfect knowledge and conceptions. They do better than was expected of them, but, nevertheless, it is scarcely possible that they should stand as they are; and if they do not get some material reinforcement, they will probably not live over next Christmas, notwithstanding any addition to the number of their supporters (and that will not be great) which a general election may bring them. The most natural reinforcement for them to look to would be the Peel party, not very numerous, counting about fifty or sixty, but containing a good many men of capacity. But as yet it seems to me that the Peelite leaders have not softened the bitter animosity they have hitherto felt for the Derby Protectionists. There is no knowing, however, how far a liberal offer of places in the Government might alter those feelings, still I think it unlikely. I believe the Derby Government rather calculate upon inducing me to join them when Protection has had its public funeral; on this point of course I am studiously silent, but I have no intention or inclination to enlist under Derby's banners. I do not think highly of him as a statesman, and I suspect that there are many matters on which he and I should not agree. Besides, after having acted for twenty-two years with the Whigs, and after having gained by, and while acting with them, any little political reputation I may have acquired, it would not answer nor be at all agreeable to me to go slap over to the opposite camp, and this merely on account of a freak of John Russell's which the whole Whig party regretted and condemned; moreover, I am in no great hurry to return to hard work, and should not dislike a little more holiday. On the other hand, I own that it would be a very pressing public emergency which would induce me to place myself again under John Russell, not on account of personal resentment, which I have ceased to feel, and he and I meet in private as good friends as ever, but he has shown on so many occasions such a want of sound judgment and discretion that I have lost all political confidence in him. This last frolic of his

in opposing the organisation of a militia by the present Government after having two months ago resigned the Government because, as he said, he was prevented (though he was not) from bringing in a Bill for the same purpose, and after having stated in Parliament that his reason for resigning instead of dissolving was that he did not think it right to deprive the country during the time necessary for a general election of the means of passing a law for the national defences—this frolic has astounded and disgusted the whole Whig party and all other parties into the bargain. The truth is that the Whigs would be glad to get rid of John Russell and to have me in his stead if this change could well be accomplished. But such a substitution is not an easy thing. It is difficult to reduce to the second place a public man who for many years has occupied the first place both as leader of Opposition and as head of a Government; and such an active man as John Russell cannot be put upon the shelf. The fact is, he has great talents, brilliant abilities, extensive knowledge; but he wants judgment, and acts perpetually from sudden and ill-considered impulse.

If the present Government should be overthrown, the decision the Queen would make as to the person she would send for to make a new Administration would of course much depend upon the circumstances attending the defeat of the present Government. But John Russell, if she sent for him, would have much difficulty in forming a Government. He would try to get Graham and the Peelites; with Graham alone he could not do. If the other Peelites were to join him he might make a strong Government, though he himself would be an element of weakness in it. If I was sent for, which, from the feeling towards me at Court, is highly unlikely, I should have some difficulty in forming a Government, but I think I could do it; and though I should be conscious that I am wanting in many of the requisite qualifications for the post of Prime Minister, yet I think, on the whole, my deficiencies are not greater than those of Derby and John Russell, or of any other person who at present could be chosen for such a duty. If our session is not of long duration, and the general election is over by the middle of July, I think that Emily and I shall probably go over to Ireland for a month, that we shall then pass the end of August and the month of September at Broadlands, and run over to Paris for a fortnight or three weeks in October, before the meeting of Parliament in November. It will not be unuseful to have some communication with the

President, or, as he will by that time perhaps be, the Emperor. My Tiverton friends are staunch, and I am not likely to have any contest there. I have received many overtures from other places, but had the offers been ever so plainly demonstrative of success I should still have preferred keeping a good and safe seat when I have been lucky enough to get it.

There was to be a dissolution at the end of the session, and speculation as to its result was afloat.

C. G.: May 23, 1852.

My dear William,—Those who have looked into the chances of the general election, like Tufnell,¹ for instance, think that the next Parliament will in its subdivisions not differ very much from the present one, and that the Government will not have a majority. If that should so be, and it seems probable, this Government can scarcely long survive the meeting of the new Parliament unless it is kept alive by the difficulty of forming another Administration; but difficulties of that kind seldom prevent the overthrow of what is, though they may embarrass those who have to build up something else to succeed what they have thrown down. John Russell would naturally be the person to be sent for to form a new Government, but he has gone down woefully in public opinion of late, and especially in the opinion of his own party. His talents are beyond dispute, but the infirmity of his judgment seems equally undeniable. At the same time there he is, at all events leader *par droit de naissance*, even though his title by *conquête* has been somewhat shaken; and he is so circumstanced that while he cannot be dealt with as if he were not, and while he must always be an important man while his health and strength lasts, yet he does not inspire that confidence which a Prime Minister ought to enjoy in order that he may be useful, and if he were again called upon to form a Government he might find it difficult to rally round him such colleagues as he would like to have. However, all speculations as to the future are at present idle. Much will depend upon the result of the general election, and the present Government are safe till the end of the year at all events.

Young Stanley (Derby's son) is just come back; he is a promising young man, and, if he trains on, he may be of much

¹ Had been 'Whip.'

service to his father's Administration. My position in the meanwhile is a very agreeable one. As I have no office which other people want, nobody abuses me in order to knock me down; while both the Government and the Liberals, wishing to get me on their side, are vying with each other in civilities. This is all very well as long as it lasts, and after five years and a half of galley-slave labour, I find it not disagreeable to have some command of my time.

While Aquila¹ was here I called upon him, and took that opportunity of telling him what I thought about the system of government in Naples. He asked me to put in writing what I had said to him, and I did so.

Lord Palmerston, who spoke and wrote Italian fluently and correctly, availed himself of his comparative leisure out of office to pay Count Aquila the compliment of corresponding with him in his own language. When Victor Emmanuel was made a Knight of the Garter at Windsor Castle, the Queen wished that he should have some notion of the oath which he was about to take. Lord Palmerston accordingly wrote out a translation in Italian and handed it to the King. Cavour, when he heard of it, was so interested in the incident that he asked for the paper, and, having ascertained that it was in Lord Palmerston's own handwriting, put it away, as an historical relic, among the archives under his control.

In the early part of June there was a debate in the House of Commons on the general conduct of our foreign affairs by the Tory Government. The immediate occasion was the question of compensation to a Mr. Mather, an Englishman, who had been cut down in the streets of Florence by an Austrian officer. Lord Palmerston found fault with the faltering action of the Foreign Office; and the next letter shows that he regarded the state of public affairs as merely provisional:—

C. G.: June 20, 1852.

My dear William,—Poor Malmesbury has got into sad disgrace by his diplomatic mismanagement and his ungrammatical despatches; but every trade requires an apprenticeship,

¹ One of the Royal Princes of Naples.

and a man cannot expect to start at once into being a good Foreign Secretary any more than into being a good performer on the violin. He is, however, naturally a clever man, and, with practice, may become a good Minister; but it was a hard trial for a man who had never been in any office whatever to undertake at once the management of our foreign affairs.

We are now on the eve of our dissolution, which is expected to happen about Tuesday or Wednesday week. The House of Commons will have finished all its business by Friday week, and the Lords will wind up theirs in two or three days afterwards. Those who have studied the matter, and are able to judge, think that the general election will send us back a House of Commons divided into fractions, not very different in their relative proportions from those which exist in the present House. Some say the Derby party will gain from ten to twenty votes, some say it will lose from ten to twenty; but that gain, if they make it, will not give them a majority of their own; and it may fairly be assumed, therefore, that the Government, as it now is constituted, cannot long survive the meeting of the new Parliament, if, indeed, it shall continue to exist as it now is until then.

The fact is, that this Government has only two real men in its ranks—one in the Lords, and one in the Commons—Derby and Disraeli. The rest are all cyphers as to debate, though many of them are, I fancy, inconvenient entities in council.

There will, however, be great difficulty found in the improvement of this Government, or in the construction of a new one. The Peelites are the only party who could as a body join Derby, and they are at present very hostile to him, and seem to me to think more of forming a Government upon the ruins of his than of entering into a combination with him. Still, a liberal offer of places might alter their feelings; and they must be conscious that they are not numerous enough as a party to make a Government by themselves. John Russell, on the other hand, still clings to the position of leader of the Whig and Liberal party; but a great number of the Whigs openly express their opinion that he has shown himself unfit to lead a large party or to be the head of a Government, and that he has in a great measure lost their confidence. He certainly has entirely lost mine. I feel no resentment towards him personally or privately; but it would require strong inducements to persuade me to become again a member of a Government of which he was the head. I could feel no confidence in his discretion

or judgment as a political leader, and could place no trust in his steady fidelity as a colleague having my official position at his mercy. The best arrangement that could be made would probably be to place Lord Lansdowne as head of the Government, and under him John Russell and myself with other Whigs, who with the best of the Peelites might serve as colleagues on equal terms. But Lansdowne's friends and family say that he would not undertake such a task. We shall see. I am told that the Court does not like the present Government, and I can believe it. All royal persons like acquiescence and subserviency of demeanour and conduct. Peel and his Government, with Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary, spoilt them in this respect; but Derby has an off-hand and sarcastic way about him, which is not the manner of a courtier, and has, I know, fought stoutly and successfully on the Danish question.

As to me, my position is as agreeable as it is possible for any public man's position to be. The Court, indeed, are cold, though civil. Either they are conscious of having made a mistake in their passionate hostility to me, and do not like to acknowledge it, or else they still dislike me, and only are just civil enough to prevent remarks. But the public, the press, the Parliament, and political parties are all well disposed and civil. Being free to act individually, I can express my own opinions without caring for others, and those opinions have generally been lucky enough to meet with concurrence. The Government are civil to me, hoping I may join them. The Whigs are civil to me, hoping that I may not leave them.

We have got a new gardener at Broadlands; our former one had dwindled down into a smoking sot. It is a trial to a man to be left as much alone and unlooked after as the gardener of a Secretary of State necessarily is.

I hear that Aquila has been told at Naples to hold his tongue about anything he heard or saw in England, and not to obtrude the revolutionary doctrines of the northern barbarians upon the more civilised sages of the south of Europe.

On the dissolution of Parliament Lord Palmerston in the first week in July went down to Tiverton, and was re-elected without opposition. At the former general election the Chartists had brought down a well-known lecturer, Mr. Julian Harney, to oppose him; but on this occasion their hearts failed them at the last moment. The only opponent, therefore,

that he had to encounter was his old friend Rowcliff, the Tiverton butcher, whom he disposed of in his happiest manner, as will be seen by the following characteristic extracts from his speech on the hustings. Much speculation was afloat as to whether or not he would join the Conservatives, now that he had broken from his former leader. Reporters flocked from all parts to gather any stray indications of his future conduct. These he dexterously baffled all through a humorous speech; and when the Radical elector, impatient of this evasion, boldly put the direct question, he was no less successfully parried. After thanking the electors for the honour which they had conferred on him for the fifth time, Lord Palmerston proceeded:—

We were told when we came to this place that we should not only have hot weather and a warm reception, but also a hot contest. We were told, in mysterious language, in handbills circulated throughout the town, that an unknown candidate would appear—a gentleman of ‘independent principles.’ I have heard, gentlemen, of an independent fortune; I have heard of independent conduct; I have heard of independent character; but the handbill does not condescend to explain what is meant by ‘independent principles.’ I presume the allusion is to principles wholly independent of common sense, of justice, and of liberality. (Laughter.) I am glad, gentlemen, for the sake of the constituency of Tiverton, that such a man has not been found. We have been told that the general election in which this country is now engaged is to determine finally and for ever one great question—I mean the question of Protection or no Protection. It is my humble opinion that that question has been long since settled. I took the liberty of telling you last autumn, when I had the pleasure of being here, that when you saw the River Exe running up from the sea to Tiverton, instead of running down from Tiverton to the sea, you might then, and not until then, consider certainly that the revival of Protection was near at hand. I see no change in the current of the Exe. I don’t even see that in the construction of your bridges you have taken any precautions to secure them against a turn of the stream. What, gentlemen, after all, is this great question which is called Protection? Why, Protection is a single word which represents a not very complex idea. Pro-

tection is a term something like that of 'independent principles,' to which I before referred ; but Protection, stripped of its generality, means practically taxing the food of the many for the sake of the interests of the few. I have that notion of the good sense and the good feeling of the British nation, that I am convinced they never will consent to revert to a system which is founded upon injustice and mistake. (Cheers.) If you wished to know what has been accomplished by the Liberal commercial measures which have marked for some years past the course of legislation, I should give you an answer similar to that inscribed upon the tablet which records the burial-place of the great architect who built the magnificent cathedral of St. Paul's. You know very well that it is usual to adorn the place of sepulture of eminent persons with marble statues, or groups representing different ideas connected with them. The burial-place of the architect of St. Paul's has no such ornaments. You find a simple inscription of his name, and it is added, 'If you seek for his monument, look around you'—look around at that magnificent structure which bears witness to the skill he had attained in his profession. Well, gentlemen, if I am asked what is the merit of those commercial measures which have of late been formed into laws, I answer, 'Look around you.' Look around you, beginning with the prosperity of the princely merchant in his counting-house, and descending to the humble peasant reposing in his cottage. Ask the mother who carries her babe in her arms ; ask the father whose children are clinging around him ; ask them what has been the benefit of the commercial relaxations of late years. They will tell you the benefit is felt both physically and morally, and they will entreat you not to revert to a system which would deprive them of the enjoyments with which they have been blessed. We are, nevertheless, told that there is one class which, amid this general prosperity, has suffered in some degree—namely, the owners and occupiers of land. If I am asked what is the real protection for them, I say their protection lies mainly in the happiness and contentment of the rest of their fellow-countrymen. Is that a vain assertion ? Why, look what happened only three or four years ago. In 1848, when all Europe was convulsed, when thrones were overturned, when constitutions, ancient and modern, were alike levelled in the dust, what was the example shown by this great country ? There were a few men who, unjustly and unwisely dissatisfied with the condition of this country, wished for a violent change ; but the

moment that change was threatened you saw every man in the great city of London, from the highest peer down to the humblest labourer, mingling in honourable fellowship, and stepping forward to defend the laws and institutions of their country in an array so formidable that it prevented even the slightest manifestation of disorder. Now, I believe that could not have happened if the people of this country had not felt that the course of legislation had been directed towards the general good. Now, gentlemen, those persons and those parties who wish to improve the institutions of a great country like this are bound to go slowly and deliberately, and they are sure to meet with great resistance at every step which they take. I, for one, do not complain of that resistance. It belongs to the character of the country, and it has this advantage, that it prevents sudden and ill-considered alterations, and that measures proposed as improvements receive that due consideration and discussion which renders them ultimately better adapted to the condition of the people to whom they apply. A love and affection for ancient practices and institutions is an honourable and peculiar characteristic of the people of this country, and I am the last to wish that that honourable and useful sentiment should ever be discarded from their minds. There are some of the nations of the Continent who are more volatile and more apt to change, and national character is often evinced by circumstances apparently trifling in themselves. Now, in many parts of the Continent if an innkeeper wishes to recommend his inn, he hangs up a sign of 'The New White Horse,' or 'The New Golden Cross.' The last novelty is that which is considered the most attractive. Here, gentlemen, a contrary course is pursued, and, if the owner of a country alehouse wishes to draw custom, he hangs up the sign of 'The Old Plough New Revived.' There is at a place called Hanwell, not far from London, an inn to which gentlemen who were fond of pigeon-shooting used to resort to practise their skill. Well, what is the sign of that inn? It is the 'Old Hats.' Not that anybody was thought to prefer an old hat to a new one, but it was expected that gentlemen would come to 'The Old Hats' in preference to 'The New Hats.' Now, a rival inn was set up, and what was its sign? Why, 'The Old Old Hats,' and much it profited by that superlative designation. I was looking, as I came down here, at the railway time-table book, and I saw among the advertisements that a firm in the Poultry announce an inn as the 'Old King's Head;' and, in order that

they may combine the attractions of national feeling with the attractions of good living, they add that it is the oldest turtle house in London. The people of this country, too, when they wish to express their attachment to the land they live in, call it, with affectionate endearment, 'Old England;' but that does not prevent them from repairing what may have got into decay, or from improving, or ornamenting, or embellishing that which is still good, but may be made better.

Lord Palmerston then turned to the Militia Bill which the Government had just passed, and which he had supported, though many of his constituents disapproved of it.

I suppose that no man in this country, except the few who think in agreement with the author of a pamphlet which I felt it my duty to mention in the House of Commons, and who, good man! recommended that we should quietly submit to be invaded and conquered, in the hope that the conqueror would be so astonished at our submission that he would grow ashamed of himself, and would go away after having taken some £50,000,000 of our money—I presume, with this exception, that there is no man who has an English heart in his bosom who does not feel that England is worth defending, and that he ought to make any sacrifice rather than allow his country to be conquered. Why, I may say, gentlemen, that this country is the heart of civil and political liberty, and that the conquest of this country would not only be one of the greatest calamities to the country itself, but would be a misfortune to the whole of the civilised world. A poet, Campbell, who died not long ago, says, in lines describing the fate of Poland, that—

Hope for a season bade the world farewell,
And Freedom shrieked when Kosciusko fell;

but Hope would indeed for ever bid adieu to the world, and Freedom would die and not shriek, if England were to be conquered. You have for the last two days had bands of music parading your streets, followed by all the healthy-looking children of the place, some toddling along in the ranks who were scarcely able to keep their feet; but that peaceful display has only manifested the joy and contentment of all the people of the town. What would you have said, however, if these bands had preceded a hostile force—if the armed hosts following the musicians had come to occupy at free quarters every house of

your town, and, having occupied every house, to make themselves perfectly free with everything and everybody therein contained? I may be told these are vain apprehensions—appeals made to the fanciful fears of the country simply for the purpose of obtaining the means of adding to the public expenditure. That reminds me of a story which I remember having heard of an elderly lady who lived near Henley-on-Thames, and who, when an invasion was expected by Napoleon Bonaparte, said she did not believe he would ever come, because she had been told in her youth the Pretender was 'coming, and, as he never came to Henley, she believed Napoleon Bonaparte never would come there either. Now, I do not quote this story, gentlemen, to throw any reflection upon the intelligence of the elderly portion of the fairer sex, because I remember to have heard that the Duchess of Gordon, in the time of Mr. Pitt, talking to an elderly statesman, was told by him, with regard to something in which he thought he had acted unwisely, 'Really, Madam, I feel that I am growing an old woman;' upon which the Duchess replied, 'I am glad to hear that that's all, for I really thought your Grace was growing an old man, and that's a much worse thing.' (Great laughter.) Now, I say that those men who tell you that because you have had no invasion since the Norman Conquest you never will have one, and that you need not guard against it, are old men. Though they may not be old in years, they are old in imbecility of intellect. All those who are most able to judge of military and naval operations tell you that an invasion is perfectly possible; that it is more possible now than it ever was before, mainly on account of the great change which has been made by the application of steam in naval and military operations; and to tell you that you are safe from invasion now because you were able to prevent it before, to tell you that you are safe from invasions now without precautions, because hitherto you have prevented it by precautions, is the greatest of all possible absurdities. Why, how happened it that you had no invasion at the time of which the good old lady at Henley spoke? Because you had then a large standing army within the kingdom; you had your whole militia organised, enrolled, and on permanent pay; you had, besides, four hundred thousand volunteers, the whole country was in arms, and the enemy could not have made an effectual attempt; but even then, I believe, and I have been told on good authority, it was only in consequence of the failure of a naval operation, by which the French fleets were to have

formed a junction, that an attempt to invade you was not made. The result would have been such as it always will be when Englishmen are armed and prepared; but I say that, if Englishmen are not armed, and are not prepared, they are doing injustice to themselves, and are not showing themselves worthy of those great and inestimable blessings which it has been the will of Providence to bestow upon them.

Mr. Rowcliff then came forward and put several questions, the nature of which will be fully apparent from Lord Palmerston's reply.

My good friend, Mr. Rowcliff, has reproached me for not coming often enough among you. I must say that he does not appear disposed to make my visits here particularly agreeable to me. (Laughter.) I cannot say that the manner in which he receives me affords much encouragement to cultivate the society of persons of his way of thinking. Whether Mr. Rowcliff is a Radical, a Chartist, or a Tory, I really cannot say. I believe that all parties may have some reason or other for claiming him. Mr. Rowcliff says that I only told you of the good that Governments and Parliaments have done, and that I have myself done, and that I have not told you of the bad. Why, God bless me! it was quite unnecessary for me to do that when he was here. (Loud laughter.) If there was a bad thing to be recorded, to be invented, or to be imagined, I am quite sure Mr. Rowcliff would be the first man to tell you of it. (Laughter, which was increased when Mr. Rowcliff called out 'Question!') Well, Mr. Rowcliff is impatient under this castigation. I will hit lower or higher, just as he pleases; but he must allow me to hit somewhere. Mr. Rowcliff has asked me what Government I mean to join. Now, that is a question that must depend upon the future; but I will tell him what Government I do not mean to join. I can assure you and him that I never will join a Government called a Rowcliff Administration. (Great laughter and cheering.) Now, gentlemen, do not you imagine, because you deem it very absurd that there should be such an administration, that my friend Mr. Rowcliff is at all of that way of thinking; for I believe I am not far mistaken in the opinion that he will consider everything going wrong in this world and in this country until the Rowcliff Administration shall govern the land. Mr. Rowcliff has raked up old and bygone commonplaces about pensions. He ought to know—

because he has no right to talk upon the subject without informing himself about it—that pensions are now extremely limited in amount, and that they are only given for acknowledged public services. All those abuses of sinecures, of inordinate pensions, and of misbestowed pensions, which existed in former times, have been corrected, and the pension list has been enormously reduced. Mr. Rowcliff says I voted for the Militia Bill. As I have already explained to you, the material difference between the Militia Bill which I opposed and the Militia Bill which I supported was, that the former was founded upon compulsory service as the rule, admitting voluntary service as the exception, while the Bill of the present Government, which I supported, was founded upon voluntary service as the rule, and admits of compulsory service as only the remote and contingent exception. The militia now to be raised will be raised by bounty, and, if I have any fault to find with the Act, it is that I think the bounty is rather too high. That, however, I presume, can be no ground of objection to young men who may be disposed to enlist. My belief is that you will have no ballot, but that you will gain all your men from the spontaneous patriotism of the people, aided by the inducement of the bounty. I do not think so ill of the young men of England as to believe that they will be afraid of twenty-one days' service during the year in the militia. I commanded a regiment of local militia, which used to assemble for twenty-eight days' training, and I knew only one instance of a man who wished to go home before the twenty-eight days were over. He was one of the privates, who came to me and said, 'My lord, I wish you would let me go home.' I replied, 'Why? You have only a week to serve now.' 'Well,' said he, 'the fact is that before I came here I promised a young woman in my parish that I'd marry her, if so be as I survived the campaign.' (Great laughter.) I replied, 'Heaven forbid that the young woman should be disappointed! Go home and marry her, and tell her the campaign has not been so dangerous as she may have thought it.' (Laughter.) I am convinced that the young men of England will not be afraid of three weeks' campaign in a militia regiment. Mr. Rowcliff has asked me my notions of Parliamentary reform. Now, Mr. Rowcliff is a Chartist, and is for the five or six or any other number of points of the Charter. I am not a Chartist, and I am too old to become a Chartist. I am quite satisfied with the constitution of the country under which I have been born, under which I

have lived, and under which I hope to die. I am for a limited and constitutional monarchy ; I am not for a republic. I have seen what republics are in other countries. I have seen that they cannot maintain their ground, and that when you try to establish them you invariably lead the way to a military despotism. I am for septennial Parliaments. A septennial Parliament, practically, is not a Parliament that lasts for seven years, for we all know that the average duration of the Parliaments during the last thirty or forty years has not been more than three or four years. If you establish annual Parliaments you will have the country in a perpetual commotion. Your members of Parliament will not have time to learn their duties, and your business will be ill done. In the same way, if you have triennial Parliaments, during the first year the members will be learning their business, in the second year they will just be beginning useful measures, and in the third year they will be thinking of the Rowcliffs of their respective constituencies (laughter), and endeavouring to shape their course, not for the good of their country, but in order to conciliate the most noisy of their constituents. With regard to vote by ballot—secret voting—I object to it, because I think it at variance with the national character, and with the principle of our constitution. I think a true Englishman hates doing a thing in secret or in the dark. I do not believe that a majority of Englishmen would consent to give their votes in secret, even if the law permitted them to do so ; and I think if the law compelled them to do so, it would be a debasement of the national character. But I have a higher objection. I hold that the right of voting is a trust reposed in the elector for the public good. I do not think that a vote is given for the benefit of the man who possesses it, and that he can take it to the best bidder and get £5, £10, or £20, as the case may be. The vote is given as a trust for the public and for the nation ; and I say that any trust reposed in a man for the public good he ought to perform in public. I say, that for men who are charged with the high and important duty of choosing the best men to represent the country in Parliament to go sneaking to the ballot-box, and, poking in a piece of paper, looking round to see that no one could read it, is a course which is unconstitutional and unworthy the character of straightforward and honest Englishmen.

From Tiverton he went to Lewes to attend the meeting of the Royal Agricultural Society. In his

speech on this occasion occurred that definition of dirt which has become a household word. The toast which he had to propose was, 'Prosperity to the Borough,' and, after remarks on its antiquity and its history as dating from the time of the Romans, he spoke as follows:—

Now, gentlemen, the Romans were great agriculturists, and drew great supplies of grain from this island. But to them was closed that wonderful book of knowledge which the scientific investigations of the present day have opened to you in that mysterious science of chemistry which was then unknown. If ever there was a case in which it was true that knowledge is power, that maxim is peculiarly true in reference to the aids which chemistry affords to agriculture. Allusion has been made to the question of guano, and it has been mentioned, what is perfectly true, that when I held an office which would have enabled me, if it had been possible, to assist the farmer with regard to guano, my endeavours proved fruitless. In fact, the Peruvians were not more disposed to let us put a price on their guano than the British farmer would be to have a price put upon his corn. But, gentlemen, I cannot but think that the progress of chemical science, and the application of that science to practical agriculture, may lead you to something which will render you less anxious and solicitous about this same guano, and that instead of sending to the other end of the world for more manure for our fields, we shall find something nearly, if not quite, as good within a few hundred yards of our dwellings. Now, gentlemen, I have heard a definition of dirt. I have heard it said that dirt is nothing but a thing in a wrong place. Now, the dirt of our towns precisely corresponds with that definition. It ought to be upon our fields, and if there could be such a reciprocal community of interests between the country and the towns, that the country should purify the towns, and the towns should fertilise the country, I am much disposed to think that the British farmer would care less than he does, though he still might care something, about Peruvian guano. Now, we all acknowledge that there are certain laws of nature, and that those who violate those laws invariably suffer for it. Well, it is a law of nature that nothing is destroyed. Matter is decomposed, but only for the purpose of again assuming some new form useful for the purposes of the human race. But we neglect that law. We allow decomposed substances in towns to pollute the atmosphere, to ruin the health, to produce

premature misery, to be pestilent to life and destructive of existence. Well, gentlemen, if instead of that there could be a system devised by which those substances which are noxious where they now are should be transferred so as to fertilise the adjoining districts, I am persuaded that, not only would the health of the town populations be thereby greatly improved, but the finances of the agricultural population would derive considerable benefit from the change. I therefore recommend you gentlemen to ponder the maxim that 'Knowledge is power,' and as the diffusion of the most useful kind of knowledge is one of the main objects for which the Royal Agricultural Society was established, I am persuaded it will tend mainly and most efficiently to the advancement of the interest and the power of the agricultural class of the country.

He returns to town, and sends off a report to his brother at Naples of what he has been doing, and what was the result of the general election.

C. G.: July 24, 1852.

My Tiverton election went off very well, and my little speeches there, as well as my speech at the Lewes Agricultural Meeting afterwards, have had much more success and praise than they really deserved. It is a comfort, however, when the world errs on the right side.

The only thing that everybody, except a few family adherents, now consider impossible is, that John Russell should form a new Administration. He has lost immensely in public confidence and consideration. Some of the most sensible of the Whigs are trying to put Lord Lansdowne up as head of the party, and the man to form the next Administration. That would do, and it seems to me that John Russell as well as I might serve under Lord Lansdowne, but I would certainly not serve again under Johnny, and Johnny, I should think, would scarcely serve under me, at least at present; and he is too considerable a man, with all his faults and failings, to be put on the shelf and entirely passed by. Lansdowne would, I think, be willing to undertake such a task if he was called upon to do so. The Government seem to have gained by the elections just strength enough to make it impossible to carry, at the beginning of the session, whether it be October, November, or January, or February, a vote of no confidence, and I should expect that no such vote will be attempted; but they

have not gained strength enough to carry them through their measures in the session, and what I expect is, that they will be beat upon some of their fanciful schemes for relieving everybody and increasing nobody's burdens. This is too mountebankish to be practicable.

Indirect overtures have lately been made to me from some members of the Government, but I at once made my excuses, saying, I am well content at present with my present position. Many people, and more than might have been supposed, talk of me as the next Minister, but I do not think that likely, and there would be at once the difficulty about John Russell. If I was Minister I should ask him to take the Foreign Office, and go to the House of Lords to assist Lansdowne, or to lead if Lansdowne should not choose to do so.

I have only one horse in training this year, and have won four races with him, two of which, however, were only walks over. He is three years old, and likely to win me several more races. He runs next week for the Goodwood Cup, but I doubt his winning, as he would have to meet some very good horses. He is by Venison out of an Emilius mare that I have had some time.

We have lost some good men in this new Parliament, George Grey, Cardwell, Mahon, Grenfell, and several others, but then we have got rid of some bad ones, George Thompson, Urquhart, and the like. I do not reckon Anstey among the riddances, for though he came in to impeach me, he has latterly become one of my warmest friends and supporters. The fact is that Urquhart and Anstey were brought in at the election of 1847 in order that they might be set at me and demolish me if they could. Urquhart's seat at Stafford, and Anstey's at Youghal, cost many thousand pounds, and neither of them had any money to throw away.

Allusion is made in the foregoing letter to incidents of political warfare which attracted much attention at the time. Lord Palmerston, in the earlier part of his career, and especially about the time of his vigorous action, in 1840, against Mehemet Ali, in despite of France, had to encounter attacks more venomous and more unscrupulous than often fall to the lot of a public man, however eminent. There went about the country a knot of men, half of them fanatical and the other

half silly, who, holding meetings in our great towns, issuing pamphlets, and gaining some of the provincial newspapers, proclaimed the Foreign Secretary as a traitor to his country, and as having sold himself to Russia for hard money. If more recent instances of popular delusion were not too fresh in our minds to permit any excessive wonderment, we might well feel amazed that even a small section of their hearers should have given ear to their assertions. But so it was; and Lord Palmerston, however imperturbable by nature, felt bound to take counsel's opinion as to the propriety of filing criminal informations against the authors of these libels. This course, however, was, on consideration, not adopted; and, indeed, it would have been giving the agitators an importance which they did not deserve. Yet a short time previously he had been obliged to take before the Court of Queen's Bench the publisher of the 'Albion,' in the columns of which he had been accused of using his official knowledge for stockjobbing purposes; and he obtained from another newspaper, without legal proceedings, an apology for a suggestion that he was concerned in a disreputable mining adventure abroad. He received, therefore, his full share of the shafts directed by political malice during the years while he was making his way to the unassailable position which he latterly occupied.

But, returning to 1852, we find him describing to his brother the state of parties during the pause between the general election and the meeting of the new Parliament:—

Brockton: September 17, 1852.

Men seem generally disposed to wait to see what measures the Government propose, and to deal with those measures according to their merits, and I think the chances are that some of those measures will be deemed objectionable, and will be rejected by Parliament. It will then remain to be seen whether such rejection will be considered by the Government a sufficient reason for resigning. The probability is that Lord Derby will not easily take such a hint, but will stand his ground until he is forced to retire. His language

is that his is the last Conservative Government, and that after him comes the Deluge. But if he begins to be beat, he will find it hard to get any fresh troops to join him, and out of his own corps he can draw little additional strength. When he is forced to retire great difficulties will arise. John Russell clings pertinaciously to his former position of Prime Minister, and will not serve under any other chief. On the other hand, the Whig and Liberal party have greatly lost confidence in his capacity as a leader, and he would find it very difficult to form such a Government as would be strong enough to stand. I do not think the Peelites would join him. I certainly would not serve under him again, though I might serve with him under a third person. Thus he would be driven either to take back his old clique of Greys and Barings, of whom the country is tired, or to ally himself with Graham and the Radicals, of whom the country is afraid, and against him he would have all the supporters of the present Government, numbering about 290, the Peelites, about 50, and a certain number of members who would be disposed to look to me, perhaps 20. This would make a majority against him, besides the general impression in the country that he has not the qualities required for a first Minister. The way of avoiding these embarrassments would be to place Lansdowne at the head of the Government, but *at present* Johnny will not hear of serving under anybody. It is probable, however, that somehow or other this difficulty may be got over, and that thus a Liberal Government may be formed, supposing always that Derby should not be able to maintain himself. However, time will show.

So we have at last lost our great Duke.¹ Old as he was, and both bodily and mentally enfeebled by age, he still is a great loss to the country. His name was a tower of strength abroad, and his opinions and counsel were valuable at home. No man ever lived or died in the possession of more unanimous love, respect, and esteem from his countrymen.

I have been rather lucky this year on the turf, having had only one horse (Buckthorn²) in training, and having won six races with him. Some who have had six horses have only won one race.

The Liberal party were now looking out for a policy and a leader. Lord John Russell was discredited.

¹ Duke of Wellington.

² Won the Ascot Stakes. He looked at one moment so out of the race that, during the running, 100 to 1 was offered against him.

Lord Palmerston had given too recent a blow. In a letter, to which the following is a reply, Lord Fitzwilliam suggested the Marquis of Lansdowne as a possible leader, although he alluded to his age as being against him, and referred to declarations made in the House of Lords as to his wish for retirement.

Lord Palmerston, as we have seen, had already thought of him as the best man for the post.

C. G. : September 24, 1852.

My dear Lord Fitzwilliam,—Seventy-two is certainly, as you say, an advanced period of life, but if health and faculties are unimpaired, lapse of years can be no objection. Cardinal Fleury was seventy-three when made Prime Minister ; and we are now lamenting the loss of a man who continued in the active administration of an important office till the age of eighty-four.¹

Leave-takings, announced in Parliament, should be construed with reference to circumstances, and they sometimes only mean that the person who pronounces them does not intend again to place himself in the particular and relative position from which he has just been freed. But your previous question—unlike those which are moved in Parliament—is a very practical one. You doubt whether ‘it is desirable at present to overthrow the present Government.’ To this I would add another doubt, namely, whether it is possible to do so? I apprehend that there are in the House of Commons many men who rank as Liberals, and who differ from the supposed principles of the present Government, who, nevertheless, would not join in any vote at the opening of the session, the avowed object of which would be to overthrow the present Government. Their motives, I conceive, would be : first, that there is no existing party organisation which would at once present the elements of another Government to succeed the present one ; and, secondly, that in such a state of things, the best course to pursue is to allow the present Government to explain their intended policy, and to develop their proposed measures, and to deal with that policy and those measures according to their intrinsic merits. I own that such appears to me to be the best course. If the present Government propose good measures, why should the country not have the benefit of such measures? If the

¹ Duke of Wellington.

measures they propose are bad, let them be rejected, and let the Government abide the consequences of their own want of judgment and skill. It is indeed hard to imagine that the Government will be able to make good all the expectations of relief which they have held out to various classes of the community; and the chances seem to be that they will sustain some defeats when these measures come to be discussed. Moreover, the composition of the Government is not one that promises long duration without material changes. The Government contains two men of first-rate abilities, one in one House, the other in the other—Derby and Disraeli; but it may be doubted whether the other members of the Cabinet are well equal to sustaining the rude shock of parliamentary conflict through a difficult session. What you say about organic changes is perfectly true. They ought not to be proposed unless they are really needed for the public good, and they should not be launched by a Government as a clap-trap for fancied popularity without any fair prospect of their being carried.

I do not myself see any reason why we may not go on very well without any such organic changes. It would, I think, be an improvement (if there would be no obstacle in the detailed execution of such a measure) if the present system of contested registration could be got rid of, and if the poor-rate register were made also the register for the right of voting; and if such a change were accompanied by some small diminution in the qualification for electors, no harm would be done. I should not be surprised if the present Government were to propose some measures of this kind. It would not be out of character for a Government of which one member proposed to give every militiaman a vote, and of which another member, on a motion for Parliamentary reform, talked very freely about the expediency of emancipating the labouring classes.

The great frankness of Lord Palmerston's character comes out in the next letter. He remained on perfectly friendly terms with Lord J. Russell, but, as will be seen, he had not hesitated to tell him openly that his confidence in him, as a leader, was shaken, and that he would be unwilling, therefore, to serve under him again. This was all received in good part by the ex-Premier; for offence can never be taken at an open expression of honest opinion, whether it be right or wrong.

Broadlands : October, 1852.

My dear Lansdowne,—The Duke and Duchess of Bedford came to Bocket for a day while we were there ; and as I found from Melbourne that the Duke was desirous of knowing my feelings as to serving in any Government that might be formed by John Russell, I sought an opportunity of a conversation with him, and as he led to the subject, I spoke my mind to him freely and in detail. I said that my private and personal regard and friendship for John Russell remain unaltered, and that I must always entertain towards him individually those sentiments of kindness which one feels for a private friend with whom one has been acting in public life for more than twenty years. But I said that my political confidence in him is gone, and that I would not again act under him as a chief who should be the arbiter of my official position or the guide of my political course. That as a political leader he is not to be depended upon : is infirm of purpose, changeable in his views, and perpetually swayed by influences which are known and felt only by their results.

So much I said as to my political confidence in John Russell as a Prime Minister. In regard to my own feelings as to a return to my former official dependence upon him, I said that the more and the longer I reflected upon his conduct towards me last year, the more I felt those sentiments which induced me at the time to write him a note to beg that he would not suppose from the quiet manner in which I took what he had done, that I did not feel that just indignation which his conduct must necessarily inspire.

The letter here goes into details connected with his dismissal in December, 1851, which have already been quoted, and then continues :—

I said to the Duke of Bedford that the upshot of all this was that I could not again serve under John Russell, but that I should not object to serve with him on equal terms under a third person. But I said that indeed it seemed to me impossible that, in the event of the present Government falling John Russell should be able to form a Government ; that I do not think the Peelites would join him ; and that he would therefore have against him the two hundred and ninety who are reckoned as supporters of the present Government, the forty or fifty Peelites, and a certain number, however small, who are likely

to ask what course I should under such circumstances pursue. In conclusion, I said to the Duke that which indeed I had stated to him some weeks before—that in the present broken-up condition of parties it seems to me that you are the leader the most likely to reconcile and reunite the sections of the Liberal party, and also to receive support from some moderate men whose present tendencies would lead them to rank as adherents of the existing Government.

The Duke expressed himself pleased with my personal feelings towards John Russell, and acknowledged the fair manner in which, according to my own view of the matter, I had stated my own case.

I do not think, however, that he seemed to be of opinion that John Russell shares my conviction as to the impossibility of his now forming another Government.

Lord Lansdowne, however, pleaded age and desire for repose in reply to those sections of the Liberal party who called upon him to come forward and fill the breach. Upon this Lord Palmerston remarks:—

Broadlands: October 14, 1852.

I can easily understand that you should, after many years of ministerial labour and confinement, prefer freedom to constraint, but—

When Honour calls, where'er she points the way,
The sons of Honour follow and obey;

and if the course of events should render a sacrifice on your part necessary, that sacrifice will undoubtedly be made.

I should not be surprised, however, if Derby's Government were to have more life in it than people generally imagine. Protection Derby will openly throw over, and if the measures which he proposes are tolerably good they will be accepted, and any proposal of a vote of no confidence would probably fail; and if Derby would recruit a little more debating power from out of his own followers, which may not be impossible, he might be able to struggle on for some considerable time. If there was an obvious prospect of forming a good Liberal Government, all these resources would be too little for Derby; but if there can be no Liberal Government but one under John Russell, Derby may have a longer tenure of office than was at first imagined.¹

¹ To Lord Lansdowne, October 14, 1852.

The new Parliament met for business on November 11. The dissolution had little altered the balance of parties, so that the Government were still in a minority. The Liberal leaders, as will be seen, had adjusted their internal difficulties, and were prepared to form a Cabinet, if necessary.

C. G. : November 17, 1852.

My dear William,—I think the chances are that the Government will fall by their measures if they are measures of any magnitude and importance, because any such measures must involve changes in the distribution of taxes ; and though the persons who are to be lightened may like such changes, they who are to be burthened will object, and the measures will most likely be thrown out. If the measures are very small they will disappoint the expectation which has been excited ; anyhow, it seems likely that this Government will not last long, and now there is another formation ready to take their place. Lord Lansdowne would consent to be chief if asked by the Queen to do so. John Russell would take office under Lansdowne, and would, moreover, if it were wished, go up to the House of Lords, and I should then be left to perform that honourable but irksome task of conducting the business of the Government in the House of Commons. In that case I should have the Home Office, and Johnny the Foreign. I should, in any case, much prefer the Home Office to going back to the immense labour of the Foreign Office. *J'y ai été*, as the Frenchman said of fox-hunting. The Peelites would form part of such a Government, and we should have the support of a good few of those who are now adherents of the present Government. However, all this is as yet in the clouds ; one should not dispose of the bear till the bear is taken and slain, and one ought not to make a Government for the Queen till one is quite sure what her intentions are upon that matter. I think, however, that this Government will sink under its own feebleness before Easter.

The Austrians have distinguished themselves by declining to send anybody to the funeral of the Duke, and I am told that our Queen is very angry with them. The papers say it is the Emperor himself who took this decision ; and I am told he is quite a fanatic, sleeps on a hard mattress on the floor, stints himself in sleep, and mortifies the body in all ways. This is a pity ; an enlightened and sensible Emperor of Austria would

be a great acquisition for Europe, though, to be sure, he would be a novelty. But the Austrians hate England and the English nation, notwithstanding the civil compliments interchanged between the Austrian Government and the Derby Administration when Derby came into office last spring. Well, we can do without them, and I hope they can do without us. It is desirable for their own sakes that they should be able to do so, for help from England they are not very likely to get.

The Queen's Speech at the opening of Parliament had been very ambiguous on the subject of Free Trade. In the opinion of many it was studiously so; and it was therefore considered necessary to elicit, without delay, a parliamentary declaration, in order to show to the world that a free-trade policy had been irrevocably adopted. Accordingly, on November 23, Mr. Charles Villiers moved a resolution which was so worded that the Government could not possibly accept it, and, therefore, had the House adopted it, the Ministry must at once have retired from office. It was, however, not the general wish to turn out the Government before they had proposed their Budget; so Lord Palmerston came to the rescue, and proposed an amended resolution worded with more regard to Tory susceptibilities. The difference between the two resolutions was, that while they both unequivocally affirmed the doctrine of Free Trade and its permanent establishment, Lord Palmerston's did not compel those who agreed to it publicly to recant the private opinions which, at a former period, they may have honestly entertained. The Government accepted it, and it was carried by a large majority.

This debate finally closed the discussions on Free Trade, which had for so many years proved the subject of controversy in Parliament.

The result of the division in the House of Commons did not, however, deceive the Ministry as to the weakness of their position, and they naturally looked round to see how they could strengthen it. There was no time to lose; so on the following day Mr. Disraeli made a formal proposal to Lord Palmerston to join Lord

Derby's Government. He declined; saying that he could not do so singly, and that the Peelites with whom he was then acting showed no disposition to approximate to the Government. The Ministry, therefore, had to face without any new allies the battle over their Budget which Mr. Disraeli, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced on December 3. The principal features were, besides a diminution of the tea duties a reduction of the malt tax, which created a large deficit, and a doubling of the house tax, to supply the void. The farmers, expecting something better, did not care about the reduction made in their favour, while the townsfolk did care very decidedly about the increase made at their cost. The Budget was generally condemned, and, in spite of an energetic 'whip,' the Government were beaten by 19 in a very full House. They accordingly resigned.

CHAPTER IX.

GOES TO THE HOME OFFICE IN THE ABERDEEN ADMINISTRATION—
WORK AT HOME OFFICE—TEMPORARY RESIGNATION.

LORD ABERDEEN was charged with the formation of a new Government. He at once sought the co-operation of Lord Palmerston, who, at first, withheld it, being unwilling to share the responsibility of a Cabinet whose foreign policy, he anticipated, would be of a character to merit his disapproval. But he was indispensable. A general though undefined feeling among the public had already marked him out as the coming man. Lord Lansdowne therefore renewed Lord Aberdeen's solicitations, and induced Lord Palmerston to reconsider his decision. He selected the Home Office as his department, and gives to his brother the following account of his feelings and motives:—

C. G.: December 22, 1852.

I have accepted the Home Office in the new Government. When first Lansdowne and Aberdeen asked me to join the new Government I declined, giving as my reason that Aberdeen and I had differed so widely for twenty-five years on all questions of foreign policy that my joining an Administration of which he was to be the head would be liable to misconstruction both at home and abroad. But the next day Lansdowne came again and urged me strongly, and I found that the Foreign Office, which I had determined not myself in any case to take, would be held either by Clarendon or John Russell, whose well-established reputations for liberality would give a security in regard to our foreign relations.

Lansdowne's representations of the great importance, in the present state of things at home and abroad, that the new Government should be as strong in its fabric as the materials available

for the purpose can make it, determined me to yield to his advice and to accept the Home Office ; and the more I have thought the matter over, the better satisfied I have felt that I have acted right. The Foreign Office will be taken by John Russell, but if he finds the business too much for him, in addition to his employment as leader in the House of Commons, he will then give it up to Clarendon. The Home Office was my own choice ; I had long settled in my own mind that I would not go back to the Foreign Office, and that if I ever took any office it should be the Home. It does not do for a man to pass his whole life in one department, and the Home Office deals with the concerns of the country internally, and brings one in contact with one's fellow-countrymen, besides which it gives one more influence in regard to the militia and the defences of the country.

This Government will combine almost all the men of talent and experience in the House of Commons except Disraeli ; but the Opposition will be numerically strong, as they reckon about 310. A good many of these, however, will probably be disposed to give the new Government a fair trial.

And to Mr. Sullivan, his brother-in-law, he writes:—

Carlton Gardens : December 24, 1852.

On Tuesday I positively declined joining the new Government, first to Lansdowne, who was nearly an hour talking to me, and afterwards to Aberdeen, who came and offered me *carte blanche* as to departments ; but on Wednesday morning Clarendon came to tell me he had had the Foreign Office offered him, and that he was disposed to accept it. That removed much of the objection which I had felt. When he left me, Lansdowne came again earnestly to press me to take office ; and I at last consented to take the Home Office, the department which I had mentioned as the one I should have preferred if I had been willing to join the new regiment. Reflection has satisfied me that I have acted rightly. The state of the country in all its interests, foreign and domestic, requires a Government as strong as there are elements for making it ; and if my aid is thought by Lansdowne and others likely to be useful, I ought not to let personal feelings stand in the way. As regards myself individually, it must be borne in mind that when the Whigs and Peelites unite to form a Government and to support it, I should, if I had persisted in standing aloof, have been left in a little agreeable political solitude. I am glad, therefore, that I have not adhered to my first determination ; and I am sure

that the course which, on second thoughts, I have pursued is the best for the public interest and for my own comfort.

There was a large body of men, however, who would have been only too glad to relieve Lord Palmerston from the 'political solitude,' which he here mentions as the alternative to joining Lord Aberdeen's Government.

The Tories were discontented with their House of Commons leader. They further had been so demoralised by recent party circumstances as to have come to doubt all political morality, and to regard statesmen as mere party swordsmen; when, therefore, at the outset of the year they saw the Foreign Secretary summarily turned adrift by the Whig leader they began looking towards him with the same anxiety and yearning with which an Italian little state in the Middle Ages would have looked for some *condottiere* of good repute who was about to be out of employment. They would gladly have hailed him as their new chief had he been minded to join them. But between these three hundred and odd gentlemen and Lord Palmerston there was little common political creed; and the members of the Opposition who indulged in such a dream as this only showed thereby how completely they misunderstood his position, his character, and his political principles.

On December 27 the new Government appeared in their places in Parliament, when Lord Aberdeen, in the House of Lords, gave a sketch of its intended policy. With regard to foreign affairs, he said that it would 'adhere to the principles which had been pursued for the last thirty years, and which consisted in respecting the rights of all independent states, while, at the same time, we asserted our own rights and interests; and above all, in an earnest desire to secure the general peace of Europe.'

Considering that Lord Palmerston had been at the Foreign Office during more than half the period named, Lord Aberdeen was paying an indirect tribute to his policy. As for Lord Palmerston himself, he quickly

settled down to his new duties, and writes thus to his brother:—

Carlton Gardens : January 31, 1853.

We (the Government) are now preparing for the renewal of the session on the 10th of this next month. We shall be strong on the Treasury bench, and I hope not weak in the division lobby. It is clear that if we were to be turned out, the only Government that could be put in our stead would be Derby's, and experience has proved that his Government could not stand. We may therefore expect that the moderate men who supported him will not be disinclined to give us a fair support, and it will be our business to deserve it. Though the Cabinet consists of men of various parties and shades of opinion, all having agreed to unite, will, I doubt not, unite to agree, and in that case we shall go on very well.

We are labouring to place the country in a state of defence, and our only limit is the purse of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but whatever may be at the bottom of the secret thoughts of the French Emperor, into whose bosom no man can dive, yet I see no reason to apprehend an immediate or even an early rupture with France; and if we have two years more of preparation allowed us, we shall be in a good defensive position. In the meantime we do not allow that we are even now defenceless. The increase of navy, artillery, marines, and the organisation of the militia, have placed us in a very different condition from that in which we stood two or three years ago.

Napoleon's marriage seems to me a most sensible one. He had no chance of a political alliance of any value, or of sufficient importance to counterbalance the annoyance of an ugly or epileptic wife whom he had never seen till she was presented to him as a bride; and he was quite right to take a wife whom he knew and liked. I admire the frankness with which he declares himself a *parvenu*, and the assertion of that truth, however it may shock the prejudices of Vienna and Petersburg, will endear him to the bulk of the French nation.

As Home Secretary Lord Palmerston astonished everybody except those who knew him well, by the vigilance, care, intelligence, and originality with which he discharged his duties. No details were too small if only they were important to those concerned. He paid a visit to Parkhurst Prison, and wrote a Memorandum on

the ventilation of the cells with just as much zeal and thoroughness as if he were conducting a Government measure in full view of the country. A standing monument of this period of his career is the system of granting tickets of leave to convicts. Hazardous as the experiment was at that time considered, it proved successful, and solved the difficulty which stared us in the face when the Colonies declined any longer to allow us to shoot our refuse on their shores. It devolved on him to find a substitute for transportation, which had become no longer available, and he carried through the House of Commons a Bill constituting the new system of secondary punishment, which, in its main features, is still in force.

Many other useful measures owed their birth to his activity during the two years that he was at the Home Office. The abatement of the smoke nuisance in the metropolis, whereby to a great extent its atmosphere was purified—the cessation of intramural interments, of which people could only have been induced to tolerate the evils by the influence of long custom—the extension of the Factory Acts,¹ and the more general holding of winter assizes for the trial of prisoners awaiting gaol delivery, were among the most prominent of the undoubted boons which his practical mind devised for the benefit of the country.

He was especially happy in his manner of receiving those numerous deputations which always converge towards the Home Office. Deputation has been wittily defined as ‘a noun of multitude which signifies many, but does not signify much.’ However accurate this may be as a definition, it would be a grave error to undervalue the importance to a minister of possessing the art of listening patiently, and giving a straight-

¹ The ten and a half hours of work were by existing Acts to be between six a.m. and six p.m. This was a great guarantee against evasion of the law. It was found, however, that the wording of the Acts did not extend this limitation to children, but only to young persons. Lord Palmerston warmly took up the cause of the children when this was brought to his notice, and rectified the law.

forward though civil 'No.' Lord Palmerston had it in a notable degree. His prompt but cordial refusal was often more palatable than another man's cold and doubtful acquiescence.¹

He alludes to some of his work in the following letter :—

C. G. : April 3, 1853.

My dear William,—It is now a long while, I fear, since I last wrote to you, but ever since the meeting of Parliament I have been living as people do during a contested election, talked to from morning till night, and with no time to do anything. The mere routine business of the Home Office, as far as that consists in daily correspondence, is very far lighter than that of the Foreign Office, but, during a session of Parliament, the whole day of the Secretary of State, up to the time when he must go to the House of Commons, is taken up by deputations of all kinds and interviews with Members of Parliament, militia colonels, &c. But on the whole it is a much easier office than the Foreign, and, in truth, I really would not, on any consideration, undertake again an office so unceasingly laborious every day of the year as that of Foreign Affairs. I shall be able to do some good in the Home Office. I am shutting up all the graveyards in London, a measure authorised by an Act of last session, and absolutely required for preservation of the health of the town. There is a company who are going to make two great tunnels under London, fifty feet below the surface, one north, the other south, of the Thames, running nearly alongside the river, beginning some way above the town, and ending some way below it. These tunnels are to be the receptacles into which all the sewers and drains of London are to be discharged, so that nothing is to go into the Thames, and the contents of these tunnels are, at the point of termination, to be dried and converted into manure to be sold to agriculturists as home-made guano. I shall try to compel, at least, the tall chimneys to burn their own smoke, and I should like to put down beershops, and to let shopkeepers sell beer like oil,

¹ His reception of certain inhabitants of Rugely, who wanted a new name for their town, which had acquired an unenviable notoriety owing to its having been the residence of the poisoner Palmer, gives a specimen of the way in which he could deal with requests that could not be treated seriously. He got rid of them by offering his own name and asking how Palmerstown would suit them.

and vinegar, and treacle, to be carried home and drunk with wives and children.

Our session will be long but not dangerous. We shall have to renew the income tax and the East India Charter. These and other matters will take time, but I do not see that any other Government is, at present, possible. The last Cabinet has been too much discredited to be put back again, and Derby, having failed in his experiment to make a Cabinet out of men who knew nothing of public business, would scarcely like to make another trial with a new lot equally ignorant and incapable. Besides, if we were beat by mere numbers, there would be the resource of a dissolution, to which I conclude we should have recourse rather than at once give up our posts. We may have some difficulty next year about Parliamentary Reform, but enough for the year are the troubles thereof. As yet, nothing can be more harmonious than our Coalition Cabinet.

I dare say you have heard at Naples much about our harbouring conspiring refugees. The answer I make to those who complain of those matters here is, that a handful of refugees in London cannot arrange a revolution in a foreign country, and send out the plan to be executed off-hand. They must, in the first place, have associates and instruments many thousand in number in the country to which the plan is to be applied, because a revolution cannot be acted by a handful of men. They must have much local knowledge to make their arrangements, and this knowledge, bearing upon circumstances which vary from day to day, is not possessed by men in London, and can only be furnished by men on the spot. Therefore these London conspirators can do nothing without the co-operation of a great number of people in the foreign country, with whom they must have long and detailed communication either by letters or by messengers. But what are the Governments of the foreign countries about if they cannot, by their police and their passport system, find out the proceedings of the large mass of these conspirators who are in their own country, and if they cannot intercept the letters or discover and arrest the messengers? It is plain that the real and practical conspiracy is worked out in the foreign country and not in England; and these foreign Governments try to throw upon us a blame which really belongs to them, and if arms and ammunition are sent or provided, it is the foreign Government that ought to be able to find that out.

The country generally is highly prosperous, trade flourish-

ing, the revenue good, and the emigration having gone just far enough to raise wages to a proper amount without making labour inconveniently scarce. The Irish emigration will, I hope, go on, and it would be a good thing if a larger number would go off to America. The priests are, of course, furious, every emigrant is so much out of their pocket.¹

I am very glad that Clarendon² has got the Foreign Office. He will do the business well, and keep up the character and dignity of the country.

The cholera appeared this year in the United Kingdom, and in the autumn the Presbytery of Edinburgh wrote, through their Moderator, to Lord Palmerston, asking whether, under the circumstances, a national fast would be appointed on Royal authority. The Home Secretary, like Cromwell, who supplemented his exhortation to his men to put their trust in God by a caution to keep their powder dry, sent the following answer:—

Whitehall: October 19, 1853.

Sir,—I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th inst., requesting, on behalf of the Presbytery of Edinburgh, to be informed whether it is proposed to appoint a day of national fast on account of the visitation of the cholera, and to state that there can be no doubt that manifestations of humble resignation to the Divine Will, and sincere acknowledgments of human unworthiness, are never more appropriate than when it has pleased Providence to afflict mankind with some severe visitation; but it does not appear to Lord Palmerston that a national fast would be suitable to the circumstances of the present moment.

The Maker of the Universe has established certain laws of nature for the planet in which we live, and the weal or woe of mankind depends upon the observance or the neglect of those laws. One of those laws connects health with the absence of those gaseous exhalations which proceed from over-crowded human beings, or from decomposing substances, whether animal or vegetable; and those same laws render sickness the almost

¹ Lord Palmerston for many years spent a large portion of his Irish income in enabling those of his tenants to emigrate who wished to do so.

² He had succeeded Lord John Russell.

inevitable consequence of exposure to those noxious influences. But it has at the same time pleased Providence to place it within the power of man to make such arrangements as will prevent or disperse such exhalations so as to render them harmless, and it is the duty of man to attend to those laws of nature and to exert the faculties which Providence has thus given to man for his own welfare.

The recent visitation of cholera, which has for the moment been mercifully checked, is an awful warning given to the people of this realm that they have too much neglected their duty in this respect, and that those persons with whom it rested to purify towns and cities, and to prevent or remove the causes of disease, have not been sufficiently active in regard to such matters. Lord Palmerston would, therefore, suggest that the best course which the people of this country can pursue to deserve that the further progress of the cholera should be stayed, will be to employ the interval that will elapse between the present time and the beginning of next spring in planning and executing measures by which those portions of their towns and cities which are inhabited by the poorest classes, and which, from the nature of things, must most need purification and improvement, may be freed from those causes and sources of contagion which, if allowed to remain, will infallibly breed pestilence and be fruitful in death, in spite of all the prayers and fastings of a united but inactive nation. When man has done his utmost for his own safety, then is the time to invoke the blessing of Heaven to give effect to his exertions.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

HENRY FITZROY.

This letter created a great stir, and some indignation among certain sections of the community; but it was, after all, the embodiment of common sense. It reminded those in authority that it was their bounden duty not to neglect the teachings of science or the spirit of practical Christianity. It suggested that until they had fulfilled their duty to their neighbour, they could not lift up clean hands in prayer and fasting. The lesson which it thus sought to inculcate on the municipal authorities of Scotland was greatly needed. Sanitary laws were at that time even less known and less cared for than now; and in the terror excited by the

mysterious appearance of this terrible disease, the fact was overlooked that the conditions under which it was developed and diffused were under human control, and grew out of the negligence and folly of individuals and local authorities. To substitute a national fast for the paramount duty of cleansing the drains and purifying the streets, would have been a strange misunderstanding of the Divine Will, as revealed in the operations of natural causes.

The free wits of the day averred that Lord Palmerston had brought into his new office the proclivities of his former department, and that in his answer to the Presbytery he treated Heaven as a 'foreign power.' The joke was, however, wide of the mark, if it meant to insinuate any irreverence for sacred things on his part, as he never either showed such a feeling himself, or encouraged its manifestation in others.

There was yet another occasion, about this time, when, owing to a speech, he found himself made into a theological target. In the winter of 1854, presiding at a labourers' meeting at Romsey, he told them that they would find that all children were born good, and that only bad education and bad associations corrupted the mind. There might be exceptions, as there are men born physically defective; but that the heart of man was naturally good, and that it depended upon training whether that goodness, implanted at birth, should continue to display itself. This apparent piece of heresy as to the doctrine of 'original sin' greatly stirred the clerical world, appearing as it did at the dull season. One leading organ had an amusing but reproachful article, saying that if Lord Palmerston had been a nurse he would have known better. 'If anybody,' it continued, 'could teach a child to smile away its tears, to bear abstinence with fortitude, rebukes with patience, and inward commotions with grace, Lord Palmerston is the man to do it; nevertheless we feel sure that he would soon find he had as difficult subjects to deal with as he ever found in perverse princes and

the evil associations of Courts.' But others were not disposed to deal with it so lightly, and discussed it very gravely. The truth being all the time that the Premier had not the remotest idea of touching upon such an abstruse topic as 'original sin,' but was talking to labouring men about those ordinary features of generally good or generally bad conduct which could be evident to every one of them.

One of the provisions of the Act forbidding intramural interment gave power to the Home Secretary to make exceptions in cases which he might deem fit. Lord Palmerston, however, appears to have deemed none fit, as may be gathered from the following answer to a request for special permission in the case of a deceased dignitary of the Church:—

Broadlands : January 3, 1855.

My dear Stanley,¹—I am sorry to say that I have already felt myself obliged to decline compliance with the request contained in the enclosed letter. The practice of burying dead bodies under buildings in which living people assemble in large numbers is a barbarous one, and ought to be at once and for ever put an end to, and I have made this a general rule in all cases. But a rule is no rule if partial exceptions are made; the rule then degenerates into an invidious selection of particular persons for its application, and other particular persons for its relaxation.

And why, pray, should archbishops and bishops, and deans and canons, be buried under churches if other persons are not to be so? What special connection is there between church dignities and the privilege of being decomposed under the feet of survivors? Do you seriously mean to imply that a soul is more likely to go to heaven because the body which it inhabited lies decomposing under the pavement of a church instead of being placed in a churchyard?

If commemoration is what is wanted, a monument may be placed in a church though the body is in the burial-ground; but why cannot the monument be equally well erected in the consecrated burial-ground?

As to what you say about pain to feelings by shutting up of burial-grounds, that is perfectly true. I am quite aware that

¹ Lord Stanley of Alderley.

the measure is necessarily attended with pain to feelings which excite respect, as well as to pressure upon pecuniary interests which are not undeserving of consideration. But no great measure of social improvement can be effected without some such temporary inconvenience to individuals, and the necessity of the case justifies the demand for such sacrifices. To have attempted to make the application of the new system gradual would have reduced it to a nullity. England is, I believe, the only country in which, in these days, people accumulate putrefying dead bodies amid the dwellings of the living; and as to burying bodies under thronged churches, you might as well put them under libraries, drawing-rooms, and dining-rooms.

During the first year of his renewed tenure of office he very nearly parted from his colleagues. In the 'Annual Register' for 1853 occurs this passage:—

On the 16th of December an important ministerial crisis was occasioned by the announcement that Viscount Palmerston had resigned his office. His resignation, however, was not accepted, and, after an interval of some days' suspense, the noble lord was prevailed upon to withdraw it. The opponents of the Government asserted that Lord Palmerston's secession from office was occasioned by a difference of opinion on his part as to the policy of the Cabinet upon the Eastern Question. On the other hand, it was strenuously contradicted by the adherents of the Ministry; but as all explanation upon the subject was declined in Parliament, the motive for a step so dangerous to the stability of the Earl of Aberdeen's Cabinet must remain matter for conjecture.

I quote a letter to his brother-in-law, the Right Hon. Laurence Sullivan, which states the case:—

C. G.: December 19, 1853.

The state of the matter is plain and simple. I told Aberdeen and Lansdowne last year, when I joined the Government, that I felt great doubts as to my being able to concur in the plan of Parliamentary reform which John Russell might propose this year.

The other day I was put on the Committee of Cabinet to prepare the plan. John Russell stated his scheme. I wrote to him next day to state my objections. I re-stated them

verbally in the Committee, and stated them again to the Cabinet when John Russell explained his scheme to the Cabinet. I stated them in a private interview afterwards, on two occasions, to Aberdeen. I stated them afterwards to him in writing. In reply to that communication, I was first told by him that he would communicate with the Queen and his colleagues. He then afterwards wrote me word that he had communicated with John Russell and Graham; that they said my objections were inadmissible; and that he concurred in their decision. I had then nothing left for it but to resign. My office is too closely connected with Parliamentary changes to allow me to sit silent during the whole progress of a Reform Bill through Parliament; and I could not take up a Bill which contained material things of which I disapproved, and assist to fight it through the House of Commons, to force it on the Lords, and to stand upon it at the hustings. I am sorry to leave an office in which I took interest, and political associates whom I like; but I could not do otherwise.

The *Times* says there has been no difference in the Cabinet about Eastern affairs. This is an untruth; but I felt that it would have been silly to have gone out because I could not have my own way about Turkish affairs, seeing that my presence in the Cabinet did good, by modifying the views of those whose policy I thought bad.

What were the 'differences' on Turkish affairs will be seen later on, when we come to the Eastern Question; but they concerned the moving of our fleet up to the scene of conflict. However, Lord Palmerston withdrew his resignation, as is shown by the next letter:—

C. G. : December 25, 1853.

I remain in the Government. I was much and strongly pressed to do so for several days by many of the members of the Government, who declared that they were no parties to Aberdeen's answer to me, and that they considered all the details of the intended Reform measure as still open to discussion. Their earnest representations, and the knowledge that the Cabinet had on Thursday taken a decision on Turkish affairs in entire accordance with opinions which I had long unsuccessfully pressed upon them, decided me to withdraw my resignation, which I did yesterday.

Of course, what I say to you about the Cabinet decision on

Turkish affairs is entirely for yourself, and not to be mentioned to anybody. But it is very important, and will give the allied squadrons the command of the Black Sea.

The French ambassador rejoiced at the return of the Home Secretary to the Cabinet. As soon as he heard that the resignation was withdrawn, he wrote to him :—

Au début de la campagne que nous allons faire ensemble, c'est un grand confort pour moi et une grande garantie pour l'Empereur que de vous savoir l'âme des conseils de notre allié. Votre concours d'ailleurs pèse d'un poids très-réel dans la balance, et on sait à Paris en apprécier toute la valeur.

Abroad as well as at home Lord Palmerston was regarded as the backbone of the Ministry.

CHAPTER X.

RUSSIAN POLICY—OCCUPATION OF PRINCIPALITIES; MOVEMENTS OF ENGLISH FLEET—LORD ABERDEEN—ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR—REFORM CLUB BANQUET—PROPOSES CRIMEAN EXPEDITION—1855—MOTION OF MR. ROEBUCK—RESIGNATION OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL—DEFEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT.

It can hardly be doubted that the prospects of peace were darkened during the eventful preliminaries of 1853 by the fact of Lord Palmerston's absence from the Foreign Office. He had won a character in Europe for being resolute, and was regarded as the embodiment of English pugnacity. That a statesman of his undoubted prestige should at this crisis in foreign affairs be relegated to the Home Office meant, in the opinion of the adversaries of England, that his policy was at a discount, and that the tide of national spirit was ebbing which had formerly floated him through so many foreign difficulties. Lord Palmerston, all the same, was not so thoroughly engrossed by questions of health, police, and local administration as to view with any indifference the dispute between Russia and Turkey. On the contrary, he watched every turn with the keenest interest, and held himself not only entitled but bound to evince his active concern in the progress of the negotiations.

Many a man, ousted from his old post, would have shown, or at any rate would have felt, some slight jealousy towards the person who had been preferred to him. Lord Palmerston, so far from being influenced by any such feeling or indulging in any carping criticism, frankly acknowledged that Lord Clarendon was the more fit Minister to be at the Foreign Office at this moment. His reasons for saying so may be gleaned from

the following extract from a letter to the Foreign Secretary :—

I admired greatly your writhing letter, but I did not like to say too much in its praise at the Cabinet, for fear that by so doing I might lead others to think that it was too strong. I can assure you that it is a great comfort and satisfaction to me to know the conduct of our foreign relations is in such able hands as yours, and your administration of your important department is attended with this great advantage to the country, that, from a variety of circumstances, you can say and do things which could not so easily have been said or done by me.¹

He hated war as much as any man, but he hated humiliation more; and he thoroughly understood the character of the adversary against whom England and France were entering the diplomatic lists in a struggle which he very soon saw involved far more than the mere questions immediately at issue. He thus describes the usual tactics adopted by Russia in any acts of aggression :—

The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow—moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggression succeed locally, the Petersburg Government adopts them as a *fait accompli* which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia. Orloff succeeded in extorting the Treaty of Unkiar-

¹ To Lord Clarendon, July 31, 1853.

Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circumstances of the time and place, and not the result of any previous instructions; but having been done, it could not be undone. On the other hand, Simoni-vitch and Vikovitch failed in getting possession of Herat, in consequence of our vigorous measures of resistance; and as they failed, and *when* they had failed, they were disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held at Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, although no human being with two ideas in his head could for a moment doubt that they had acted under specific instructions.¹

As soon as the question of the 'Holy Places' had been settled, through the intervention of Sir Stratford Canning, Russia had put forward her claim to a Protectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey. On the refusal of this demand by the Sultan, Prince Menschikoff left Constantinople, and, on July 2, the Russian army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Danubian Principalities. The combined English and French fleets were at Besika Bay, at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Lord Palmerston was meanwhile writing to the Premier as follows:—

C. G.: July 4, 1853.

I quite agree with you that we ought to try whether we can devise any proposal which, without involving any departure by the Sultan from the ground of independence on which he has taken his stand, might satisfy every just claim which the Emperor can put forward. In the meantime, however, I hope you will allow the squadrons to be ordered to go up to the Bosphorus as soon as it is known at Constantinople that the Russians have entered the Principalities, and to be further at liberty to go into the Black Sea, if necessary or useful for the protection of Turkish territory.

The advantages of such a course seem to be—

- 1st. That it would encourage and assist the Turks in those defensive arrangements and organisations which the present crisis may give the Turkish Government facilities for making, and the benefit of which, in

¹ To Lord Clarendon, May 22, 1853.

strengthening Turkey against attack, will continue after the crisis is over.

2ndly. It would essentially tend to prevent any further inroad on Turkish territory in Europe or in Asia, and it is manifest that any such further inroad would much increase the difficulties of a settlement.

3rdly. It would act as a wholesome check upon the Emperor and his advisers, and would stimulate Austria and Prussia to increased exertions to bring the Russian Government to reason.

4thly. It would relieve England and France from the disagreeable, and not very creditable, position of waiting without venturing to enter the back door as friends, while the Russians have taken forcible possession of the front hall as enemies.

If these orders are to be given, I would suggest that it is very important that they should be given without delay, so that we may be able, when these matters are discussed this week in Parliament, to say that such orders have been sent off; of course they would at the same time be communicated to the Russian Government.

I am confident that this country expects that we should pursue such a course, and I cannot believe that we should receive anything but support in pursuing it from the party now in Opposition.

Lord Aberdeen replied, that although the invasion of the Principalities was an indefensible act, and one that gave to every European Power a right of interference, still, as the Emperor had made no declaration of war, but, on the contrary, notified that he would not make war, it became very doubtful how far it would be justifiable for our fleet to violate the treaty of 1841 by passing the Dardanelles. As to Lord Palmerston's assertion of the general approval which a bold course would receive, Lord Aberdeen concluded his letter by a characteristic paragraph to the effect that in a case of this kind he dreaded popular support, just as on some occasion, when the Athenian assembly vehemently applauded Alcibiades, he asked if he had said anything particularly foolish.

Meanwhile the representatives of the four Powers, England, France, Austria, and Prussia, were conferring in the Austrian capital and drawing up a document, which soon became known to Europe under the name of the 'Vienna Note.' It was an abortive attempt to reconcile conflicting views. The English Cabinet were busy on a similarly hopeless task :—

C. G. : July 7, 1853.

My dear John Russell,—The Cabinet yesterday agreed provisionally to an amended draft of Convention to be proposed for Russia and Turkey, simply renewing the engagements of Kainardjy and Adrianople without any extension. This was to be communicated first for approval to the French Government, and, if finally agreed to, it was proposed that it should be sent by Vienna to Constantinople, and, if not strongly objected to by the Porte, to be returned to Vienna, and to be sent on thence to Petersburg with any recommendation which the Austrian Government might be inclined to give. This Convention made no mention of the Holy Places, because the French would not agree to a Convention between Russia and Turkey on that matter. All this is very well for effect and for a Blue Book, but, in my opinion, the course which the Emperor has pursued on these matters from his first overtures for a partition of Turkey, and especially the violent, abusive, and menacing language of his last manifesto, seem to show that he has taken his line, and that nothing will satisfy him but complete submission on the part of Turkey; and we ought, therefore, not to disguise from ourselves that he is bent upon a stand-up fight.

I tried again to persuade the Cabinet to send the squadrons up to the Bosphorus, but failed; I was told that Stratford and La Cour have powers to call for them. This is, no doubt, stated in public despatches, but we all know that he has been privately desired not to do so. I think our position, waiting timidly and submissively at the back door while Russia is violently, threateningly, and arrogantly forcing her way into the house, is unwise with a view to a peaceful settlement, and derogatory to the character, and standing, and dignity of the two Powers. I think that when pressed on this point, as of course we shall be in both Houses, we shall have no good answer or explanation to give. We cannot say that the provinces are not parts of the Turkish empire, because treaties

have made them so, and it is as such that Nicholas seizes them, as a way of compelling the Porte to submit to his demands.

We cannot say that Turkey is at peace, because no country is at peace when important parts of its territory are invaded as a means of coercion, with a threat of further advance if stubbornness and blindness should make such a step, in the opinion of the invader, necessary. We cannot deny that the presence of our squadrons in the Bosphorus would greatly encourage the Porte, greatly discourage insurrections in any part of Turkey, and greatly tend to make the Emperor pause. The only reason we can give for our inactivity must be a yielding to Brunnow's advice and a fear of displeasing the Emperor. But these motives ought to have led us to leave Turkey to her fate. Words may properly be answered by words, but acts should be replied to by acts; and the entrance of the Russians as invaders into the Turkish territory ought to be followed and replied to by the entrance of the squadrons into the Bosphorus as protectors. Much, however, of the effect of such a measure must depend on the promptitude of its execution, and it would have this advantage that, while it indicated spirit and determination on the part of England and France, it could not by any perversion be represented as an act of hostility against Russia. We should be relieved from much embarrassment in the approaching debate if we could say that orders for this purpose had actually been sent, and the actual advance of the squadrons ought surely to accompany any overtures made to Russia.

The Russian Government now addressed a despatch to its diplomatic agents, the burden of which was to the effect that the occupation of the Principalities was in answer to the presence of the British and French fleets outside the Dardanelles, and would only cease when they retired.

In the following Memorandum, sent round by Lord Palmerston to the members of the Cabinet, he states how he would wish to meet this declaration:—

C. G. : July 12, 1853.

The Circular of Count Nesselrode, dated July 2, and published in the newspapers of this morning, shows how imperfectly we have understood the character of the Russian Government, and how entirely thrown away upon that Government

has been the excessive forbearance with which England and France have acted. But the result might have been foreseen. It is in the nature of men whose influence over events and whose power over others are founded on intimidation, and kept up by arrogant assumptions and pretensions, to mistake forbearance for irresolution, and to look upon inaction and hesitation as symptoms of fear, and forerunners of submission.

Thus it has been with Russia on the one hand and England and France on the other. If the two Powers had acted with that energy, decision, and promptitude which the occasion required; if when Menschikoff began to threaten, the two squadrons had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and if the Russian Government had been plainly told that the moment a Russian soldier set foot on Turkish territory, or as soon as a Russian ship-of-war approached with hostile intentions the Turkish coast, the combined squadrons would move up to the Bosphorus, and, if necessary, operate in the Black Sea, there can be little doubt that the Russian Government would have paused in its course, and things would not have come to the pass at which they have now arrived. But the Russian Government has been led on step by step by the apparent timidity of the Government of England, and reports artfully propagated that the British Cabinet had declared that it would have *la paix à tout prix* have not been sufficiently contradicted by any overt acts. The result has now been that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, not content with bullying Turkey, threatens and insults England and France, and arrogantly pretends to forbid the ships-of-war of those Powers from frequenting the waters of another Power over whose waters Russia has no authority whatever, and who has invited those ships into those waters specifically to protect it against Russian aggression.

It is the robber who declares that he will not leave the house until the policeman shall have first retired from the courtyard.

The position of England and France was already sufficiently humiliating, but this insolent pretension, published to all Europe even before it was communicated to us, seems to me to make that position no longer tenable consistently with a due regard to the honour and character of this country.

I would therefore beg to submit, and to place my opinion thus on record, that orders should forthwith be sent to the two squadrons to go up to the Bosphorus, and that the Russian Government should be informed that, although we had not

intended that this move should have taken place without some fresh incident, or some more urgent request from the Porte, yet after the inadmissible pretension put forward in Count Nesselrode's note, to dictate to us as to the movements of our fleet, we had no alternative left but to station that fleet at the heart of that empire whose integrity and independence have been unwarrantably threatened by a Russian invasion of its territory.

PALMERSTON.

Lord Aberdeen, on the other hand, hoping and believing that the form of Convention between Russia and Turkey, which had been prepared by France and England, would be accepted, and that peace would thus be maintained, considered that Count Nesselrode's Circular should only be met by a grave expostulation. 'When, he added, 'the four Powers simultaneously advised the Porte not to regard the entrance of the Russian troops into the Principalities as a *casus belli*, it was not that they attached any weight to the declaration of the Emperor that he did not intend to make war upon Turkey, or that they entertained any doubt of an act of real hostility having been committed, but they wished to accept his declaration so far as to preserve in their own hands the means of negotiating with greater hopes of success than if the utmost extremity of war had been proclaimed.' Lord Clarendon also shared Lord Aberdeen's views.

Lord Palmerston acquiesced, with reservations, in the Premier's decision. He said:—

I do not think that we advised the Porte not to consider the invasion of the Principalities a *casus belli*. A *casus belli*, if I understand the term, means a case which would justify war. Now we have told the Porte that the invasion of the Principalities would justify war on the part of Turkey against Russia, but we advised the Sultan, on grounds of prudence and as a question of strategy, not to exercise his right and to send an army to fight at a disadvantage beyond the Danube. It seems to me, therefore, that we have told the Sultan that the invasion of his territory is a *casus belli*, but that he would do best by

standing on the defensive. As to the fleet, I acquiesce in your reasoning, and, on consideration, I admit that, as we have launched proposals for a peaceful arrangement, it would be better not to endanger the negotiation by throwing into it any fresh element of difficulty; and I am, therefore, prepared to share the responsibility of submitting even to insult rather than afford to the quibbling and pettifogging Government with which we have to deal any pretext arising out of our course for refusing terms of accommodation unobjectionable in themselves.¹

Parliament was prorogued, with an expression of hope, in the Speech from the Throne, that the dispute would yet be arranged without recourse to arms. Lord Palmerston, as soon as he was released from the House of Commons, went down to Derbyshire to open the Melbourne Athenæum, on which occasion he gave an address on the educational facilities provided by such institutions. This was very proper for a Home Secretary, although, in his character of ex-Foreign Secretary, it was abroad that his eyes were fixed, while he was in close correspondence with his colleagues, stimulating each in turn to adopt a bold tone as to the events then taking place. To Mr. Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War, he writes, in September, from Balmoral, whither he had gone in attendance on the Queen:—

Balmoral : September 21, 1853.

The question between Russia and Turkey seems, as you say, to be in an unsatisfactory and unpromising state, and yet it lies in a nutshell, and its solution depends upon honest intentions and plain dealing on the part of Russia. What is it the Emperor wants? Why will he not plainly tell us what it is? Does he want merely what all of us want—namely, that the Christians in the Turkish empire shall be safe from oppression, vexation, and injury? If that is what he wants, let him begin by himself setting the example, and let him, by evacuating the Principalities, relieve the Christian inhabitants of that part of the Turkish empire from the complicated and various miseries which the occupation of their country by a Russian army inflicts upon them. Beyond that, let him be satisfied, as we all are,

¹ To Lord Aberdeen, July 15, 1853.

with the progressively liberal system of Turkey, and let him keep his remonstrances till some case and occasion arises which calls for them. At present he has not been able even to allege any oppression of the Christians, except that which he himself practises in the Principalities. I believe the real fact at the bottom of all these unintelligible pretences is that what he really wants is that the Sultan should not, by liberal measures and progressive improvement, interfere with the arbitrary and tyrannical powers which the Greek clergy now too often exercise, whether by right or by assumption, to the cruel oppression of the Greek communities. But if the Emperor wants no more than what I have said, he ought to be satisfied with the declarations which the Sultan is ready to make. If, on the other hand, the Emperor wants to become acknowledged protector of the Greek subjects of the Sultan, and to be allowed to interfere between the Sultan and the Sultan's subjects, why then I say let him manfully avow this pretension, and let us manfully assist Turkey in manfully resisting it, and let the fortune of war decide between the Emperor's wrong and the Sultan's rightful cause. In my opinion Russia ought to be required to give a categorical answer, and to be driven from the discreditable subterfuges behind which she has so long sheltered her aggressive intentions. I believe that what I have last stated is what the Emperor really means and wants, and therefore I am coming reluctantly to the conclusion that war between him and Turkey is becoming inevitable. If such war shall happen, upon his head be the responsibility of the consequences.

I by no means think with you that he will have an easy victory over the Turks. On the contrary, if the betting is not even, I would lay the odds on the Turks. All that the Turkish army wants are directory officers, and it would be strange indeed if England, France, Poland, and Hungary could not amply supply that deficiency. I do not believe in the disaffection of the Turkish provinces; this is an oft-repeated tale got up by the Russians. The best refutation is, that for many months past the Russian agents have been trying *per fas et nefas* to provoke insurrection in Turkey, and have failed. The fact is, that the Christian subjects in Turkey know too well what Russian *régime* is not to be aware that it is of all things the most to be dreaded, and the oftener Russian troops enter Turkish territory the stronger this conviction is impressed upon the people. Russia ought not to forget that she has weak points—Poland, Circassia, Georgia. My wish is that England should

be on friendly terms with Russia; it is desirable that this should be, for the sake of both countries and for the sake of Europe. Neither country would gain anything by war with the other; and Russia, if her Government understood properly her position, has important and useful functions to perform in the system of Europe. The Emperor has, since 1848, and till this last affair, performed those functions to the admiration of all thinking men. He seems latterly to have lost his reasoning faculties.

Brunnow has often said to me that, however different the internal organisation of England and Russia, and however opposite their respective views as to the theory of government, they have, nevertheless, so many great interests in common, that there is nothing to prevent them from working well together *so long as no difference arises between them in regard to the affairs of Turkey or of Persia*. Brunnow is a wise man, but matters seem to have been lately managed at Petersburg by men who are *otherwise*.

All I can say is that, as far as I am concerned, I am desirous that England should be well with Russia as long as the Emperor allows us to be so; but if he is determined to break a lance with us, why, then, have at him, say I, and perhaps he may have enough of it before we have done with him.

On October 4, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, suggesting that it would be advantageous in all communications with Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, to maintain a mysterious indefiniteness and uncertainty as to the degree and the manner of assistance which England would give to Turkey against Russia, and pointing out that the Russian Government must greatly dread an open rupture with England and France. He knew that private and verbal communications, given in all honesty, but tinged by the personal bias of the Prime Minister, were doing irreparable mischief, and that the Russian Minister was determined not to take them at their true value, but persisted in giving them the interpretation which he desired for them, namely, an insuperable dislike on the part of the English Government to any active measures against his country. Lord Aberdeen replied, with a view to reassure Lord Palmerston:—

It is very true that I may formerly have regarded the possibility of war between England and Russia with the utmost incredulity ; but for some time past I have seen the desire for war increase so much as to lead me to think that it is but too probable. At present, therefore, *vous prêchez le converti*. As for Brunnow, he is already frightened out of his wits at the prospect, and most assuredly he hears nothing from me to diminish his alarm.

The crisis was now rapidly culminating. On October 5 the Porte issued a declaration making the further continuation of peace depend upon the evacuation of the Principalities within fifteen days ; and on October 14 the English and French fleets passed up to Constantinople, at the request of the Sultan. Lord Palmerston wanted something even more decisive on our part.

C. G. : October 7, 1853.

My dear Aberdeen,—The state of Russo-Turkish affairs seems to require some statement on the part of England and France, assuming, of course, that war has been declared by Turkey, and that hostilities between Russia and Turkey are about to commence. I should, therefore, wish to propose to the Cabinet to-day—

‘First, that instructions should be sent to Constantinople that, in the event of war having been declared, the two squadrons should enter the Black Sea, and should send word to the Russian admiral at Sebastopol that, in the existing state of things, any Russian ship-of-war found cruising in the Black Sea would be detained, and be given over to the Turkish Government.

‘Secondly, that England and France should propose to the Sultan to conclude a convention to the effect that, whereas war has, unfortunately, broken out between Russia and Turkey, in consequence of differences created by unjust demands made upon Turkey by Russia, and by an unwarrantable invasion of the Turkish territory by a Russian army ; and whereas it is deemed by England and France to be an object of general European interest, and of special importance to them that the political independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire should be maintained inviolate against Russian aggression, the two Powers engage to furnish to the Sultan such naval assistance as may be necessary in existing circumstances for the

defence of his empire ; and they moreover engage to permit any of their respective subjects who may be willing to do so to enter the military or naval service of the Sultan. In return, the Sultan to engage that he will consult with England and France as to the terms and conditions of the new treaty which is to determine, on the conclusion of hostilities, the future relations of Russia and Turkey.'

Such a convention would unquestionably have a great and useful effect on the course to be pursued by the three Eastern Powers.

Lord Aberdeen, in reply, said: 'I cannot say that I think the present state of the Russo-Turkish question would authorise such a proceeding on our part as that which you intend to propose.' Indeed, as the rupture of peace appeared more and more likely, more and more hesitation was developed in high quarters. Representations were made that the fanatical party at Constantinople had become so clamorous for war, for their own purposes, that the Turk was thwarting instead of assisting English efforts to come to a satisfactory understanding with Russia. It began to be feared that England was about to be dragged behind the Ottoman chariot in a campaign the real object of which was to obtain more power for two millions of Mussulmen to rule oppressively twelve millions of Christians. Suggestions were thrown out that if, setting aside all Turkish considerations, it was thought that England and Europe had such a strong interest in keeping Turkish territory out of the hands of Russia as to be justified in going to war for that purpose, such a war ought to be carried on unshackled by any obligations to the Porte, and ought to lead to such a peace as would provide other and better arrangements for the future than the 'recomposition of the ignorant, barbarian, and despotic rule of the Mussulman over the most favoured and fertile portion of Europe.'

Lord Aberdeen had forwarded to Lord Palmerston a Memorandum which he had received drawn up in this

sense.¹ Lord Palmerston returned it with the following remarks :—

Broadlands: November 1, 1853.

I return the Memorandum, which states very clearly the course of past events, but which, towards its conclusion, points to future objects not consistent with the policy laid down in its beginning, and not easy to be carried into execution.

According to my view of the matters in question, the case is simple and our course is clear. The five great Powers have, in a formal document, recorded their opinion that it is for the general interest of Europe that the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire should be maintained ; and it would be easy to show that strong reasons, political and commercial, make it especially the interest of England that this integrity and independence should be maintained. But Russia has attacked the independence and has violated the integrity of the Ottoman empire ; and Russia must, by fair means or foul, be brought to give up her pretensions and withdraw her aggression. England and France, urged by common interests to defend Turkey against Russia, have given Turkey physical assistance and political and diplomatic support. They undertook to obtain for Turkey, by negotiation, a satisfactory and honourable settlement of her differences with Russia, and, failing that, to support Turkey in her defensive war.

Hitherto our efforts at negotiation have failed, because the arrangement which we proposed was declared, both by Turkey and by Russia, to be such as Turkey could not honourably nor safely adopt. The Turkish Government, seeing no apparent prospect of better results from negotiation, and aware that lapse of time was running to the disadvantage of Turkey, at length, after having for some considerable time yielded to our advice to remain passive, came to a determination not unnatural, and not unwise, and issued that declaration of war which we had officially and publicly said that the Sultan would have been justified in issuing the moment the Russians invaded his territory.

This declaration of war makes no change in the position of England and France in relation to Turkey. We may still try to persuade Russia to do what she ought to do, but we are still bound, by a regard for our own interests, to defend Turkey. Peace is an excellent thing, and war is a great misfortune ; but there are many things more valuable than peace, and many things much worse than war.

¹ From the Prince Consort.

We passed the Rubicon when we first took part with Turkey and sent our squadrons to support her ; and when England and France have once taken a third Power by the hand, that third Power *must* be carried in safety through the difficulties in which it may be involved. England and France cannot afford to be baffled, and whatever measures may be necessary on their part to baffle their opponent, those measures must be adopted ; and the Governments of the two most powerful countries on the face of the earth must not be frightened, either by words or things, either by the name or by the reality of war.

No doubt when we put forth our whole strength in defence of Turkey we shall be entitled to direct in a great measure the course and character of the war, and to exercise a deciding influence on the negotiations which may afterwards lead to peace. And it was with that view that, some time ago, I proposed to the Cabinet that, negotiation failing, England and France should conclude a convention with Turkey, by which, on the one hand, the two Powers should engage to afford Turkey naval assistance, and to permit their respective subjects to enter the Sultan's service, naval and military ; and by which the Sultan, on the other hand, should engage to consult with the two Powers as to the terms and conditions of peace. But the only grounds on which we can claim influence in these matters is our determination to give hearty and effectual support. We support Turkey for our own sake and for our own interests, and to withdraw our support, or to cripple it, so as to render it ineffectual, merely because the Turkish Government did not show as much deference to our advice as our advice deserved, would be to place our national interests at the mercy of other persons. If Lord Liverpool's Government had so acted in regard to the Provisional Government of Spain, we never should have driven the French out of the Peninsula.

But, it is said, the Turks seem to wish for war, while we wish for peace. I apprehend that both parties wish for one and the same thing, namely, the relinquishment by Russia of inadmissible pretensions and her retirement from the Turkish territory ; both parties would rather gain these ends by the pen than by the sword : we only differ in our belief as to the efficacy of these two methods. It is indeed possible that the Turks may think that a successful conflict would enable them to make a treaty of peace which should free them from the thralldom of some of their old engagements ; and if this were possible, it would certainly place future peace on a firmer foundation.

The concluding part of the Memorandum points to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the establishment of a Greek empire in European Turkey. But such a scheme would be diametrically opposed to the principles of the policy on which we have hitherto acted. To carry such a system into execution, we ought to join the Russians against the Turks, instead of helping the Turks against the Russians; for how could such a reconstruction of Turkey become the result of a successful contest by England and France in defence of Turkey? I have no partiality for the Turks as Mahometans, and should be very glad if they could be turned into Christians; but as to the character of the Turkish Government in regard to its treatment of Christians, I am well convinced that there are a vast number of Christians under the Governments of Russia, Austria, Rome, and Naples who would be rejoiced to be as well treated, and to enjoy as much security for person and property as the Christian subjects of the Sultan.¹

To expel from Europe the Sultan and his two millions of Mussulman subjects, including the army and the bulk of the landowners, might not be an easy task; still, the five Powers might effect it, and play the Polish drama over again. But they would find the building up still more difficult than the pulling down. There are no sufficient Christian elements as yet for a Christian state in European Turkey capable of performing its functions as a component part of the European system. The Greeks are a small minority, and could not be the governing race. The Slavonians, who are the majority, do not possess the conditions necessary for becoming the bones and sinews of a new state. A reconstruction of Turkey means neither more nor less than its subjection to Russia, direct or indirect, immediate or for a time delayed.

It seems to me, then, that our course is plain, simple, and straight: that we must help Turkey out of her difficulties by negotiation, if possible; and that if negotiation fails, we must, by force of arms, carry her safely through her dangers.

Lord Palmerston was not confining his suggestions to proposals for mere acts of force. He enters, in the next letter, on a discussion as to the best way of presenting a form of arrangement to the two contending parties so as to secure its favourable consideration. He

¹ The Italians, when this was written, had not achieved the liberty and good government which they now enjoy.

agreed with Lord John Russell in thinking it unadvisable to present the note to the Turks without leaving them any discretion as to alterations which they might desire.

Broadlands: October 24, 1853.

My dear John Russell,—If we wish to prevail on the Porte to sign a note for presentation to the Emperor, we must leave the Turkish Government the power of proposing alterations in the draft we send them. We may hope that our draft may be accepted by them without alteration; but they may have good reasons which have not occurred to us for desiring some changes, or they may have even bad reasons which, if the changes they propose would not increase our difficulties at Petersburg, might, in spite of their badness, be allowed to prevail. If we send them a draft which they must either take as it is or reject, we may have a rejection, and we may lose by our pertinacity an invaluable chance of a peaceful arrangement.

But further, if we are prepared to impose our form of words on Turkey, we should thereby incur an honourable engagement to impose them equally on Russia; and are we, or are the French, or is Austria, or is Prussia prepared to declare war against Russia, not for the defence of the Turkish empire and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, but in order to compel the Emperor of Russia to accept a particular form of words put together in Downing Street. This would surely be carrying the parental affection of authorship beyond reasonable extent. Then as to the way in which the draft of note should be sent to Constantinople. I agree with you that it would be inexpedient to revive the Vienna conference for such a purpose, or, indeed, for any other. That conference is dead—peace to its remains. No good can come out of a conference at Vienna on these matters, and at the present time. A Vienna conference means Buol, and Buol means Meyendorf, and Meyendorf means Nicholas; and the Turks know this, and so does all Europe.

Moreover, the very atmosphere of Vienna is unhealthy.¹ I doubt whether even you or I should not find ourselves paralysed by the political miasma of the place. If the machinery of a conference is to be set up again, and it may be very useful

¹ 'Vienna is a sad place for humbug, and X. suffered from the atmosphere as does the liveliest and sturdiest dog in the Grotto del Cane.'—*Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon.*

to reorganise it, we ought to make a *sine quâ non* of its being held in London.

It is, indeed, doubtful whether the gold and silver age of notes has not gone by, and whether, when the *Fury* gets to Constantinople, she will not find the age of brass and iron already begun; but we are quite right to make the attempt.

Indeed it was so. The two armies were already in conflict; and, on November 30, the navies also met in deadly fight, when the Turkish fleet was destroyed at Sinope. The feeling now roused in England was very strong; and Lord Palmerston, on December 10, wrote to Lord Aberdeen:—

Will you allow me to take this opportunity of repeating in writing what I have more than once said verbally, on the state of things between Russia and Turkey? It appears to me that we have two objects in view: the one to put an end to the present war between these two Powers; the other to prevent, as far as diplomatic arrangements can do so, a recurrence of similar differences, and, through those differences, renewed dangers to the peace of Europe.

Now, it seems to me that, unless Turkey shall be laid prostrate at the feet of Russia by disasters and war, an event which England and France could not without dishonour permit, no peace can be concluded between the contending parties unless the Emperor consents to evacuate the Principalities, to abandon his demands, and to renounce some of the embarrassing stipulations of former treaties upon which he has founded the pretensions which have been the cause of existing difficulties.

To bring the Emperor to agree to this, it is necessary to exert a considerable pressure upon him; and the quarter in which that pressure can at present be most easily brought to bear is the Black Sea and the countries bordering upon it. In the Black Sea, the combined English, French, and Turkish squadrons are indisputably superior to the Russian fleet, and are able to give the law to that fleet. What I would strongly recommend, therefore, is that which I proposed some months ago to the Cabinet, namely, that the Russian Government and the Russian admiral at Sebastopol should be informed that so long as Russian troops occupy the Principalities, or hold a position in any other part of the Turkish territory, no Russian ships-of-war can be allowed to show themselves out of port in the Black Sea.

You will say that this would be an act of hostility towards Russia; but so is the declaration already made, that no Russian ships shall be permitted to make any landing or attack on any part of the Turkish territory. The only difference between the two declarations is, that the one already made is incomplete and insufficient for its purpose, and that the one which I propose would be complete and sufficient. If the Russian fleet were shut up in Sebastopol, it is probable that the Turks would be able to make in Asia an impression that would tend to facilitate the conclusion of peace.

With regard to the conditions of peace, it seems to me that the only arrangement which could afford to Europe a fair security against future dangers arising out of the encroachments of Russia on Turkey, and the attempts of the Russian Government to interfere in the internal affairs of the Turkish empire, would be that arrangement which I have often suggested, namely, that the treaty to be concluded between Russia and Turkey should be an ordinary treaty of peace and friendship, of boundaries, commerce, and mutual protection of the subjects of one party within the territories of the other; and that all the stipulations which might be required for the privileges of the Principalities and of Servia, and for the protection of the Christian religion and its churches in the Ottoman dominions by the Sultan should be contained in a treaty between the Sultan and the five Powers. By such a treaty Russia would be prevented from dealing single-handed with Turkey in regard to those matters on which she has, from time to time, endeavoured to fasten a quarrel on the Sultan.

Lord Aberdeen replied on the 13th: 'I confess I am not prepared to adopt the mode which you think most likely to restore peace.' He went on to say that he should prefer an open declaration of war to the 'pressure' which Lord Palmerston proposed; but as the union of the four Powers had just been effected, with a declaration that the integrity of the Turkish Empire was an object of general interest, it was to be presumed that they would take measures to secure it. Recourse, therefore, to direct hostility would be out of place, although it might eventually come.

Lord Palmerston resigned on the 15th. We have

seen in the last chapter what was the immediate reason which he assigned; but the fact is that, as Mr. Kinglake says, he was gifted with the instinct which enables a man to read the heart of a nation, and he felt that the English people would never forgive the Ministry if nothing decisive was done after the disaster at Sinope. During his short absence of about ten days, the Cabinet resolved to send the fleet into the Black Sea, with instructions to the admiral to prevent any Russian vessels of war from leaving port. Lord Aberdeen, in acknowledging the withdrawal of Lord Palmerston's resignation, says :—

I am glad to find that you approve of a recent decision of the Cabinet with respect to the British and French fleets adopted in your absence. I feel sure you will have learnt with pleasure that, whether you are absent or present, the Government are duly careful to preserve from all injury the interests and dignity of the country.

The session of 1854 began on January 31. On February 7, the Russian ambassador was recalled, and shortly after the British Government sent a final ultimatum to the Russian Emperor, calling upon him to evacuate the Principalities by April 30. Meanwhile troops were despatched to the East, and active preparations were carried on at home. On March 7 Lord Palmerston presided over a banquet given at the Reform Club to Sir Charles Napier, previous to his departure with the fleet for the Baltic. I give an extract from Lord Palmerston's speech on this occasion, both as illustrating the temper of the time, and as a specimen of the spirited ease and humour with which he could stir up an after-dinner audience. His enjoyment was contagious, and the company laughed sympathetically even before they heard the joke.

After the formal toasts had been duly drunk, Lord Palmerston rose and said :—

There was a very remarkable entertainer of dinner company, called Sir R. Preston, who lived in the City, and who, when he

gave dinners at Greenwich, after gorging his guests with turtle, used to turn round to the waiters and say, 'Now bring dinner.' Gentlemen, we have had the toasts which correspond with the turtle, and now let's go to dinner. Now let us drink the toast which belongs to the real occasion of our assembling here. I give you 'The health of my gallant friend Sir Charles Napier,' who sits beside me. If, gentlemen, I were addressing a Hampshire audience, consisting of country gentlemen residing in that county, to which my gallant friend and myself belong, I should introduce him to your notice as an eminent agriculturist. It has been my good fortune, when enjoying his hospitality at Merchistoun Hall, to receive most valuable instructions from him while walking over his farm about stall-feeding, growing turnips, wire fencing, under-draining, and the like. My gallant friend is a match for everything, and whatever he turns his hand to he generally succeeds in it. However, gentlemen, he now, like Cincinnatus, leaves his plough, puts on his armour, and is prepared to do that good service to his country which he will always perform whenever an opportunity is afforded to him. I pass over those earlier exploits of his younger days, which are well known to the members of his profession; but, perhaps, one of the most remarkable exploits of his life is that which he performed in the same cause of liberty and justice in which he is now about to be engaged. In the year 1833, when gallantly volunteering to serve the cause of the Queen of Portugal against the encroachments and the usurpations of Don Miguel—to defend constitutional rights and liberties against arbitrary power—he took the command of a modest fleet of frigates and corvettes, and, at the head of that little squadron, he captured a squadron far superior in force, including two line-of-battle ships, one of which my gallant friend was the first to board. But on that occasion my gallant friend exhibited a characteristic trait. When he had scrambled upon the deck of this great line-of-battle ship, and was clearing the deck of those who had possession of it, a Portuguese officer ran at him full dart with his drawn sword to run him through. My gallant friend quietly parried the thrust, and, not giving himself the trouble to deal in any other way with his Portuguese assailant, merely gave him a hearty kick, and sent him down the hatchway. Well, gentlemen, that victory was a great event—I don't mean the victory over the officer who went down, but the victory over the fleet, which my gallant friend took into port; for that victory decided a great cause then pending. It decided the liber-

ties of Portugal ; it decided the question between constitutional and arbitrary power—a contest which began in Portugal, and which went on afterwards in Spain, when my gallant friend Sir De Lacy Evans lent his powerful aid in the same cause, and with the same success. My gallant friend Sir Charles Napier, however, got the first turn of fortune, and it was mainly owing to that victory of his that the Queen of Portugal afterwards occupied the throne to which she was rightfully entitled, and the Portuguese nation obtained that Constitution which they have ever since enjoyed. A noble friend of mine, now no more, whose loss I greatly lament, for he was equally distinguished as a man, as a soldier, and as a diplomatist, the late Lord William Russell—an honour to his country, as to his family—told me that one day he heard that my gallant friend Sir Charles Napier was in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Valenza, a Portuguese fortress some considerable distance from the squadron which he commanded. Lord W. Russell and Colonel Hare went to see my gallant friend, and Lord W. Russell told me that they met a man dressed in a very easy way, followed by a fellow with two muskets on his shoulders. They took him at first for Robinson Crusoe ; but who should these men prove to be but the gallant admiral on my right and a marine behind him. ‘Well, Napier,’ said Lord W. Russell, ‘what are you doing here?’ ‘Why,’ said my gallant friend, ‘I am waiting to take Valenza.’ ‘But,’ said Lord William, ‘Valenza is a fortified town, and you must know that we soldiers understand how fortified towns are taken. You must open trenches ; you must make approaches ; you must establish a battery in breach ; and all this takes a good deal of time, and must be done according to rule.’ ‘Oh,’ said my gallant friend, ‘I have no time for all that. I have got some of my blue-jackets up here and a few of my ship’s guns, and I mean to take the town with a letter.’ And so he did. He sent the governor a letter to tell him he had much better surrender at discretion. The governor was a very sensible man ; and so surrender he did. So the trenches, and the approaches, the battery, breach, and all that, were saved, and the town of Valenza was handed over to the Queen of Portugal. Well, the next great occasion in which my gallant friend took a prominent and distinguished part—a part for which I can assure you that I personally, in my official capacity, and the Government to which I had the honour to belong, felt deeply indebted and obliged to him—was the occasion of the war in Syria. There my gallant friend distinguished himself,

as usual, at sea and on shore. All was one to him, wherever an enemy was to be found: and I feel sure that when the enemy was found, the enemy wished to Heaven he had not been found. Well, my gallant friend landed with his marines, headed a Turkish detachment, defeated the Egyptian troops, gained a very important victory, stormed the town of Sidon, captured three or four thousand Egyptian prisoners, and afterwards took a prominent part in the attack and capture of the important fortress of Acre. I am bound to say that the Government to which I belonged, in sending those instructions which led to the attack upon Acre, were very much guided by the opinions which we had received of the practicability of that achievement in letters from my gallant friend.

Mr. Bright, a few days later in the House of Commons, took Lord Palmerston to task for the tone of this speech. Such apparent levity and *gaieté de cœur* in a Minister of the Crown must have grated on the sentiment of one who abhorred the war, and thought it unnecessary. But surely when the conflict was inevitable and imminent, it was the common-sense view of patriotism to neglect no means, however trifling, of keeping up the heart and spirit of the nation. Lord Palmerston, however, was so stung by the manner of the attack, that he replied with a bitterness and severity quite unusual for him, and which, perhaps, was excessive—the House for the moment showing by the exclamations of some of its members that this was the impression made upon it. At the same time it must be allowed that it was very galling to a man of Lord Palmerston's character to be held up to public reprobation as one who was inciting people to fight as if they were cocks in a pit.

The war had now fairly begun, and as early as June Lord Palmerston proposed to the Cabinet a descent on the Crimea. He urged that the siege of Sebastopol was the object on which the allied armies should be directed. The occupation of the Principalities by the Russian forces he regarded as a pledge for the neutrality of Austria, her active alliance with the enemy being

quite possible should all fear be removed of Russia's permanent hold upon the Danube. He was, therefore, a strong advocate for leaving the Russians in undisturbed enjoyment of the pestilential air of the Dobrudscha, and for crossing over from Varna to the great Russian arsenal on the Black Sea.

The Cabinet unanimously acknowledged the force of his arguments, though there were some few who wished for a postponement of such an expedition until the second year of the campaign. The difficulty was the unprepared state of the French army, which was still deficient both in men and material. The French officers, indeed, generally disliked this selection of the Crimea as their battle-field.

The following Memorandum on the measures to be adopted against Russia was sent round to the Cabinet :—

C. G. : June 15, 1854.

Some conversation having passed on Wednesday evening at Sir Charles Wood's between some members of the Cabinet, about the objects to which our operations ought to be directed in the war against Russia, I wish to submit the following observations to the Cabinet.

England and France have entered into war with a great Power, have made great exertions, at a great expense, and for a great purpose. They would lose caste in the world if they concluded the war with only a small result. The particular overt act by which Russia broke the peace was the invasion of the Danube Principalities, but the purpose for which we took up arms would be very imperfectly accomplished if the only result of the war was to be the evacuation of those provinces by the Russian army, even if that evacuation were accompanied by a waiver on the part of Russia of the demands she has made upon Turkey. Such a result would be a triumph rather than a defeat for Russia.

She would say that she had defied and withstood the naval and military strength of two of the greatest Powers of the world, that these Powers had been unable to hurt her, and that she had substantially gained all that she had set out by demanding, inasmuch as the Sultan had done by his own act for his Christian subjects that which she had required. We should then have no security for the future, and whenever a more

favourable opportunity might present itself, whenever England and France were disunited, she would again make her spring upon Turkey, and with a better chance of success.

It seems absolutely necessary that some heavy blow should be struck at the naval power and territorial dimensions of Russia, and unless this be done in the present year, the accomplishment of it will become more difficult, and the reputation of England and France will materially suffer.

The points where such blows could best be struck are evidently the Russian possessions in Georgia and Circassia and the Crimea.

The expulsion of the Russians from Georgia and Circassia must probably be left to the Turks and the Circassians, and no effort should be left untried to reorganise the Turkish army in Asia, by placing it under European officers, so as to put it into a condition to drive the Russians out of Georgia before the season for military operations is over, and to co-operate with the Circassians.

The British and French troops are now, to a certain degree, pledged to co-operate with Omar Pasha in raising the siege of Silistria.

If that can be accomplished early enough to leave time for operations afterwards in the Crimea, well and good; and of course the British and French troops would be ordered in no case to cross the Danube and entangle themselves in the unhealthy plains of Wallachia.

But I confess that it seems to me, that if the combined army had been ready to undertake the reduction of the Crimea and Sebastopol, that object is so infinitely more important than the temporary defence of the Danube fortresses, that I would have preferred that Silistria and the line of the Danube should have been abandoned, and that Omar Pasha should have fallen back upon Schumla, and Varna, and Adrianople, and that the allied army should have gone at once to the Crimea.

The Russians could not retain permanently the Danube fortresses, and if they moved on to the southward they must have left garrisons in them. The further they advanced southward the greater would be their difficulties of all kinds, and the more the effective strength of their army would dwindle away, and the more easily, therefore, they would afterwards be defeated. But the further south the point at which they might be defeated, the more fatal a defeat would be.

The occupation of the Danube fortresses by Russia would

be only a temporary and precarious advantage for her. The capture of Sebastopol and of the Russian Black Sea fleet would be a lasting and important advantage to us. Such a success would act with great weight upon the fortunes of the war, and would tell essentially upon the negotiations for peace. We should be able materially and at once to reduce our naval expenditure if the Russian Black Sea fleet were destroyed or in our possession; and, holding the Crimea and Sebastopol, we could dictate the conditions of peace in regard to the naval position of Russia in the Black Sea.

There does not seem good reason to believe that the Russians have at present more than 40,000 men in the Crimea, if they have so many; and if 25,000 English and 35,000 French could be landed somewhere in the large bay to the north of Sebastopol, there can be little doubt that they would be able to take the fort on the hill on the north side of the harbour of Sebastopol, and they would then command the harbour, fleet, and town.

This enterprise need not prevent the capture of Anapa and Poti this year, but even if it did there can surely be no comparison between the value of the capture of Sebastopol and the taking of the forts on the coast of Circassia. The capture of Sebastopol and the capture or destruction of the Russian fleet would of course imply the surrender of the Russian troops which form the garrison of the place, or their evacuation of the Crimea by capitulation, and either of these results would be a brilliant feat of arms for the allied forces. Anapa and Poti might be taken at leisure afterwards, and with greater ease if Sebastopol had been mastered.

But if the attack on the Crimea is put off till next year the Russian Government will have time to strengthen the defences of the place, and to increase the garrison to any amount which the peninsula can hold, and we may find the undertaking far more difficult then than it would have been this year.

The Emperor will, during the autumn, winter, and spring, raise and train recruits enough to make good his losses during this campaign, and next year we should have to deal with a reinforced and reorganised army, instead of with one worn down and dispirited by the unsuccessful operations of this summer. On the other hand, the allied troops are now fresh, eager, and ready for enterprise. If they are to remain inactive till next spring, their health may give way, their spirits may flag, their mutual cordiality and good understanding may be

cooled down by intrigues, jealousies, and disputes, and public opinion, which in England and France now stands by the two Governments, and bears up the people of the two countries to make the sacrifices necessary for the war, may take another turn, and people may grow tired of burthens which have produced no sufficient and satisfactory result.

It seems to me, then, that the French Government ought to be urged to press forward the complete formation of their co-operating army in Turkey, and that we ought to endeavour to make arrangements with them for an attack on Sebastopol as soon as the combined army is in a state to undertake it.

We do not seem likely to accomplish anything of much importance in the Baltic, and on that account it is the more desirable that we should gain some real and signal advantage in the Black Sea.

PALMERSTON.

And to the Minister of War he writes on the same subject.

Brocket : June 16, 1854.

You said yesterday at the Cabinet that you wished to talk over what was to be written to Raglan by the mail which would go before our next Cabinet, and as I was obliged to leave the Cabinet early to save my railway train to this place, I send you my vote in writing.

It seems to me that to keep the allied army in Bulgaria, and to carry on operations on the banks of the Danube, would be to throw away time, money, men, official and national reputation.

Nothing that we could do there would have any decisive effect on the war, nor could it help us one step towards the attainment of that future security which our convention with France specifies as one of the main conditions of peace. Even if we were to drive the Russians across the Pruth, it would be what the French call a *coup d'épée dans l'eau*—a temporary advantage which would cease the moment we withdrew. I should, indeed, doubt the wisdom of an advance of the Turks to the north of the Danube, nor ought they to attach too much importance to the line of the Danube. Omar Pasha was quite right to defend the Danube and Silistria as long as he could, but I should not have thought less well of ultimate results if he had retired at length to Schumla and Varna, or even to

Adrianople. The Russian difficulties would increase with every day's march to the southward, and the dangers of their position would become more and more serious.

Our only chance of bringing Russia to terms is by offensive and not by defensive operations. We and the French ought to go to the Crimea and take Sebastopol and the Russian fleet the moment our two armies are in a condition to go thither. Sixty thousand English and French troops, with the fleets co-operating, would accomplish the object in six weeks after landing, and if this blow were accompanied by successful operations in Georgia and Circassia, we might have a merry Christmas and a happy New Year.

There is not the slightest danger of the Russians getting to Constantinople. The Turks are able to prevent that; but even if they could not, the Austrians would be compelled, by the force of circumstances, to do so. Austria has, as usual, been playing a shabby game. When she thought the Russians likely to get on, and while she fancied England and France needed hastening, she bragged of her determination to be active against Russia. As soon as she found our troops at Varna, she changed her tone, and, according to a despatch which Clarendon had in his hand yesterday, she now says she shall not enter the Principalities, and the Russians must be driven out by the Turks and the English and French. She can hardly think us simple enough to do her work for her; but the best way to force her to act would be to send our troops off to the Crimea. This is my vote.

On the 29th of June the Duke of Newcastle sent out instructions to Lord Raglan to make an immediate advance on Sebastopol. Few persons at that time foresaw the delay and difficulties which would have to be encountered before success crowned the enterprise. The Secretary of State for War himself, writing to Lord Palmerston in the beginning of September, said that he was sanguine enough to give the allied forces only three or four days after descending upon the Russian coast before they would be in possession of Sebastopol. On the 14th of September the troops of France and England landed in the Crimea, and a few days later they won the battle of the Alma. On the 3rd of October the news of the fall of Sebastopol arrived. It was believed by

most people for nearly twenty-four hours. Indeed, the Emperor of the French himself announced it to his troops at the camp of Helfaut.

These reported successes drew from no less an authority than Mr. Gladstone a recognition of Lord Palmerston's initiative in designating the Crimea as the proper field for the allied armies. In a letter of the 4th October, he says :—

My purpose is to offer you a congratulation which I feel to be especially due to you upon the great events which are taking place in the Crimea. Much as we must all rejoice on public grounds at these signal successes, and thankful as the whole nation may justly feel to a Higher Power, yet in looking back upon the instruments through which such results have come about, I for one cannot help repeating to you the thanks I offered at an earlier period for the manner in which you urged—when we were amidst many temptations to far more embarrassing and less effective proceedings—the duty of concentrating our strokes upon the true heart and centre of the war at Sebastopol.

In the month of November, 1854, Lord Palmerston went over to Paris with Lady Palmerston, mainly with the view of having an interview with the Emperor. He writes to his brother :—

Yesterday Emily and I dined at St. Cloud. The dinner was very handsome, and our hosts very agreeable. The Empress was full of life, animation, and talk, and the more one looks at her the prettier one thinks her. I have found the Emperor and Drouyn de Lhuys in very good opinions on the subject of the war, and acting towards us with perfect fairness, openness, and good faith.

Meanwhile in the Crimea all was not prospering, and the disappointment of the public when they learnt that Sebastopol had not been taken, as reported, increased their impatience. A sort of Nemesis hung over Lord John Russell, and compelled him to become the spokesman of the general feeling, and to indicate Lord Palmerston, his rejected lieutenant, as the man of the

hour. In a letter to the Prime Minister Lord John urged the necessity of a change in the War Department, and pointed out the 'necessity of having in that office a man who, from experience of military details, from inherent vigour of mind, and from weight with the House of Commons, can be expected to guide the great operations of war with authority and success. There is only one person,' he continued, 'belonging to the Government who combines these advantages. My conclusion is, that before Parliament meets Lord Palmerston should be entrusted with the seals of the War Department.' Lord Aberdeen, however, declined to recommend the change to the Queen, alleging, with great fairness, that although on the first constitution of the office such an arrangement might have been best, yet that the Duke of Newcastle had discharged his duties too ably and honourably to afford any justification for his removal.

After a short winter session, in which the Foreign Enlistment Bill was passed, Parliament reassembled on the 23rd of January, 1855. Mr. Roebuck, on the first night, gave notice that he intended to move for the appointment of a select committee 'to inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army.' Lord John Russell immediately resigned. Writing to Lord Aberdeen, he said: 'I do not see how the motion is to be resisted: but as it involves a censure upon the War Department, with which some of my colleagues are connected, my only course is to tender my resignation.' Lord Palmerston's opinion on this event is contained in the following letter:—

Piccadilly : January 24, 1855.

My dear John Russell,—I received your letter of this morning with much regret, and I feel bound in candour to say that I think your decision ill-timed. Everybody foresaw that on the meeting of Parliament after Christmas some such motion as that given notice of by Roebuck was likely to be made; and if you had determined not to face such a motion, your announcement

of such a decision a fortnight ago would have rendered it more easy for your colleagues to have taken whatever course such an announcement might have led to, either to have met your views by a new arrangement of offices, or to have given up the Government in a manner creditable to all parties concerned. As it is, you will have the appearance of having remained in office, aiding in carrying on a system of which you disapproved until driven out by Roebuck's announced notice, and the Government will have the appearance of self-condemnation by flying from a discussion which they dare not face; while as regards the country, the action of the executive will be paralysed for a time in a critical moment of a great war, with an impending negotiation, and we shall exhibit to the world a melancholy spectacle of disorganisation among our political men at home similar to that which has prevailed among our military men abroad. My opinion is that, if you had simply renewed the proposal which you made before Christmas, such an arrangement might have been made; and there are constitutional and practical grounds on which such a motion as Roebuck's might have been resisted without violence to any opinions which you may entertain as to the past period.

The ministerial explanations which took place in the House of Commons were immediately followed by the Roebuck motion for a select committee. Left in the lurch by their recognised leader, the Aberdeen Cabinet found their best defender in the man for whom many of them had felt distrust. Lord Palmerston, coming gallantly forward to take upon himself the invidious duty of supporting an Administration over which he had little control, and which, before disaster came, had neglected his advice, said that he fully concurred that the responsibility for the conduct of the war fell not on the Duke of Newcastle alone, but on the whole Cabinet. He did not deny that there had been something calamitous in the condition of our army, but he traced it to the inexperience arising from a long peace. If the House thought the Government not deserving of confidence, the direct and manly course would have been to affirm that proposition. The course about to be pursued would be dangerous and inconvenient in its results abroad.

He hoped that when the House had determined what set of men should be entrusted with public affairs, they would give their support to that Government, and not show to Europe that a nation could only meet a great crisis when it was deprived of representative institutions. When the House divided there appeared for Mr. Roebuck's motion, 305; against it, 148. Majority against the Government, 157. This startling result so amazed the House that they forgot to cheer, but laughed derisively.

On the 1st of February Lord Palmerston formally announced in the Commons the resignation of the Ministry. Thus fell the Coalition Cabinet of 1852, the victim of the war which it had itself declared.

CHAPTER XI.

BECOMES PRIME MINISTER—ATTENDS TO STATE OF THE ARMY—
NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA—REFORMS FOR TURKEY—CONFERENCE
BREAKS UP.

LORD DERBY was sent for to form a Government, and immediately sought the co-operation of Lord Palmerston, offering him the leadership of the House of Commons, which Mr. Disraeli was willing to waive in his favour. Offers were also made, through him, to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Sidney Herbert. Lord Palmerston, however, in the following letter, declined the proposals, having also expressed his great unwillingness, under existing circumstances, to belong to any Government in which the management of foreign affairs did not remain in Lord Clarendon's hands :—

144 Piccadilly: January 31, 1855.

My dear Derby,—Having well reflected upon the proposition which you made to me this morning, I have come to the conclusion that if I were to join your Government, as proposed by you, I should not give to that Government that strength which you are good enough to think would accrue to you from my acceptance of office.

I shall, however, deem it my duty, in the present critical state of affairs, to give, out of office, my support to any Government that shall carry on the war with energy and vigour, and will, in the management of our foreign relations, sustain the dignity and interests of the country, and maintain unimpaired the alliances which have been formed.

I have conveyed to Gladstone and Sidney Herbert the communication which you wished me to make to them; but it seemed to me to be best that they should write to you themselves.

Lord Derby at once retired, and Lord John Russell was the next person sent for by the Queen, who signified that it would give her particular satisfaction if Lord Palmerston could join in the formation. He expressed his willingness to do so; but many of the Whigs positively declined, and notably Lord Clarendon. Lord John Russell therefore resigned the commission which the Queen had entrusted to him; and in his letter announcing this to Lord Palmerston he thanked him for the readiness with which he had consented to aid the formation of a Government, and promised his support in the event of Lord Palmerston being charged by the Queen with this difficult but honourable task.

Lord Palmerston replied :—

February 4, 1855.

Thank you for your letter, which I have just received. I think the course which you have adopted was, under all circumstances, the best. The events which led to the present state of things were too recent to have allowed personal feelings to subside sufficiently to have enabled you to succeed in the task which the Queen had asked you to undertake; and to have made an imperfect arrangement would not have been advantageous either to yourself or to the country.

I feel very thankful to you for what you say with reference to the possibility that the Queen might desire me to try to form a Government; and if this should be, I should, of course, lose no time in communicating with you.

The ‘possibility’ was what everyone, during these ‘stage’ negotiations, foresaw to be a necessity. Lord Palmerston was requested to take up the abandoned task, and he successfully performed it. He thus writes to his brother to announce the event :—

Downing Street: February 15, 1855.

..... ‘*Quod nemo promittere Divum
Auderet volvenda dies en attulit ultro.*’

A month ago if any man had asked me to say what was one of the most improbable events, I should have said my being Prime Minister. Aberdeen was there, Derby was head of one great party, John Russell of the other, and yet, in about ten

days' time, they all gave way like straws before the wind, and so here am I, writing to you from Downing Street, as First Lord of the Treasury.

The fact was that Aberdeen and Newcastle had become discredited in public estimation as statesmen equal to the emergency. Derby felt conscious of the incapacity of the greater portion of his party, and their unfitness to govern the country, and John Russell, by the way in which he suddenly abandoned the Government, had so lost caste for the moment that I was the only one of his political friends who was willing to serve under him. I could not refuse to do so, because he told me that upon my answer depended his undertaking to form a Government, and if I had refused, and he had declined the task, and the Queen had then sent for me, people would have ascribed my refusal to personal ambition. Besides, he broke with the late Government because the War Department was not given to me, and it would have been ungrateful of me to have refused to assist him. It is, however, curious that the same man who summarily dismissed me three years ago, as unfit to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, should now have broken up a Government because I was not placed in what he conceived to be the most important post in the present state of things.

I think our Government will do very well. I am backed by the general opinion of the whole country, and I have no reason to complain of the least want of cordiality or confidence on the part of the Court.

As Aberdeen has become an impossibility, I am, for the moment *l'inévitable*. We are sending John Russell to negotiate at Vienna. This will serve as a proof to show that we are in earnest in our wish for peace, and in our determination to have sufficiently satisfactory terms. I have no great faith in the sincerity of Russia, though it is said that the Emperor Nicholas is much pressed by many around him to make peace as soon as he can. But we must insist upon his having a very small number of ships-of-war in the Black Sea, probably not more than four, and it will be a great gulp for him to swallow such a condition, especially seeing that we have not been able as yet to take his fleet. We must also *ask* for the destruction of the works at Sebastopol, although we should not make that a *sine quâ non*, unless we had taken the place and had destroyed the works ourselves. However, a short time will show whether we are to have peace or war, and, in the meanwhile, we are

making our preparations for war as if peace was out of the question.

I expect to be tolerably strong in Parliament for some little time to come, and I think that when the session is over it will be advisable to dissolve.

We shall have many discontented men behind us, because the body of the Whigs are angry that the Peelites joined me, and have occupied places which the Whigs hoped to have themselves; but if the Peelites had not joined me, we should have had an equally numerous band of discontented, only with this difference, that they would have consisted of more able men. Aberdeen and Newcastle behaved in the most friendly and honourable manner possible in persuading their friends to remain in the Government, but I see that the Peelite section still continues to endeavour to make itself a little separate section.

When one of the leading Peelites hesitated to accept the offer made to him, Lord Palmerston, divining his thoughts, wrote openly to him as follows:—

To speak plainly and frankly, you distrust my views and intentions, and you think that I should be disposed to continue the war without necessity, for the attainment of objects either unreasonable in themselves or unattainable by the means at our command, or not worth the efforts necessary for their attainment. In this you misjudge me. If by a stroke of the wand I could effect in the map of the world the changes which I could wish, I am quite sure that I could make arrangements far more conducive than some of the present ones to the peace of nations, to the progress of civilisation, to the happiness and welfare of mankind; but I am not so destitute of common sense as not to be able to compare ends with means, and to see that the former must be given up when the latter are wanting; and when the means to be brought to bear for the attainment of any ends consist in the blood and treasure of a great nation, those who are answerable to that nation for the expenditure of that blood and treasure must well weigh the value of the objects which they pursue, and must remember that, if they should forget the just proportion between ends and means, the good sense of the people whose affairs they manage will soon step in to correct their errors, and to call them to a severe account for the evils of which they would have been the cause.¹

¹ February 6, 1855.

No time was lost by the reorganised Cabinet in remedying some of the most pressing evils which had borne down our army in the Crimea. Lord Palmerston, in announcing to the House of Commons the formation of his Government, detailed also some of his new administrative measures. The office of Secretary at War was to be amalgamated with that of the Secretary of State in the person of Lord Panmure; a Bill was immediately to be introduced for the enlistment of older men on short service; the Admiralty was to establish a special Board to superintend the transport service; lastly, a sanitary commission was to be sent to the Crimea, and another, under Sir John M'Neil, to superintend the commissariat. I append Lord Palmerston's letter to Lord Raglan accompanying the Sanitary Commission:—

Downing Street: February 22, 1855.

This will be given to you by Dr. Sutherland, Chief of the Sanitary Commission, consisting of himself, Dr. Gavin, and Mr. Rawlinson, whom we have sent out to put the hospitals, the port, and the camp into a less unhealthy condition than has hitherto existed, and I request that you will give them every assistance and support in your power. They will, of course, be opposed and thwarted by the medical officers, by the men who have charge of the port arrangements, and by those who have the cleaning of the camp. Their mission will be ridiculed, and their recommendations and directions set aside, unless enforced by the peremptory exercise of your authority.

But that authority I must request you to exert in the most peremptory manner for the immediate and exact carrying into execution whatever changes of arrangement they may recommend; for these are matters on which depend the health and lives of many hundreds of men, I may indeed say of thousands. It is scarcely to be expected that officers, whether military or medical, whose time is wholly occupied by the pressing business of each day, should be able to give their attention or their time to the matters to which these commissioners have for many years devoted their action and their thoughts.

But the interposition of men skilled in this way is urgently required. The hospital at Scutari is become a hotbed of pestilence, and if no proper precautions are taken before the

sun's rays begin to be felt, your camp will become one vast seat of the most virulent plague. I hope this commission will arrive in time to prevent much evil, but I am very sure that not one hour should be lost after their arrival in carrying into effect the precautionary and remedial measures which they may recommend.

The patriotic impatience, however, of a certain section of ambitious politicians was so great that they could not wait. Before five days had elapsed Mr. Layard again drew attention to the state of the army, and, in a speech decidedly hostile to Lord Palmerston's Administration, recommended that, in imitation of the French revolutionary Convention, the House should send out some of its own members to sit in judgment on the guilty. In reply to this, Lord Palmerston, amid general laughter, suggested that it might be satisfactory to the House to take the honourable member at his word, and to add to the direction that he and his colleagues should proceed instantly to the Crimea, the further instruction that they should remain there during the rest of the session.

As to Mr. Roebuck's committee, Lord Palmerston still retained his objection to it, as not in accordance with the Constitution or efficient for its purpose. He told the House that, as an English king once rode up to an insurrection and offered to be its leader,¹ so the Government offered to the House of Commons to be its committee, and would do of itself all that it was possible to do. As, however, Mr. Roebuck still persisted, 'aiming,' as he said, to 'assist the noble Lord in infusing new vigour into the Constitution of the country,' Lord Palmerston yielded, giving as his reason for so doing that the country asked for an inquiry, and that, whatever inconvenience there might be in such a course, there would be greater inconvenience and danger if the government of the country were again to be in abeyance. This concession, however, produced another ministerial crisis, which was, however, of short dura-

¹ Richard II. in Wat Tyler's insurrection.

tion. Sir James Graham, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sidney Herbert retired because the renewed motion was not to be resisted; and Sir Charles Wood, Sir George Lewis, and Lord John Russell took the vacant places.

The death of the Emperor Nicholas and the active alliance of Sardinia with the Western Powers were both events which appeared likely to affect favourably for peace the negotiations which had now been renewed at Vienna. Lord John Russell, who went to the Conference as English representative, was instructed that the end to be held in view was the admission of Turkey into the great European family, and that there were certain points which must be insisted on as necessary fully to attain this object. They lay under four principal heads, namely, the Principalities, the free navigation of the Danube, Russian supremacy in the Black Sea, and the independence of the Porte. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord John Russell private instructions:—

Piccadilly: March 28, 1855.

I fear from all you have said to Clarendon, public and private, that there is no chance of the new Emperor of Russia agreeing to the only conditions which would afford us security for the future, and though some few people here would applaud us for making peace on almost any conditions, yet the bulk of the nation would soon see through the flimsy veil with which we should have endeavoured to disguise entire failure in attaining the objects for which we undertook the war, and we should receive the general condemnation which we should rightly deserve.

The Austrians, the Prussians, and the Russian agents of course trumpet forth the vast value of the concessions made by Russia by her acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiation; but the whole value and practical effect of those points must depend upon the manner in which they are worked out, and, according to the schemes of Gortschakoff and Prokesh, the vaunted concessions would be reduced to absolute nullity. The two important points of the four are the first and the third; the second lays down a principle not new, but always admitted even by Russia herself, though in practice she contrived to evade the carrying of it out. The fourth point Russia felt to be

only the relinquishment of a pretension which could not be enforced by arms when England and France resolved to back Turkey, and the admission involved in the Russian acceptance of this fourth point does not take from her one particle of her power of future aggression against Turkey, though it saves Turkey from a source of great internal weakness. But the pretension was one which Russia had yet to make good, and she could not make it good against Turkey supported by England and France.

The first point is very important, because the object the allies had in view to be attained by it is to emancipate the Principalities from foreign interference and to tie them more closely to the Sultan, while, at the same time, security should be given them for the maintenance of local self-government, and for those privileges of religion, internal administration, and commerce which are essential to their welfare and prosperity. For these purposes it is plain that their Constitution should be improved and liberalised, that their Prince should be appointed by the Sultan, with the only condition that he should be one of the Sultan's Christian subjects. That the Constitution, which ought to include a representative system, should be granted (*octroyé*) by the Sovereign, confirmed by him by the most solemn sanction, and communicated by him to the contracting Powers. Such an arrangement would seem to be a sufficient guarantee, considering that there has been no complaint by the two provinces that the Sultan has endeavoured to infringe on their privileges or to curtail their liberties. The only evil to be guarded against is the recurrence of that intermeddling in the internal affairs of the provinces by a foreign Power, and those military occupations of those two provinces by foreign troops, which have led to the conflicts between the Powers of Europe.

Now, the scheme of Gortschakoff and Prokesh, so far from attaining the objects we have in view, would have the effect of riveting the foreign shackles which Russia has sought to fasten on the Principalities, adding to their tightness and their weight, and fixing them down by the assistance and co-operation of Austria, with the formal sanction and approval of England and France.

The treacherous game of Austria and Russia is manifest and palpable. They propose to England and France the most objectionable arrangements on the first, second, and fourth points. They tell England and France, or, at least, Austria

suggests to England and France, that it would be necessary for those two Powers to agree to these objectionable conditions, in order to secure the co-operation of Austria on the third point, the most important to the Western Powers. And what would be the result? Why that which follows all such bargains with his sable majesty: we should have paid the price without obtaining the thing we wanted to buy. Austria evidently means to throw us over on the third point; and if that is to happen, the sooner we are undeceived as to her intentions the better.

Her substitutes for a narrow limitation of the Russian Black Sea fleet, are, as you say, futile. The opening of the Straits would be a standing danger to the Sultan, with no compensating advantage, but, on the contrary, with probable inconvenience to England and France. The maintenance by us and the French of permanent fleets in the Black Sea to counterbalance the fleet of Russia, is simply a *mauvaise plaisanterie*. The stipulation that Russia should not have a larger fleet than she now has, even assuming that the sunken ships are not to count, would still leave her with too powerful a naval force; and it must be remembered that it is easy to build steamers which, though unarmed at first, may easily be strengthened and turned into ships-of-war. The neutrality scheme of Drouyn might do, if confined to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff, but it would probably be as distasteful to Russia as our own proposals. The truth is we are in the middle of a battle, and our adversary seems determined to try the fate of arms, though it is clearly for his interest not to do so. Possibly this Czar might find more difficulty in yielding than his father might have done. However, I presume a few days will now give a turn to affairs. Drouyn comes here to-morrow on his way to Vienna, whither he is going to stiffen Bourqueney.

We are getting on very fairly in the House of Commons, and people there are behaving very well towards the Government.

I am taking charge of the current business of the Colonial Office, in order to know a little about it, and because I thought it began to press a little too much on George Grey's health. I did not, however, state that latter reason to him, but put it upon the first, my proposal to take charge.

Whilst there was a chance of peace issuing out of the doings at Vienna, Lord Palmerston was consider-

ing what were the reforms which would have to be demanded from the Sultan. Letters have been already quoted to show how constantly he urged upon the Turks that complete equality between Christian and Mahomedans was the only means whereby the Ottoman empire could be permanently strengthened; and in the following letter he summarises what he was prepared to press upon the Porte. He also advocated the establishment of primary schools in which Christian and Mussulman children should receive elementary instruction together:—

May 14, 1855.

My dear Clarendon,—What remains to be done for the *nonconformists* in Turkey would be, I apprehend, speaking generally:—

- a. Capacity for military service by voluntary enlistment and eligibility to rise to any rank in the army.
- b. Admission of non-Mussulman evidence in civil as well as criminal cases.
- c. Establishment of mixed courts of justice (with an equal number of Christian and Mussulman judges) for all cases in which Mahomedans and non-Mahomedans are parties.
- d. Appointment of a Christian officer as assessor to every governor of a province when that governor is a Mussulman; such assessor to be of suitable rank and to have full liberty to appeal to Constantinople against any act of the governor unjust, oppressive, or corrupt.
- e. Eligibility of Christians to all places in the administration, whether at Constantinople or in the provinces, and a practical application of this rule by the appointment of Christians at once to some places of trust, civil and military.
- f. The total abolition of the present system by which offices at Constantinople and in the provinces are bought and sold and given to unfit and unworthy men for money paid or promised. Such men become tyrants in their offices, either from incapacity or bad passions, or from a desire to repay themselves the money paid for their appointments.

There ought not only to be complete toleration of non-Mussulman religion, but all punishment on converts from Islam, whether natives or foreigners, ought to be abolished.

This would have been a very complete programme of civil and religious emancipation, could only the instruments have been found to carry it out thoroughly and honestly. But thorough and honest instruments can never be found under such a blighting and corrupt despotism as that of the Sultan of Turkey. The depths of criminal recklessness and indifference to which it habitually descends is illustrated by the following Memorandum of Lord Palmerston's, from which it appears that the very first loan the Turkish Government ever raised—a loan paid to them at the very height of war, and for the purposes of their struggle for national existence, was being deliberately squandered by their sovereign on favourites and on personal luxuries, while the fortress of Kars and its gallant defenders were being abandoned to their fate. We were pouring water into a cracked vase: no wonder that it was all uselessly spilt:—

Should we not be justified in saying to the Turkish Government that we will not advance any more of the loan which we have guaranteed until these extravagant prodigalities have been put an end to? We shall not be able to justify to Parliament our having incurred pecuniary responsibility to assist the Turkish Government in carrying on the war if it turns out that our guarantee has thus been made subservient to wasteful expenditure for personal and private purposes. The Turkish troops are in arrear of their pay. We are told that commissariat supplies are stopped for want of money. Kars and its brave army are lost because the Turkish Government has not supplied pay, provisions, and munitions of war to them; and at this crisis, when a proper sense of duty would have led the Sultan to stint himself, in order to find money for the defence of his throne and empire, he launches into extravagance in repairing and building palaces, and he nearly doubles the amount of money applied to his personal expenses and to the allowances to members of his family. This is scandalous.

P. 16-12-55.

The second Vienna Conference broke up without any result being arrived at, Russia declining to accede to the fixed limitations sought to be imposed on her naval

forces in the Black Sea. Lord Palmerston had some difficulty during these Conferences in keeping our ally staunch. Napoleon's bugbear was a German Confederacy against France, and this inclined him to back up the proposals of Austria, with a view to remaining on friendly terms with her, so as to secure her neutrality. The war also had never been so popular in France as it was in England, and the French appeared too ready to accept terms which the English Government thought insufficient. In the following letter the Emperor of the French is urged not to allow a subtle diplomacy to rob him of the fruits of victory. The English Ministry had just obtained a large majority in the House of Commons on Mr. Disraeli's resolution expressing 'dissatisfaction with the ambiguous language and uncertain conduct of Her Majesty's Government.'

Londres : Mai 28, 1855.

Sire,—Votre Majesté a daigné me permettre de vous exprimer ma pensée de temps en temps dans des occasions importantes. J'ose donc vous soumettre que la proposition que nous fait l'Autriche de prononcer dans la Conférence de Vienne le mot 'Limitation,' n'est qu'un piège qu'on nous tend.

Le Principe de Limitation n'a aucune valeur pour nous, tout dépend du Chiffre. La Russie pourrait bien accepter le principe sans que nous fussions pour cela plus près d'une paix sûre et honorable. Mais par une telle acceptation, la Russie nous entraînerait dans un dédale de négociations qui amolliraient les esprits en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, partout, et même en Crimée ; car ces négociations oisives et illusoires empêcheraient de conduire énergiquement la guerre, et ne nous aideraient pas à faire la paix. La position de la France et de l'Angleterre n'est-elle pas simple et claire ? Nous avons fait à la Russie des propositions qu'on ne peut critiquer qu'en les prononçant trop libérales envers notre ennemi ; ces propositions, la Russie les a rejetées avec fierté, on pourrait même le dire, avec insolence. Qu'avons-nous à faire donc, excepté de nous mettre à obtenir des succès par la guerre ; pourquoi nous humilier en faisant de nouvelles propositions à la Russie, et en quittant le terrain où nous nous étions placés ? Ce terrain n'est pas le principe de Limitation, mais une Limitation définie et suffisante à nos yeux pour parer aux dangers de l'avenir.

Je sens bien que nous n'avons pas le droit de soumettre à V. M. des considérations puisées dans notre situation intérieure, mais peut-être V. M. me permettra de remarquer que le Gouvernement anglais vient de remporter une grande victoire Parlementaire : nous avons eu à la Chambre des Communes, vendredi soir, une majorité de 100 voix, et contre quelle attaque ? Contre une accusation que nous nous occupions d'une négociation inutile et peu honorable, tandis que nous devons nous occuper uniquement de remporter des succès dans la guerre. La Chambre a compris, d'après les explications que nous lui avons données, que les négociations étaient suspendues 'sine die,' et que la guerre se poursuivait avec vigueur. Si après cela nous nous trouvions replongés dans le Labyrinthe de Vienne, seulement et uniquement pour faciliter à l'Autriche le moyen de faire une communication à Frankfort, j'en craindais les suites chez nous. On nous dit chaque semaine, 'il ne faut pas que l'Autriche nous échappe,' mais nous ne la tenons pas encore ; et jamais nous ne la tiendrons, tant que nous ne nous soyons montrés les plus forts.

Victorieux en Crimée nous commanderons l'amitié, peut-être même l'épée, de l'Autriche ; manquant de succès en Crimée nous n'aurons pas même sa plume. Voici le Poste important de Jenikalé qui est tombé entre nos mains, voilà Anapa qui va suivre la même destinée, en peu de semaines nous serons maîtres de Sevastopol et de la force flottante des Russes ; ne permettons donc pas à la Diplomatie de nous ravir les grands et importants avantages que nous sommes sur le point de recueillir.

Napoleon's Court and Ministers were much mixed up in speculations and affairs on the Bourse, and it was by the Bourse-mongers at Paris that the cry for peace at any price was stimulated. Count Persigny told Lord Palmerston that as often as the Emperor received the English answers differing from his pacific proposals, he always smiled and said, 'After all, the English are right.'

The last formal sitting of the Conference had been held on April 26. Lord John Russell, who had favoured the Austrian propositions of peace, returned to England to find the Cabinet indisposed to accept them, on the ground that they would legalize by treaty the state of things which had been declared to be a menace to

Turkey. His first impulse was to resign, therein following the example of Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister, who had also expressed his assent to Count Buol's proposals. Yielding, however, to the representations of his colleagues, he remained a member of the Government till July, when Sir E. Lytton, having given notice of a motion in the House of Commons directly aimed at him and his conduct at Vienna, he relieved the Government of the embarrassment natural to such an attack by retiring from the Administration. Not only all the supporters of the Government, but nearly all its members out of the Cabinet, had come to the opinion that this step was necessary.

During the whole of this session the Opposition and the Radicals poured an incessant fire on the Treasury Bench, discharging their artillery from very different quarters though concentrating it in the same direction. The Opposition wished the country to believe that the Government were careless of the honour and prestige of England, and were too ready to make peace at any price; while the Manchester school, on the other hand, taking Lord John Russell's attitude at Vienna as their text, enlarged on the folly and wickedness of the war. Lord Palmerston, although almost single-handed, met these attacks with success. He had the confidence of the country, who saw in his character that mixture of moderation and firmness which the circumstances required. He struck the keynote of the public tone when, in a debate on August 7, he referred to what had been alleged as to the assent of the Turkish ambassador to those proposals of the Vienna Conference which the English and French Cabinets had subsequently rejected, and asserted that the objects of the war were wider than could depend upon the decision of the Turkish Government. The protection of Turkey was a means to an end; behind the protection of Turkey was the greater question of repressing the grasping ambition of Russia, and preventing the extinction of political and commercial liberty. The Governments of France and

England had as great, or even greater, interest than Turkey in the conditions of the future peace of Europe.

Parliament was prorogued on August 14, the message from the Lords interrupting Lord Palmerston as he was speaking in acquiescence with Sir De Lacy Evans's exhortations for the vigorous prosecution of military measures.

The Prime Minister was indeed indefatigable in his attention to all the details of the campaign. The following letter, only one among many, illustrates the care and knowledge which he showed :—

Piccadilly: June 10, 1855.

My dear Panmure,—This is capital news from the Sea of Azoff, and the extensive destruction of magazines and supplies in the towns attached must greatly cripple the Russian army in the Crimea. I am very sorry, however, to see so sad an account of the health of the Sardinians, and I strongly recommend you to urge Raglan, by telegraph to-day, to move the Sardinian camp to some other and healthier situation.

Such prevalence of disease as the telegraphic message mentions *must* be the effect of some local cause; and I am as sure as if I was on the spot that these Sardinians are put down in some unhealthy place, from which they ought without the loss of a day to be removed. Our quartermaster-generals never bestow a thought about healthiness of situations, and, indeed, they are in general wholly ignorant of the sanitary principles upon which any given situation should be chosen or avoided; but if Raglan were to consult Dr. Sutherland on the subject, I am confident he would get a good opinion. At all events, these men ought to be removed from where they are without loss of a day; and no excuse of military arrangements ought to be accepted as a pretence for delay.

As the cholera seems to be increasing among the troops, I should advise you to send for the doctor I mentioned, and who would give you useful suggestions as to the treatment of the disease, and as to the best way of administering sulphuric acid, which seems now to be the most effectual remedy, and which, if taken in time, seldom fails in stopping the attack.

We are 40,000 men short of the number voted by Parliament, and we shall be without the shadow of an excuse if we do not resort to every possible means and every possible quarter

to complete our force to the number which Parliament has authorised. Let us get as many Germans and Swiss as we can ; let us get men from Halifax ; let us enlist Italians ; and let us forthwith increase our bounty at home without raising the standard. Do not let departmental, or official, or professional prejudices and habits stand in our way. We must override all such obstacles and difficulties. The only answer to give to objectors on such grounds is, the thing *must* be done ; we *must* have troops. War cannot be carried on without troops. We have asked Parliament for a certain amount of force, and have thereby pledged ourselves to the opinion that such a number is necessary ; and we shall disgrace ourselves if we do not make every effort to raise that amount. We are now getting on in the month of June, and no time is to be lost.

Do not forget to suggest to our commissariat people in the Black Sea that large supplies of oxen to be eaten, and of horses to be ridden or to draw, may be derived from the country on the eastern shore of the Sea of Azoff, from whence these animals might be brought down to the port of Taman, near the Straits of Kertch, and be from thence carried coastwise to Balaclava ; and it would be well also to point their attention to the projecting neck of land or island called Krassnoi, in the Bay of Perekop, which is said to abound in sheep and hay. It lies north-west of the coast of the Crimea.

The good results of the new energy infused into the military authorities were soon evident. In a speech at Melbourne during the autumn, Lord Palmerston was enabled to say that the hospitals in the Crimea were, at length, ‘in an admirable condition, and might, in fact, almost be regarded as models for the hospitals of London. The troops enjoyed every comfort compatible with a military campaign, and were in as good a condition as if they were on a peace establishment at home.’

Thus was England, as is her wont, profiting by bitter experience, gradually strengthening through the conflict itself, and slowly, but surely, outstripping her allies in the development of her latent resources.

Among the minor results of the evidence of her power and military resources was an offer made, about this time, of a Spanish contingent of ten to twenty

thousand men. It is not unreasonable to suppose that if they had been really wanted we should never have had the chance given to us of declining with thanks their proffered services.

Lord Palmerston now foresaw, with the daily decrease of the dangers which accompany war, the near approach of dangers from diplomacy. He writes to his brother:—

Piccadilly: August 25, 1855.

I am kept in town for the present, but hope to go down to Broadlands in the first week of September, subject to weekly attendances here in London on matters connected with the conduct of the war. Things in that matter are looking well. Our bombardment of Sweabourg and our successes in repulsing the Russians in the Crimea will, I hope, be followed by the capture of Sebastopol and the expulsion of the Russians from the Crimea. Our danger will then begin—a danger of peace, and not a danger of war. Austria will try to draw us again into negotiations for an insufficient peace, and we shall not yet have obtained those decisive successes which would entitle us to insist on such terms as will effectually curb the ambition of Russia for the future.

I must try to fight the battle of negotiation as well as the battle of war, and, fortunately, the spirit of the British nation will support us. I wish I could reckon with equal confidence on the steady determination of the French.

King Bomba's insult to England, through the British mission at Naples, must be properly atoned for. Clarendon being at Paris, nothing can be decided till he returns and the Cabinet can be assembled; but I have written to Clarendon to say that my opinion is that we ought to insist upon the immediate dismissal of Massa,¹ and upon a promise that he shall never again be employed in any public capacity. I would not make this demand till our reserve squadron—now in attendance on the Queen, but which will return with her on Tuesday, and which consists of three line-of-battle ships—shall have anchored in the Bay of Naples, opposite the King's palace, and shall have taken on board the mission and the consul, and then I would have a boat sent on shore with a demand that in two hours an answer should be sent by the King saying that Massa was dismissed, allowing half an hour for the letter to go, half an hour for the answer to come back, and a whole hour for writing the answer.

¹ Minister of Police at Naples.

If the time passed without a satisfactory reply, the place should share the fate of Sweabourg ; *e poi dopo*, if that should not be sufficient. However, we shall see what resolution may be come to when the Cabinet meets on the question.

The King of Naples had acted a very unfriendly part during our war with Russia. He had forbidden, within his territory, the sale of horses, mules, or other supplies to English agents. He gave way in this matter of the Minister of Police as soon as he heard of our success at Sebastopol, which happened very shortly afier the date of this letter.

CHAPTER XII.

RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS — PEACE SIGNED — DECLARATION OF PARIS—DISPUTES ABOUT EXECUTION OF TREATY—MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES—DEATH OF SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE—EGYPT—PERSIAN AFFAIRS.

IN September came the news of the fall of Sebastopol. Austria, who had never relaxed her efforts to bring about an accommodation, now renewed her endeavours, and found in France a much more pliable subject to deal with than England. The French Emperor was assailed on all sides by a 'feu d'enfer' of Russian and Austrian intrigue trying to shake his constancy and to drive him to some act of weakness. One such act that he meditated at this moment, and that it required all the weight of English persuasion to arrest, was the recall of a considerable number of his troops home from the Crimea.

The Austrian and French Cabinets, however, very much mistook the intention of this country if they imagined that we were going to surrender ourselves blindly into the hands of our allies without fully exercising our own rights and judgment. On November 21, Lord Palmerston thus writes to the Comte de Persigny, French ambassador in London:—

Piccadilly: 21 Novembre 1855.

Mon cher Comte,—D'après notre Constitution et notre Régime Parlementaire, le pouvoir exécutif ne doit jamais faire une démarche aussi importante que celle dont il s'agit, sans avoir des pièces officielles à produire au Parlement, afin d'être à même d'expliquer clairement ce qui a été proposé à l'Angleterre, par quels motifs la proposition a été appuyée, et quelles on été les raisons qui ont conseillé son adoption.

Mais, jusqu'à présent, nous n'avons rien de tout cela. Il y a eu à Vienne une négociation à laquelle nous n'avons pas pris part; on a signé, du moins paraphé, un protocole pour nous, mais sans nous; on nous communique confidentiellement ce protocole paraphé, à prendre ou à laisser, en nous disant qu'il faut ou le rejeter ou l'accepter immédiatement, bon ou mauvais, sans en discuter la rédaction et les détails.

Cette manière d'agir dans une affaire tellement grave ne nous convient pas. Nous souhaitons nous conformer aux désirs de l'Empereur, mais il faut que nous soyons en règle vis-à-vis de notre Parlement; et nous ne pouvons pas souscrire à une proposition de paix à être faite en notre nom, à la Russie, sans que nous soyons entièrement d'accord et sur la forme et sur la substance d'une telle proposition. Il est donc indispensable que nous ayons une proposition par écrit, dont nous puissions bien examiner la rédaction, avant de pouvoir donner à l'Autriche l'autorisation qu'elle nous demande, de parler à la Russie en notre nom.

Je dis parler en notre nom, parce que, malgré que l'Autriche doit s'approprier la démarche qu'elle voudrait faire à Pétersbourg, elle se propose de dire qu'elle sait d'avance que sa proposition serait adoptée par la France et l'Angleterre, si elle venait à être acceptée par la Russie.

La nation anglaise serait enchantée d'une bonne paix qui assurât les objets de la guerre; mais plutôt que d'être entraînée à signer une paix à des conditions insuffisantes, elle préférerait continuer la guerre sans d'autres alliés que la Turquie, et elle se sent tout-à-fait en état d'en soutenir le fardeau, et de se tirer ainsi d'affaire. Soumettez, je vous prie, ces observations à Walewsky.

These observations were not unnecessary, because Count Buol had already persuaded France to favour his proposal that the Black Sea arrangements should be contained in a separate treaty between Russia and Turkey. Four days after this letter, Count Persigny came to urge, at Downing Street, acquiescence in this arrangement, but he met with a distinct refusal.

'We ought to stand firm,' said Lord Palmerston, 'as to having all the stipulations about the Black Sea made parts of the Treaty between Russia and all the belligerents. I can fancy how I should be hooted in the House of Commons if I were to

get up and say that we had agreed to an imperfect and unsatisfactory arrangement about one of the most important parts of the whole matter, as a personal favour to Count Buol, or to save the *amour-propre* of Russia. I had better beforehand take the Chiltern Hundreds.’¹

Towards the end of the year, when winter had caused hostilities to cease, Count Buol put forward, in the name of Austria, four new points, which in substance were nearly the same as the four old points. The third, on which the former negotiations had broken off, proposed that no fleet and no naval station of any country should be permitted in the Black Sea. The Czar, on January 16, 1856, accepted these proposals as a basis for negotiating a treaty of peace; although, of course, there were other points, many and difficult, to be settled by subsequent negotiation. Sir Hamilton Seymour was now our ambassador at Vienna. He was one of the ablest members of our diplomacy, and Lord Palmerston felt that he could speak proudly to him in reply to Austrian pressure without leading him into imprudences.

94 Piccadilly : January 24, 1856.

My dear Seymour,—Buol’s statement to you the night before last was what in plain English we should call impertinent. We are happily not yet in such a condition that an Austrian minister should bid us sign a treaty without hesitation or conditions. The Cabinet of Vienna, forsooth, must insist upon our doing so! Why, really our friend Buol must have had his head turned by his success at St. Petersburg, and quite forgot whom he was addressing such language to. He should remember that he is a self-constituted mediator, but that nobody has made him umpire, arbiter, or dictator. He may depend upon it we shall do no such thing. We shall not sign without knowing what it is that we are signing. We shall not sign unless we are satisfied with that which we may be asked to put our names to. Pray tell him so, and say to him privately from me, with my best regards and compliments, that we feel very sincerely obliged to him for his friendly and firm conduct in these recent transactions, that we accepted, with the addition

¹ To Lord Clarendon, November 26, 1855.

of our own supplementary conditions, the arrangement which he proposed to us, because we felt that it contained all that, in the present state of things, we were entitled to exact from Russia, subject, of course, to any further demands which the fifth article provides for and authorises us to make.

But it is Russia rather than the allies who ought to feel grateful to him for his good offices in these matters, because we are confident that if the war goes on, the results of another campaign will enable us this time twelvemonth to obtain from Russia much better conditions than those which we are now willing to accept.

We know the exhaustion, the internal pressure, difficulties, and distress of Russia quite as well as Buol does ; but we know better than he does our own resources and strength. He may rest assured, however, that we have no wish to continue the war for the prospect of what we may accomplish another year, if we can now obtain peace upon the conditions which we deem absolutely necessary and essential ; but we are quite prepared to go on if such conditions cannot be obtained. The British nation is unanimous in this matter. I say unanimous, for I cannot reckon Cobden, Bright, and Co. for anything ; and even if the Government were not kept straight by a sense of our public duty, the strong feeling which prevails throughout the country would make it impossible for us to swerve. So pray let Count Buol keep his *threats* for elsewhere, and not send them over here.

On February 1 a protocol was signed at Vienna by the representatives of the five Powers, and the congress for the final settlement of the terms of peace was appointed to meet in Paris.

To this Congress Lord Clarendon went as British plenipotentiary, in concert with Lord Cowley. During its sittings Lord Palmerston was in constant correspondence with him, and entered, with indefatigable industry, into the smallest details. They had, however, a difficult task in the negotiations. The Russians, although beaten, were not inclined to yield one inch, save to absolute necessity, and the French were too eager for peace to be depended upon for much assistance. The Emperor himself was swayed by Count Walewski's many Russian affinities ; he was horrified

by the daily accounts of the privations endured by his army in the Crimea, and he was absorbed in a domestic event which had given him an heir, whom he was anxious to christen amid the rejoicings for peace. He was, therefore, only thinking of how to 'faire le généreux' towards the Czar, whom he would gladly have conciliated now that his position in Europe was secured. Amid all such secret motives and tortuous actions the British Government had to hold on its way, now and then yielding on minor matters, but adhering firmly to the principal conditions of peace. In this it succeeded; and on March 30 the Treaty of Paris was signed.

A few days later, the plenipotentiaries also subscribed a declaration about maritime war.

At the beginning of hostilities Great Britain had tacitly abandoned her ancient doctrines respecting neutrals, which she could only have attempted to enforce under pain of having all mankind against her. It was evident that they could never be revived, and that the concessions which she had once made to neutral rights could never be withdrawn. When, therefore, the President of the Congress, in the name of his Government, suggested to the English plenipotentiary that it would be a 'benevolent' act for the Congress to proclaim as permanent the principles upon which the war had been carried on, with the addition that privateering should be abolished,¹ Lord Clarendon

¹ *Original Draft of Resolution handed to Lord Clarendon.*—'Le congrès de Westphalie a consacré la liberté des cultes, le congrès de Vienne l'abolition de la traite des noirs et la liberté de la navigation des fleuves; il appartiendrait au congrès de Paris de consacrer l'abolition de la course et la franchise du commerce des neutres, conformément aux principes appliqués dans la guerre actuelle.'

* Ces principes sont d'après les déclarations émanées de la France et de l'Angleterre au début de la guerre :

* Que le pavillon neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, excepté la contrebande de guerre.

* Que la marchandise neutre, excepté la contrebande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavillon ennemi.

* Et que les blocus doivent être effectifs, c'est-à-dire maintenus par une force navale suffisante.'

The Americans had previously, by a circular, asked the assent of the

referred the matter home, and, with the approval of the Queen and of the entire Cabinet, conveyed the assent of the British plenipotentiaries to the proposal, pointing out at the same time, as a necessary proviso, 'that the declaration should not be binding except between those Powers who have acceded or shall accede to it.' This clause was added, and certain other modifications made in the declaration before it was finally settled. Its policy is not a matter for discussion here; but the fact of its having been deliberately adopted by the English Cabinet, for what they considered good and sufficient reasons, is the point which it is desirable to record, as many absurd tales have been from time to time current about it: as though the English plenipotentiary had agreed to it without any authority from home or consultation with the rest of the Ministry.

On May 5, an animated and prolonged debate took place in the House of Commons on the treaty of peace. Lord Palmerston spoke on the second night of the discussion from twelve o'clock till half-past two, and exhaustively defended the acts of the Government. The following day he moved a vote of thanks to the navy and army.

Thus ended the Crimean war—a war which, however some men may look back to it with regret, on account of the incapacity since shown by the Turks for profiting by the breathing-time afforded to them, was certainly just, and possibly necessary. It cost England some 25,000 men, and fifty millions in money, but Russian overbearance and greed of dominion received a wholesome, if only temporary, check, and, had the war continued a little longer, would have been still more severely punished. The plans proposed to the Allies for the ensuing campaign embraced operations in Circassia

maritime Powers to the doctrine of 'free ships, free goods.' Most of the Powers consulted England as to the answer they should give, and, in accordance with our views, answered that they should not agree unless the United States at the same time gave up the system of privateers. This they declined to do; but by the Declaration of Paris they are left to stand alone in their anachronism.

and Finland; the English to have chief command in the South, and the French in the North. The Shah of Persia had promised certain facilities on the Caspian in view of a campaign in Georgia, and a Treaty with Sweden had already been signed the previous December. It is not impossible that the result might have been the restoration of Finland to Sweden, of her lost provinces to Persia, and the independence of Circassia.

Only twenty years, however, elapsed before Russia and Turkey again found themselves in hand-to-hand conflict; but this time they fought alone. Neither France nor England intervened, and the Turk had to maintain the struggle without allies. There were plenty of reasons, both foreign and domestic, why Frenchmen in 1877 should be unwilling to fight anew for a cause about which even in 1854 they were, as a nation, wholly indifferent. But, at first sight, it appeared to many that Englishmen were, to say the least, inconsistent when they successfully protested against being a second time led to war with Russia in behalf of Turkey. This was a very superficial view of the case, as the circumstances of the two periods were wholly different. In 1877 the Russian Czar came forward to free a nationality. This, at any rate, was the ostensible object as well as the inevitable result of his acts, whatever secret aims and unavowed motives may have also been at work. At the time of the Crimean war not only was there no such justificatory pretext put forward, but had there been it would have found no echo in England, because the Bulgarian people were not deemed to be in a condition to profit by any such demands made in their behalf. But during the years which elapsed between the Congress of Paris and the Conference at Constantinople education, wealth, and general civilization had, by various agencies, so spread among the Slavs of Turkey, that Lord Palmerston's dictum, as to there being among them no elements capable of self-government, was rapidly becoming an anachronism. He himself, had he been alive, would

have been the first to recognize this; nor, if we may judge by his conduct at the time of the establishment of the Greek Kingdom, would he have been among the most laggard in action to endow them with whatever measure of freedom they were capable of receiving. Again, the antecedents of Czar Nicholas and of his son were entirely different—in other words, the Russia of 1854 presented to the world a totally different aspect from the Russia of 1877. The Emperor Nicholas in his haughty arrogance and imperious conduct was but the representative and embodiment of what had been the aggressive policy of his empire for many years. The duel between him and Lord Palmerston, as the official representative of British honour and interests, only culminated in the Crimean war. During earlier years it had been fiercely maintained, while almost dramatic in its personal incidents. Persia, India, Poland, Hungary and the outlying parts of Turkey had in turn been the ground of contest. That a check to the continual encroachments of Russia was required had become a cardinal point in the creed of almost every European statesman. The Emperor Alexander, on the contrary, was not only credited with a distaste for war, and with a conciliatory disposition, but also had never shown himself a disturber of the peace. His noblest triumph—namely, the emancipation of the serfs—had been at home. When at last he did proceed to carry his arms abroad he had patiently waited till the unanimous voice of Europe at the Constantinople Conference pronounced that, in the actual controversy, he was right and his adversary wrong. Lastly, the Government of the Turk stood before the eyes of the English people in a very different light from that with which hope had surrounded it in 1854. That Lord Palmerston and most of the statesmen of that period believed in the probable reform and regeneration of Ottoman rule, is not only an undoubted truth, but the only justification of the policy which they so long and so earnestly maintained. But when Lord Russell, in 1860, in a let-

ter to Lord Palmerston, stated his fears that ‘nothing, but honesty and energy in a degree that are not to be found at Constantinople can restore the Turkish Empire,’ he was only giving expression to convictions which were beginning to dawn everywhere. It came to pass, therefore, that when, after twenty years of profound peace, and the command during that time of immense sums of money which the capitalists of Europe had poured into the lap of Turkey, her Government proved worse and her corruption greater than before the English people thought her case hopeless, and wisely preferred to let her get through her troubles with Russia unassisted and alone.

But to return to 1856. Difficulties shortly arose respecting the execution of some of the articles of the treaty of peace. A Turkish officer had been sent to take possession of Serpent’s Island, at the mouth of the Danube, and the Turkish flag was hoisted. Soon afterwards a party of seven Russian marines, with a lieutenant, landed and occupied the island. The Russian Government declined to remove them, on the ground that the question of its occupation was to be settled by a Conference at Paris. The English admiral then stationed a vessel off the island, with orders to prevent, by force if necessary, all attempts to increase the Russian force on the island. So matters remained till the end of the year.

Another point in dispute was as to the identification of a place marked Bolgrad on the map. The treaty said that the new frontier was to run ‘south of Bolgrad.’ When the commissioners met to mark it out, they discovered that the real Bolgrad was much more to the south than the Bolgrad of the Conference maps. They were unable, therefore, to agree, and the matter, together with the question of Serpent’s Island, was referred to a new Conference.

Lord Palmerston, in the following memorandum, recounts his first interview with the new Russian ambassador in London, and records what he said to him about these two disputed points:—

Piccadilly, August 12, 1856.

Count Chreptovitch came to me this morning at half-past eleven by appointment. He began by civil expressions of pleasure at renewal of old acquaintance, to which I replied in similar terms. After some preliminary talk of this kind, I said I was sorry that, at our first interview on the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two Governments, I should have to enter upon a string of grievances. 'Well,' said he, 'let us hear them : what are they ?' I said I was sorry to have to say that, ever since the conclusion of the treaty of peace, the Russian Government has been acting in a manner inconsistent with its engagements, and has in some instances broken them, in others tried to evade them. That the treaty distinctly says that the fortress and district of Kars are to be restored to Turkey ; in violation of which engagement the fortress had been demolished, and the Russian occupying force increased. The treaty says that a portion of Bessarabia is to be restored to Turkey, and from the ratification of the treaty that territory belonged of right to Turkey ; but in disregard of this, the Russians have destroyed the fortifications of Ismail and Reni. Here Count Chreptovitch interrupted me with much impatience. He said these things were done, whether right or wrong, and there was no use in going back to past events, and that we must look only to the future. I said I entirely differed from him ; I thought there was great use in going back to past events, and that they had, as I would presently explain, a great bearing on the future. That I must be allowed to tell him fully and plainly all I think on these matters ; that it was for the purpose of doing so that I had asked him to call upon me ; and that if he did not choose to listen to me, he had better go back to Petersburg. I then resumed. I said that these acts were not only at variance with the treaty, but quite unworthy of a great Power like Russia. If Russia had been able at the Congress of Paris to obtain stipulations that there should be no defensive works at Kars, and no fortifications at Ismail and Reni, and that both those frontiers should be left open to the future attacks of Russia—meditated attacks, her conduct would lead us to think, though I did not ask him to admit that—if such stipulations could have been obtained, I could have understood the value which Russia would have attached to them, and they would have been worth a struggle in the negotiation ; but as no such stipulations were made, the only effect of demolishing Kars and Ismail and Reni would be to put

the Turks to some expense and trouble in reconstructing these works, and the probable result would be that they would be rebuilt upon a better plan. This, therefore, was an ebullition of ill-humour and revenge that might be called childish. I said, however, that we were glad to find that one part of this grievance is about to cease, and that Kars and its district is to be immediately evacuated by the Russians. The next point I had to complain of was the attempt to take possession of Serpent's Island. When the east and west boundary between Russia and Turkey in Europe ran south of this island, the island naturally belonged to Russia; but now that the east and west boundary line will run a good way to the north of that island, the island must naturally belong to Turkey. I said that the island has no intrinsic value as territory; that its only value is that it is, by means of its lighthouse, a guiding point to ships making the mouths of the Danube, and on that account it must belong to the Powers to which the mouths of the Danube belong. Count Chreptovitch said that the island is also important for ships going to Odessa, because when they happen, as is frequently the case, to be blown to the southward and out of their course by adverse winds, the light on this island tells them where they are. I said that the light kept for the Danube would do equally well for Odessa; and that, being on this point, I would observe, in passing, that we have been informed that the Russian detachment which landed to take possession of the island, finding a superior force of Turks there, endeavoured to induce the Turks to violate their duty, and either to go away and give up the island to the Russians, or to desert over to the Russian service. Count Chreptovitch seemed to admit the force of the reasoning that the change of the boundary line in those quarters must throw this island into the Turkish limits.

I then went on to Bessarabia. I said that the Emperor of Russia had formally accepted the Vienna proposal, which drew the new boundary between Russia and Moldavia by a line starting from a point north of the Pruth, and going southward along a chain of hills to Lake Salyick; that at Paris, out of pure deference to the wishes of the Emperor of Russia, and from a desire to insist on nothing that had not a real political value, the allies had agreed to a great modification of this line in favour of Russia; that the new line was, however, very plainly and clearly described by the treaty; that it is to start from a point on the sea-coast beyond Lake Bournasola, to run up to the Ackerman Road, and to follow along that road to the

River Yalpouk, leaving the town of Bolgrad to the north of the boundary; that at the Congress a map had been produced, on which a town had been pointed out bearing the name of Tabor, or of Bolgrad, and which was designated as the town to the south of which the boundary line is to run, and between that town and Lake Yalpouk there is space enough for the line to be drawn. But, I said, when the commissioners came to the ground, the Russians started a new Bolgrad on the allies; and this new Bolgrad is much to the south of the Bolgrad of the Conference, and so close to Lake Yalpouk that there is no space for a boundary line between the town and the lake. I said this was an unworthy deception which cannot be acquiesced in, and that the old Bolgrad, which was the town meant by the Congress, must be the Bolgrad to the south of which the boundary is to run. Count Chreptovitch said that in fact the new Bolgrad is the real town, the old Bolgrad being only a ruined and deserted village; but nevertheless he admitted that the old Bolgrad, and not the new one, must be deemed the Bolgrad of the treaty.

I said that we had to complain of another proceeding of the Russian commissioners. That the commission had agreed to make a general survey of the whole line in the first instance, and then go over it regularly, putting up landmarks as they went. That upon a great part of the line all are agreed; and our commissioners proposed that upon those parts the landmarks should be fixed, leaving the other parts, as to which differences had arisen, to be landmarked afterwards, when the disputed points should have been settled. That to this the Russians have objected, and want to delay the whole till the whole is agreed upon. I said that in this way the season for operations will be lost; winter will come on before the boundary is laid down; and what will be the consequence? The Russians will not go out of the district to be ceded, because the boundary line is not settled and drawn; the Austrians will not go out of the Principalities because the Russians are not out of ceded Bessarabia; and our fleet may probably not leave the Black Sea because the treaty is not executed. All this state of things will be contrary to the treaty; but the fault will be with Russia, and with her also the responsibility; and this we shall have to say when Parliament meets. Count Chreptovitch said that these delays were the fault of subordinate agents, and not of the Russian Government, who are anxious for a final settlement. I said that might be; but we cannot give orders to

these subordinate Russian agents, and the Russian Government can; and as that Government is despotic, it can make its orders to be obeyed, and we must therefore hold the Government answerable for the conduct of its agents. However, the Count assured me, in the most positive terms, that these matters shall be speedily and satisfactorily settled. I said I hoped they would, and that thus all difficulties would be got over. That the information that Kars is immediately to be restored to the Turks, had relieved us from an embarrassment we had felt as to whether Lord Granville should be allowed to go on to Moscow; and if those other points were well settled, we should resume with Russia our former habits of cordial friendship. That we are plain and simple people, and look to things and not to words; and that the sort of small attentions and flattery which we understand they are lavishing on the French—though with what success may be doubted—would be altogether thrown away upon us. That Prince Gortschakoff seems to have expressed to Lord Granville some surprise that England should have taken singly, in the Black Sea, a step with reference to a treaty to which England is only one of several contracting parties; but that Prince Gortschakoff must not be surprised if we continue to act in the same manner, whenever any occasion for doing so should arise, inasmuch as we consider that we have a right to do so, and we know that we have the power to do so.

I said that Baron Brunnow had often said to me that England and Russia hold to different principles of government. Russia is for despotic power; England for constitutions; but nevertheless the two countries have great interests in common, upon which abstract and theoretical differences of opinion have no direct bearing; and that, as long as Russia and England do not come into collision about the affairs of Turkey or the affairs of Persia, there is no reason why they should not act in concert on many important matters. I said I hoped that Russia would stick to her engagements about Turkey, and then there could be no differences on that subject. That as to Persia, Russia had, during the war, done in Persia what she had done in America, and what she had a perfect right to do, that is to say, create for England as much embarrassment and hostility as she could. That her instruments, however, had become, or will become, her victims. That Russia had lost for President Pierce all chance of re-election by the course she urged him to take towards England; and that as to Persia,

though we have hitherto shown great forbearance, the time is fast approaching when the Persian Government will see cause to repent its conduct towards us, unless in the interval that conduct shall be entirely changed, and fully atoned for. I observed that Count Chreptovitch did not very much deny what I said as to the action of Russia in America and in Persia. I said—and he with great warmth of manner joined in the wish—that our sincere desire is to forget the recent past, and to remember only our former good relations. I said that, with regard to himself personally, it is unfortunate that so long a delay has taken place between his nomination and his arrival, because it cannot be considered otherwise than as a mark of want of respect to the Queen—not perhaps on his part, but on the part of his Government. That in general, when a foreign Minister arrives while the Queen is at Osborne, such Minister is taken down by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to have as early as possible his audience of Her Majesty at Osborne; but that in his case this practice will not be observed; and that, as he has shown so little *empressement* to pay his respects to the Queen, Her Majesty cannot be advised to show any *empressement* to receive him; and that he cannot have his audience till the Queen shall return to London.

We parted with much mutual cordiality, and tender inquiries about mutual friends, English and Russian.

France did not show herself so ready to support England at the council table as she had proved herself in the field. Lord Palmerston spoke frankly to the French ambassador. He pointed out that owing to French assistance at the Congress, Russia had obtained many concessions to which she was not entitled: that, all the same, a Treaty had been concluded which was sufficient, if loyally carried out; but that, on the contrary, it was being evaded, and that the Russians pretended that they were secretly backed by France. He said that, as to these two points of Bolgrad and the Isle of Serpents, it was absolutely impossible for England to admit the pretensions of Russia. That England had resigned herself to accept somewhat unsatisfactory conditions of peace, sooner than be the cause of a continuance of the curse of war, but that she was quite resolved

to insist on the full and entire execution of those conditions, and that the only result of any failure of French co-operation would be a weakening of the honourable and advantageous alliance between France and England.

Count Walewski's answer was of a nature to draw from Lord Palmerston a very decided hint that England would take her own line, whether France went back or forward, and his firmness eventually carried the day.

During the session a resolution was introduced in the House of Commons alleging that 'the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in the differences with the United States on the question of enlistment has not entitled them to the approbation of the House.' We had been charged with violating the neutrality of the United States, by enlisting recruits for the British service. No doubt the laws of the States had in some respects been infringed, but not intentionally, nor by any authorised English official.¹ However, Mr. Cramp-ton, our minister at Washington, received his passports from the President and left the country. Our Government did not retaliate for this act of diplomatic censure, but continued to receive Mr. Dallas in London. Both their original offence and their subsequent apologetic conduct formed the grounds of Parliamentary attack on the Government. Lord Palmerston, when the resolution was discussed, successfully pointed out the inconsistencies of its supporters. While with one accord they joined in aspirations for peace and goodwill between the two countries, they were doing all they could to create illwill.

These gentlemen, so anxious for peace, tell you that England has been insulted, treated with contempt, contumely, and indignity. What is the effect likely to be produced? Why, to excite a spirit of resentment towards our neighbours and kin-

¹ During the Crimean war we sent a remonstrance to Holland on her violation of neutrality in supplying arms to Russia, and then discovered that our own Ordnance Department had been ordering from the Dutch large quantities of gunpowder.

dred in the United States. Others, again, tell the Americans that their Government has been deluded, and persuaded to accept an apology they ought not to have accepted, and that their laws have been intentionally violated by a foreign Government. Is that the way to create good feeling? Is that the way to persuade the American people to cultivate the most friendly relations with England?

Thus he met his critics.

Towards the end of the year Lord Palmerston visited Manchester and Liverpool, and received, amid much enthusiasm, addresses from the corporations and other public bodies.

Any record of his life would be incomplete that did not notice the death of his only brother, Sir William Temple, which occurred in London, in August of this year. Although Lord Palmerston was the older by not more than two years, he always treated his younger brother with the affectionate care which might rather be expected from a father. Many of the most interesting of his letters are those to his brother, who, being in the diplomatic service, lived much abroad, and whom Lord Palmerston therefore endeavoured, in spite of all his work, to keep informed as to what was going on at home. A strong affection subsisted between them, although their temperaments were very different; and during William Temple's last illness in London, Lord Palmerston passed a considerable time with him every day.

The future of Egypt must, for a long time to come, have a special interest for Englishmen. The following letter to Lord Clarendon sufficiently explains itself, and is interesting as showing the head of the British Cabinet declining proposals coming from an unexpected quarter, which were to lead to the possession of Egypt by England. Lord Palmerston's opinions on this matter were frequently repeated. He saw the paramount importance of its being kept open for transit, but never encouraged any idea of annexation. On one occasion, to Lord Cowley, he used a homely but apt illustration: 'We do

not want Egypt,' he said, 'or wish it for ourselves any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England and a residence in the south, would have wished to possess the inns on the north road. All he could want would have been that the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton chops and post-horses.'¹

Piccadilly: March 1, 1857.

My dear Clarendon,—As to the Emperor's schemes about Africa, the sooner Cowley sends in his grounds of objection the better. It is very possible that many parts of the world would be better governed by France, England, and Sardinia than they are now; and we need not go beyond Italy, Sicily, and Spain for examples. But the alliance of England and France has derived its strength not merely from the military and naval power of the two states, but from the force of the moral principle upon which that union has been founded. Our union has for its foundation resistance to unjust aggression, the defence of the weak against the strong, and the maintenance of the existing balance of power. How, then, could we combine to become unprovoked aggressors, to imitate, in Africa, the partition of Poland by the conquest of Morocco for France, of Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of Egypt for England? and, more especially, how could England and France, who have guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire, turn round and wrest Egypt from the Sultan? A coalition for such a purpose would revolt the moral feelings of mankind, and would certainly be fatal to any English Government that was a party to it. Then, as to the balance of power to be maintained by giving us Egypt. In the first place, we don't want to have Egypt. What we wish about Egypt is that it should continue attached to the Turkish empire, which is a security against its belonging to any European Power. We want to trade with Egypt, and to travel through Egypt, but we do not want the burthen of governing Egypt, and its possession would not, as a political, military, and naval question, be considered, in this country, as a set-off against the possession of Morocco by France. Let us try to improve all these countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let us all abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call upon us the condemnation of all the other civilised nations.

¹ To Lord Cowley, November 25, 1859.

This conquest of Morocco was the secret aim of Louis Philippe, and is one of the plans deposited for use, as occasion may offer, in the archives of the French Government.

In August the Emperor of the French, with the Empress, paid a visit to the Queen at Osborne. The great question to be discussed was that of the Danubian Principalities. Russia, France, and Sardinia were in favour of the union of Roumania with Moldavia; Prussia was neutral; England, Austria, and Turkey were opposed to it. By the Treaty of Paris their future constitution had been left to be settled by the Treaty Powers after a Divan had been convoked in each of the two provinces to ascertain the wishes of the people themselves. There was little doubt as to what they were, but the elections in Moldavia resulted in the return of members unfavourable to the union. The Porte being accused of having obtained this result by unfair means, a demand was made for the annulling of the elections under a threat of the withdrawal of the French and Russian ambassadors from Constantinople. This meant war and general confusion. Lord Palmerston's attendance was requested at Osborne in order to confer about these matters, and a memorandum of the arrangement agreed upon was drawn up by him. It was in effect that the Moldavian elections should be annulled; while the two Governments were to combine to secure the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Provinces. The end of it all, however, was, as we know, their union under one ruler, thereby affording another illustration of the futility of attempting in these days to sever by artificial means countries which affinity, fellow-feeling, and geography combine to join. England gave herself on this occasion much trouble and incurred some risk, with the sole result of alienating from herself the sympathies of the populations whose fate was involved. France had taken an opposite line, though, no doubt, from other motives than pure affection for the Roumanians and Moldavians.

Lord Palmerston's character must have been quite a puzzle to the French Emperor, who found that he could neither intimidate nor cajole him, nor yet shake him off. No wonder that he sometimes showed a little temper.

'I am rather surprised,' says Lord Palmerston,¹ 'that the Emperor should have spoken with so much bitterness about me, for nothing could be more personally friendly than his manner at Osborne. But the fact, no doubt, is that he is much annoyed at finding that we did not give in to his notions about driving the Mahomedans away from the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and about giving an extension to French occupation in Africa. The fact is that, in our alliance with France, we are riding a runaway horse, and must always be on our guard; but a runaway horse is best kept in by a light hand and an easy snaffle. It is fortunate for us that we are thus mounted, instead of being on foot, to be kicked at by this same steed; and as our ally finds the alliance useful to himself, it will probably go on for a good time to come. The danger is, and always has been, that France and Russia should unite to carry into effect some great scheme of mutual ambition. England and Germany would then have to stand out against them; and Germany is too much broken up and disjointed to be an efficient ally.

We had this year a little war with Persia, owing to her occupation of Herat, contrary to the solemn engagements made with England in 1853. Although the dispute did not attract much public attention, Lord Palmerston was fully alive to the importance of the issues involved. He foresaw that Khiva and Bokhara would shortly be occupied by Russia, and that Cabul and Candahar might, before very long, be deemed the advanced outposts of British India. Whether it would be better that Herat should remain a weak, independent Government, or that it should be in the hands of a ruler able to defend it, like the ruler of Cabul, and who, by geographical position, must attach himself to an English alliance, might be a moot point; but at any rate it was clear that it must not be allowed to fall to Persia. About the general question he says to Lord Clarendon:—

¹ To Lord Clarendon, September 29, 1857.

February 17, 1857.

It is quite true, as you say, that people in general are disposed to think lightly of our Persian war; that is to say, not enough to see the importance of the question at issue. Ellenborough is right: we are beginning to repel the first opening of trenches against India by Russia; ¹ and whatever difficulties Ferokh ² may make about Afghanistan, we may be sure that Russia is his prompter and secret backer. But that makes it the more essential that we should carry our point on that subject. What, however, are our important points? The renunciation by Persia of all claim over Herat and of all future design or attempt to invade Herat. This is a *sine qua non*, and, of course, includes an acknowledgment of the independence of Herat, and includes it so completely that a distinct acknowledgment of that independence seems hardly necessary. Any engagement on our part towards Persia about our own relations with Afghanistan should be peremptorily refused.

As to our mediation, as there is in most men's minds a confusion of ideas between mediation and arbitration, we might, if driven to it, substitute for mediation, a condition that if any difference should arise between Persia and any of the Affghan states, including Herat, Persia would, in the first place, ask our good offices to arrange the matter in dispute; and we might promise to use our good offices to obtain a settlement just and honourable to both parties.

The treaty of peace between the Queen of England and 'His Majesty whose standard is the sun' was signed at Paris on March 4. Persia renounced all claim or dominion over Herat and Affghanistan, and engaged (in such terms as were suggested in the above letter) to refer any future differences she might have with the Affghan states to the friendly offices of the British Government.

The opportunity of this war was also taken to obtain the abolition of slave trade in the Persian Gulf—an act consistent with the many former efforts of Lord Palmerston to put an end to traffic in human beings.

¹ Lord Ellenborough had just made a speech in the House of Lords in this sense.

² Ferokh Khan, ambassador from Persia.

I append a letter which, on the conclusion of peace, he wrote to the Sadr Azim¹ in reply to a flowery communication from that minister. It is a specimen both of the skill with which he could read as well as write between the lines and of candid irony in expressing his sentiments. Behind the diplomatic effusion of the Persian minister he discerned the true character and motives of his correspondent, who had secretly been a bitter enemy of England. His courteous reply conveys very clearly that he knew it all, but that the 'least said, soonest mended; only don't let it occur again':—

London : September 8, 1857.

Excellency,—I have received with much pleasure the letter dated June 5 last, which you were so good as to address to me; and I have been much gratified by the friendly sentiments which it contains. I rejoice, as your Excellency does, at the treaty of peace, which has happily put an end to the war between England and Persia; and I hope that the peace which has thus been established may long continue for the mutual advantage of both countries. I can truly assure your Excellency that it is the wish of the English Government and of the English nation that Persia should be a happy, a prosperous, a strong, and an independent state, and that the most perfect friendship and the fullest confidence should prevail between the Governments of England and of Persia.

I am rejoiced to find, from your Excellency's letter, that it is your desire and intention to cultivate in future the friendship of England. But I should not be deserving of your good opinion if I were to disguise from you the truth of my thoughts, and there are parts of your Excellency's letter which compel me to speak frankly in reply.

Your Excellency says that, until now, out of various considerations, you have looked upon yourself as alone and without assistance in your endeavours to preserve the friendship of the two Governments from injury. And you further say that you request me, and you entertain the firm hope that I shall henceforward give my full attention to the observance of the rules of friendship and unity between the two Governments.

Now upon this I feel myself obliged to say that the war which took place between our two countries was not owing to

¹ The 'Prime Minister' of Persia.

any neglect on the part of the English Government of the rules of friendship and equity, but was occasioned solely and entirely by your Excellency's own unfriendly conduct, and by the violent hostility which your Excellency displayed towards England, both in word and deed; and, therefore, so far from your Excellency having been alone in endeavours to preserve friendship between the two Governments, your Excellency was the main and principal cause of the cessation of that friendship.

I have no doubt that your Excellency, in seeking a quarrel with England, believed that you were promoting the interests of Persia, and I am bound to suppose that your Excellency considered yourself as performing on that occasion the part of a true patriot; and this belief on my part strengthens my confidence in the future maintenance of friendship between the two Governments and countries, because the events of the war, and the decisive victories obtained by the British troops over superior numbers of Persian troops, must have shown and have proved to the sagacious mind and powerful understanding of your Excellency that the true interests of Persia are best promoted by peace and friendship with England, and that the sure results to Persia of war with England must be defeat and disaster. With this conviction strongly impressed upon your mind, your Excellency will, I am sure, like a good patriot, clearly see in what direction the welfare of your country lies, and you will direct your policy as minister of your Sovereign so as to secure that welfare. Therefore it is that, knowing the high statesmanlike qualities which so eminently distinguish your Excellency, I feel satisfied that the alliance between our two countries will rest henceforward upon the basis of national interest, which is a firmer foundation than the sentiments of individual ministers, however friendly and sincere those sentiments may be. With every wish for the health and happiness of your Excellency, and with a fervent hope that the reign of your illustrious master and Sovereign the Shah of Persia may be long and prosperous,

I have the honour to remain,
Your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful Servant,

PALMERSTON.

His Excellency The SADR AZIM, &c.

CHAPTER XIII.

QUARREL WITH CHINA—RESOLUTION CARRIED BY MR. COBDEN
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT—DISSOLUTION INDIAN MUTINY—
GOVERNMENT INDIA BILL—DEFEAT ON CONSPIRACY BILL—
RESIGNATION.

‘HER MAJESTY commands us to inform you that acts of violence, insults to the British flag, and infraction of treaty rights committed by the local Chinese authorities at Canton, and a pertinacious refusal of redress, have rendered it necessary for Her Majesty’s officers in China to have recourse to measures of force to obtain satisfaction.’ So ran the Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament in February 1857.

This was the affair of the lorcha ‘Arrow,’ destined to attain some celebrity. It happened thus. Under treaties with China, British vessels were to be subject to consular jurisdiction only. The ‘Arrow,’ having a British register, was boarded by Chinese from a war junk and the crew carried off, on a charge of piracy. Sir John Bowring, Governor of Hong-Kong, demanded satisfaction from the Chinese Commissioner, Yeh, and, failing to obtain it, proceeded to use force with the fleet under Admiral Sir Michael Seymour. He also added to his former demands one for the admission of foreigners to the port and city of Canton under treaty engagements which had never been carried out. Yeh retaliated by proclamations offering rewards for the heads of the barbarians.

Such was the position of affairs when Mr. Cobden brought forward in the House of Commons a resolution to the effect that ‘the papers laid on the table failed to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measures

resorted to.' In the House of Lords a similar motion, brought forward by Lord Derby, had been rejected by a majority of thirty-six. The discussion in the Commons lasted four nights, and was marked by great ability. Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, Lord John Russell, Mr. Disraeli, and Mr. Roebuck all joined Mr. Cobden in his attack upon the Government. As the debate proceeded it became evident that the fate of the Government was involved. Meetings were held, on the one hand by the Opposition, and on the other by the friends of the Government, at which resolutions to put forward all their respective strength were adopted. The ministerial phalanx had been lately weakened, many Liberals having grown apathetic, owing to the coldness shown towards the cause of Reform. The issue was up to the last doubtful. Lord Palmerston spoke vigorously, and concluded with some pointed strictures upon the combination of parties confederated against him, warning the House that it had in its keeping not only the interests and lives of many of their fellow-countrymen, but also the honour and reputation of the country. The resolution was, however, carried against the Government by a majority of sixteen.

'Let the noble Lord,' Mr. Disraeli had said in his speech, 'who complained that he was the victim of a conspiracy, not only complain to the country, but let him appeal to it.' Perhaps he little thought that he would be taken at his word. Anyhow, the next day but one, Lord Palmerston announced to the house that, as soon as the necessary business could be completed, Parliament would be dissolved. He was at once asked whether meanwhile the war, which had been condemned, was to be carried on, and whether the Governor, who had been censured, was to be retained. But Lord Palmerston was not a man to be awed by logic into conclusions inconsistent with that policy which he was about to ask the nation to ratify. His answer to these challenges was that the policy of the Government, so long as it continued a Government

would remain what it had been. That policy was 'to maintain the rights and defend the lives and properties of British subjects; to improve our relations with China; and in the selection and arrangement of the means for the accomplishment of those objects to perform the duty which they owed to the country.'

There never, perhaps, was a general election which turned more completely than this one of 1857 on the personal prestige of a minister and the national confidence in one man. Lord Palmerston—after declining overtures from the City of London and other places—put forth his address to the country through the electors of Tiverton, the Devonshire borough to which he was wedded, both by ties of gratitude and of inclination. In it he distinctly challenged the verdict of the constituencies as one of confidence or no confidence in his administration. But in a very short time there was no doubt as to what the answer would be. Personally, he was in the heyday of his popularity. The country remembered that when others had shrunk from the responsibility of conducting the war with Russia, he had come forward and carried it to a successful issue in the face of great difficulties at home, in the field, and at the congress table. It appreciated his talent and versatility. It admired his good-humour and gallant bearing in the face of opposition, and was proud of his marvellous energy and boisterous fun in despite of advancing years. The news of a happy conclusion to the Persian war came in time to aid his supporters. 'Palmerston!' became a rallying cry on every hustings. The 'fortuitous concourse of atoms,' as he apologetically termed his opponents when they denied having *combined* against him, was scattered to the winds. Many of the leading Peelites lost their seats. Mr. Bright and Mr. Milner Gibson were displaced at Manchester, Mr. Layard at Aylesbury, and Cobden himself was rejected at Huddersfield. The Opposition was discomfited, and a triumphant majority was returned to support Lord Palmerston's Government.

The new Parliament met on the 30th of April; and almost immediately after the commencement of business Lord Palmerston moved the Army Estimates, Sir John Ramsden, the Under-Secretary for War, not having had time to make himself acquainted with the details of his office. This short session was naturally not very productive of legislation. The silence of the Queen's Speech on the subject of Parliamentary Reform had been strongly commented upon in the discussion on the Address. The murmurers had been quieted by Lord Palmerston's assurance that before next year it would be the duty of the Government to take the subject into their fullest consideration, but that they felt no useful purpose could be served by calling upon the House during so brief a session to enter upon so large and sweeping a question. One of the principal measures carried was the Divorce Court Bill, which encountered pertinacious opposition. Lord Palmerston met the charge of hurrying the Bill through Parliament by a laughing rejoinder that, on the contrary, he was quite ready to sit through September if it was desired to have a full discussion of all the details, and added, amid laughter and cheers, 'One prominent opponent of the Bill said to me on one occasion, "You never shall pass the Bill." I replied, "Won't we?"' The question had indeed occupied the attention of the Legislature for so many years, that it seemed likely to do so for many years longer. It was only the firmness and determination of the Premier that carried it to a settlement.

Lord Palmerston varied his labours during the session by a visit to Manchester, for the opening of the Fine Art Exhibition, and by interviews at Osborne with the Emperor of the French and the Grand Duke Constantine, who both visited England this summer. He availed himself of his conversation with the latter to tell him that the English Government could not consent to the proposal which had been made to them by the Russian Government, namely, to limit British

consuls to the southern districts of Persia, and to leave the Russian consuls in undisturbed possession of the northern.

About the middle of June the news of the Indian mutiny burst upon the Government. Troops were at once ordered to prepare for embarkation. The next mail brought tidings of the death of General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief. The news arrived on a Saturday. That same night Lord Palmerston had an interview with Sir Colin Campbell, who started on the Sunday, to take the command in India.

Vigorous as were the efforts of the Government to meet the crisis, they did not completely satisfy the very natural anxiety of their Sovereign. The Queen had expressed her views to this effect in a letter to Lord Palmerston, which drew from him the following characteristic answer:—

Piccadilly: 18th July, 1857.

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has had the honour to receive your Majesty's communication of yesterday, stating what your Majesty would have said if your Majesty had been in the House of Commons.

Viscount Palmerston may perhaps be permitted to take the liberty of saying that it is fortunate for those from whose opinions your Majesty differs that your Majesty is not in the House of Commons, for they would have had to encounter a formidable antagonist in argument; although, on the other hand, those whose opinions your Majesty approves would have had the support of a powerful ally in debate.

But with regard to the arrangements in connection with the state of affairs in India, Viscount Palmerston can assure your Majesty that the Government are taking, and will not fail to continue to take, every measure which may appear well adapted to the emergency; but measures are sometimes best calculated to succeed which follow each other step by step.

This drew another and a more detailed communication from the Queen, in which the military measures to be adopted were urged at greater length. The Cabinet were not backward in seconding the wishes of the Crown, and, 'step by step,' but without any loss of

time, a succouring and avenging army was dispatched across the sea. The first vessel had sailed from our shores with troops on the 1st of July, and she was followed by others in continuous succession, so that by the end of September about eighty ships had left for India, with upwards of 30,000 troops on board. This rapidity and vigour was but the fitting counterpart to the heroic efforts of our fellow-countrymen in the East, who preserved for us our empire in Hindostan. Lord Palmerston, at the Lord Mayor's banquet on the 9th of November, paid a tribute to the national spirit.

It is impossible for any Englishman to allude to that which has been achieved in India—not by soldiers only, but by civilians, by individuals, and by knots of men scattered over the whole surface of a great empire—without feeling prouder than ever of the nation to which we have the happiness to belong. There never was an instance in the history of the world of such splendid examples of bravery, of intrepidity, of resource, and self-reliance accomplishing such results as those which we have lately witnessed. The Government at home, on the other hand, may justly pride themselves on not having been unequal to the magnitude of the occasion. We took the earliest opportunity of despatching to India a great army—an army which had not yet arrived when those great victories were accomplished, but which, when it shall arrive, will render that which remains to be done comparatively easy of accomplishment, and will, I cannot entertain the slightest doubt, re-establish the power and authority of England upon an unshakable basis throughout the whole of our Indian empire. My noble friend Lord Pannure has alluded to the spirit which has been displayed in this country, and I am proud to say, that although we have despatched from these shores the largest army that I believe ever at one time left them, we have now under arms in the United Kingdom as many fighting men as we had before the news of the mutiny reached us; and, therefore, if any foreign nation ever dreamed in its visions that the exertions which we had been compelled to make in India had lessened our strength at home, and that the time had arrived when a different bearing might be exhibited towards us from that which was safe in the moment of our strength, the manner in which the spirit of the country has burst forth, the manner in which our ranks have been filled, the manner in which our

whole force has been replenished, will teach the world that it would not be a safe game to play to attempt to take advantage of that which was erroneously imagined to be the moment of our weakness. It has been the fashion among the people of the Continent to say that the English nation is not a military nation. In one sense, indeed—in their sense—that assertion may be said to be true. An Englishman is not so fond as the people of some other countries are of uniforms, of steel scabbards, and of iron heels; but no nation can excel the English, either as officers or soldiers, in a knowledge of the duties of the military profession, and in the zeal and ability with which those duties are performed; and wherever desperate deeds are to be accomplished—wherever superior numbers are to be boldly encountered and triumphantly overcome—wherever privations are to be encountered—wherever that which a soldier has to confront is individually or collectively to be faced, there, I will venture to say, there is no nation on the face of the globe which can surpass—I might, without too much national vanity, say, I believe that there is no nation which can equal—the people of the British islands. But, my Lord Mayor and gentlemen, while we all admire the bravery, the constancy, and the intrepidity of our countrymen in India, we must not forget to do justice also to our countrywomen. In the ordinary course of life the functions of woman are to cheer the days of adversity, to soothe the hours of suffering, and to give additional brilliancy to the sunshine of prosperity; but our countrywomen in India have had occasion to show qualities of a higher and nobler kind, and when they have had either to sustain the perils of the siege, to endure the privations of a difficult escape, to forget their own sufferings in endeavouring to minister to the wants of others, the women of the United Kingdom have, wherever they have been found in India, displayed qualities of the noblest kind, such as never have been surpassed in the history of the world. Henceforth the bravest soldier may think it no disparagement to be told that his courage and his power of endurance are equal to those of an Englishwoman.

In Lord Palmerston's pocket-book I find a note about this speech: 'Gave much offence at Compiègne—can't be helped—il n'y a que la vérité qui blesse.' The allusion to the 'foreign nation which might dream that we had lessened our strength at home' had been appropriated by the French Court, which was just then

showing, in concert with certain noisy bodies in France, considerable umbrage at the protection England afforded to foreign refugees, although Lord Palmerston, writing to Lord Clarendon, says, 'My speech was pointed, not at France particularly, but at the whole Continent, where, for the last six months, we have been talked of, and written of, and printed of as a second-rate power. I hear that at Paris, since the fall of Delhi, no Frenchman in the clubs ever mentions India.'¹

The fact was, that not only our Indian empire, but our place among nations was at stake during this crisis. So sensible of this was Lord Palmerston that he steadily declined pressing offers of foreign assistance which were made to the British Government, feeling that, from the tone adopted abroad, it became necessary that England should triumph entirely 'off her own bat,' as he jauntily expressed it. Not only did Prussian officers individually volunteer their services, but an offer was made of two Belgian regiments to be taken bodily into our pay. The object in either case was, no doubt, the experience to be gained by active operations in the field on a large scale, rather than any quixotic devotion to the English cause. But, whatever the motives, Lord Palmerston steadily set his face against the proposals, although some in places of authority appeared inclined to favour the idea of a Belgian contingent. 'The more I think of it,' he wrote to Lord Clarendon on September 29, 'the more I feel it is necessary for our standing and reputation in the world that we should put down this mutiny and restore order by our own means, and I am perfectly certain that we can do it and that we shall do it.'

Parliament was called together for the next session on December 4, to pass a Bill of Indemnity for the Government for having suspended the Bank Charter Act during the financial panic of the autumn. Lord Palmerston has a pithy note about the debate: 'Geo.

¹ To Lord Clarendon, November 16, 1857.

Lewis and J. Russell made good speeches. The others, not having a clear idea, conveyed none.' The two Houses adjourned for Christmas, and met again at the usual time in February. On the first evening the Premier moved an address of congratulation to the Queen on the marriage of the Princess Royal and the Crown Prince of Prussia, stating that there had been no event since the marriage of her Majesty herself which had so much enlisted the feelings and so much excited the interest of the whole British nation. With his usual instinct as to what would be most pleasing to the people of England, he put into the foreground that this was not a marriage of mere political convenience, but one of mutual affection. The illustrious parties chiefly concerned, he added, 'have been more fortunate than many royal personages. They, indeed, have belonged to that class whom it is said—

. "Gentle stars unite, and in one fate
Their hearts, their fortunes, and their feelings blend."

A few days later he introduced the Government Bill which was to transfer the rule over India from the old Company to the Crown, it having been shown by the events of the past year that, to use his own words to the Queen, the inconvenience and difficulty of administering the government of a vast country on the other side of the globe by means of two Cabinets, the one responsible to the Crown and Parliament, the other only responsible to the holders of India Stock, meeting, for a few hours, three or four times a year, was no longer tolerable. Many vested interests were involved, and, under a plea of delay, a strong opposition was offered; but on a division the Ministry, contrary to general expectation, obtained the large majority of 145.¹ Walking home with Lord Palmerston after this

¹ The majority was even greater than had been expected, and proves how little credit is to be given to reports which circulate in clubs and drawing-rooms as to the probable result of Parliamentary proceedings. (Lord Palmerston to the Queen, Feb. 18, 1858.)

victorious result, Sir Richard Bethell, then Attorney-General, remarked to him that he ought, like the Roman consuls in a triumph, to have somebody to remind him that he was, as a minister, mortal.

That day week showed that no such reminder was needed. But we must go back to recall the circumstances which had prepared the ground for the catastrophe which was now imminent.

On January 14 a most determined attempt had been made to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon as he was being driven with the Empress to the Opera. Bombs had been thrown under his carriage, shattering the framework when they exploded and killing some twenty bystanders. Fortunately, the Imperial party escaped with only trifling injuries. The gang who had perpetrated this outrage, of whom the leader was one Orsini, had come from London, where they had made their preparations for this atrocious attempt. Much indignation was felt by the French that men should be able to contrive such a diabolical deed under the protection of English hospitality. It was felt to be unjust that shelter should be afforded by a Government—and still more by a friendly Government—to the assassins of a friendly Sovereign. This very natural feeling found expression in a despatch from the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Paris to Count Persigny, the French ambassador in London. Count Walewski, after deprecating any intention to find fault with the right of asylum which England extended to political refugees, pointed out that men such as Pianori and Orsini were not mere fugitives, but were assassins :—

Ought the English legislation, he proceeded, to contribute to their designs and continue to shelter persons who place themselves beyond the pale of common right and under the ban of humanity? Her Britannic Majesty's Government can assist us in averting a repetition of such guilty enterprises by affording us a guarantee of security which no state can refuse to a neighbouring state, and which we are authorised to expect from an ally. Fully relying, moreover, on the high sense of the English

Cabinet, we refrain from indicating in any way the measures which it may see fit to take in order to comply with this wish. We rest entirely upon it for estimating the decisions which it shall deem best calculated to attain the object.

There was little in this document to arouse the susceptibilities of the nation; and the Cabinet, sensible of the justice of some of the observations contained in it, determined, without answering it officially, to introduce a measure the effect of which would be to make the crime of conspiracy to murder—which had hitherto been treated as a misdemeanour—a felony, punishable with penal servitude. Lord Palmerston's first idea was a measure to give power to the Secretary of State to send away any foreigner whom the Government might have good reason to suspect was plotting a scheme against the life of a foreign sovereign, the Government being bound to state the grounds upon which the person in question had been sent away, either to a secret committee of Parliament or to a committee composed of the three chiefs of the courts of law. This notion, however, was abandoned for the simpler form of Bill which would, it was believed, attain the object in view. The Bill, although strongly opposed, was read a first time by a majority of no less than 200. Meantime, however, events were occurring which rapidly altered the public tone. Addresses had been presented to the Emperor from members of the French army, which, while congratulating him on his escape, contained expressions and menaces but too well calculated to wound the pride and inflame the temper of the English people. Some of these 'French colonels'—as they were popularly designated—spoke of the English as 'protectors of assassins,' and uttered threats to the effect that 'the infamous haunt in which such infernal machinations were planned should be destroyed for ever.'

These ridiculous effusions would have passed unnoticed, unless with contempt, had not some of them, unfortunately, been inserted in the '*Moniteur*,' the official organ of the French Government. In vain did

the ambassador, by order of his Government, express regret at their insertion and explain that it happened through inadvertence, owing to the number of addresses which, according to the usual custom, required such official notification; in vain did Lord Palmerston urge in the House that it would be unworthy of the nation to be turned from a course, otherwise proper, by the idle vapourings of irresponsible swashbucklers, and 'upon any paltry feelings of offended dignity or of irritation at the expressions of three or four colonels of French regiments, to act the childish part of refusing an important measure on grounds so insignificant and trumpery.' The nation's back was up. The House repented of its former vote, and the leader of the Opposition, who had spoken for the Bill on its first reading, joined with the other malcontents in giving it its death-blow, by supporting Mr. Milner Gibson's amendment to the question that it should be read a second time. This amendment was: 'That this House cannot but regret that Her Majesty's Government, previously to inviting the House to amend the law of conspiracy at the present time, have not felt it to be their duty to reply to the important despatch received from the French Government, dated January 20.'

Verbal answers, fitting both in substance and in tone, had been given to the French ambassador in London and, through Lord Cowley, to the French Cabinet at Paris; but an official despatch, in reply, had been deliberately postponed, under the conviction that in the actual temper of men's minds, no advantage, but only exasperation, would be the result of any answer which the English Foreign Office could consistently give.

Report said that Lord Derby, sitting under the gallery of the House of Commons and watching the progress of the debate, saw the turn of the tide with the quick eye of an old parliamentary tactician, and sent hasty word to his lieutenants that they should take it at the flood which led to office. Anyhow, Mr. Disraeli plunged into the stream, and, declaring that while, on the first

reading, the question was between England and France, on this the second reading, by some strange metamorphosis, it had become one between the House of Commons and the English minister, he announced that he sided with the House. Mr. Gladstone also threw in his lot with the Opposition in a powerful speech; Lord John Russell joined the Radicals; and when a division was called, Lord Palmerston's Government found itself in a minority of nineteen.

This defeat was a complete surprise. Ministers, when they went down to the House of Commons on the afternoon of this February 19, did not even anticipate a narrow division, much less a crisis. There were unseen causes, however, which had been gradually sapping Lord Palmerston's ascendancy over the House of Commons. Some injudicious appointments had alienated not a few of his supporters, and his manner lately had certainly, for some reason or other, become more brusque and dictatorial than was altogether pleasing to the members. Many, however, of those who voted in the majority did not wish to overthrow his Government, and had he thought fit to appeal to the House of Commons for a vote of confidence, it would probably have accorded it, and have remained satisfied with the reply already given by the public to the denunciations of the French army. But Lord Palmerston never showed any undue tenacity in the retention of office. He at once tendered his resignation to the Queen, and persisted, although Her Majesty at first declined to accept it.

Thus Lord Palmerston, after weathering many a turbulent storm, was overthrown by a gust, and Lord Derby, being sent for, reigned in his stead. The new Premier, with a candour which was very characteristic of him, soon acknowledged the hasty and needless character of the vote which had proved fatal to his opponents, and to which he had so greatly contributed. In the House of Lords, on March 1, Lord Clarendon, who had been the Foreign Secretary of the late Government, fully vindicated their conduct; and Lord Derby,

in reporting to the Queen the proceedings of the evening, said, ‘ Lord Clarendon made an admirable speech in explanation of the course which the late Government pursued, and which, had it been delivered in the House of Commons on the subject of the amendment, would probably have deprived Lord Derby of the honour of addressing your Majesty on the present occasion.’¹

¹ Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 190.

CHAPTER XIV.

OUT OF OFFICE—GOES TO COMPIÈGNE—DERBY GOVERNMENT DEFEATED ON REFORM BILL, 1859—DISSOLUTION—OUTBREAK OF FRANCO-AUSTRIAN WAR—VOTE OF WANT OF CONFIDENCE IN MINISTERS—SECOND PREMIERSHIP—ITALIAN AFFAIRS—SPAIN AND MOROCCO—FORTIFICATIONS.

JUST before his resignation, Lord Palmerston had the satisfaction of being able to announce the capture of Canton and the successful issue of his China policy. He was thus quite content to retire for awhile from the cares of office, convinced that the conduct of his Government in the matter of the attempt upon the French Emperor's life, though it involved him personally in a temporary banishment from power, had contributed to the preservation of that French alliance which it was one of his chief aims to maintain. Indeed, even after he had ceased to be responsible for the course of events, he still exerted his undoubted influence to smooth the path of his successors and to save them and the country from the consequences of a rupture with France. He writes, on March 1, to Lord Clarendon:—

I am told that Persigny says that if the Derby Government drop the Murder Bill he will be immediately recalled. It would be most unfortunate that the diplomatic relations of the two countries should be broken off on such a ground. Such a rupture would justly incense the British nation, would make any measure in the matter impossible, and would leave hardly any way for a reconciliation.

It would be very desirable that you should convey, if you can, these considerations to Cowley, in order that he might, in case of need, press them upon the Emperor, and urge upon him strongly that his own personal interest as well as that of both

countries would be very seriously injured by such a step as the recall of his ambassador.

We find him availing himself of his comparative leisure to serve on a committee about the pollution of the Thames, to preside at the Royal Literary Fund dinner, to see Rarey, the horse-tamer, perform on a mare called Surplice at the Duke of Wellington's Riding-school, and to make notes afterwards about his system of breaking and the pedigree of the animal. Such variety of employment must have been to him both new and refreshing.

In November he went over to Compiègne on a visit to the Emperor Napoleon, and with both horse and gun joined in the sports of the French Court, though, on the hunting days, a stag, and not a fox, was the quarry. He wrote to his brother-in-law: 'They are all very civil and courteous, and the visits of the English to the Emperor serve as links to maintain and strengthen English alliance.' I find a scrap of conversation recorded which is amusing, as illustrating an odd bent of the French mind. While the dancing was going on, Lord Palmerston and the Emperor walked up and down an inner room, and the Imperial philosopher propounded his idea of an improvement upon the existing system of universal suffrage, namely, to limit the right of voting to married men. He said that unmarried men do not feel the same sentiments about their country as those who have a family stake in it, and that such a voting qualification would shut out both priests and soldiers—classes which he would wish to see excluded. Lord Palmerston could only answer that property of some sort ought, in his opinion, to be the real basis for the suffrage, and that while many bachelors might own property, many a man with both wife and child might have none.¹

¹ During this conversation the Emperor also said that the Emperor of Russia had told him that he would spend his last rouble, and sacrifice his last man, to prevent the establishment of a Greek empire at Constantinople.

Lord Derby's ministry meanwhile was conducting affairs in the face of a majority which did not show much inclination to tolerate them for long. After fulfilling the object of their call to power, namely, writing an answer of some sort to Count Walewski's despatch about the refugees, they had proceeded to bring in and immediately to withdraw their India Bill, and then to pass a different Bill, founded upon resolutions of the House. They managed, however, to struggle through the session by the aid of the self-sacrifice of one of their colleagues¹ and of the gladiatorial genius of their Chancellor of the Exchequer.

At the beginning of the session of 1859 a Reform Bill was introduced by the Government, one new feature of which was a franchise founded upon personal property. On the second reading, Lord John Russell moved an amendment condemnatory of its provisions, and Lord Palmerston spoke in support of Lord John's resolution; he chaffed the Ministry by assuring them that he did not want them to resign, but said to them, 'As Voltaire said of some minister who had incurred his displeasure, "I won't punish him; I won't send him to prison; I condemn him to keep his place."' On a division in the House of 621 members, the Government were left in a minority of 39, and a few days later they announced their intention of dissolving Parliament.

Lord Palmerston was re-elected for Tiverton without opposition. Of course he had his usual tournament with the Radical butcher after he had finished his speech. In vain did Rowcliffe, from the middle of the crowd in front of the hustings, insist on a plain, straightforward answer to the questions he was about to put. He got what he asked for, but was left as much in the dark as ever. Yet it was all done so good-humouredly and with such an evident enjoyment of the

¹ Lord Ellenborough resigned in consequence of an attack on the Government about the publication of his despatch censuring the Governor-General of India, Lord Canning.

fun of the thing, that the most exacting elector could not take it amiss.

Mr. Rowcliffe said that as Lord Palmerston had talked a great deal about Lord Derby's Reform Bill, he hoped his lordship would favour the electors and non-electors with his views on Reform. He would ask his lordship whether he would vote for the ballot, and whether he was in favour of manhood suffrage, or 6*l.* franchise, or rating franchise. He was once a member of the noble lord's committee, but finding his opinions in advance of his lordship's, he refused to remain a member any longer. The noble lord also said a great deal about the Conspiracy Bill, but it was well known he was a pet of the Emperor of the French. (Laughter.) He believed that the noble lord was a downright Tory, and the best representative the Conservatives could possibly have. He hoped his lordship would answer his questions in a straightforward and honest manner.

Lord Palmerston said he was delighted to find that his old friend, however far advanced in years, retained that youthful vigour which he possessed when first he knew him, and with his vigour he had retained also his prejudices and opinions. (Laughter, and a cry of 'No chaff.') His friend asked for a straightforward answer, and he would give him one. He totally disagreed with him in almost all his opinions. He (the noble lord) thought the day would never come when he and his friend would agree in political faith. His friend asked him what he thought on many points. In the first place he would say he was opposed to the ballot. He was against manhood suffrage. (Rowcliffe: 'How far will you go with the franchise?') He would give a straightforward answer to that. He would not tell him. (Laughter.) He held it was his duty, after the confidence they had reposed in him, to act according to his judgment in any measure relating to Reform. He hoped that the political difference of Mr. Rowcliffe and himself would not alter their private friendship. He was sorry to disagree with his friend, but no man could agree with everybody. The man who did agree with everybody was not worth having anybody to agree with him. (Cheers and laughter.)

The elections were much influenced by the aspect of foreign affairs. On New Year's Day the French Emperor had electrified Europe by addressing the Austrian ambassador, at the usual reception of the

diplomatic corps, in a manner which betokened an unpleasant feeling between the two countries. Whether in so doing he was imitating his uncle, whose abrupt remark to the English minister at Paris in 1803 immediately preceded the rupture of the peace of Amiens, was a matter for curious speculation; but the parallel did not fail to excite general uneasiness. The relations between Austria and Sardinia were known to be strained, owing to the impatience of the Italians at the continuance of Austrian predominance in the peninsula. Did these few words spoken at the Tuileries import that France would join in the fray should hostilities break out? This proved to be their meaning, and, after a few months of suspense, Austria fired the mine by a summons to Sardinia to disarm. On her refusal war was declared, and French troops began to pour into North Italy, as allies of Victor Emmanuel. This was the moment of the general election in England. Lord Derby's Government were, rightly or wrongly, suspected of leanings towards Austria, while public feeling was strongly in favour of Italian independence. This sufficed to turn the scale wherever parties were evenly balanced, and so the dissolution failed to give the Conservative party a majority.

A renewed attempt was made to induce Lord Palmerston to join the Government with the leadership of the House of Commons, but the Liberal party had meanwhile been engaged in preparing for the future by healing their dissensions and reconciling their leaders. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell had come to an agreement that whichever of the two was charged with the formation of a Government should receive the co-operation of the other. And at a meeting in Willis's Rooms, at which some of the Peelites were present, it was arranged that an immediate vote of want of confidence in ministers should be moved by Lord Hartington in the House of Commons. Accordingly, on June 10, in a House of no less

than 637 members, such a vote was carried by a majority of 13, in spite of Mr. Disraeli's amusing protest against the scene of Almack's, where dowagers and beauties formerly held sway, having been turned into an arena for the issuing of vouchers by political patrons.

Lord Granville, to the astonishment of everybody, was charged with the construction of a Ministry, the Queen feeling that 'to make so marked a distinction as is implied in the choice of one or other as Prime Minister of two statesmen so full of years and honours as Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, would be a very invidious and unwelcome task.' Lord Granville's failure to make a Government under the circumstances is worth noting, as an illustration of the working of our form of government, and of the fact that the House of Commons is the ultimate depository of the power that makes, as well as unmakes, ministers.

Lord Palmerston consented to serve under Lord Granville for the reasons and under the limitations stated in the following paper:—

94 Piccadilly: June 11, 1859.

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour of assuring Your Majesty that he will deem it his duty to afford Lord Granville his assistance and co-operation in forming an administration in obedience to Your Majesty's commands. Viscount Palmerston considered himself to be promoting the public interest by taking an active part in the late proceedings in the House of Commons tending to the removal of Lord Derby's administration; but he feels that it would have been inexcusable in him to have encouraged and organised those proceedings with a view to any personal objects or interests of his own. Those who unite to turn out an existing Government ought to be prepared to unite to form a stronger Government than that which is to be overthrown; and it was in this spirit, and with a deep sense of what is due by public men to Your Majesty and to the country, that Viscount Palmerston and Lord John Russell, before they called the meeting at Willis's Rooms, came to an agreement to co-operate with each other in the formation of a new administration, whichever

of the two might be called upon by Your Majesty to reconstruct Your Majesty's Government. That agreement did not extend to the case of any third person; but Viscount Palmerston conceives that the same sense of public duty which had led him to enter into that engagement with Lord John Russell, should also lead him to give assistance to Lord Granville towards the execution of Your Majesty's commands. Viscount Palmerston's promise to Lord Granville has, however, been conditional. He thinks that it would be a great disappointment and an evil for the country if, on the overthrow of one administration by a deliberate vote of want of confidence by a recently elected House of Commons, the overthrowing majority should be so paralysed as not to be able to offer to Your Majesty a stronger administration than that which they have overthrown. But, on the other hand, it would be injurious to the interest of the Crown and of the nation, that on such an occasion an administration should be formed which, by the weakness of its personal elements, should be destitute of the inherent strength necessary to enable it to face and overcome the difficulties with which it must have to contend; and Viscount Palmerston deems himself bound by his duty to Your Majesty, and by a proper regard to what he owes to himself, to say that to an administration so composed he would feel it impossible to belong. The promise, therefore, which he has given to Lord Granville has been made conditional on Lord Granville's success in organising a Government so composed as to be calculated officially to carry on the public service, and to command the confidence of Parliament and of the country.

This success did not attend Lord Granville's efforts. He found Lord John Russell reluctant to accept his leadership, with Lord Palmerston leading the House of Commons; and as he met with insuperable difficulties in the task which he had unwillingly undertaken, he resigned his commission. Lord Palmerston having then been sent for, constructed a Ministry, with Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office, and Mr. Gladstone at the Exchequer. He also offered the Board of Trade to Mr. Cobden, who declined it. The Administration was looked upon as the strongest that was ever formed so far as the individual talents of its members were concerned. Men of some political mark were appointed,

down to the most subordinate offices. Thus Lord Palmerston, in his seventy-fifth year, again became Prime Minister and leader of the House of Commons. The remainder of his course was to be comparatively smooth. For six years he was accepted by the country as the minister of the nation, and almost occupied a position removed from the chances of party strife. Whatever difficulties he had to contend with did not consist either in wars abroad or in parliamentary defeats at home. Such as they may have been, they were of a more hidden character. The events of this period are too recent to warrant either great detail in their history, or absence of reserve on the part of the historian.

The war in North Italy was sharp and short. The victories of Magenta and Solferino drove the Austrians within their famous Quadrilateral, and the last week in July found the French and Sardinians pausing in view of these formidable defences. The Emperor Napoleon had previously learnt that Prussia was preparing to take the field and to march on Paris. He had lost many men, and was anxious to make peace; and so it happened that, within a fortnight after accession to office, Lord Palmerston had to consider a proposal made to the British Cabinet that they should intervene between the belligerents, and propose an armistice upon terms which were laid before them by the French ambassador. These included the surrender of Lombardy and the Duchies to Sardinia, and the erection of Venetia into an independent state under an Archduke, but made no provision for the Papal States. In the following letter he gives his reasons for declining to place England in such a false position :—

Piccadilly: July 6, 1859.

My dear John Russell,—The more I think of Persigny's proposal the less I like it, and the more I incline to the opinion that we ought to be very careful not to involve ourselves, and not to commit ourselves by hastily adopting it. Those who propose to two belligerents on the point of fighting that they should agree to an armistice, in order to negotiate a peace,

ought to have settled in their own minds the outline of such an arrangement as might be proposed to the belligerents with a chance of success ; but we have no plan of our own, and we are asked to adopt as our own one sketched out by one of the belligerent parties out of three. It would be useless to propose an armistice to the Austrians, unless we gave them an idea of the terms to be the subject of negotiation ; but if we confine ourselves simply to the first condition, that Italy should be entirely given up to the Italians, Austria would, of course, peremptorily refuse. If we were to go farther, and communicate the details of the Persigny scheme, we should identify ourselves with it, and be committed to an approval of it ; but that I should be unwilling to do, though if such an arrangement were to be worked out as the result of the war, we should, of course, acquiesce in it, and say that matters might have turned out worse. It is to be observed that we are not told that this scheme has the assent of the Sardinians nor of the Italians generally. It would obviously fall far short of the wishes and expectations of Italy ; and if we made it, we should be accused of having interposed and stopped the allied armies in their career of victory, and of having either endeavoured or of having succeeded to rivet on Italy a remnant of Austrian shackles, and of having betrayed and disappointed the Italians at the very moment when their prospects were the brightest.

The scheme proposes to give Venetia and Modena to an Austrian archduke, as an independent Sovereign, by way of interposing some neutral state between Piedmont and Austria. But what would be the result ? The same Austrian influences and interference which have been the bane of Tuscany would soon afflict this new state. It would not be constitutional, and there would be worse neighbourhood between it and constitutional Piedmont than there would be between Venetia as part of Piedmont and Austria, because Venetia and Piedmont would be separated only by an imaginary line ; whereas the Tyrol would be a buffer between Venetia and Austria. The freedom of Piedmont would excite the aspirations of the Venetians. Discontent and disturbance would arise. Austria would intervene, she could not see an archduke in trouble and not come and help him. She would again be brought into active interference in Italian affairs ; and if Modena were added to Venetia, Austria would again take her place in Central Italy. Fresh quarrels would arise because the old grievances would spring up anew, and fresh wars would inevitably follow. If the

scheme is the Emperor's own, it is suggested by jealousy of Sardinia and tenderness for the Pope; but we feel neither of these mental affections, and are not bound to adopt them. The scheme, moreover, throws wholly out of question the wishes of the Italians themselves, and we are asked to propose to the belligerents a parcelling out of the nations of Italy, as if we had any authority to dispose of them. I cannot be a party to Persigny's scheme.

If the French Emperor is tired of his war, and finds the job tougher than he expected, let him make what proposals he pleases, and to whomsoever he pleases; but let them be made as from himself formally and officially, and let him not ask us to father his suggestions, and make ourselves answerable for them.

The French Emperor must have anticipated the refusal of England to become his cat's-paw. Anyhow, on July 5, he acted for himself. On that day he sent General Fleury to the headquarters of the Emperor of Austria with a letter proposing an armistice. General Fleury arrived at a late hour, and the night was spent by the Emperor Francis Joseph in council with Count Rechberg, Prince Metternich, and Count Mensdorff. Next morning Napoleon received a reply accepting the armistice. An interview took place on the 8th between the two Emperors, and on the 11th, at Villafranca, a provisional treaty of peace was signed, containing as bases the creation of an Italian Confederation, under the presidency of the Pope, the cession of Lombardy to Sardinia, and the return of the Grand Dukes of Tuscany and Modena to their states. The Emperor Napoleon, however, obtained from the Austrian Emperor a verbal assurance that no force should be employed to restore the Grand Dukes. The definitive treaty was to be settled in a Conference at Zurich. Cavour withdrew from the Sardinian Ministry on the announcement of this peace, although the spirit, which he had raised and left behind him, was not destined to be quelled until, in defiance of the imperial compromises at Villafranca, it had worked out his project of a Northern Italian Kingdom. Lord Palmerston also lost

no time in expressing his disappointment at the terms of the treaty :—

94 Piccadilly : juillet 13, 1859.

Mon cher Persigny,—Si je comprends ce qui va être arrêté pour l'Italie, il est question d'une Confédération italienne où l'Autriche prendrait place en vertu de la Vénitie; un tel arrangement serait funeste, et mettrait l'Italie au désespoir.

La plus grande partie des maux de l'Italie, et l'esprit révolutionnaire qui s'y est montré, prennent leur source dans l'ingérence de l'Autriche dans les affaires des Etats au-delà du Pô. Jusqu'à présent cette ingérence n'a eu aucune base légitime, et un des buts que l'Empereur des Français se proposait d'atteindre était d'affranchir l'Italie de cette ingérence autrichienne en des pays ne faisant pas partie des possessions de l'Autriche.

Mais une fois que l'Autriche devient membre d'une Confédération Italienne, toute l'Italie est livrée pieds et mains liés à l'Autriche. Jamais l'Angleterre ne pourra s'associer à un si mauvais arrangement. Au contraire, nous pourrions croire de notre devoir de protester hautement et en face de l'Europe contre un pareil asservissement des peuples de l'Italie. L'Autriche devrait au contraire être strictement exclue de toute ingérence politique ou militaire en dehors de ses frontières. Et si cela n'est pas fait, rien n'est fait, et tout sera à recommencer en fort peu de temps.

Confédération politique des Etats italiens, oui ou non, c'est une question qui mérite examen. Il y a du pour et du contre. Le Pape, Naples, Toscane, Modena seraient toujours pour l'Absolutisme. Le Piémont seul pour un système libéral; comment on parviendrait à s'entendre reste à savoir.

Union douanière de toute l'Italie avec un tarif modéré et libéral encourageant le commerce, quant à cela il n'y aurait que du 'pour' parmi les hommes intelligents. Mais même avec cette union, les relations de l'Autriche ne devraient être que celles d'un pays étranger faisant un pacte avec un corps dont il n'est pas membre.

Soyez bien sûr que si l'Autriche n'est pas soigneusement exclue de toute ingérence, de toute espèce, dans les affaires de l'Italie, le sang français a été versé en vain, et la gloire de l'Empereur ne sera que de courte durée.

This scheme of an Italian Confederation was not proposed by Austria, but by Louis Napoleon. It had been floating in his mind for many years as a means

of substituting Italian support of the Pope for the support of French and Austrian troops. The English Cabinet stated without delay, in a despatch to Paris, their objections to it, which they felt sure the French Government would, on consideration, recognise.

It further appeared likely that, in contravention of the verbal engagement given at Villafranca, and looking merely to the text of the provisional treaty, Austria might attempt to employ her troops in restoring the archdukes. An official remonstrance was therefore sent, in the month of August, by our Government to Vienna, which declared that 'a provision for the employment of French or Austrian forces to put down the clearly expressed will of the people of Central Italy would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, not be justifiable. Great Britain would feel it her duty to protest against a supplement to the treaty of Villafranca of that nature, if such were even contemplated.' The Emperor Napoleon also was urged to remain firm on this point.

No doubt the French Emperor was in a dilemma, and looked to England to extricate him from it. The war was over, but not the conflict. Neither Romagna nor the Duchies would agree to a confederation of which Austria would be the most powerful member, and in which the ecclesiastical domination of the Vatican was secured by the Presidency of the Pope. But Napoleon had bound himself not to move forward in the only direction which would satisfy the national aspirations of the people whose cause he had espoused. He therefore turned to England with the hope that she would propose a Congress, which should take the burden off his shoulders. Mr. Theodore Martin, in his 'Life of the Prince Consort,' says that there was much cause for anxiety lest the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary would, at this time, 'be carried into some imprudence by their enthusiasm for the Italian cause.' If enthusiasm is the proper word to apply to their feelings in the matter, it was at any rate cer-

tainly not the ill-regulated and unreflecting enthusiasm of youth, which often leads men to be imprudent, but it was the firm sympathy of experienced statesmen who recognised in the Italian cause not only a just cause, but one destined by the very nature of things to win in the end, and involving meanwhile the peace and prosperity of Europe. But there was no fear at any time of England being led on where she would not wish to go, and the Cabinet declined even taking the French proposals into consideration until the preliminaries of peace had been reduced into the form of a treaty. If Austria then expressed no objection to a Conference, the British Government signified that they would not by any act of theirs be the means of preventing European concert.

In the work already referred to the author also implies that the Foreign Office at this juncture was unnecessarily eager to communicate its views to the parties concerned, and that it was no business of England to intermeddle in the bad peace which the French Emperor had made, but that the proper course for her to maintain was perfect silence. Lord John Russell, in a letter to Lord Palmerston, dated Abergeldie, September 11, 1859, stated in the following words how he met this criticism :—

I maintained that so far as regarded the Emperors, and the transfer of the province of Lombardy from one to the other, we had never said a word. But the state of Italy was another question. It had occupied our Government for years, and had during these years been a source of anxiety. To say that because two Emperors had treated the question at Villafranca we should suddenly become silent, and not try to prevent the renewal of troubles, would be in my opinion to desert our duty. That the policy of the Cabinet was contained in two despatches, for each of which there was a cause. The cause of the first was an invitation on the part of France to join in a Congress, to which we had replied by objecting to certain provisions of the peace, and supposed intentions of the Powers. The cause of the second was the apprehension that Austria might use force to restore the Archdukes. Against such a course we protested.

I was willing to keep within the line of these despatches. But conversations with foreign ministers abroad raised fresh questions, to which it was necessary to reply by fresh explanations.

Naturally all this caused Lord Palmerston to be represented as very hostile to Austria, just as was the case in the former revolutionary years. He denies it.

94 Piccadilly : August 22, 1859.

My dear Cowley,—I know that all the partisans of arbitrary government in Europe represent me as the bitter enemy of Austria, and I wish whenever you hear this to deny its truth. I am an enemy to bad government, to oppression and tyranny; and, unfortunately, the Austrian rule in Italy, as elsewhere, has been marked by those evils. I am an enemy, therefore, to the bad system of Austrian government, and heartily wish all Italians to be freed from the Austrian yoke. It would be better for Austria that this should be. It has been decided that Venetia shall still be a victim, but care ought to be taken that Austria be prevented, either as member of a Confederation, or in any other way, from interfering in the affairs of Italy beyond her own frontier. The Austrian Government is unfortunately hated in many Austrian provinces north of the Alps, and especially in Hungary and Galicia. I wish with all my heart she would change her system, and conciliate the goodwill of her subjects; for I hold a great and powerful Austrian empire north of the Alps to be of the utmost importance for the general interests of Europe.

Much is said at Paris of what are called the intrigues of Cavour—unjustly, I think. If it is meant that he has laboured for the enlargement of Piedmont and the freedom of Italy from foreign yoke and from Austrian rule, he will in history be called a patriot; but the means he has employed may be good or bad. I know not what they have been; but the end in view is, I am sure, the good of Italy. The people of the Duchies have as good a right to change their rulers as the people of England, France, Belgium, and Sweden; and the annexation of the Duchies to Piedmont would be an unmixed good for Italy, and for France, and for Europe. I hope Walewski will not sway the mind of the Emperor to make the enslaving of Italy the end of a drama, which opened with the declaration, 'Italy free from the Alps to the Adriatic,' and 'l'Italie rendue à elle-même.'

If the Italians are left to themselves all will go well ; and when it is said that if the French garrison were drawn away from Rome, all the priests would be killed, the example of Bologna may be quoted, where the priests remain unmolested, and perfect order has been maintained.

When the French showed an evident leaning to Austria during the negotiations at Zurich, Lord Palmerston pithily said that this famous declaration, '*l'Italie rendue à elle-même*' was being turned into '*l'Italie vendue à l'Autriche.*'

These negotiations proceeded very slowly, and were not finished till the autumn. The Duchies had absolutely refused to take back their sovereigns, and in September Tuscany and Romagna had formally tendered their annexation to Sardinia. How, then, without the employment of force, was the proposed Treaty of Zurich to be reconciled with the stipulations of Villafranca? Towards the end of October, therefore, France became more than ever urgent for a Congress. Mr. Martin, in his '*Life of the Prince Consort,*'¹ says that Lord John Russell stated that Lord Palmerston and himself would advise the Cabinet to accede to the French Emperor's proposal, and implies that, superior counsels prevailing, their intentions were fortunately overruled. It is difficult to reconcile this alleged statement of Lord John Russell's with the following note from him to Lord Palmerston and Lord Palmerston's endorsement, made the same day:—

Pembroke Lodge: October 21, 1859.

My dear Palmerston,—On reading the articles of the Treaty of Zurich and reflecting upon the figure we should make in a Congress, I can see no reason sufficient to induce us to go to one. We cannot object to the transfer of Lombardy, but the clause about the Duchies and the article about the Pope are especially objectionable. I cannot but think that by going into a Congress we should give some sanction to the Austrian doctrine of the divine right of kings. The notion of a confederation we have always scouted as a way of leading Sardinia back to the house of bondage.

¹ Vol. iv. p. 504.

I should therefore be inclined to say in answer to Walewski's dispatch that our objections on the score of Venetia being part of the Italian Confederation are by no means removed—that the Pope's assurance that he will grant reforms when his authority is restored is of no value in our eyes, as we do not see how the authority of the Pope is to be re-established without the employment of foreign force—that to such employment of foreign force, either to re-establish the authority of the Pope or to restore the Archdukes in Tuscany and Modena, we have insuperable objections. The rights reserved to the Archdukes and to the Duchess of Parma by the Treaty of Zurich appear to us in the same light as the rights of the Count de Chambord and Prince Wasa—rights to respect and observance, but not to obedience and subjection on the part of France and Sweden. That if the independence of Italy mentioned in the Treaty of Zurich, is not to be illusory, the rights of the Italian people ought to be respected and observed. Yet if the Congress should decide to use force, what would be the position of Great Britain? She would only have to protest and withdraw. France would be in a similar position, but France has bound herself by engagements to which Great Britain is not a party. For these reasons, etc.

Yours truly,
J. RUSSELL.

Lord Palmerston's endorsement on this note is as follows: 'I entirely agree with John Russell, and had already come to the same conclusions.'—P. 21, 10-59.

It is true that a few days later these views were modified, but it is acknowledged how 'evenly balanced the arguments were on both sides.' The ground finally taken by the Foreign Secretary was that, as we already had differences with France about China, Morocco, the Suez Canal, &c., a blank refusal of her proposed Congress would be the prelude to a total divergence of views between the two countries. The decision, therefore, finally arrived at by the Cabinet was not to decline the Congress, if it were clearly understood beforehand that the declaration made against the employment of foreign force would be maintained and acted upon, and provided there was nothing in the invitation contrary to the already declared policy of England. This deci-

sion was made known to the French Government, which was to issue the invitations to the other Powers.

There was a dispute this year between Spain and Morocco, which, as affecting English interests, attracted Lord Palmerston's attention. Spain demanded a *rayon* of territory round her fortress of Ceuta on the African coast. This was agreed to by the Moors, but they could not come to a settlement as to what should be the boundary lines of the territory to be ceded.

Broadlands: October 11, 1859.

My dear John Russell,—It is plain that France aims, through Spain, at getting fortified points on each side of the Gut of Gibraltar, which, in the event of war between Spain and France on the one hand, and England on the other, would, by a cross fire, render that strait very difficult and dangerous to pass, and thus virtually to shut us out of the Mediterranean. The distance between part of the African coast and the Spanish coast is only eight miles. With a fortified port on each side, and guns that would carry three miles or more, a fleet of merchantmen or of transports would have some difficulty in keeping out of fire, especially if on each side there were a flotilla of gun-boats, protected by the guns of the fortresses, firing from a certain distance out from these fortresses, and presenting but a small mark to any ships-of-war convoying the merchantmen or transports. As things now stand such vessels would be safe by keeping well over to the African coast, but they would no longer be so if that coast belonged to France or Spain.

The French Minister of War or of Marine said the other day that Algeria never would be safe till France possessed a port on the Atlantic coast of Africa. Against whom would such a port make Algeria safe? Evidently only against England; and how could such a port help France against England? Only by tending to shut us out of the Mediterranean.

I still think that the Spanish Government are determined to pick a quarrel with Morocco, and that their first act will be to take Tangier, and their *last* to evacuate it; and that the best way of preventing a serious difference between us and Spain would be to ask the Emperor of Morocco to request us to occupy Tangier in trust for him during hostilities with Spain, if war with Spain should break out.

War was declared a few days after this. It was intimated to the Spaniards that if Tangier were occupied by their troops, we could not permit the occupation to be prolonged after the close of the war. The Spanish Foreign Minister promised that Spain 'would not take possession of any point on the Straits the position of which would give her a superiority threatening the navigation.' On this assurance being given, and the undertaking being observed, Great Britain remained neutral.

The next letter refers to the fortifications which were afterwards constructed. It was a subject much canvassed at the time, and on which Lord Palmerston was excessively anxious.

There could be no question which so thoroughly tested the patriotism of a British statesman, because the more it was successful the less likely it was to be popular. The fact that we were placed in a state of adequate defence was precisely the fact that rendered any attack upon us unlikely; and if we were never attacked, it was sure to be said that our defences were uncalled for. But we must remember that though the boy who cried 'wolf' did so often when the wolf did not appear, he was right in the main, for the wolf did come at last, and the flock was eaten because the cry had been disbelieved. We might as well have no locks on our doors and no bars to our windows, because thieves do not attempt to break into our houses every night.

94 Piccadilly : December 15, 1859.

My dear Gladstone,—Sidney Herbert has asked me to summon a Cabinet for to-morrow, that we may come to a decision on a fortification question, and I am most anxious that the arrangement which he has proposed should be adopted.

The main question is whether our naval arsenals and some other important points should be defended by fortifications or not; and I can hardly imagine two opinions on that question. It is quite clear that if, by a sudden attack by an army landed in strength, our dockyards were to be destroyed, our maritime power would for more than half a century be paralysed, and our

colonies, our commerce, and the subsistence of a large part of our population would be at the mercy of our enemy, who would be sure to show us no mercy. We should be reduced to the rank of a third-rate power, if no worse happened to us.

That such a landing is, in the present state of things, possible, must be manifest. No naval force of ours can effectually prevent it. Blockades of a hostile port are no longer possible, as of yore. The blockading squadron must be under sail, because there would be no means of supplying it with coals enough to be always steaming, while the outrushing fleet would come steaming on with great advantage, and might choose its moment when an on-shore wind had compelled the blockaders to haul off. One night is enough for the passage to our coast, and twenty thousand men might be landed at any point before our fleet knew that the enemy was out of harbour. There could be no security against the simultaneous landing of twenty thousand for Portsmouth, twenty thousand for Plymouth, and twenty thousand for Ireland. Our troops would necessarily be scattered about the United Kingdom; and with Portsmouth and Plymouth as they now are, those two dockyards and all they contain would be entered and burnt before twenty thousand men could be brought together to defend either of them.

Then, again, suppose the manœuvre of the first Napoleon repeated, and a large French fleet, with troops on board, to start for the West Indies, what should we do? Would the nation be satisfied to see our fleet remain at anchor at Torbay or Portland, leaving our colonies to their fate? And if we pursued the French, they might be found to have doubled back, to have returned to the Channel, and for ten days or a fortnight to have the command of the narrow seas. Now the use of fortifications is to establish for a certain number of days (twenty-one to thirty) an equation between a smaller inside and a larger force outside, and thus to give time for a relieving force to arrive. This in our case would just make the difference between safety and destruction. But if these defensive works are necessary, it is manifest that they ought to be made with the least possible delay; to spread their completion over twenty or thirty years would be folly, unless we could come to an agreement with a chivalrous antagonist not to molest us till we could inform him we were quite ready to repel his attack. We are told that these works might, if money were forthcoming, be finished possibly in three, or latest four years—long enough this to be kept in a state of imperfect defence.

But how is the money, estimated in round numbers at ten or eleven millions, to be got? There are two ways: annual taxation, to raise for this purpose over and above all other expenses a third or a fourth of this sum, or the raising a loan for the whole amount, payable in three or four annual instalments, with interest, in twenty or thirty years. The first method would evidently be the best in principle, and the cheapest, but the burthen would be heavy, and the danger would be that after the first year the desire for financial relief might prevail over a provident sense of danger, and the annual grants would dwindle down to their present insufficiency; and the works would thus remain indefinitely unfinished. The second course has the advantage of being financially as light, or nearly so, as the present system, because the annual repayment of principal and interest would be but little heavier than the present annual votes, while we should gain the same advantage of early completion of works which would be secured by the greater financial burthen of the first plan.

Arrangements of this kind have been deemed, by the deliberate judgment and action of Parliament, wise and proper for private persons. Why should they not be so for a nation, in regard to outlays of the same nature as those for which private persons have been by law enabled to charge their estates? The objection to borrowing for expenditure is stronger for individuals than for a nation.

The individual, if he went on borrowing for annual expenses, would end by having no income left to live upon or to assign to a fresh lender. A nation would, perhaps, in the end come to the same standstill, but its power of increasing its income is greater than that of an individual; but still Parliament has encouraged and enabled private persons to borrow money for permanent improvement of their estates, the money so borrowed to be repaid in a limited number of years.

If we do not ourselves propose such a measure to Parliament, it will infallibly be proposed by somebody else, and will be carried, not indeed against us, because I for one should vote with the proposer, whoever he might be, but with great discredit to the Government for allowing a measure of this kind, involving, one may say, the fate of the empire, to be taken out of their hands. People would say, and justly too, that we and the proposer ought to change places, and that he and his friends had shown themselves fitter than we were to assume the responsibility of taking care '*ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat.*'

In accordance with these views he moved a resolution in the following session providing nine millions for the purpose of fortifying our dockyards and arsenals. His proposals were founded on the report of a Royal Commission which had enquired, during the preceding autumn, into our means of defence. The resolution was adopted by the House by a large majority, and the results of his action are seen in our existing forts and lines round Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Cork.

CHAPTER XV.

FRANCE AND THE ITALIAN DUCHIES—SYRIA—EMPEROR NAPOLEON'S SCHEMES—NEUTRALITY OF SAVOY—ATTITUDE OF FRANCE—THE 'DERBY' OF 1860—CONFLICT BETWEEN LORDS AND COMMONS ON PAPER DUTIES—DISCUSSION ABOUT THE 'PRESS.'

WHATEVER may have been the previous differences which arose between Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell in the course of their long career, these two statesmen were, during the years which covered the second Palmerston administration, thoroughly united, both in their general views of policy and also as to the best manner of giving them effect.

In the year 1860, Italian affairs absorbed almost the whole interest of foreign events, and both ministers had for their one aim the speedy realisation of an independent and united Italy. In the following memorandum, drawn up by Lord Palmerston and circulated among his colleagues, we find sketched out the policy which, in agreement with the Foreign Secretary, he wished to pursue. We must, however, in order to appreciate it, recall the position of matters at the opening of the year.

The Congress which, by the Treaty of Zurich, France and Austria had engaged themselves to summon had been postponed. The British Government had then come forward and proposed that France and Austria should agree not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy, that the French Emperor should concert with the Pope for the evacuation of Rome, and that Sardinia should not send troops into Central Italy until its several states had voted as to their future destiny, she being at liberty to do so as soon

as a vote for annexation to her was passed. To these proposals France had instantly assented. Meanwhile the Duchies had preserved internal order, and had given unmistakable signs of their intention to declare for annexation to Sardinia if left to themselves. France had demanded and was about to receive the cession of Savoy from Sardinia as an equivalent for the increase of territory which the latter was on the point of acquiring. Lord Palmerston had foreseen this result, but, though deploring it, had considered that the unity of Northern Italy was cheaply purchased at the price. Lord Palmerston's memorandum was as follows:—

Broadlands: January 5, 1860.

The affairs of Italy are coming to a crisis, and it is indispensably necessary that the English Government should come without further delay to a decision as to the course which England is to pursue. But, in truth, that course has been already marked out. The English Government might have determined that, in regard to Italian affairs, England should abdicate its position as one of the great Powers of Europe. We might have said that we live in an island, and care not what may be done on the Continent; that we think only of making money, and of defending our own shores; and that we leave to others the task of settling as they like the affairs of the continent of Europe. But such has not been the policy of the wisest and greatest statesmen who have taken part in the government of this country. We might have deemed the present an exceptional case; we might have said the Emperor Napoleon has got into a scrape about Italian affairs; let him get out of it as he can: it is not our business to help him. But we rightly considered that what is at issue is not the interests of the Emperor Napoleon, but the interests of the people of Italy, and, through them, the welfare and peace of Europe. Therefore when a proposal was made that a Congress should meet to consider how best the independence and welfare of Italy could be secured, and when England was invited to be a party to that Congress, we accepted the invitation.

But it would have been unworthy of the Government of a great Power like England to have accepted such an invitation without having decided upon the policy which we were to pursue when in the Congress. We had a policy, and we lost no

time in making that policy known to the principal Powers invited to the Congress. That policy is in accordance with those principles which English statesmen in our times have professed and acted upon, and which are the foundation of public opinion in England. We declared that in going into Congress we should take our stand upon the principle that no force should be employed for the purpose of imposing upon the people of Italy any form of government or constitution, that is to say, that the people of Italy, and especially of Central Italy, should be left free to determine their own condition of political existence. We shall therefore go into Congress, if Congress there is to be, not as jurymen go into their box, discarding preconceived opinions and bound to be determined by what we hear in Congress, but like statesmen with a well-matured and deliberately formed policy, and with the intention of endeavouring to make that policy prevail. What is the best way of accomplishing this purpose? Why, obviously to persuade those Powers to agree with us, who are most able to sway the course of events in Italy and to bring them to the result we wish for.

What are those Powers? Obviously France and Sardinia. Austria, the Pope, and the King of Naples have views directly opposite to ours; and the other states to be represented in Congress are too far off to have the same influence as France and Sardinia on Italian affairs.

It is demonstrable, therefore, that we ought to endeavour to come to an understanding with France and Sardinia, for the purpose of common and united action with them in regard to the matters to be treated of in Congress. We need take little trouble about Sardinia, because we know that her views tally with our own: we can have little doubt as to the inclination of the Emperor Napoleon, because he has declared over and over again in manifestoes, in speeches, in letters and other communications that his object is to free Italy from foreign domination, to make Italy free from the Alps to the Adriatic, and to '*rendre l'Italie à elle-même.*' There can be no reasonable doubt, therefore, that both France and Sardinia would unite with England in maintaining the principle that the Italians should be secured against foreign compulsion, and should be left free to determine, according to their own will, what shall be their future political condition. But what is the best time for endeavouring to establish this understanding? Shall we take steps now, or shall we wait till the Congress is assembled, and till some proposal is made by Austria or by the Pope, or by some

other Power, which would be at variance with our views? Common sense seems to point out that if such an understanding is to be aimed at, we ought to endeavour to establish it without delay, and not to allow France and Sardinia to go into Congress ignorant whether England would or would not support efficiently the principles which she has theoretically declared. To put off endeavouring to establish an understanding with France and Sardinia till after the Congress had met and had begun its discussions, would be the most unbusinesslike proceeding that could well be imagined, and would, in all probability, expose us to deserved disappointment. Austria does not trust thus to the chapter of accidents, but has been actively employed in canvassing for support to her views.

But what is the understanding or agreement which we ought to establish with France and Sardinia? Clearly a joint determination to prevent any forcible interference by any foreign Power in the affairs of Italy. This, it is said, would be a league against Austria. No doubt it would be, as far as regards the interference of Austria by force of arms in the affairs of Italy; and such a triple league would better deserve the title of holy alliance than the league which bore that name.

But such an engagement might lead us into war. War with whom? War with Austria. Well, suppose it did, would that war be one of great effort and expense? Clearly not. France, Sardinia, and Central Italy would furnish troops more than enough to repel any attempt which Austria could make to coerce Sardinia or Central Italy. Our share in such a war would be chiefly, if not wholly, naval; and our squadron in the Adriatic would probably be the utmost of our contribution, unless we were asked to lend a couple of regiments to garrison some point on the Adriatic, which, however, we should probably not be asked to do, and if asked, we might not consent to do. We ought not to be frightened by words; we ought to examine things. But is such a war likely? On the contrary, it is in the highest degree probable that such an engagement between England, France, and Sardinia would be the most effectual means of preventing a renewal of war in Italy. As long as England keeps aloof, Austria may speculate upon our joining her in a war between her on the one hand, and France and Sardinia on the other. It is so natural that we should side with France and Italy, that our holding back from doing so would be looked upon by Austria as a proof that there was some strong undercurrent which prevented us from doing so; and the Austrian

Government would not unnaturally reckon that when the war had broken out, that undercurrent would drive us to side with Austria against France; and this speculation would be a great encouragement to Austria to take a course leading to war. If, on the contrary, we make it publicly known that we engaged ourselves heartily on the side of France and Italy, it might be affirmed, as confidently as anything can be affirmed as to a future event, that there would be and could be no renewal of war in Italy, and the triple alliance, while it would be honourable to England (I might say, the only course that would be honourable to England), would secure the continuance of peace in Italy, and thereby avert one danger to the general peace of Europe.

But it is said we cannot trust the Emperor Napoleon, and when we had entered into this triple alliance, he would throw us over and make some arrangement of his own without consulting us. It is no doubt true that such was the course pursued by Austria during the war which ended in 1815. Austria took our subsidies, bound herself by treaty not to make peace without our concurrence, sustained signal defeat in battle, and precipitately made peace without our concurrence. But on what occasion has the Emperor Napoleon so acted? On none. He differed with us about certain conditions and the interpretation of certain conditions of the treaty of peace with Russia, but the points in dispute were settled substantially in conformity with our views. There is no ground for imputing to him bad faith in his conduct towards us as allies. But it is said that he has no steadiness of purpose, and the agreement of Villafranca is a proof of this. That agreement was certainly much short of the declarations of intention with which he began the war, but he had great difficulties of many kinds to contend with in further carrying on the war; and though we, as lookers on, may think, and perhaps rightly, that if he had persevered those difficulties would have faded away, yet there can be no doubt that he thought them at the time real; and he is not the only instance of a sovereign or a general who has at the end of a war or a campaign accepted conditions of peace less full and complete than what he expected or demanded when hostilities began.

But there is no ground for imputing to Napoleon unsteadiness of purpose in regard to his views about Italy. I have, during the last four or five years, had at different times opportunities of conversation with him upon many subjects, and, among others, upon the affairs of Italy, and I always found him strongly entertaining the same views and opinions which have

filled his mind since January of last year, in regard to forcing Italy from Austrian domination, and curtailing the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. There seems, therefore, no reason to apprehend that if we came to an understanding with France and Sardinia, for the purpose of maintaining the principle that no force should be employed to coerce the free will of the Italians, the Emperor Napoleon should turn round and leave us in the lurch. There is every reason, on the contrary, to be confident that by such an agreement with France and Sardinia, we should without war complete a settlement of Italy highly honourable to the Powers who brought it about, and full of advantage, not to Italy alone, but to Europe in general.

I have argued thus far on the supposition that the Congress will meet, and I think it most probable that it will meet. Austria and the Pope look to the Congress (mistakenly, I trust and believe, and mistakenly if the proposed concert with France and Sardinia is established) as the means by which the Arch-dukes are to be restored and Romagna brought back to obedience. These two Powers will not lightly let the Congress slip through their fingers. The Emperor Napoleon also wishes the Congress to meet, in order to relieve him from responsibility as to the settlement of Italy. The probability, therefore, is that the difficulty arising out of the pamphlet¹ will be got over, and that the Congress will meet. But if that difficulty should prove insurmountable, and the Congress should be given up, everything which I have said in this memorandum would equally apply; or rather, I should say, the necessity of coming to an agreement with France and Sardinia would be stronger still. In that case matters would have to be settled by diplomatic negotiation or by force of arms; and in either way an agreement between England, France, and Sardinia would carry into effect the objects which such an agreement might have in view.

It is said, however, that although the course now recommended might in itself be right and proper, it would not be approved by the country nor by Parliament.

My deliberate opinion is that it would be highly approved by the country, upon the double ground of its own merits, and

¹ *Le Pape et le Congrès*, by M. de la Guéronnière. Supposed to have been dictated by the Emperor himself. It advocated depriving the Pope of his temporal power except over the city of Rome. This pamphlet was the indirect cause of the failure of the Congress. Austria required from the French Government an undertaking not to support the measures advocated in it. France hesitating, Austria declined to appear at the Congress.

of its tendency to avert a rupture with France, and to secure the continuance of peace with our neighbour. I am equally of opinion that it would be approved by Parliament; but if, by any combination of parties, an adverse decision were come to, it would, in my opinion, be the duty of the Government to appeal from Parliament to the country. My belief is that such an appeal would be eminently successful; but if it were not, I would far rather give up office for maintaining the principle on which the course which I recommend would be founded, than retain office by giving that principle up.

PALMERSTON.

There was no need, however, of any formal league like this 'triple alliance.' The influence of the two Western Powers sufficed to restrain any forcible intervention, if such had been contemplated. In the month of March, Tuscany and Emilia declared by an immense majority in favour of annexation to Sardinia, and King Victor Emmanuel formally received them into the Piedmontese monarchy. Italy was already half-way on her road to unity.

The massacre of the Maronites by the Druses with the connivance of the local authorities in the neighbourhood of Beyrout and Damascus led this year to the despatch of English ships and French troops to Syria, under the provisions of a convention between the five Powers and Turkey, after we had declined a proposal made by France to invite the Viceroy of Egypt to Syria. Lord Palmerston consented, but unwillingly, to the expedition, fearing lest there would be much trouble in getting the French out again. This was, indeed, the case; for, although all danger of renewed violence had passed away by the time they arrived on the coast, it was not until the latter end of 1861 that they retired; and during this interval continuous representations to urge their departure were deemed necessary by the British Government. Before they left, however, the coercive influence of their presence had secured the due punishment of the guilty, and had enabled the British and French Commissioners to

establish a system of administration which brought about in the Lebanon a durable state of peace and good order.

Lord Palmerston had, no doubt, a personal partiality for Napoleon III., and fully acknowledged that his conduct had in many instances been that of an honourable ally, but he was not blinded to the tendency which this active-minded Prince, whose youth had been passed in schemes of personal ambition, had to the forming and nurturing of national projects which might be more or less inconvenient to his neighbours; and the English Government under Lord Palmerston, though very desirous to be friendly, would not in any emergency have been subservient to that of France. A short note to our ambassador at Paris may serve as an illustration:—¹

John Russell has shown me his private letter to you. I concur in all he says. We must not take the language of Thouvenel or the Emperor as ordinances from the book of fate. It is an old-established manœuvre to represent as settled and inevitable that which one desires to accomplish, and thus beforehand to deaden resistance by making people imagine it hopeless.

The Emperor's mind seems as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits, and, like rabbits, his schemes go to ground for the moment to avoid notice or antagonism.

We had no ground for war, and no sufficient reasons for war about Nice and Savoy, nor could we by any obvious means have prevented their annexation; but other questions may arise in regard to which England could not be thus passive.

The illustration was very apt that compared the French Emperor's mind to a rabbit warren, for he was constantly working underground, but at no great depth. In 1863, for instance, conversing with Nigra, the Italian minister at Paris, he told him that if the Italians wanted to get Rome they ought never to talk of it as their capital, just as he himself, desiring to have Brussels, never professed it openly, but proposed the

¹ To Lord Cowley, April 1860.

exact contrary, and that, in that way, he was more likely to get it than if he raised opposition by talking of it!

Lord Palmerston in the note quoted above pointed to questions in regard to which England could not remain passive. One was the question of Genoa. When, later on, it was suspected that France was to be repaid for her acquiescence in Garibaldi's conquest of Sicily and Naples by the cession of Genoa or the Island of Sardinia, he let it be understood that the fleet of England would not be a passive witness of the transaction. If any such intention existed—of which there is some evidence—his outspoken remonstrances acted as an effectual check to it.

He was not so successful in his efforts on behalf of Switzerland, whose position was greatly affected by the annexation of Savoy to France. The two districts of Chablais and Faucigny, bordering on the Lake of Geneva, had been declared by the treaties of 1815 to participate in the neutrality of Switzerland. It was at first hoped that the Emperor would consent to hand over these two northern districts of Savoy to the Swiss Confederation. When this expectation vanished, it was at any rate believed that France might be induced to cede a strip of territory, so as to leave the lake wholly to the Swiss, and to provide them with a strategic line on the frontier of the Valais. Lord Palmerston writes in this sense to the French Ambassador, and appeals with great tact to those considerations of generosity which, on paper at any rate, have so much apparent influence with Frenchmen.

94 Piccadilly: avril 17, 1860.

Mon cher Persigny,—Soyez bien convaincu que nous souhaitons sincèrement de nous entendre avec la France sur cette question Savoyardo-Suisse, mais dans cette discussion la France et l'Angleterre ne partent pas du même point de départ; chez nous, ici, l'habitude est de considérer les questions politiques d'après ce que nous croyons leur résultat pratique, et chez vous, en France, c'est trop l'habitude de traiter toutes les questions politiques, non pas sur le terrain du résultat pratique, mais sur

le terrain de l'amour-propre national, et, si vous me permettez de vous le dire, c'est surtout, lorsque les arguments vous manquent, qu'on se place à Paris le plus fortement sur le terrain de l'amour-propre. Cependant ce n'est pas là la bonne manière d'envisager les questions de haute politique; mais le vrai amour-propre national ne doit-il pas conseiller à faire ce qui est juste et généreux et honorable? et n'est-ce pas que la justice, la générosité et l'honneur conseilleraient à la France de satisfaire aux réclamations légitimes de la Suisse? La France a demandé à la Sardaigne une frontière stratégique pour la sûreté militaire de la France. Est-ce juste que la France ôte à la Suisse la frontière stratégique que l'Europe, la France elle-même incluse, avait donnée à la Suisse pour la sûreté du territoire de la Confédération? Tous les arguments dont la France s'est servie pour justifier sa demande, soutiennent plus encore la demande de la Suisse. Mais une grande Puissance et un grand Souverain, en traitant avec un voisin faible, devraient se montrer non-seulement justes, mais généreux; il n'est pas une faiblesse que d'agir ainsi, c'est une preuve de la conscience de sa force; mais avec l'Empereur des Français ce n'est pas seulement une question de générosité; la reconnaissance y entre pour sa part. C'est en Suisse que l'Empereur a fait ses premières études, et qu'il a commencé à développer ce caractère qui lui a valu, depuis, des succès si éclatants; c'est en Suisse plus tard, et dans des temps moins heureux que les dernières dix années, que l'Empereur a eu à se louer des procédés de la Suisse à son égard: il est impossible que l'Empereur ne sente pas de la bienveillance envers la Suisse. On croit en Europe que l'Empereur a donné à espérer aux Suisses, qu'après que la Savoie lui aurait été cédée par la Sardaigne, il donnerait à la Suisse les parties neutralisées; ne serait-ce pas inconséquent de leur refuser même la frontière stratégique dont ils seraient contents? Les bords du Lac de Genève et la ligne stratégique, qui couvre le Valais, paraissent essentiels pour la Suisse. Quant aux bords du Lac, il est à remarquer que de toutes les raisons stratégiques mises en avant par la France pour appuyer la demande de la cession de la Savoie, il n'y en a pas une qui s'applique aux bords du Lac de Genève, tandis que toutes ces raisons s'appliquent à la demande que fait la Suisse de ne pas avoir sur le Lac un voisin aussi puissant que la France. Les stipulations dont on parle, par lesquelles la France s'engagerait à n'avoir aucun bâtiment armé sur le Lac, et de ne construire aucune forteresse sur les bords, ne pourraient guère être prises au sérieux: il y a des in-

vasions morales, tout comme des invasions militaires, et il est essentiel à l'intérêt commun de l'Europe que la Suisse continue à rester Suisse ; il ne s'agit pas dans cette affaire d'une question entre la France et l'Angleterre : c'est un intérêt européen, et non pas un intérêt anglais, dont il s'agit, et c'est à l'Europe et non pas à l'Angleterre que la France doit des égards à ce sujet. Pourquoi la France ne prendrait-elle pas l'initiative dans cette affaire ? pourquoi ne se ferait-elle pas un mérite de contenter spontanément les justes désirs de ses voisins en Suisse ? ne serait-ce pas agir en grand Seigneur, et cela sans rien sacrifier qui soit essentiel aux vrais intérêts de la France ?

Soyez bien sûr que, dans les temps où nous vivons, la bonne opinion de l'Europe vaut tout autant qu'un petit bout de territoire.

All that was obtained, however, was an article in the Treaty of Cession declaring that the King of Sardinia could only transfer the neutralised parts of Savoy on the conditions upon which he himself possessed them.

There is no doubt that Lord Palmerston by this time had become really distrustful of the intentions of the Emperor Napoleon. His attitude about Savoy was coupled with the open avowals of some French officers that it was the intention of, and a necessity for, France to annex Geneva. Pamphlets supposed to be published by the Emperor's permission were appearing and advocating territorial changes. Ortéga, the martyr of the last Carlist rising, was reported to have declared that he had been encouraged in his enterprise by the Emperor ; while the Portuguese minister in London stated it to be generally believed in the Peninsula that the Emperor of the French had agreed with Count Montemolin that if the Carlist attempt succeeded, the price of the acknowledgment and support of France was to have been the advance of the French frontier from the Pyrenees to the Ebro, or else the cession of the Balearic Islands, and that Spain was to have been assisted by France in conquering and annexing Portugal. Reports of the Emperor's conversation, derived from unimpeachable sources, contained expressions of opinion

that it was necessary for France to obtain the Palatinate; and to acquire Saarbruck and Saarlouis, places which, indeed, became in 1870 the first point of his attack on Prussia. The general concurrence of many other such indications, some, no doubt, false, and each by itself perhaps trivial, gave strength to the distrust which Lord Palmerston had already felt at the end of the previous year, when he wrote to Lord John Russell.

Broadlands : November 4, 1859.

My dear John Russell,—Till lately I had strong confidence in the fair intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late I have begun to feel great distrust and to suspect that his formerly declared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant, and has not died away. He seems to have thought that he ought to lay his foundation by beating, with our aid, or with our concurrence, or our neutrality, first Russia and then Austria, and, by dealing with them generously, to make them his friends in any subsequent quarrel with us. In this, however, he would, probably, find himself mistaken; because with nations and governments resentments for former antagonism or gratitude for former benefits invariably give way to considerations of present and prospective interests; and Russia probably, and Austria certainly, would see no advantage in any great lowering of England for the augmentation of the preponderance of France. But this reasoning of mine may be wrong, and Russia, at least, might join France against us.

Next, he has been assiduously labouring to increase his naval means, evidently for offensive as well as for defensive purposes; and latterly great pains have been taken to raise throughout France, and especially among the army and navy, hatred of England, and a disparaging feeling of our military and naval means. All this may be explained away, and may be accounted for by other causes than a deliberate purpose of hostility to England; but it would be unwise in any English Government to shut its eyes to all these symptoms, and not to make all due preparations for the gale which the political barometer thus indicates, though it may possibly pass away. Of course we should take as ‘*argent comptant*’ all their professions of ‘*alliance intime et durable*,’ as Walewski termed it in his China despatch; and the only expression we ought to give of anything like suspicion should be in the activity and the scale

of our defensive arrangements. In regard to them, however, we must not be overruled by financial economy.

The incessant exertions which the French were making to place their navy upon the most complete and efficient footing did not tend to diminish the causes for anxiety. It was under these circumstances that Lord Palmerston urged forward our defensive preparations and the construction of fortifications, and encouraged the development of the Volunteer Rifle Movement. This was no mere 'invasion panic.' He felt that the salutary and restraining action of a great Power like England is not confined to the employment of physical force. If such a Power is known to be strong within itself, and capable of exertion when required, its diplomatic action will command attention, will often strongly influence the course of events, and, by dealing timely with beginnings, may prevent proceedings which, if unchecked, would lead to great and disastrous international convulsions.

Lord Palmerston, however, also feared direct action against England if we remained unprepared. He says in a letter to the Duke of Somerset :

I have watched the French Emperor narrowly, and have studied his character and conduct. You may rely upon it that at the bottom of his heart there rankles a deep and inextinguishable desire to humble and punish England, and to avenge, if he can, the many humiliations, political, naval, and military, which, since the beginning of this century, England has, by herself and her allies, inflicted upon France. He has sufficiently organised his military means ; he is now stealthily but steadily organising his naval means ; and, when all is ready, the overture will be played, the curtain will draw up, and we shall have a very disagreeable melodrama.

The following conversation with Count Flahault and the letter to Count Persigny are very characteristic. Lord Palmerston had an enviable power of telling hard truths under a sense of duty, while he avoided giving offence, owing to the frankness and geniality of his manner :—

*Memorandum of a Conversation with Count Flahault on Tuesday,
March 27, 1860.*

Count Flahault came to me at a quarter after four, just as I was going down to the House of Commons. He said he was going to Paris next morning, and he wished to know what he should say from me to the Emperor. I said I could not wait a minute, as I had to be in the House to answer a question, but that if he would go down with me in my brougham we might talk as we went along. To this he agreed. I then referred to what Lord John had said. He objected to that reference, saying that what had fallen from Lord John was personally offensive to the Emperor. I asked what part. He said not the latter part, which related to concert with other Powers; that was political, and could not be objected to; but Lord John had expressed distrust of the Emperor. I said distrust might be founded on either of two grounds: either upon the supposition of intentional deceit, or upon such a frequent change of purpose and of conduct as to show that no reliance could be placed upon the continuance of the intentions or policy of the moment, and Count Flahault must admit that, without imputing the first, there is ample ground for a feeling founded on the second consideration. Count Flahault said his great object was to prevent war between the two countries. I said that I feared the Emperor and Thouvenel had schemes and views which tended to bring about that result, and might array Europe against France. Count Flahault did not fear that, but was apprehensive that irritation on both sides might bring on war between England and France. I said that I was most anxious to prevent such a war; but if it was forced upon England, England would fearlessly accept it, whether in conjunction with a confederated alliance, or singly and by herself; that the nation would rise and rally as one man; although, speaking to a Frenchman, I ought perhaps not to say so, yet I could not refrain from observing that the examples of history led me to conclude that the result of a conflict between English and French, upon anything like equal terms, would not be unsatisfactory to the former.

Count Flahault said that he had been at the battle of Waterloo, and knew what English troops are, but that the French army now is far superior to that which fought on that day. I said no doubt it is, and so is the present English army; but with regard to the excellence of the French army, I would remind Count Flahault of what passed between Marshal Tallard

and the Duke of Marlborough, when the former was taken prisoner at the battle of Blenheim: 'Vous venez, milord,' said the Marshal, 'de battre les meilleures troupes de l'Europe.' 'Exceptez toujours,' replied Marlborough, 'celles qui les ont battues.' 'But,' said Count Flahault, 'what I fear is an invasion of this country, for which steam affords such facilities, and which would be disastrous to England.' I replied that steam tells both ways, for defence as well as for attack; and that as for invasion, though it would no doubt be a temporary evil, we are under no apprehension as to its results. That a war between England and France would doubtless be disastrous to both countries, but it is by no means certain which of the two would suffer the most.

Arrived at the House of Commons, we took leave of each other. Count Flahault said he should not say anything to the Emperor calculated to increase the irritation which he expected to find, but would endeavour to calm. I said that of course Count Flahault would judge for himself what he should say, but he must have observed what is the state of public feeling and opinion in this country. The conversation was carried on in the most friendly manner, as between two private friends who had known each other for a long course of years.

Broadlands : octobre 18, 1860.

Mon cher Persigny,—Borthwick s'est rendu ici il y a quelques jours, d'après votre désir, pour me donner communication de la conversation que vous avez eue avec lui.

La substance de ce qu'il m'a raconté comme le résumé de ce que vous lui avez dit est à peu près que l'Empereur souhaite, aujourd'hui comme toujours, paix avec tous et alliance avec nous; mais que le maintien de cette alliance dépend beaucoup de nous. Vous avez dit que dans les masses en France il y a mauvais vouloir envers l'Angleterre; que l'Empereur peut réprimer et contraindre ce sentiment, tant qu'il est aidé par une politique amicale de la part du Gouvernement anglais, et que ce qu'il faudrait de notre part, ce serait d'exprimer confiance en l'Empereur, et de nous abstenir de toute tentative d'organiser une coalition européenne contre la France. Que si nous devons poursuivre un autre et différent système, il y aurait danger de guerre entre les deux pays, chose que vous considéreriez comme déplorable pour les deux. Mais vous avez ajouté que dans l'état des préparatifs et des moyens guerriers sur terre et sur mer des deux pays, le résultat d'une telle guerre ne serait peut-

être pas favorable pour nous ; qu'avec vos bâtimens blindés vous pourriez détruire nos chantiers, et que le résultat d'une telle lutte serait peut-être de mettre la France à la tête d'une coalition européenne dirigée contre l'Angleterre, isolée par sa politique autant que par la géographie, et finalement vous avez suggéré l'idée que, lorsque je vais à Leeds vers la fin du mois prochain, je pourrais utilement pour les deux pays profiter de l'occasion pour exprimer dans un discours notre confiance en les intentions pacifiques et désintéressées de l'Empereur.

Eh bien ! je suis toujours bien aise d'apprendre, soit par les discours de l'Empereur, soit parce qu'on nous rapporte de ses conversations, que la politique extérieure de la France est pacifique et désintéressée ; et quant à la question de paix ou de guerre entre nos deux pays, vous pouvez être sûr qu'il n'y a personne en Angleterre qui voudrait la guerre, et qui ne désire pas la paix.

Mais pour ce qui regarde la guerre, l'histoire du passé nous rassure quant aux chances de l'avenir. Il n'y a certainement pas de nation qui puisse se vanter d'être plus brave que la nation française, mais je crois que nos hommes ont quelques dix minutes de ténacité de plus que les vôtres ; et lorsque le courage est égal des deux côtés, c'est la ténacité qui décide du sort du combat. Pour ce qui regarde l'application de la science et des arts mécaniques à la guerre, je crois qu'il n'y a pas grande différence entre les deux pays, soit pour les opérations sur terre, soit pour celles sur mer ; mais nous avons plus de fer et de charbon que vous, et notre industrie en ces matières est plus développée que la vôtre.

La grande différence entre les deux pays consiste en ceci, que tous nos préparatifs, soit militaires, soit navals, sont essentiellement défensifs, tandis que les vôtres ont du moins l'apparence d'être destinés pour des opérations offensives.

Si par conséquent les autres gouvernemens de l'Europe commencent, non pas à se coaliser pour attaquer la France, chose à laquelle la démente seule pourrait penser, mais pour s'entraider dans le cas où la France devenait agressive, ce sont les actes récents de la France et son attitude présente qui seuls en sont les causes. Mais ceci ne donne à la France aucun juste sujet de plainte. Il n'y a pas un homme en Angleterre qui songerait à organiser une coalition pour attaquer la France tranquille et paisible ; mais il n'y a pas un homme qui ne ferait son possible pour organiser une coalition, pour restreindre la France ambitieuse et envahissante.

Il résulte de tout ceci, que l'Empereur a entre ses mains les décisions de paix ou de guerre pour l'Europe. J'espère qu'il choisira la paix, et si cela est, nous l'aiderons de tout notre cœur à la maintenir.

Nous savons très-bien que, parmi les masses en France, il y a un mauvais vouloir envers l'Angleterre. Il n'est pas surprenant que les passions haineuses des nos guerres aient survécu plus longtemps en France que chez nous. Dans notre pays toute la population est si activement occupée de la vie politique du présent, qu'elle oublie bien vite le passé, et ne porte ses regards qu'à une petite distance dans l'avenir.

Chez vous en France, les masses ne prennent que peu de part à la vie politique du présent, et par conséquent elles retiennent beaucoup plus longtemps les souvenirs du passé, et elles tournent leurs regards plus activement vers l'avenir. Mais pour vous dire franchement la vérité, il nous revient de plusieurs personnes que les agents du Gouvernement français ne se montrent pas fâchés de voir ce mauvais vouloir se propager, s'accroître et se perpétuer.

Quant à Leeds, j'y vais pour rencontrer des ouvriers, et pour leur parler ménage et éducation, et non pas pour faire un discours politique.

Mille amitiés,
PALMERSTON.

At the same time he acquaints the English Ambassador at Paris with the correspondence that had taken place.

Broadlands : November 2, 1860.

My dear Cowley,—As you say that Persigny has only sent extracts from my letter, I think it right to send you a full copy of it, which I wish you to show to Thouvenel, because the first part of the letter accounts for my having written at all, and for that which I did write.

I could not consider Persigny's message, coming as he did straight from Paris, in any other light than as a sort of semi-official communication, and it was necessary for me to answer it civilly but firmly. I believe that I was not wrong in considering the communication as coming from superior authority at Paris, though possibly Persigny, in his zeal, may have added something of his own. He wrote me an answer, in which he pretty well admitted that Borthwick had faithfully rendered the substance of what had been said to him. I purposely

omitted to allude to one thing which Persigny had said, which was that if I did not adopt a friendly course towards France, I should be turned out at the beginning of next session by a coalition of Tories and Radicals upon the cry of peace against what they would represent a policy calculated to bring about a war with France. Other things which I have heard satisfy me that Persigny spoke by order and according to orders, and, therefore, the Emperor and his ministers ought not to be hurt or offended at the answer which it was impossible for me not to give. If Persigny had been able to come down here, the dialogue would have been by word of mouth instead of by letter, and it would, therefore, have been less formal. But pray assure the Emperor that my great wish and that of all my colleagues is to maintain the closest relations of friendship and alliance with France, and that it will certainly not be our fault if things should take a different course. But they must know that confidence depends upon facts, and not upon words and things which have happened, and language which has been held for some time past could not fail to inspire distrust as to the future; but that distrust has not been accompanied by the slightest feeling of hostility to France, and is purely and entirely a feeling of a defensive character.

The Emperor and those about him fancy we are making a coalition to attack France. We should be insane to do so. What would be the object of such an attack, and what possible hopes would anyone have of success?

France is an essential element in the balance of power in Europe, and, I may say, in the world. All that we want is, that France should be content with what she is, and should not take up the schemes and policy of the first Napoleon, which many things of late lead us to think she has an inclination to do. Of course if that system were again to be acted upon, it would be resisted now as it was before, but with earlier success. The seizure of Savoy and Nice and the breach of promise towards Switzerland about the cession to the Swiss of the neutralised district are matters which cannot be got over easily.

At Leeds he did not make a political speech, but was there in October to open a mechanics' institute and to converse familiarly, as he so well could, about the everyday life of his hearers. When one of the speakers, in a laboured oration, was enlarging on every

man having his own sphere, and that while the mechanic would be out of place as Prime Minister, the Premier would fail as a weaver, Lord Palmerston quickly replied, amid general laughter, 'Oh, my business is not to weave, but to unravel!'

There was one confederacy of a totally different kind from any that came across the path of his official duties which baffled his 'unravelling' powers this year. When the much-coveted 'blue riband' of the turf seemed just within his grasp, his horse Mainstone—third in the betting—unaccountably broke down, with strong suspicion of foul play. The entries in his list of interviews on the morning of Monday, May 21, are striking by their variety:—

John Day and Professor Spooner about Mainstone: settled he should run on Wednesday.—Shaftesbury about Church appointments.—Powell, to ask about Mainstone.—Sir Robert Peel, ditto.—Bernstorff to read me a despatch.—Sidney Herbert about his evidence to be given to-morrow before committee on army organisation.—Deputation from Manchester against intention of the House of Lords to throw out the repeal of the excise duty on paper.

The Derby Day being the next but one, we may be sure that on this morning the trainer and the veterinary were received with even more interest than the Prussian ambassador and the deputation. In spite of a bad report from the stable, Lord Palmerston rode down to Epsom on Wednesday to see Thormanby win and his own horse only come in somewhere about tenth. It was a great disappointment to him. He had never been so near taking the great prize of the turf, and he was convinced that if his horse had been fairly dealt with, it would at any rate have made a good show to the front. Lord Palmerston's connection with the turf extended over a long period, commencing in 1815, with a filly called Mignonette, at Winchester, and only ending with his death. He seldom betted, but raced from innate love of sport and horses. He

usually bred his animals himself, and named them after his farms. A visit to his three paddocks at Broadlands made his favourite Sunday afternoon walk. The interest he took in Turf matters, and the assistance which he gave to those responsible for them, were signally recognised when the Jockey Club in 1845 passed an unanimous resolution that their thanks should be offered to him for his invaluable services in revising the laws of the Turf, and that he should be requested to become an honorary member of the club, having been elected unanimously by a suspension of the rules. Changing his trainer after this Mainstone affair, and feeling very much disgusted at the state of the Turf, revealed, as he considered, by the treatment of his horse, he had no animal of any merit afterwards except Baldwin,¹ which he disposed of shortly before his death in the manner shown by the following letter :—

94 Piccadilly : July 31, 1865.

My dear Lord Naas,—I have been obliged to throw my horse Baldwin out of training, in order to prevent his becoming regularly lame.

I mean to devote the rest of his days to the production of good horses, and, if you like to accept him as a stallion for the Palmerstown breeding stud, I will gladly make him a present to that establishment, on the single condition that if at any time you found that he did not suit, he should be returned to me.

If you take him, you should send some trusty person to Broadlands to give him over to Ireland, and the sooner the better.

The session of 1860 offered many occasions on which the tact and good humour of the leader of the House of Commons were required. Conspicuous among these was the dispute about the paper duties, which threatened to disturb the mutual relations of Lords

¹ Baldwin was named by Lord Palmerston after Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker. The Admiralty had despatched a fast steamer to fetch Sir Baldwin back after he had sailed from Plymouth, but it could not catch him.

and Commons. The Upper House had thrown out, by a large majority, the Bill for the repeal of the excise duty on paper, and, by so doing, they undoubtedly usurped a power which, by the spirit of the Constitution, whatever might be its letter, rested solely with the Lower House. Lord Palmerston was not inclined to allow the misunderstanding to grow into a quarrel. He moved for a committee to enquire into precedents, and, on its report, proposed three resolutions which affirmed that the right of granting aids and supplies is in the Commons alone, and that although the Lords had exercised on some occasions the power of rejecting Bills relating to taxation by negating the whole, the House viewed such acts with peculiar jealousy, and reserved in their own hands the power so to frame Bills of Supply as to maintain their rights inviolate. He urged these resolutions on the acceptance of the House with great dexterity and, as it proved, with entire success. His position was difficult. There was indeed no case for a resolution at all; but while he wished to build a bridge for the retreat of the Lords, he had two colleagues in his Cabinet who were committed far too deeply by their expressions of wrath at what they termed an outrageous invasion of the liberties of the people to permit of their passing the matter over in silence. So he had, as a wise and moderate counsellor, to vindicate in his speech the rights of the Commons while sparing the susceptibilities of the Lords. The resolutions were adopted, the question rested for the remainder of this session, and the Bill passed the Upper House in the next.

Another matter of smaller moment served to illustrate his happy art of putting things. Mr. Horsman had raised a discussion which involved allusions to the connection between the Government and the press, and insinuated that the social influences of Cambridge House helped to sway the political leanings of one of the chief organs of public opinion. Lord Palmerston answered him as follows :—

My right honourable friend has stated that he did not know what the influence was which drew one of the editors or managers of the 'Times' to me; and if by that statement he means to imply a wish on my part to exercise any influence over the line of conduct which is pursued in the case of that journal, I can only say in answer to that charge, in the words of Mrs. Malaprop, that I should be but too glad to plead guilty to the soft impeachment, and to know that the insinuation which it involves was really founded on fact. If there are influences which, as the right honourable gentleman says, have fortunately led Mr. Delane to me, they are none other than the influences of society. My right honourable friend has observed, in that glowing address which he has just delivered, that the contributors to the press are the favourites and the ornaments of the social circles into which they enter. In that opinion he is, it seems to me, perfectly correct. The gentlemen to whom he refers are, generally speaking, persons of great attainments and information. It is, then, but natural that their society should be agreeable. My acquaintance with Mr. Delane is exactly of that character. I have had the pleasure of meeting him frequently in society, and he has occasionally done me the honour to join in society under my roof; that society was, I may add, composed of persons of all shades of politics and of various pursuits. I need hardly say I feel proud when persons so honour me without undertaking any other engagement than that which Mr. Delane always makes good—of making themselves agreeable during the time of their stay.

A tribute paid by the Lord Chancellor to Lord Palmerston's conduct of public affairs during this session is so forcible and compendious that I here insert it. Lord Westbury writes to him in the month of August :

I cannot close this note without expressing to you, with the most unfeigned sincerity, my admiration of your masterly leadership during this most difficult session. Great knowledge, great judgment, great temper and forbearance, infinite skill and tact, matchless courtesy, and great oratorical talent, rising with each important occasion, have in a most eminent degree marked your conduct of the Government and your leadership of the House of Commons. Those who know the secrets of the Cabinet must feel that none but you could have kept it together.

But what I esteem most is that happy quality you possess by which, whilst you receive the admiration, you at the same time win the affection of all around you.

We must remember that during all these years the Liberal party had only a small nominal majority of twenty in the House of Commons, and that the Cabinet, containing statesmen of marked individual importance, contained also strong elements of divergence, whether on matters of finance, of reform, or of foreign affairs. Lord Westbury was right in thinking that none but a minister possessing peculiar talent for reconciling, cementing, and commanding diverse idiosyncrasies could have overcome such obvious difficulties.

CHAPTER XVI.

STATE OF PARTIES—LORD WARDENSHIP OF THE CINQUE PORTS—
CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA—COTTON SUPPLY—TURKISH FINANCES
—VISIT TO HARROW—FATHER DALY—DEATH OF PRINCE CON-
SORT—‘TRENT’ AFFAIR—NATIONAL EXPENDITURE—CHURCH
PATRONAGE.

POLITICAL parties were in a singular jumble at the period which we have now reached. The Conservatives, alarmed at the ‘advanced’ tendencies of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, promised to refrain from all attempts to turn out the Liberal Premier, if only he would resist ‘democratic’ budgets, and keep his hands from any violent action against Austria. Needless to say that Lord Palmerston was too loyal to enter into any such secret understanding. The Radicals, on the other hand, hopeless of any effective pressure on their part, and impatient of the laggard steps of the Whig Cabinet, offered to help the Tories to turn out the existing Government, and to give the administration which would succeed a two years’ lease of power. They anticipated that by that time the country would be ready for such a Government and such a Reform Bill as they would themselves desire. Needless to say that the Conservatives were not so shortsighted as to accept such an alliance. The upshot was that Lord Palmerston, although with a small nominal majority, continued to hold an unassailable position both in the House and the country.

The very ancient and dignified office of Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports becoming vacant by the death of Lord Dalhousie in the spring of 1861, the dignity

was conferred by Her Majesty upon Lord Palmerston. It was at first intended that the post should not be filled up; but, on representations being made of the historical traditions which attached to it, and of the long line of illustrious men who had filled it, including during this century both Pitt and Wellington, the Premier rightly considered that, unless for some good reason, a link with the past so interesting in its character should not be lightly broken. The ancient residence of Walmer Castle still remained to the Lord Warden, although his emoluments, save a few droits of Admiralty, had disappeared. Lord Palmerston's installation took place at Dover with pomp and circumstance. Under the antiquarian care of the town-clerk all the old traditions had been unearthed and rusty ceremonies refurbished, and the new Lord Warden was conducted to the Bredenstone with due solemnity to take the oaths of office at a grand Court of Shepway. Lord Palmerston entered into the thing with proper spirit, and made an appropriate speech at the inaugural banquet, in which reminiscences of the past mingled with exhortations to the practice of modern patriotism.

But another penalty attached to the acceptance of the Lord Wardenship. It was a 'place of profit' (though of small profit) 'under the Crown.' So during the Easter recess he had to vacate his seat in Parliament, and was compelled to enjoy what the newspapers of the day called his 'favourite relaxation, when he had nothing else particular to do'—namely, the being returned for Tiverton. Of course the redoubtable Rowcliffe was on the watch, and from an open window near the hustings upbraided the Premier for his lukewarmness about reform. 'You come to Tiverton to gull the people, but you don't gull me. I have given the Whigs a long trial, but now I throw them over. Go back to Downing Street, and bring in an honest Reform Bill, and let us have no more double shuffle.' At the sound of the well-known accents Lord Palmerston came up smiling to the front, and, amid the cheers and laughter

of the crowd, turned his tormentor inside out, and then went down, shook hands with him, and gave him a receipt for the gout. This Tiverton butcher was a vulgar specimen, eager for notoriety; yet the spectacle of a Prime Minister, at the height of his power and popularity, giving himself as much pains to answer these taunts as if they had come from the Leader of the Opposition had its moral. In some countries the man would have been ejected, or at least hustled; but in England his rights as an elector were recognised both by the mob and the minister.

The great event of this year was, undoubtedly, the outbreak of the civil war in America. The English Government, though it recognised the Southerners as belligerents, proclaimed its neutrality and maintained it in spite of many temptations and frequent solicitations to take a different course. Not only were motions to that effect pressed upon them in both Houses of Parliament, but similar proposals were made to them by the French Government; but they early recognised that, if the war was to cease in any other way than by the complete success of the North, it was far better that it should so cease owing to a conviction on both sides that they could never live again happily as one community, than that the termination of hostilities should be brought about by the mediation or interference of any European Power. The sentiments which inspired the Cabinet may be gathered from the tone of the following short note, which I insert as contradicting the generally received impression of Lord Palmerston's hostility to the American Republic. It is quite true that he entertained a feeling of contempt, and even of dislike, for many of the men who from time to time occupied public positions in connection with the United States Government. He thought them deficient in honesty and offensive in tone—in short, not 'gentlemen,' in the sense which is independent of birth and depends solely upon character; but for the American people, apart from its politicians, he had that admiration and

regard which his truly English nature would necessarily feel for a free and kindred nation. To his correspondent who had been urging proposals for our mediation he writes :—

94 Piccadilly: May 5, 1861.

My dear Ellice,¹—The day on which we could succeed in putting an end to this unnatural war between the two sections of our North American cousins would be one of the happiest of our lives, and all that is wanting to induce us to take steps for that purpose is a belief that any such steps would lead towards the accomplishment of that purpose, and would not do more harm than good. The danger is that, in the excited state of men's minds in America, the offer of anyone to interpose to arrest their action, and disappoint them of their expected triumph, might be resented by both sides; and that jealousy of European, especially of English, interference in their internal affairs might make them still more prone to reject our offer as impertinent.

There would, moreover, be great difficulty in suggesting any basis of arrangement to which both parties could agree, and which it would not be repugnant to English feelings and principles to propose. We could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment of slavery and the principle that a slave escaping to a free soil State should be followed, claimed, and recovered, like a horse or an ox. We might possibly propose that the North and South should separate amicably; that they should make some boundary line, to be agreed upon, the line of separation between them; and that each confederation should be free to make for its own internal affairs and concerns such laws as it might think fit—the two confederations entering, however, into certain mutual arrangements as to trade and commerce with each other.

Do you think the time is come for any arrangement of such a kind? or is it not in the nature of things and in human nature that the wiry edge must be taken off this craving appetite for conflict in arms before any real and widespread desire for peace by mutual concession can be looked for?

For those who looked ahead the civil war threatened an early blow to English interests in the shape of the loss of our cotton supply. Lord Palmerston writes to

¹ Right Hon. Edward Ellice, M.P.

the President of the Board of Trade, to see if he could provide in any manner for the expected deficiency:—

94 Piccadilly: June 7, 1861.

My dear Milner Gibson,—It is wise when the weather is fine to put one's house in wind and water-tight condition against the time when foul weather may come on. The reports from our manufacturing districts are at present good; the mills are all working, and the people are in full employment. But we must expect a change towards the end of next autumn, and during the winter and the spring of next year. The civil war in America must infallibly diminish to a great degree our supply of cotton, unless, indeed, England and France should, as suggested by M. Mercier, the French Minister at Washington, compel the Northern States to let the cotton come to Europe from the South; but this would almost be tantamount to a war with the North, although not perhaps a very formidable thing for England and France combined. But even then this year's crop must be less plentiful than that of last year. Well, then, has the Board of Trade, or has any other department of the Government, any means of procuring or of helping to procure anywhere in the wide world a subsidiary supply of cotton? As to our manufacturers themselves, they will do nothing unless directed and pushed on. They are some of the most helpless and short-sighted of men. They are like the people who held out their dishes and prayed that it might rain plum-puddings. They think it is enough to open their mill-gates, and that cotton will come of its own accord. They say they have for years been looking to India as a source of supply; but their looks seem to have had only the first effect of the eyes of the rattlesnake, viz., to paralyse the objects looked at, and as yet it has shown no signs of falling into their jaws. The western coast of Africa, the eastern coast of Africa, India, Australia, the Fiji Islands, Syria, and Egypt, all grow great quantities of cotton, not to mention China, and probably Japan. If active measures were taken in time to draw from these places such quantities of cotton as might be procured, some portion at least of the probable falling off of this next year might be made good, and our demand this year would make a better supply spring up for future years. I do not know whether you can do anything in this matter; but it is an important one, and deserves early attention.

With his care for the preservation of the rights of the Ottoman Porte, Lord Palmerston had, of course, never ceased to keep a watchful eye on the proceedings of the French in Syria. He now writes to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and bases on the success of his endeavours in that quarter an exhortation to the new Sultan to abandon the architects and builders of Abdul Mejid for nobler agents and objects more worthy of an enlightened ruler. The years which have since elapsed have sufficiently shown how vain were the hopes of any such change; but it cannot be too clearly remembered that the keynote of Lord Palmerston's Eastern policy at the time of the Crimean War and for some time after was a sincere belief in the possibility, if not the probability, of the complete regeneration of Turkey, if the opportunity were offered to her. He died before the experiment could be finally pronounced a failure.

94 Piccadilly: June 26, 1861.

My dear Bulwer,—I am heartily glad we have got the French out of Syria, and a hard job it was to do so. The arrangement made for the future government of the Lebanon will, I dare say, work sufficiently well to prevent the French from having any pretext for returning thither. But the death of the late Sultan and the accession of the present one are the great and important events of the day, as bearing upon Eastern affairs. Abdul Mejid was a good-hearted and weak-headed man who was running two horses to the goal of perdition—his own life, and that of his empire. Luckily for the empire, his own life won the race. If the accounts we have heard of the new Sultan are true, we may hope that he will restore Turkey to its proper position among the Powers of Europe. If he will continue the system of Liberal toleration and progressive internal improvement established by his predecessor on paper, and in some cases and places carried into execution, and if he will apply to his empire the well-regulated economy with which he is said to have managed his own private affairs, he may be able to rescue his country from the downfall with which it has lately seemed to be threatened.

You will, of course, encourage him to follow such a course, and the present Grand Vizier will be a useful instrument for

such a policy. But the Sultan must begin by clearing out the Harem, dismissing his architects and builders, and turning off his robber ministers. The natural resources of the empire, intellectual, physical, and material, are great; and, if properly brought out and turned to account, would render Turkey a powerful and important state.

Lord Palmerston always entertained a great affection for Harrow, the place of his early education. Many a time did he ride down in the course of his life to revisit the old scenes, and this year he was present at an interesting ceremony, for he undertook to lay the foundation stone of the School Library, erected in honour of Dr. Vaughan, who had recently retired from the head-mastership. In spite of the pouring rain he went down on horseback, and was received by the assembled boys with great enthusiasm. He reminded them, in his speech, that the strength of a nation consists not so much in the number of the people as in the character of the men; and then, turning the rain to account, went on:—

We ought to pay due respect to those who form the character of the rising generation; who instruct them that self-control is better than indulgence; who tell them that labour is to be preferred to pleasure; and that whereas mere amusements may be compared to the southern breezes, which, though pleasant to be enjoyed, yet pass away and leave no trace behind them, honourable exertion, on the contrary, may be compared to the fertilizing shower which, though it may, as you all know at the present moment, not be agreeable to those who are exposed to it (laughter), yet nevertheless leaves, by enriching and improving the soil on which it falls, solid marks behind it by the ample and abundant harvest which it helps to create. I must, as a Harrow man, be permitted to say that Harrow has held its place in public estimation and public service by furnishing men distinguished the most in all the careers which they may have chosen for their future life. We have named the most distinguished in arms. We are proud of one name—a poet, Lord Byron—who here imbibed the first elements of that classical attainment which afterwards led to his high fame. We may boast—I speak now as a Harrow boy—that in the present

century four Harrow boys¹ have attained the post which I now have the honour to hold, and I trust that there are many other four Harrow boys who are destined to become distinguished men like those to whom I allude.

After this he rode back in the rain to pass the rest of the day and night on the Treasury Bench; being at the time close upon seventy-seven years of age.

The manner in which from his place on that bench he, this session, countermined the workings of an unscrupulous intriguer deserves notice as illustrative of his readiness of resource and knowledge of human nature. The Government had announced the withdrawal of a grant given by the Derby administration towards the maintenance of a mail-packet service between the port of Galway and the United States. Great indignation was excited by this withdrawal in those parts of Ireland which had expected to profit by the scheme; and a certain Father Daly, armed with credentials from influential quarters, came over to England, with the avowed design, by means of the Irish vote, to put the Government in a minority should it refuse to give way. He had an interview with Lord Palmerston, and threatened him with this party defection on the forthcoming Budget. Lord Palmerston merely replied, that he should go straight down to the House of Commons and relate exactly what had just passed between them. He did so in a manner both frank and amusing, and with such effect, that the Irish Liberals, even had they secretly nursed any thoughts of playing traitor to their party for the sake of local emoluments, became ashamed to appear as dancing to the wire-pulling of an Irish priest, and the Budget was saved.

Some of Lord Palmerston's views about contemporary Italian and American affairs are given in the following letter:—

¹ Perceval, Goderich, Peel, Aberdeen.

Broadlands : October 18, 1861. 3

My dear Russell,—First, as to Rome, I believe you are right in not instructing Cowley to make, at present at least, any suggestion to the Emperor as to a final arrangement of the question about the Pope. We could not suggest any arrangement which was not founded on the basis that Rome and its whole territory should be evacuated by the French ; that the Pope should have no temporal dominion over any part of the people of Italy, and that the city of Rome should be the capital of the Italian kingdom. But the first of these conditions would at once stop the discussion of the other two. Notwithstanding the affected regret of the Emperor at having been led to occupy Rome, it is, I think, pretty clear that he clings to the occupation of that central part of Italy, as affording him great military and political advantages which he is fully determined not at present to give up. He is ready there with his army of twenty-five thousand men, capable of being increased to any amount, either to take advantage of any successful disturbance in the Neapolitan territory, or to turn the flank of the Austrians in Venetia, or to pass over to Dalmatia, whenever it may suit him to quarrel with Austria—and he may very possibly do so next spring. But at all events his occupation of Rome, and the protection which he thus affords to Antonelli, the Pope, and King Francis in their intrigues, retards the consolidation of the unity of Italy and holds out to him a still glimmering ray of hope that he may succeed in his own scheme of an Italian confederation instead of an united kingdom. The course of events will settle the Papal question. Peter's pence will at last begin to fail ; and if the Pope will only put forth a few more allocutions, even good Catholics will become reconciled to the cessation of his temporal power. I think you are right in believing that the Emperor will turn Austria out of Venetia before he turns himself out of Rome ; and there can be little doubt that he remains in Rome for the purpose of being more easily able to turn Austria out of Venetia.

The arrangement you suggest by which Turkey would sell Herzegovina to Italy, and Italy would give it to Austria in exchange for Venetia, would be a very good one, but it would be hard to accomplish. Turkey would not easily be persuaded to sell Herzegovina, and Austria would not be more disposed to take that province in exchange for Venetia, to which she foolishly attaches great military importance. I suspect that

Austria will not give up Venetia till compelled to do so for nothing by defeat in war. It might be worth considering whether parties concerned might be sounded about some such plan—Turkey first, because the first cession would be made by her.

As to North America, our best and true policy seems to be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the conflict between North and South. It is true, as you say, that there have been cases in Europe in which allied Powers have said to fighting parties, like the man in the 'Critic,' 'In the Queen's name I bid you to drop your swords ;' but those cases are rare and peculiar. The love of quarrelling and fighting is inherent in man, and to prevent its indulgence is to impose restraints on natural liberty. A state may so shackle its own subjects ; but it is an infringement on national independence to restrain other nations. The only excuse would be the danger to the interfering parties if the conflict went on ; but in the American case this cannot be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.

I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress created by that want was far more serious than it is likely to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply than usual from other quarters.

The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of our fellow-countrymen.

Towards the end of the year 1861 two events, very different in their nature, but alike sudden and startling, highly excited the public mind. I refer to the illness and death of the Prince Consort and the seizure of the Confederate envoys on board the British mail-steamer 'Trent,' which brought us to the verge of a war with the United States. During the simultaneous interval of suspense, Lord Palmerston was laid up with an attack of gout, the worst in his whole life. No doubt his symptoms were aggravated by the anxieties of the moment ; and I remember that both his hands and both his feet were completely crippled, and that he was unable for a fortnight even to open a letter for himself. Yet

he never abandoned his post. Daily communications with the physicians in attendance at Windsor, urging, perhaps with unnecessary precaution, the summoning of additional advice, daily communications and interviews with those charged with the duties of negotiation or of preparation for war, showed that the spirit was not daunted by the pain and prostration of the body. He felt the death of the Prince Consort most acutely, and looked upon it as an irreparable loss. As to the dispute with America, he regarded the despatch of the Guards and other troops to Canada before the arrival of a reply to our demand for a surrender of the captives as the best means of averting war, and so it proved. Although by certain organs of the peace party it was denounced as an irritating measure, it was no such thing, but the one way of showing, without offence to the United States Cabinet, that England was in earnest. It was only by extraordinary exertions that the troopships were enabled to reach the St. Lawrence before the river navigation was closed by ice.

During these years there was constant friction at work between the two wings of the Liberal party about the national expenditure; both parties apparently agreeing as to the ends to be attained, but differing as to the necessary means. In 1862 Mr. Stansfeld, as spokesman of the one section, moved a resolution in the House that the national expenditure was capable of reduction without compromising the safety or the legitimate influence of the country. Lord Palmerston met this by a counter-resolution, by which the House, acknowledging the obligations of economy, declined to bind themselves to any declaration beyond a trust that such further reductions might be made as the future state of things might warrant. The two following letters refer to this question of outlay on the army and navy, and to his disinclination to rest upon shifts and chances when the position of England was concerned:—

94 Piccadilly : January 8, 1862.

My dear Mr. Cobden,—I have many apologies to make to you for not having sooner acknowledged the memorandum which you sent me some time ago suggesting an understanding and agreement between the Governments of England and France about the number of ships of war which each of the two countries should maintain. It would be very delightful if your Utopia could be realised, and if the nations of the earth would think of nothing but peace and commerce, and would give up quarrelling and fighting altogether. But unfortunately man is a fighting and quarrelling animal; and that this is human nature is proved by the fact that republics, where the masses govern, are far more quarrelsome, and more addicted to fighting, than monarchies, which are governed by comparatively few persons. But so long as other nations are animated by these human passions, a country like England, wealthy and exposed to attack, must by necessity be provided with the means of defence, and however expensive these means may be, they are infinitely cheaper than the war which they tend to keep off.

94 Piccadilly : April 29, 1862.

My dear Gladstone,—I read with much interest, as I came up yesterday by the railway, your able and eloquent speeches at Manchester; but I wish to submit to you some observations upon the financial part of the second speech. You seem in that speech to make it a reproach to the nation at large that it has forced, as you say it has, on the Parliament and the Government the high amount of expenditure which we have at present to provide for. Now I do not quite agree with you as to the fact; but admitting it to be as you state, it seems to me to be rather a proof of the superior sagacity of the nation than a subject for reproach.

The main sources of increased expenditure have been army, navy, and education. As to education, the increase has arisen from the working of a self-acting system. We may not have had the full value of our money, but we have derived great advantage from the outlay.

Now as to the augmentation of our military and naval means of defence, I cannot give to the nation, contradistinguished from Parliament and Government, the exclusive merit of having demanded them. It appears to me that the merit, as I call it, is equally to be shared by the nation, Parliament, and Government. Successive Governments have taken the lead by pro-

posing to Parliaments such estimates as, acting upon their responsibility, they thought needful for the public service; successive Parliaments have sanctioned those estimates, and the nation has ratified those acts by their approval. It is, therefore, a mistake to say that this scale of expenditure has been forced upon Parliament or upon the Government; and it is a still greater mistake to accuse the nation, as Cobden does, of having rushed headlong into extravagance under the impulse of panic. Panic there has been none on the part of anybody. There was for a long time an apathetic blindness on the part of the governed and the governors as to the defensive means of the country compared with the offensive means acquired and acquiring by other Powers. The country at last awoke from its lethargy, not indeed to rush into extravagance and uncalled-for exertions, but to make up gradually for former omissions, and so far, no doubt, to throw upon a shorter period of time expenses which earlier foresight might have spread over a greater length of time. The Government, the Parliament, and the nation acted in harmonious concert; and if any proof were wanting that the nation has been inspired by a deliberate and sagacious appreciation of its position with respect to other Powers, that proof has been afforded by the long-continued and well-sustained sacrifices of time and money which have been made by the 160,000 Volunteers, and by those who have contributed to supply them with requisite funds.

But have the Government, or rather have both Liberal and Conservative Governments, have the Parliament and the nation been wrong, and have Bright and Cobden been right? I venture to think that the Government, the Parliament, and the nation have taken the juster view of what the state of things required.

We have on the other side of the Channel a people who, say what they may, hate us as a nation from the bottom of their hearts, and would make any sacrifice to inflict a deep humiliation upon England.

It is natural that this should be. They are eminently vain, and their passion is glory in war. They cannot forget or forgive Aboukir, Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo, and St. Helena.

Increased commercial intercourse may add to the links of mutual interest between us and them; but commercial interest is a link that snaps under the pressure of national passions. Witness the bitter enmity to England lately freely vented, and now with difficulty suppressed, by those Northern States of

America with whom we have had a most extensive commercial intercourse. Well, then, at the head of this neighbouring nation, who would like nothing so well as a retaliatory blow upon England, we see an able, active, wary, counsel-keeping, but ever-planning sovereign; and we see this sovereign organising an army which, including his reserve, is more than six times greater in amount than the whole of our regular forces in our two islands, and at the same time labouring hard to create a navy equal to, if not superior to ours. Give him a cause of quarrel, which any foreign Power may at any time invent or create, if so minded; give him the command of the Channel, which permanent or accidental naval superiority might afford him, and then calculate if you can—for it would pass my reckoning power to do so—the disastrous consequences to the British nation which a landing of an army of from one to two hundred thousand men would bring with it. Surely even a large yearly expenditure for army and navy is an economical insurance against such a catastrophe.

To the argument that, ample financial means being necessary for national defence, we should devote our principal attention during peace to the husbanding of our resources, he used to reply, that if a war should suddenly come, as it might have come, with France about Tahiti, or with America about the ‘Trent,’ the want of ships, troops, guns, and dockyard defences would be ill made up for by the fact that some hundreds of merchants and manufacturers had made large fortunes; for that this ‘would only be offering to the butcher a well-fatted calf instead of a well-armed bull’s head.’ When it was urged that our measures of preparation made the French angry, he answered that it was so only because these preparations rendered us secure against the effects of French anger. ‘The anger of a Power no stronger than ourselves may be borne, with regret no doubt, but without alarm. The anger of a Power greatly and decidedly stronger must cause apprehension, and is likely to lead to humiliation or disaster.’

He was also very watchful at this time for the security of our Canadian frontier, in presence of the strife

in the United States, and insisted on an increase to our regular force in Canada, in order, by so doing, to 'keep the United States Government in check, to give spirit and confidence to our own people in the provinces, and to take the best chance for the continuance of peace.'¹

Towards the end of the session Mr. Cobden made a vigorous attack upon Lord Palmerston and his conduct of affairs. The Prime Minister was accused of playing false to the professions of Reform which had, it was alleged, been freely made, if not by himself at any rate by many of his followers, when Radical support was wanted to oust the Tories. He was charged with owing his retention of power to the support of his political adversaries, who had more confidence in him than in their own leader. Mr. Cobden asserted that, what with fortifications, ironclads, wars in China, and reinforcements sent in haste in every direction, whether to Canada, during the 'Trent' affair, or elsewhere, Lord Palmerston had cost the country one hundred millions, which, he maintained, was too heavy a price even for such a bargain. Lord Palmerston replied with quiet confidence and imperturbable good humour. He left the charge of lukewarmness about Reform as one for which the country, and not he, was responsible; but, acknowledging the other points, he sarcastically thanked Mr. Cobden most warmly for having drawn attention to the successful efforts which the Government had made for the preservation of the honour, the safety, and the interests of the empire. The very acts which Mr. Cobden urged as calling for censure he claimed as those which deserved the chief approbation of the House, which, nothing loath, testified their accord in this view. Both sides of the British House of Commons are always ready to support a Minister whose extravagance, even if it deserve that name, is in their belief honestly intended for the maintenance of the national interests, and not merely for the promotion of the interests of a class or a party.

¹ To Duke of Newcastle: September 1, 1861.

The Church patronage which Lord Palmerston administered during his two premierships was so large, that the principle on which he declared himself to act, and on which, indeed, he consistently did act, is worth reading in his own words. I can certainly of my own knowledge assert, that the one way in which a clergyman could make it certain that he would not get preferment was to commence his letter of application by a statement of his political opinions, thus making them a ground of claim. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Carlisle, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland :—¹

I have never considered ecclesiastical appointments as patronage to be given away for grace and favour, and for personal or political objects. The choice to be made of persons to fill dignities in the Church must have a great influence on many important matters ; and I have always endeavoured, in making such appointments, to choose the best man I could find, without any regard to the wishes of those who may have recommended candidates for choice.

I conclude this chapter with a short but suggestive note about Slavery and the Board of Admiralty :—

August 13, 1862.

My dear Russell,—No First Lord and no Board of Admiralty have ever felt any interest in the suppression of the slave trade, or taken of their own free will any steps towards its accomplishment, and whatever they have done in compliance with the wishes of others they have done grudgingly and imperfectly. If there was a particularly old slow-going tub in the navy, she was sure to be sent to the coast of Africa to try to catch the fast-sailing American clippers ; and if there was an officer notoriously addicted to drinking, he was sent to a station where rum is a deadly poison.

Things go on better now ; but still there is at the Admiralty an invincible aversion to the measures necessary for putting down the slave trade. These prejudices are so strong with the naval officers of the Board, that the First Lord can hardly be expected not to be swayed by them.

¹ Walmer Castle : August 17, 1862.

For nothing will Lord Palmerston be more honourably remembered than for his long and successful efforts for the suppression of the slave trade and the discouragement of slavery. From the moment that he was called to the Foreign Office in 1830, he entered warmly into the subject, and with his whole heart laboured for their extinction. He sought to engage all maritime states in one great network of treaties for the combined annihilation of this nefarious traffic in human beings, and to a large extent he succeeded. Some of the Spanish and other diplomatists used to be quite surprised at what they thought his craze, and were fain to humour him on, what they considered, so insignificant a matter. When action succeeded to negotiation—as, for instance, in the decisive blow dealt in 1840 at the Portuguese slave-dealers by the destruction of their barracoons on the West Coast of Africa—he never allowed any consideration for the susceptibilities or anger of foreign Governments to induce him to halt in his course. On the contrary, when the country, sick with deferred hopes and aghast at the expense of the necessary squadrons, seemed at one moment disposed to flinch, his earnest language, conveying lofty aspirations, maintained its spirit and strengthened it for renewed efforts.

CHAPTER XVII.

RUSSIA AND POLAND—VISIT TO SCOTLAND—PROPOSED CONGRESS—
 DENMARK AND SLESWIG-HOLSTEIN — LONDON CONFERENCE —
 DANISH DEBATE — VISIT TO NORTHAMPTONSHIRE — CRIMINAL
 LUNACY—CUBAN SLAVERY—IRISH CATHOLICS—CONVOCATION—
 LAST ILLNESS AND DEATH.

As Premier, Lord Palmerston kept a watchful eye over the proceedings of all the departments of his Government, and was an unwearied attendant on the sittings of the House of Commons, ready at any moment to smooth a difficulty or avert a storm. But he was very chary of speech; and when there was nothing particular to say he did not attempt to say it. The session of 1863 was entirely deficient of any subject of debate, domestic or foreign, which could call for any lengthened interposition on his part, with the exception of the question of Poland; and while this was being discussed he was kept away by an attack of his old enemy the gout.

The immediate cause of the Polish outbreak was a seizure by the Russian Government of all the young men in the cities whom they had reason to believe were disaffected, and their enrolment in the ranks of the army under the name of a conscription, or 'partial recruiting.' In fact, to use the words of our ambassador at Petersburg, it was 'a simple plan, by a clean sweep of the revolutionary youth of Poland, to kidnap the opposition and to carry it off to Siberia or the Caucasus.' No wonder that this produced resistance. Those who escaped took to the woods and organized themselves in armed bands.

Lord Palmerston writes to 'condole' with the Russian ambassador:—

4 février 1863.

Mon cher Brunnow,—Je regrette beaucoup les insurrections qui ont éclaté en Pologne et en plusieurs des provinces de la Russie, parce que ces mouvements produiront de grands malheurs dans le pays, et parce que beaucoup d'hommes qui devraient se rendre utiles à leur patrie payeront de leur sang, ou par l'exil, la révolte dont ils ont été coupables.

Mais, quant au Gouvernement russe, je considère ces insurrections comme une juste punition du Ciel, pour les menées dont ce Gouvernement a été coupable, pour préparer pour le printemps des révoltes et des insurrections dans Moldo-Wallachie, en Servie et en Bosnie, contre le Sultan.

. Non lex est justior ulla,
Quam necis artifices arte perire sua.

Il est vrai que ces insurrections, ou éclatées, ou préparées, ne menacent de mort ni l'Empire russe ni l'Empire ottoman; la Russie saura mettre ordre dans les provinces et la Porte saura apprendre à Couza, au Prince de Servie et aux Bosniacs, qu'il est mieux de rester fidèle à son Souverain que d'écouter les conseils subversifs d'un voisin ambitieux.

Mais, pour le moment, la Russie souffre dans son intérieur le mal qu'elle a l'intention d'infliger à un voisin inoffensif. Vous concevez bien que je parle maintenant des cent mille et plus de fusils que le Gouvernement russe a envoyés en Servie et en Bosnie par des chemins détournés, et avec toutes les précautions pour cacher, autant que possible, ce que l'on faisait, et je fais allusion aussi à cette nuée d'agents provocateurs qui, venant de la Russie, abondent et travaillent dans les provinces Européennes de la Turquie. Si le Prince Gortschakoff était ami autant à moi comme vous l'êtes, je me serais adressé à lui au lieu de vous écrire, mais j'aimerais beaucoup qu'il sût l'impression que sa politique a faite sur nous.

Mille amitiés,

PALMERSTON.

General disgust had been excited throughout Europe by the Prussian Government having entered into a convention with Russia whereby the troops of either were authorised to cross the frontier, and pursue the Polish insurgents into the territory of the other. The following extract from a letter to the King of the Belgians shows

that, however much Lord Palmerston disapproved of this active assistance being given by Prussia to one of the two contending parties, he was not going in consequence to allow England to become the cat's-paw of an ambitious neighbour:—¹

Your Majesty will have learnt that we declined to fall into the trap which the Emperor of the French laid for us by his scheme for a violent identical note to be presented to the Government of Prussia.

It was evidently intended that the demands of such a note being refused, or evaded, a pretence would thereby have been afforded to France for an occupation of the Prussian Rhenish provinces, and the French Government have shown much ill-humour at the failure of that scheme. But the danger to Prussia and to other States is not over. If the Polish Revolution goes on, and Prussia is led to take an active part in any way against the Poles, the Emperor of the French is sure, sooner or later, and upon some pretext or other, to enter the Rhenish provinces as a means of coercing Prussia to be neutral. Your Majesty would render an essential service to Prussia and to Europe if you could exert your influence with the King of Prussia to abstain from any action of any kind whatever beyond the frontiers of his own territory.

During the ensuing months the British and Russian Governments were engaged in a long correspondence. Lord Russell proposed a suspension of arms, and a conference of the eight Powers to settle the affairs of Poland, on the basis of national representation, liberty of conscience, establishment of a legal system of recruiting, and Polish administration of the country. The communications which were exchanged were couched in friendly, though very frank terms, but they yielded no visible fruit, Russia declining to accede to the English proposals. At one moment England, France, and Austria contemplated combining together in order to create a semi-detached state in Poland, but as Austria soon drew back the project fell to the ground. The feeling, however, which the reports of Russian misdeeds in Poland, whether exaggerated or not, had excited in

¹ To the King of the Belgians: March 13, 1863.

the public mind, compelled the organ of the British Government to put on record such observations as he considered himself entitled to make, England having been a party to the Treaty of Vienna whereby Poland was secured to Russia.

In the spring of this year Lord Palmerston went to Scotland to deliver an address on being installed as Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow. He also visited Edinburgh, where he received the freedom of the city and an honorary degree at the University. He was received everywhere with marked enthusiasm. As he went down the Clyde in a small steamer to Greenock, both banks of the river were lined with thousands of workmen, who had left their work to catch a glimpse of the Premier on the paddlebox, and to cheer him as he passed. The captain of the guard-ship, anxious to do honour to the occasion, was hindered by the fact that a Prime Minister was not recognised in the code of naval salutes ; but he found an escape from his dilemma in the discovery that Lord Palmerston was not only First Lord of the Treasury, but also Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, for which great officer a salute of nineteen guns was prescribed—an apt instance of the minor anomalies of the Constitution under which we live.

Before the end of the Glasgow visit an incident occurred which illustrates the fun and simplicity that characterised Lord Palmerston to the end of his life. A number of gentlemen had confederated themselves together under the title of the 'Gaiter' Club, with power to add to their number. This club had no local habitation, but only a name. Its objects, beyond a mild pedestrianism, were left undefined, but embraced all that could be comprised under the mysterious, yet far-reaching head of 'gaiterdom.' This body was about to entertain at a breakfast one of their number on his return from China, namely, that distinguished officer Admiral Sir James Hope, and they determined to profit by the opportunity to invite Lord Palmerston to become a 'Gaiter.' He entered with becoming zest into the

Scotch humour of the thing, and in acknowledging the honour conferred upon him spoke without rising (every Gaiter being bound to speak sitting), and with appropriate brevity, 'that whether the gaiters which the members wore were long or short, of which he was ignorant, of this he was quite sure, that his memory of that day would be as long as they could possibly desire.' It had devolved upon Dr. Norman M'Leod, one of the Queen's chaplains, and also chaplain to the club, to propose that the new member should be received. Those who remember his rich vein of humour, and the solemn fun which he kept ready for appropriate occasions, can picture for themselves the manner in which he spoke as follows: That he had been lately staying at Balmoral; that he had taken the opportunity of informing Her Majesty that it was contemplated by the gentlemen he now had the honour of addressing to make Lord Palmerston a 'Gaiter;' and that it was only due to Her Majesty that, before so grave a step was taken, she should be asked for Her gracious permission. That Her Majesty had, after much consideration, replied, that although, no doubt, it was a dangerous thing for any subject to be both Prime Minister and a 'Gaiter,' still, considering Lord Palmerston's great services, and, above all, his age and experience, which would preserve him from any abuse of the power conferred upon him, she would, in his favour, waive her objections. The party had broken up laughing, when it was discovered that a 'Times' reporter had been present the whole time, and it was feared that he might, perhaps, be a Scotchman who had neither undergone operation by a surgeon, nor milder treatment by a 'Gaiter,' in order to admit the joke. Dr. M'Leod had really just come from Balmoral, and in panic terror lest all he had said might appear in the next day's 'Times,' he rushed from the room, called a cab, and hurried to the railway in time to catch the reporter before his parcel left. No doubt the precaution was unnecessary, but the witty chaplain's agony of mind was none the less diverting.

At Edinburgh Lord Palmerston climbed to the top of Arthur's Seat, and wrote to his brother-in-law that he really felt very little more difficulty in so doing than when he used to mount it daily sixty years before. The past was also recalled to him by a visit which he paid to an old woman named Peggie Forbes, who had been servant at Dugald Stewart's when he was studying there in 1801. She produced an old box of tools, which she had preserved all these years because it had been the property of 'young Maister Henry.'

The French Emperor now sent letters to the different sovereigns of Europe, proposing the assembling of a Congress, and suggesting Paris as the place of meeting. 'It is on the Treaty of Vienna,' he said, 'that now reposes the political edifice of Europe, and yet it is crumbling away on all sides.' The British Government declined the invitation. Some of Lord Palmerston's remarks upon it are contained in the following letter:—¹

94 Piccadilly : November 15, 1863.

Sire,—The subject to which Your Majesty's letter relates is one of very great importance and deserving of mature consideration. Our answer to the Emperor's proposal has been, in substance, that we do not admit that the Treaties of Vienna have ceased to be in force, inasmuch as, on the contrary, they are still the basis of the existing arrangements of Europe; that, with regard to the proposed Congress, before we can come to any decision about it, we should like to know what subjects it is to discuss, and what power it is to possess to give effect to its decisions.

My own impression is that the Congress will never meet, and that the Emperor has no expectation that it should meet.

The truth is that the assembling of a Congress is not a measure applicable to the present state of Europe.

In 1815 a Congress was a necessity. France had overrun all Europe, had overthrown almost all the former territorial arrangements, and had established a new order of things. Then came the returning tide of the Allied Armies overturning everything which France had created, and establishing, for the moment, military occupation of the greater part of Europe. It

¹ To the King of the Belgians.

was absolutely necessary to determine to whom, and in what portions, and on what conditions, the vast regions reconquered from France should be thenceforward possessed. The Powers whose armies had made this reconquest were the natural and indeed the only arbiters; and they had, by their armies, the means of carrying their decisions into effect.

Nothing of the kind exists in the present state of Europe. There are no doubts as to who is the owner of any piece of territory, and there are not even any boundary questions in dispute.

The functions of a Congress, if now to be assembled, might be twofold, and would bear either on the past or on the future, or on both. Drouyn says that the Congress might take up the treaties of 1815, go through them article by article, strike out whatever has been repealed or set aside, and re-enact the remainder as the Treaty of 1863-64, the name of which would be less disagreeable to France than that of the Treaty of 1815, which brings to mind Waterloo and St. Helena. This may be a natural feeling for France; but it is no good reason why all the rest of Europe should meet round a table to please the French nation; and those who hold their estates under a good title, now nearly half a century old, might not be particularly desirous of having it brought under discussion with all the alterations which good-natured neighbours might wish to suggest in their boundaries.

No doubt there have been some not unimportant changes made in the territorial arrangements of Europe established by the Treaty of 1815; but some of these were made regularly by treaty at the time, and the others, not so made, some of the parties to the Congress might not like to sanction by treaty acknowledgment.

Chief among the first class is the separation of Belgium from Holland; but that was solemnly sanctioned by negotiations the length of which I cannot easily forget, and by a treaty between the five Powers and Holland and the German Diet. That transaction requires no confirmation. Chief among the second class was the absorption of Cracow by Austria without any treaty sanction; and to that transaction the British Government, which protested against it at the time, would not be greatly desirous of giving retrospective sanction by treaty now. Then come the cession of Lombardy to Italy, and of Savoy and Nice to France. These were legally made by the rightful owners of the ceded territory, and no confirmation can

be required. There was indeed, in the case of Savoy, an omission to attach to the territory as conveyed to France the condition of neutrality as to Chablais and Faucigny, subject to which the King of Sardinia held Savoy ; but it may be doubted whether France would consent to undertake that condition ; and its real value, either for Switzerland or Italy, might, after all, be trifling. Then comes the absorption into the kingdom of Italy of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Emilia, Naples, and Sicily. These were all violations of the Treaty of Vienna, done without treaty sanction ; but they were the will of the people of those countries. Those transactions have been virtually sanctioned by all the Powers who have acknowledged the King of Italy ; and if Victor Emmanuel is wise, he would be content with leaving those matters as they are, the more especially because if a new European treaty were to describe the kingdom of Italy as it now is, that treaty would be a virtual renunciation by the King of Italy to any claim to Venetia and Rome. On the other hand, Austria and the Pope would hardly be prepared to give their formal sanction to the acquisitions made by the Italian kingdom.

As to the past, therefore, the functions of the Congress would either be unnecessary or barred by insurmountable difficulties.

But then as to the future ? Would the Congress have to range over the wide and almost endless extent of proposed and possible changes, or would it have to confine itself to questions now practically pending ? There are but two such questions : the one relating to Poland, the other to the difference between the German Confederation and Denmark about Holstein and Lauenburg and about Sleswig. As to Poland, would Russia be more likely to yield in a Congress than she has shown herself to be in a negotiation ? I much doubt it. And as to the question between Germany and Denmark, a smaller machinery than a European Congress might surely be sufficient to solve that question.

But if the Congress were to enter upon the wide field of proposed and possible changes of territory, what squabbles and animosities would ensue ! Russia would ask to get back all she lost by the Treaty of Paris ; Italy would ask for Venetia and Rome ; France would plead geography for the frontier of the Rhine ; Austria would show how advantageous it would be to Turkey to transfer to Austria Bosnia or Moldo-Wallachia ; Greece would have a word to say about Thessaly and Epirus ;

Spain would wonder how England could think of retaining Gibraltar; Denmark would say that Sleswig is geographically part of Jutland, and that, as Jutland is an integral part of Denmark, so ought Sleswig to be so too; Sweden would claim Finland; and some of the greater German states would strongly urge the expediency of mediatizing a score of the smaller Princes.

If the members of the Congress should be unanimous in agreeing to any of these proposals, of course there would be no difficulty in carrying a unanimous decision into effect; but if a majority were one way, and a minority, however small, the other way, that minority including the party by which a concession was to be made, is it intended that force should be used, or is the Congress to remain powerless to execute its own decrees?

In the face of all these difficulties, my humble opinion is that no Congress will meet; and I shall be glad to think that the Emperor will have mended his position at home by making the proposal, while its failure will have saved Europe from some danger and much embarrassment.

Lady Palmerston desires me to tender to your Majesty her sincere thanks for your condescending message; and we both are greatly delighted at the prospect which your Majesty's letter holds out to us of the possibility of having, in the course of the winter, the honour of receiving your Majesty at Broadlands.

And a fortnight later he writes to Lord Russell:—¹

The state of Europe in 1815 was wholly different, from what it is now. At that time the success of French arms had swept away most of the territorial boundaries and separate sovereignties which existed before 1792. The tide of conquest which at first ran from west to east, then returned back from east to west, and swept away almost all that France had established. Europe was a political waste, and required the action of a body of inclosure commissioners to allot the lands, and to give holding titles. This was done at Vienna in 1814 and 1815. But nothing of the kind exists in 1863, and nobody wants an improved title to any possession except those who ought not to get it; as, for instance, Russia to the kingdom of Poland, Austria to Cracow, France to Savoy without neutrality, and the Pope to what he holds and as much as he could get back.

¹ December 2, 1863.

It is quite certain that the deliberations of a Congress would consist of demands and pretensions put forward by some and resolutely resisted by others, and that, there being no supreme authority in such an assembly to enforce the opinions or decisions of the majority, the Congress would separate leaving many of the members on worse terms with each other than when they met.

I think it seems pretty clear that, among other schemes which the Emperor had for the Congress, there was a proposal that there should be given to the Pope a European guarantee for his unmolested possession of the territory now held for him by the French troops, which then might have been withdrawn. France and all the Catholic Powers would willingly have joined in such an arrangement, and Russia might have done so out of complaisance to France. Italy would have been embarrassed, but might have been overruled. We should have been placed in a disagreeable dilemma, having either to refuse and to take openly a position hostile to the Pope and distasteful to our Catholic fellow-subjects, or to give our formal sanction and guarantee to the permanence of the temporal power of the Pope, against which we have not hesitated to declare our opinion.

This, however, was probably only one of the traps laid by Napoleon for the silly birds he was trying to lure into his decoy.

Several of the other great Powers also declining the Congress, the project fell through.

An account of the intricate proceedings connected with the Sleswig-Holstein question cannot come within either the scope or the space of this book; but the part which Lord Palmerston's Government took in the matter must be briefly narrated.

The real dispute between Denmark and Germany dated from the year 1848, when an insurrectionary party in the former declared their grievances and appealed to Germany for aid in establishing the union of Holstein and Sleswig with a constitutional existence separate from the rest of the monarchy. Germany assisted the insurrection, and at the Peace of Berlin in 1850, although nothing was stipulated, it was understood that the Danish Monarchy was to be reconstructed with a view to satisfying the wishes of

the Sleswig-Holsteiners. Negotiations followed, which, as far as Sleswig was concerned, were of an international character, and not merely between Denmark and the Germanic Diet. It was on the interpretation and fulfilment of the engagements contracted by Denmark as the result of these negotiations that the dispute with Germany turned, which, while at its height, assumed a new and more complicated aspect by the sudden death of the King of Denmark. In conformity with the Treaty of London, 1852, Prince Christian ascended the Danish throne, including that of the Duchies, as King Christian IX.; but the Duke of Augustenburg, although his father had renounced for himself and his family, insisted on being recognised as Duke of Sleswig-Holstein. Some of the smaller German states, in spite of the treaty to which many of them had acceded, were disposed to go with him on the ground that the treaty of 1852 was not binding unless the other engagements alleged to have been entered into by the Crown of Denmark at an antecedent time and upon another subject were also fulfilled. To state such a proposition was to refute it; and the British Government had common sense and common justice on their side when they urged that every consideration of honour and good faith demanded the acknowledgment of King Christian as King Duke of all the territories which were under the sway of his predecessor, and that there would then be a responsible sovereign from whom might be claimed the fulfilment of any and every engagement taken by the late King and not made good. The German Diet, however, decreed a federal execution in Holstein—that is to say, an administration of the Government by commissioners—and, though this was nominally done only in the interests of the Holsteiners, it was undisguised intervention in behalf of the Duke of Augustenburg, who made his appearance at Kiel, and was greeted as the rightful Duke. The close of the year saw the Danish and German troops confronting one another on the opposite banks of the Eider.

Austria and Prussia were at first inclined firmly to abide by the Treaty of London ; but the pressure of the Diet acting upon their mutual jealousies, and the fear of each lest it should jeopardise its position in Germany, combined to drive them along the path of aggression. The first to suffer was the Diet itself ; for the matter was taken out of their control, and a combined Austrian and Prussian force advanced through Holstein into Sleswig. On February 2 the Danes evacuated the Dannewerke, on which so much reliance had been placed, and fell back upon Düppel. Meanwhile, as might have been expected, there had sprung up in England a strong feeling of indignation at the violence offered to little Denmark by the two great military powers. It was suggested that France and Great Britain should offer their mediation on the basis of the integrity of the Danish monarchy and the engagements of 1851-52 ; and that, if such mediation were refused by Austria and Prussia, England should despatch a squadron to Copenhagen, and France a corps d'armée to the Rhenish frontier of Prussia. The following letter shows what Lord Palmerston said about this proposal :—

94 Piccadilly : February 13, 1864.

My dear Russell,—I share fully your indignation. The conduct of Austria and Prussia is discreditably bad, and one or both of them will suffer for it before these matters are settled. I rather doubt, however, the expediency of taking at the present moment the steps proposed. The French Government would probably decline it, unless tempted by the suggestion that they should place an armed force on the Rhenish frontier in the event of a refusal by Austria and Prussia—which refusal we ought to reckon upon as nearly certain.

The objections which might be urged against the measures suggested as the consequences of the refusal of Austria and Prussia may be stated to be : First, that we could not for many weeks to come send a squadron to the Baltic ; and that such a step would not have much effect upon the Germans unless it were understood to be a first step towards something more ; and I doubt whether the Cabinet or the country are as yet prepared for active interference. The truth is, that to enter

into a military conflict with all Germany on continental ground would be a serious undertaking. If Sweden and Denmark were actively co-operating with us, our 20,000 men might do a good deal; but Austria and Prussia could bring 200,000 or 300,000 into the field, and would be joined by the smaller German States.

Secondly, though it is very useful to remind the Austrians and the Prussians privately of the danger they are running at home—Austria in Italy, Hungary and Galicia; Prussia in her Rhenish provinces—yet it might not be advisable nor for our own interest to suggest to France an attack upon the Prussian Rhenish territory. It would serve Prussia right if such an attack were made; and if Prussia remains in the wrong we could not take part with her against France. But the conquest of that territory by France would be an evil for us, and would seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium. On the whole, I should say that it would be best for us to wait awhile before taking any strong step in these matters.

The English Government was, in fact, not only hampered, but fettered by the refusal of Russia and France to join heartily with her. Russia acted, it may be supposed, from the same motives which have hitherto always kept her from breaking with Prussia; France partly, no doubt, from pique at our refusal the previous year to agree to her Congress. It might, of course, have been very different could England have consented to French conquest on the Rhine as the price to be paid for French assistance.

Lord Palmerston, however, was anxious to do all he could for Denmark within the bounds of what was statesmanlike and possible. He wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty:—¹

I own I quite agree with Russell, that our squadron ought to go to Copenhagen as soon as the season will permit, and that it ought to have orders to prevent any invasion of, or attack upon Zealand and Copenhagen. It is not unlikely that Austria and Prussia, reckoning upon our passive attitude, contemplate the occupation of Copenhagen, and think to imitate what the first Napoleon did at Vienna and Berlin, and mean to dictate

¹ To the Duke of Somerset: February 20, 1864.

at the Danish capital their own terms of peace. We should be laughed at if we stood by and allowed this to be done.

The Prussians took Düppel in April, and soon after a solitary gleam of sunshine for the Danes broke the monotonous gloom of their reverses, and they gained a naval success against the Austrians off Heligoland. The two following letters tell Lord Palmerston's intended action in case of the Austrian Government proposing to reinforce their fleet in the Baltic:—

94 Piccadilly: May 1, 1864.

My dear Russell,—I felt so little satisfied with the decision of the Cabinet on Saturday, that I determined to make a notch off my own bat, and accordingly I wrote this morning to Apponyi, asking him to come here and give me half an hour's conversation. He came accordingly. I said I wished to have some friendly and unreserved conversation with him, not as between an English minister and the Austrian ambassador, but as between Palmerston and Apponyi; that what I was going to say related to serious matters; but I begged that nothing I might say should be looked upon as a threat, but only as a frank explanation between friends on matters which might lead to disagreements, and with regard to which, unless timely explanation were given as to possible consequences of certain things, a reproach might afterwards be made that timely explanation might have averted disagreeable results. I said that we have from the beginning taken a deep interest in favour of Denmark—not from family ties, which have little influence on English policy, and sometimes act unfavourably—but, first, that we have thought from the beginning that Denmark has been harshly and unjustly treated; and, secondly, we deem the integrity and independence of the State which commands the entrance to the Baltic objects of interest to England. That we abstained from taking the field in defence of Denmark for many reasons—from the season of the year; from the smallness of our army, and the great risk of failure in a struggle with all Germany by land. That with regard to operations by sea, the positions would be reversed: we are strong, Germany is weak; and the German ports in the Baltic, North Sea, and Adriatic would be greatly at our command. Speaking for myself personally, and for nobody else, I must frankly tell him that, if an Austrian squadron were to pass along our coasts and ports, and

go into the Baltic to help in any way the German operations against Denmark, I should look upon it as an affront and insult to England. That I could not, and would not stand such a thing; and that, unless in such case a superior British squadron were to follow, with such orders for acting as the case might require, I would not continue to hold my present position; and such a case would probably lead to collision—that is, war; and in my opinion Germany, and especially Austria, would be the sufferer in such a war. I should deeply regret such a result, because it is the wish of England to be well with Austria; but I am confident that I should be borne out by public opinion. I again begged that he would not consider this communication as a threat, but simply as a friendly reminder of consequences which might follow a possible course of action.

Apponyi, having listened with great attention to what I said, replied that the considerations which I had pointed out were not new to his mind; that they had been forcibly dwelt upon, among other persons, by the King of the Belgians. That he was quite aware that, if the Austrian ships entered the Baltic, an English squadron would follow them; that in all probability one of two things would happen—either that the Austrian squadron would be destroyed, or that it would be compelled by orders from the English admiral to leave the Baltic. Thus they would run the risk of a catastrophe or a humiliation, and they did not wish for either. That, therefore, whatever may have been said by Rechberg in his note, we might be sure that the Austrian squadron will not enter the Baltic. This is satisfactory, as far as Apponyi may be considered the organ of the Austrian Government; but I think we ought to have something more positive in writing than we have got.

I shall state to the Cabinet to-morrow the substance of my conversation with Apponyi.

At the same time he wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty:—

May 4, 1864.

My dear Somerset,—It seems to me that we ought to insist that no Austrian ships of war shall at any time, or under any circumstances during the war, enter the Baltic. We have never declared ourselves neutral in this war: we have declined, for reasons of our own, to take a part in it; but we have done our best to help the Danes by diplomatic interference.

The reasons which opposed military interference on our part do not apply to naval aid; and, so far as forbidding the Austrians to enter the Baltic at any time during the war, we are rendering valuable aid to the Danes, without any great effort to ourselves.

I should be much disposed to allow the Danes to have their roneclad. I am satisfied that a manifestation of good-will on our part towards the Danes must contribute much to make the Germans more reasonable in negotiation. They have been encouraged hitherto by a belief that nothing would induce us to interfere; and this belief has been much strengthened, unfortunately, by letters and language received in England.

In the meantime the British Government were making active exertions, by a conference of the Great Powers, to put a stop to the further prosecution of the war; and after much trouble they persuaded the belligerents to come into such a conference to be held in London. It met on April 25, and, after proclaiming an armistice, proceeded to business. But no agreement could be arrived at as to the future frontier between Denmark and the Duchies. The victorious Germans were exacting; the desperate Danes were obstinate; and after sitting for two months the conference broke up without any result of their labours. On June 24 an informal application was made by our Government to the French Emperor, again seeking for his active alliance to defend Denmark. Louis Napoleon unhesitatingly declined giving any such assistance. He was not inclined to incur the cost and risk of a war with Austria and Germany, without the prospect of compensation on the banks of the Rhine. He showed at the same time the strongest desire that England should undertake the task, promising any amount of 'moral' support. It is clear that he had hopes that, should such a war spread, and naval operations begin in the Adriatic, it would turn to his advantage in his cherished object of procuring the freedom of Venetia. He urged upon the British Government that, England having no frontiers to be concerned about, it was for her to stand forward as the champion of the Danes. But with no

ally save Sweden the Cabinet did not think this country bound to enter the lists, when the independent existence of the Danish monarchy was not at stake, but only its rights and dominion over the provinces in dispute. The peremptory refusal of France caused the abandonment of the plans which England had conceived, and no renewed proposal for active assistance was made to Russia. Had Great Britain, in alliance with France and Russia, succeeded in arresting the proceedings of the German Powers, there can be but little doubt that she would have made radical reforms by Denmark in her administration of the subject provinces a *sine quâ non*. If, however, she had single-handed defended Denmark by arms she would have been looked upon as the upholder of Danish policy towards the Duchies in its entirety—a policy which was at total variance with the principles by which she had been hitherto guided; for though the accounts of Danish oppression might have been exaggerated, there was no doubt that the Duchies had good cause for complaint. Hostilities were quickly renewed, and Denmark was compelled to sign a peace at Vienna, by which she finally surrendered to Germany the Duchies of Sleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg.

Parliament now intervened to call Ministers to account for their conduct of these affairs. During the whole of the session there had been frequent interpellations and fragmentary debates upon this Dano-German question; but in the beginning of July a simultaneous attack was made in both Houses upon the policy of the Government. In the House of Lords the resolution moved by Lord Malmesbury was carried by a majority of nine, and in the House of Commons Mr. Disraeli proposed a similar resolution. He asked the House to join with him in expressing the opinion that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government had 'lowered the just influence of this country in the councils of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace.' This was a distinct vote of censure, and was accepted

as such. The debate, which lasted for four nights, aroused much public interest, because the strength of parties was pretty nearly equal, and on the result of the vote depended the continuance or retirement of Lord Palmerston's administration. Each afternoon, as Lord Palmerston went down to the House, he was cheered by the crowd assembled in Palace Yard. He spoke on the last night. As the successful winding up of a great party debate, involving the fate of a Ministry, his speech on this occasion was his last triumph, and showed that though he spoke at the end of a night of long and weary sitting, his old vigour and cunning of fence had not deserted him. He had, in truth, a difficult task. There had been a conspicuous failure; of that much there could be no doubt. Allies, colleagues, and circumstances had proved adverse; yet the excuses for failure could not publicly be laid on any of them. So, with the exception of a dexterous allusion to the words of the resolution as 'a gratuitous libel upon the country by a great party who hoped to rule it,' he did not detain the House long on the points immediately at issue, but, dropping the Danish matter altogether, went straight into a history of the financial triumphs of his Government. What has this to do with the question? asked impatient Tories. But it had all to do with the party question, for it decided the votes of doubting men, who, caring little about Sleswig-Holstein, cared a great deal about English finance. Anyhow it commanded success, for the Government got a majority of eighteen, and thus renewed their lease of power. Both inside the House of Commons and outside in Westminster Hall the excitement and cheering about the result was immense.

To the King of the Belgians Lord Palmerston shortly afterwards opens his mind:—

94 Piccadilly: August 28, 1864.

Sire,—I have many apologies to make to your Majesty for not having sooner thanked you for your letter of the 15th June. We were at that time in the midst of an engrossing session of Parliament, and the unequal contest between Denmark and

Germany was still undecided, though with little hope that right could prevail over might. The Danish Government, both under the late and under the present King, undoubtedly committed many mistakes, both of commission and omission, and they showed throughout these affairs, from beginning to end, that inaptitude to deal with great concerns which might, perhaps, have been expected from a nation shut up in a remote corner of Europe, and not mixed up or practised with the general politics of the world. It was, however, an unworthy abuse of power by Austria and Prussia to take advantage of their superior enlightenment and strength to crush an antagonist utterly incapable of successful resistance; and the events of this Danish war do not form a page in German history which any honourable or generous German hereafter will look back upon without a blush. I wish that France and Russia had consented to join with us in giving a different direction to those affairs; and I am convinced that words from three such Powers would have been sufficient without a recourse to blows. One consequence is clear and certain, namely, that if our good friend and neighbour at Paris were to take it into his head to deprive Prussia of her Rhenish provinces, not a finger in England would be stirred, nor a voice raised, nor a man nor a shilling voted to resist such retribution upon the Prussian monarch; and when France and Italy shall be prepared to deliver Venetia from the Austrian yoke, the joy with which the success of such an undertaking will be hailed throughout England will be doubled by the recollection of Holstein, Lauenburg, Sleswig, and Jutland.

He went to the North after the session, visiting Bradford, where he had a very cordial reception, and afterwards proceeding to Hereford, to uncover the statue erected in memory of Sir George Lewis. The enthusiasm with which he was received drew the following from Lord Russell:—¹

Let me congratulate you on the reception you have met everywhere since the prorogation. It is clear your popularity is a plant of hardy growth and deep roots, as the real embarrassments of the Danish question have not shaken it. I still believe that with a less timid cabinet we might have been able to deter Austria from the Danish war, and shown that it was in our power '*pacis imponere morem.*' But the risk was some-

¹ Sept. 8, 1864.

thing, and the course pursued justifiable, though not so justifiable, though not so splendid as one could have wished.

In reply to this note of congratulation from the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston writes as follows :—¹

Many thanks for what you say about my August peregrinations ; they were not sought for by me, but they were successful, not simply as regards myself, but as relates to the Government ; and I may safely affirm that our general conduct has been approved by the country, and especially the management of our foreign affairs, notwithstanding the run made against us on that point in Parliament. You say that with less timidity around us we might probably have kept Austria quiet in the Danish affair. Perhaps we might ; but then we had no equal pull upon Prussia, and she would have rallied all the smaller German Powers round her, and we should equally have failed in saving Denmark.

As to Cabinets, if we had colleagues like those who sat in Pitt's Cabinet, such as Westmoreland and others, or such men as those who were with Peel, like Goulburne and Hardinge, you and I might have our own way on most things ; but when, as is now the case, able men fill every department, such men will have opinions, and hold to them ; but unfortunately they are often too busy with their own department to follow up foreign questions so as to be fully masters of them, and their conclusions are generally on the timid side of what might be the best.

Before going to Bradford he went with Lady Palmerston to visit her estates in Northamptonshire, and to assist her at Towcester to cut the first sod of a railway from Northampton to Stratford-on-Avon. Of course he was well received ; and the county member,² in his speech at the banquet, very happily hit off the popular sentiment about the Premier, illustrating as follows the way in which his personal influence buoyed up the Ministry, and the exceptional position which he held with all parties in the state :—

The noble lord and his Ministry seem to be always engaged in the game of chuck-farthing, and it is invariably with ' Heads

¹ To Lord Russell : September 11, 1864.

² Mr., now Sir Rainald, Knightley.

I win, tails you lose.' (Cheers and laughter.) Whenever it comes up 'head,' the noble Viscount very properly has all the credit; when it comes up 'tail,' the rest of the ministers get the blame. I do not mean to say that the noble Viscount is guilty of unfair play, but the people, it is evident, are determined to give him all the halfpence, and the rest of the Ministry all the kicks. (Great laughter.)

His own speech on this occasion is an instance of how genially he could touch the veriest commonplace. It was after dinner, and his topic was the advantages of railways. Instead of giving a laboured dissertation on steam and civilisation, he brought home to the country squires, in the following words, what they would gain by a new railroad:—

In former times a gentleman asked his friend in London to come down to him in the country, and the friend came with things to last him a fortnight or three weeks, and he took, perhaps, a week on the journey. Now, if a friend meets another in St. James's Street and says, 'I shall have some good shooting next week; will you come down to me and spend a few days?' the friend says, 'Oh, by all means; I shall be charmed. What is the nearest station to your house?' 'Well,' the friend says, 'I am not very well off at present with regard to railway communication; the nearest station is sixteen miles from my house; but it is a good road: you will get a nice fly, and you will come very well.' Upon which the invited guest says, 'Did you say it was Tuesday you asked me for?' 'Yes,' says the countryman; 'and I think you told me that you were free on that day.' Upon which the other replies, 'I have a very bad memory. Upon my word, I am very sorry, but I have a particular engagement on that day. Some other time I shall be happy to come down to you.' Then he offers himself as a visitor to some other friend, who has a station within one or two miles of his house. (Laughter.)

This autumn Lord Palmerston became eighty years old. Traits of physical vigour at such an advanced period of life are always interesting and generally instructive, as teaching us how best to preserve and enjoy those bodily faculties which we receive at our birth. Lord Palmerston was endowed with an excellent con-

stitution, and was very temperate both in eating and drinking; but he maintained his freshness, both of mind and body, to a great degree by the exercise of his will. He never gave anything up on the score of age. At any rate, he never owned to that as a reason. He used to go out partridge-shooting long after his eyesight was too dim to take a correct aim, and persevered in his other outdoor pursuits. Twice during this year, starting at nine o'clock and not getting back till two, he rode over from Broadlands to the training stables at Littleton, to see his horses take a gallop on Winchester racecourse. He rode down in June to Harrow speeches, and timed himself to trot the distance from Piccadilly to the head master's door, nearly twelve miles, within the hour, and accomplished it. On his eightieth birthday, in October, he started at half-past eight from Broadlands, taking his horses by train to Fareham, was met by Engineer officers, and rode along the Portsdown and Hilsca lines of forts, getting off his horse and inspecting some of them, crossing over to Anglesey forts and Gosport, and not reaching home till six in the evening—an instance of such combined energy both of mind and body as cannot in the nature of things be very common at fourscore.

The opening of the session of 1865 found Lord Palmerston still maintaining his ground in the confidence of the nation. Party spirit was not extinct, but it was certainly dormant, and there was a general acquiescence in the opinion that the veteran might safely be trusted with the honour and interests of England, and that he should be left undisturbed during the short remainder of his career. The Parliament, too, was old. Everybody thus was looking to the future rather than to the present, and the session—the last which the minister was destined to see—was, therefore, uneventful. Among the minor topics which Lord Palmerston joined in discussing was that of the condition of Ireland. He repeated on this occasion his favourite saying, that 'tenant's right is landlord's wrong;' but by this he

only meant the extreme demands of the Irish agrarian party, who claimed for the tenants the right of dealing with the landlord's property, not only without but against his sanction, coupled with the condition that at some future period they might compel the landlord to pay for alterations to the making of which he had objected when being made. Lord Palmerston, however, spoke with great warmth of feeling and affection for the Irish people, lamenting the want of capital in Ireland, the influx of which was prevented, as he maintained, by the sense that there was not the same security for property as elsewhere, and by the alarm and distrust which had been engendered by political and religious feuds.

Lunacy, when pleaded as an excuse for crime, has been frequently handled as a subject for discussion. Lord Palmerston had at any rate distinct notions as to how he should meet it, as is seen in the following extract of a letter to the Home Secretary. The occasion that elicited this letter was the reprieve of Victor Townley, who had murdered Miss Goodwin because she had broken off her engagement with him. Neither the presiding judge nor the Commissioners of Lunacy reported to the Home Office in terms sufficient to justify an exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, but three justices and two medical men obtaining access to the condemned man, sent in a certificate to the effect that he was insane. This certificate had been prepared in conformity with an Act of Parliament, which, when thus put in force, Sir George Grey conceived he had no alternative but to comply with. The convict was accordingly respited. Lord Palmerston, after saying that the statute could never have been intended to act in this way, and that it ought to be altered, went on:—¹

For my part I never have had but one opinion upon the manner of dealing with murderers said to be insane. It seems to me that if a man is sufficiently in possession of his reasoning

¹ To Sir George Grey.

faculties to be able to take care of himself, and not to maim or attempt to kill himself, he is, and ought to be, made to answer for taking away the life of another person.

The object of punishment is not vengeance on the criminal, but deterring example to others. Madmen are proverbially cunning, and are perfectly able to calculate consequences, and can be swayed like other people by the fear of evil to themselves resulting from violence committed upon others. The doctrine set up in the Townley case seems to me most dangerous to the general interests of society. Here is a man who, after much deliberation, commits a barbarous murder, having gone about and mixed in society without being reputed insane, and he is rescued from the hands of justice, and from the sentence of the law, because four gentlemen choose to say that he has imperfect notions of the distinction between right and wrong, and because he chose to maintain that he had a right to put his victim to death. Why what murderer would not, *after* condemnation, and in order to save his own life, make a similar declaration? And what an encouragement it is to murder to let it be known that by such means a man may escape the penalty of the law. Again, the doctrine of these benevolence-mongers is that the more atrocious the deed, the more should be the impunity to the doer; because, the greater the enormity of the crime, the more certain it must be that the criminal was out of his mind, for no man in his right senses would be guilty of such a crime.

What is called in such cases mercy to the guilty is, in fact, cruelty to the nation at large, by taking away some of the restraints which the laws impose on the bad and violent passions of mankind. The true test, as it appears to me, is not whether the culprit, after condemnation, chooses to say that he does not admit the difference between right and wrong, but whether, at the time of committing the crime, he knew that by the law punishment would follow.

The sympathy which the Government had shown for Italian unity—the realisation of which was most hateful to the Papacy—had deprived it to a great extent of the Liberal Irish vote. Lord Palmerston speaks of this in the following letter:—¹

¹ To Mr. Chichester Fortescue.

September 10, 1864.

I should of course be very glad to have the support of the Catholic body in Ireland; but as their political action is regulated by the orders they receive from time to time from Rome, and as the Papal Government is pleased to deem us its enemy, because we are of opinion that Italian unity would be a good thing, nothing that we could do with propriety in Ireland would have the slightest influence upon the Irish Catholics. If they were in any degree capable of political gratitude they would have supported the Whig Government; but two Monsignores from Rome, and a 'Grandis Epistola' from the Vatican, array in hostility to us men in the House of Commons who call themselves Liberals, but who are ready to vote as Tories in obedience to foreign injunctions. This, it is true, was foretold by the opponents of the Catholic Emancipation, and we who supported that measure derided the prediction. By though I am sorry to have been in this respect a false prophet, I do not the less rejoice at that act of sound policy and strict justice.

And two days later he says to the same:—

We have invariably endeavoured to deal with equal impartiality between Protestant and Catholic, but there is no shutting our eyes to the fact that in Ireland, as elsewhere, the Catholic priesthood—and through them a portion of the laity—while professing a desire for religious equality, aim at nothing less than political domination, and strive to transfer the source and directing centre of that domination to a foreign authority.

Closely connected with this subject was that of Catholic Colleges—a matter which has already caused much debate, and may cause much more. His view of the matter is thus conveyed to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland:—

July 28, 1865.

My dear Wodehouse,—The new arrangement to be made about the Catholic College will require much circumspection. What is required is that young men brought up in that establishment should have the means of being examined for a Degree. What the Irish Catholics want to accomplish under cover of this reasonable purpose, is to substitute their Sectarian College entirely for the Queen's Colleges, which are founded on the principle of mixed education. This is an aim which we must not allow them to accomplish. Their scheme of affiliation,

plausibly recommended, tends to that end. My opinion, on the contrary, is that the aggregate University body of the Queen's Colleges should examine for Degrees all comers, wheresoever educated. It is said that this would not give any security for moral character, but that might be required from the instructors of each candidate; and it may safely be inferred that a young man, who by study and application has qualified himself for a Degree, must be possessed of sufficient self-control to prove him to be a well-conducted young man. What the Catholic priesthood want is that this Catholic College should be the only place of education for the young Irish Catholics, and that it should be, like Maynooth, a place where young men should be brought up to be bigoted in religion, to feel for Protestants theological hatred, and to feel political hatred for England. It is proposed to put a number of lay Catholics into the council of the aggregate University. This would be quite right, but would be little check upon the priests and bishops. How could such men as O'Hagan and Monsell be expected to stand up against Cullen and others upon any important religious matter? They might make a good fight about Euclid and algebra, or chemistry or astronomy, but upon all questions involving the real objects of the Catholic priesthood they would give way. The conclusion I come to is, that we ought to give the students of the Catholic College the means of obtaining Degrees, if they are sufficiently instructed to pass examination; but that we ought not to give to the Catholic College a University condition of existence. Therefore, if it should be necessary to give that College a charter of incorporation, such charter should be limited to the usual capacities of suing and being sued, and should not convey the power of holding lands, either by purchase, grant, or bequest, and of course should not give power to confer Degrees.

Clerical rule he regarded as very objectionable, in whatever communion it might be found; and he writes to the Home Secretary about Convocation:—

May 24, 1865.

I see that Convocation have been very active, and are proposing to draw up a Reform Bill for themselves. My opinion is that, unless kept very tight and within the narrowest bounds, Convocation would become a nuisance, and I should not be disposed to consent to any alterations which would tend to give them a more real and practical experience. Might not some hint be given them to check their exuberant activity? I re-

member that Aberdeen, who was not addicted to unnecessary vigour of action, sent them about their business one time when they were beginning to be meddlesome.

His last two letters about foreign affairs will, I think, be found interesting:—

September 3, 1865.

My dear Cowley,—The Duke of Somerset writes me word that the French were surprised, during the recent meeting at Portsmouth, to find how real the cordiality was with which they were received. If this should happen to be mentioned or observed upon to you by any of the French ministers, it might not be amiss that you should explain to them that we Englishmen see two distinct entities in France, the nation and the Government. Towards the French nation we all feel that cordial friendship which was expressed by words and deeds during the late meetings; all old sentiments of rivalry and antagonism as between Englishmen and Frenchmen are, on our part, extinguished. But with regard to the French Government, we see, from time to time, measures taken and schemes put forward which, whether framed or not in hostility to England, are, in our opinion, calculated to be injurious to our national interests. Such schemes, therefore, we do our best to oppose and to defeat; not, as some French agents endeavour to make out, from hatred to France and to everything French, but solely from that watchful care of the interests of our country which it is the duty of every Government to exert. The result is that, on the one hand, the French nation ought not to see in our occasional opposition to the schemes of their Government anything inconsistent with the friendly feelings manifested in the late meetings of the two navies; and, on the other hand, the French Government should not infer, from the friendliness of our reception of their fleet, that we shall be more likely to give way upon any matter in which the interests of England are concerned.

September 13, 1865.

My dear Russell,—It was dishonest and unjust to deprive Denmark of Sleswig and Holstein. It is another question how those two Duchies, when separated from Denmark, can be disposed of best for the interests of Europe. I should say that, with that view, it is better that they should go to increase the power of Prussia than that they should form another little state to be added to the cluster of small bodies politic which encum-

ber Germany, and render it of less force than it ought to be in the general balance of power in the world. Prussia is too weak as she now is ever to be honest or independent in her action; and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Germany, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two ambitious and aggressive powers, France and Russia, that press upon her west and east. As to France, we know how restless and aggressive she is, and how ready to break loose for Belgium, for the Rhine, for anything she would be likely to get without too great an exertion. As to Russia, she will, in due time, become a power almost as great as the old Roman Empire. She can become mistress of all Asia, except British India, whenever she chooses to take it; and when enlightened arrangements shall have made her revenue proportioned to her territory, and railways shall have abridged distances, her command of men will become enormous, her pecuniary means gigantic, and her power of transporting armies over great distances most formidable. Germany ought to be strong in order to resist Russian aggression, and a strong Prussia is essential to German strength. Therefore, though I heartily condemn the whole of the proceedings of Austria and Prussia about the Duchies, I own that I should rather see them incorporated with Prussia than converted into an additional asteroid in the system of Europe.

As the foregoing pages do not profess to give a 'history of the times,' but only those events and incidents in which Lord Palmerston individually took a marked share, a very rapid retrospect of a more general character over the period dealt with in this volume may not be out of place.

The years of his last administration of the Foreign Office have this peculiar feature about them, that they form the last period of active intervention by England in the affairs of other countries. We appear to be removed from that epoch by a vast interval. It seems difficult for us now to imagine the despatch of a British legion to assist a sovereign against a portion of his subjects, to realise a Quadruple Alliance in which England should join to secure the succession to a continental throne, or even to believe in the advance of a British fleet to protect a weak neighbour from wrong. In the

first place, such a foreign policy requires a man like Lord Palmerston to carry it out successfully, and such men are rare. His was not a flash policy, sacrificing essentials to appearance, constructed merely to suit party purposes, and casting aside while still incomplete enterprises and undertakings, as soon as they had served their turn. On the contrary, he worked quietly but perseveringly, keeping always in view 'British interests,' but not ostentatiously thrusting them into the foreground on every occasion, and thus defeating his object. So much was this the case, that during his early career he incurred temporary unpopularity for acts which, if they had been puffed and heralded, or, to borrow a word from the Stock Exchange, properly 'floated,' in the more modern fashion, would have secured immediate and general applause.

Another element of his success lay in such circumstances of comparative freedom to act without check or interference as can hardly be the lot of any minister, however able, now-a-days, when foreign matters are made as familiar to the peasant, if he can only read, as aforetime to the prince. The doctrine of 'non-intervention' and the penny press have rapidly and simultaneously grown into favour with the British public; and the activity which characterised the Foreign Office under the Palmerstonian *régime* is a thing of the past. Yet the fruits which Lord Palmerston was able to show as the results of his energy and determination were well worth some risk and trouble in the cultivation. Peace between nations was preserved right through an era of revolutions; constitutional government was planted in a great part of Europe; and, meanwhile, England was known, respected, and dreaded wherever the name of Palmerston had penetrated; and that was—everywhere.

Of course the enemies of such a policy became countless. Disturbers of the peace must dislike the constable; neither despots nor their friends relish constitutions; bullies, whether high or low, hate those who

keep them in order; and the selfish or apathetic at home grow weary of being constantly called upon for exertions on behalf of objects which, however just, do not affect their immediate interests. These combined antipathies, foiled in 1850, made a renewed attack the following year, and, as they hoped and believed, succeeded in crushing Lord Palmerston. Had he been a mere partisan, relying for his position solely on his connection with a great party, the blow might perhaps have proved as fatal as it was intended to be; but his strength lay, as he well knew, in the country itself, which saw in him a statesman, not indeed without blemish, but who maintained the honour of England, extricated her from innumerable difficulties without drawing the sword, and extended abroad those principles of civil and political liberty which are dear to Englishmen.

During the greater part of Lord Palmerston's next term of office questions relating to Turkey and the Crimean war filled up the foreground of politics. We have seen that, from the first, he foresaw that Russia was so bent on an aggressive movement, that ordinary diplomatic remonstrances would not suffice to check her, and that nothing would stop her in time except a conviction that she would have to face an active Anglo-French alliance. The success with which, when called to the head of affairs, he finished the war and settled the terms of peace greatly consolidated his power.

The short interval which separated his first from his second Premiership sufficed to enable him to renew and cement his political association with those whom diplomatic and parliamentary disasters consequent on the war had temporarily removed from his side; and he was thus, in 1859, in a position to form a very strong administration.

The relations between England and France were at this moment somewhat strained, Lord Derby's cabinet having shown but scant sympathy towards the French Emperor's action for the liberation of Italy. Lord

Palmerston's Government not only quickly established a good feeling with France, but, by its influence, greatly aided the Italian people to become a nation; and, in so doing, they were undoubtedly acting in harmony with the general feeling of the English people.

Although Louis Napoleon had taken the French army to fight for Italy, he was in no way desirous of seeing Italian unity such as it exists to-day. He wished for a Northern and Southern Italy, with a Papal sovereignty between them; and this was the secret of his persistent retention of French troops at Rome. He kept a large force there, in order to hold for the Pope what remained to him, and in the hope also of being able to set up some nominee of his own as King of Naples if Ferdinand became impossible. Italy would thus have been divided into three portions, each too weak to resist his influence. But the march of events was too strong for him; and although the frank and urgent representations which Lord Palmerston used to make against the continued occupation of Rome failed of effect, his Government was of signal service to the Italian cause, both when there was a question of restoring the Grand Dukes after the Peace of Villafranca, and later on when Garibaldi was helping to crown the edifice. So sensible were the Italians of this that, after the annexation of Naples, addresses of thanks poured in to Lord Palmerston from all parts of Italy.

One of the earliest and most beneficial results of the accession to power of a Liberal Ministry was the conclusion of a commercial treaty with France, which was ratified at home in spite of strong resistance from the Conservative Opposition. The treaty was signed in January 1860; and to Mr. Cobden, its distinguished negotiator, Lord Palmerston offered, as an acknowledgment, in the name of the Queen, the choice of a baronetcy or a seat at the Privy Council; but Mr. Cobden declined to receive any titular distinction.

The general financial achievements of Lord Palmerston's Government, with Mr. Gladstone as Chancellor

of the Exchequer, cannot be forgotten, embracing as they did extensive relief to trade, industry, and labour by the remission of taxation, simplification of the tariff, and reduction of debt. Notwithstanding the cotton famine and the war in America, the nation, during this period, made great progress in wealth and prosperity.

In the early part of 1860, the Imperial Court of China having shown its determination still to evade its treaty engagements, a second Chinese war was undertaken in conjunction with the French. Lord Elgin was sent out from England to co-operate with Baron Gros; and, finally, the success of the allied forces enabled us at last to obtain regular diplomatic intercourse with the Court of Peking.

Overtures were soon after made to this country by France, the object of which was to persuade us to assist them in obtaining some compensation, if possible, for the losses sustained by the holders of Mexican bonds, and to restore peace to Mexico, long distracted by chronic revolution. The Palmerston Ministry, though consenting to aid in operations at Vera Cruz, where the proceeds of the customs were seized, wisely declined to join in any further intervention, even though our allies kindly intimated that they would be satisfied if our contingent consisted merely of black troops. The French undertook the hopeless task of establishing order in the country and placing an Austrian Emperor on the throne; but the Spaniards and men of Spanish descent loved disorder, and hated both French and Austrians, while the remainder were weak and helpless, and of the Mexican leaders each was for himself and jealous of the others. The only class, therefore, whom the French could find to back them was the Priest party. They were thus obliged either to join in suppressing religious liberty and restoring intolerance and persecution, or to quarrel with their own supporters. Inevitable was the failure which ensued. The discomfiture of the French and the sad fate of the Archduke Maximilian, who had accepted the imperial crown of Mexico, showed how

fully justified the British Government were in their refusal to share in Napoleon's scheme, which, hatched at Rome, was but a bad imitation of his uncle's earlier attempt to force on the Spaniards of old Spain a king of his and not of their choice.

Greece, through the bad government of King Otho, became the scene of revolution, and was for some time in a state of anarchy. At last our Government and that of France determined on a friendly intervention, and had in 1862 to find a new king for the Greeks, who wanted an English prince. Any member of the English, French, or Russian royal families was, however, excluded by a mutual agreement to that effect; and finally, after much fruitless search for a fit man, Prince George of Denmark accepted the crown, and the Ionian Islands were handed over by England to the reconstituted kingdom. This cession evoked a considerable amount of opposition at the time; but as these Islands formed no part of the dominions of the British Crown, and as the protectorate which we exercised had long been to us a source of annoyance, this gift to the Greeks was a politic measure. It was hoped that not only would their kingdom thus be strengthened, but that such a proof of our goodwill would tend to rivet their attachment to England. But this was not all: Lord Palmerston's Government at the same time strenuously urged Turkey to give Thessaly and Epirus over to the Greeks, but, as the map of Europe still indicates, without success.

We have seen how the Polish rising began, and also the attack on Denmark by Germany. In both these cases Lord Palmerston could easily have stirred up a cry for war. English feeling was much excited on either question; but it was felt that neither the English interests involved, nor our available means of offence, were sufficient to justify an appeal to the national sentiment. In July 1865, Parliament having nearly reached its full term of existence, had been dissolved. There was a contest at Tiverton, and Lord Palmerston went down

there for the last time, and was re-elected, although his Liberal colleague lost his seat. The general result of the elections was very favourable to the Ministry.

During the latter part of the preceding session Lord Palmerston had suffered continuously from gout and disturbed sleep. He never abandoned his duties as leader of the House; but without doubt they were, under the circumstances, a matter of much physical difficulty for him, and greatly aggravated his disorder. Immediately after the Tiverton election he retired to Brocket, in Hertfordshire—the place Lady Palmerston had inherited from her brother, Lord Melbourne—selecting this in preference to Broadlands, as being more within reach of medical advice. The gout had flown to the bladder, owing to his having ridden on horseback before he was sufficiently recovered; and, although all his bodily organs were sound, and there was no reason why, with proper care, he should not have lived for several years longer, those around him could not fail to feel anxiety about his evident state of weakness, not only for the moment, but at the prospect of his again meeting Parliament as Prime Minister. That he himself felt the same anxiety for the future was clear; and one morning, about a fortnight before he died, I witnessed an incident which was both evidence of this and also very characteristic of the man. There were some high railings immediately opposite the front door, and Lord Palmerston, coming out of the house without his hat, went straight up to them, after casting a look all round to see that no one was looking. He then climbed deliberately over the top rail down to the ground on the other side, turned round, climbed back again, and then went indoors. It was clear that he had come out to test his strength, and to find out for himself in a practical way how far he was gaining or losing ground. Not that he had any excessive dread of death, for, as he put it one day, in homely fashion, to his doctor, when pressing for a frank opinion as to his state, ‘When a man’s time is up there is no use in repining.’ The

most touching and characteristic feature of his bearing at this time was his solicitude to avoid adding to Lady Palmerston's anxiety, and the cheerfulness which he assumed in her presence. Indeed, consideration for others was, as in life so in death, one of his finest qualities. I remember that, only a few days before his end, when, so far as the aspect of his face could betoken illness, he appeared as ill as a man could be when about and at work, Lady Palmerston, at breakfast, alluded to the cattle plague, which was then making great havoc in England. He at once remarked that all the symptoms of the disorder were described by Virgil, and repeated to me some eight lines out of the Georgics descriptive of the disease. He then told us a story of a scrape he got into at Harrow, for throwing stones; and the excess of laughter, which he was unable to restrain, with which he recalled the incident, was the only token that could have betrayed to Lady Palmerston how weak he was.

A chill caught while out driving brought on inflammation of the kidneys, and on October 18, 1865, within two days of completing his eighty-first year, he closed his earthly career. The half-opened cabinet-box on his table, and the unfinished letter on his desk, testified that he was at his post to the last.

I here quote a letter written very shortly before his death, as it shows him, instead of being engrossed in his own state of health, solicitous and active about the health of a subordinate. On Sir Arthur Helps, as Clerk of the Council, had come a great influx of business, owing to the outbreak of rinderpest, and Lord Palmerston had already volunteered to help him by undertaking some of the work:—

Brocket : October 3, 1865.

My dear Gladstone,—I have this morning received the enclosed from an eminent physician of Southampton. The report he makes of the health of Helps and of the state of the Council Office Establishment seems to me to require immediate and effective action. I have, therefore, written to Helps positively to forbid his going to Balmoral; and, as it seems that his second

in command, Harrison, is also knocked down by excessive work, and as the limited establishment of the Council Office is already too small and weak for the daily work pouring in upon it by reason of these cattle, sheep, and pig diseases, together with a threatening of extension to horses, I have written to Waddington to request him to send some Home Office clerk to Balmoral to officiate at the Council.

I have also told Helps that, as head of the Government, I authorise him to take, without any delay, such steps as may be necessary to procure additional assistance for his office which this great influx of daily business continues to press upon it. I have told him that I will write to you to ask you to give the necessary directions for an official sanction to the arrangement; but I have said that he ought not to delay taking the necessary steps for obtaining relief by additional assistance.

That, in spite of the depressing influence of his illness, he was also fully alive to any new emergencies which might arise, is shown by the next letter, of the same date, to the Home Secretary, about the Fenian movement in Ireland:—

Brocket: October 3, 1865.

I am clearly for sending to Ireland a regiment of cavalry to take the place of the one which it seems was lately brought away from Ireland, and whether Rose¹ is for such a reinforcement or against it. If the question was reversed, and we were considering whether a regiment could be spared from Ireland, we could not properly decide to diminish the Irish force without the full assent of the general commanding; but the question being whether we could add to the existing force, though it is highly satisfactory to find that Sir Hugh Rose does not consider any addition necessary, we ought nevertheless to send it. Sir Hugh Rose has been accustomed to walk over everything and everybody opposed to him; but in this case final success is not the only thing to be provided for. If there is any outbreak it will begin by partial risings in scattered places, and in small numbers, but yet numbers sufficient, if there should be no protecting force, to murder, burn, and lay waste particular villages and landlord residences. A small regular force, capable of rapid movement, would do what would be necessary in such cases, and cavalry would be well fitted for the purpose. The

¹ Commander-in-Chief in Ireland.

Fenians, moreover, may have arms for infantry, and may, by possibility, have guns, though that is unlikely, but cavalry they cannot have; and a Fenian put suddenly on horseback, even if they could so fit out some of their men, would not be a cavalry soldier. Then, upon the general principle, we should be inspiring confidence in the loyal, and be giving a useful warning to the Fenians by showing that we could, if needed, add to the regular force now in Ireland.

The same week he is writing to the Secretary of State for War to inquire into the provision of arms and ammunition in Canada, and to suggest heavier armaments for the works around Quebec. Three years previously he had urged successfully that these fortifications should be restored and enlarged, so as to provide some place of strength for our small body of regular troops to fall back upon, should a sudden invasion take place from the United States. This did not then appear an unlikely event. It was very widely anticipated, at the time, that the civil war would end in the separation of South from North, and that the North would want compensation and some triumph over somebody to wipe away the stain of failure. The invasion of Canada, if it could be followed by the conquest of the province, would have satisfied both requirements, and, had we been unprepared, the temptation might have been overpowering. Matters, however, took a different turn, and the defeat of the Southerners not improbably saved the Canadians from attack. But during the summer of 1865 alarm had been renewed by the threatening aspect of the Federal Government, as manifested by a notice to the British Government of the abrogation of the Treaty of 1817, and by the establishment of a system of passports between Canada and the United States. The Federals were flushed with success; they had many men under arms, and many grudges against the Canadians. Lord Palmerston was fully alive to all this, and was anxious, by assisting the colony in her fortifications, and by maintaining an efficient flotilla on the lakes, to back that spirit of self-reliance which alone, in the moment

of danger, could secure her independence, and to form a centre round which some 200,000 loyal volunteers might rally if they wished to maintain their connection with the British Crown.

Thus, indefatigable to the last in his care of the interests committed to his charge, did Lord Palmerston complete his work, which had lasted through a longer term of public service than is easily paralleled in official annals.

In one life he summed up the political honours of several generations, for he was a member of every Government from 1807 to 1865, except those of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Derby. He sat in sixteen Parliaments, and was elected to sit in the seventeenth. During the later years of his life a detractor might have been driven to say of him what the sarcastic Archbishop Sheldon said of his ancestor, Sir John Temple, 'He has the curse of the Gospel, for all men speak well of him.' He died full of years and honours, and free from fears or unmanly regrets. Over his grave might well be written the words, '*Felix etiam opportunitate mortis,*' for he suffered neither long nor painfully, died at work, and quitted the scene with undimmed reputation, before any failing on his part had made the audience impatient. He bequeathed his Party to his successor, newly strengthened and consolidated by a general election, fought and won under his name; while to the Party itself he left as a noble legacy the example of a long and honourable career, spent indeed within their ranks, but devoted, even in the closing hours, to the service of the whole country. The national voice decreed for his remains the tribute of a public funeral and a grave in Westminster Abbey.

He had prepared for himself a last resting-place in Romsey Cemetery; but, as he had left no express directions as to his place of burial, it was considered right to yield to the representations of those who urged that the last testimony of respect which can be paid to frail mortality was in his case the concern of the nation.

His body was accordingly moved up to his town residence in Piccadilly, and the funeral took place on the 27th of October. The whole distance to the Abbey was lined by a dense crowd of interested and sympathetic spectators, and the sacred building itself was filled with all that was most distinguished and most representative. The Houses of Parliament, although their session was over, were amply represented, and through the dense crowd that surrounded the entrance into the Abbey Church all his late colleagues of the Cabinet marched as pallbearers. In the north transept, near the grave of Pitt, were laid the mortal remains of Palmerston.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CHARACTER—CHARACTERISTICS OF STYLE OF WRITING AND
SPEAKING.

LORD PALMERSTON'S character has been so frequently discussed—its many-sidedness offering to such various dispositions some point or other of attraction—that it may seem superfluous in me to attempt a repetition of a similar kind. Yet, in closing this history, I cannot resist the desire to put, however imperfectly, on record the impressions made upon me by seven years of close intercourse, both private and official. Biographers are proverbially partial; and it is, on the whole, to their credit that they should be so. Retrospect should rather fasten on the good than the evil. But, on the other hand, indiscriminate and extravagant praise is as unreal as it is unsatisfactory; and whoever undertakes to inform his fellow-countrymen is bound to bring his judgment as well as his affection into play.

Lord Palmerston, then, was a great man chiefly in the sense that he was so complete a man. His character deserves our attention more from its unusual combination of good qualities than from the marked presence of any one great quality or attribute. He had about him neither the glories nor the follies of a genius; but he possessed, in rare harmony, characteristics which are generally in antagonism. He had great pluck, combined with remarkable tact; unfailing good-temper, associated with firmness amounting almost to obstinacy. He was a strict disciplinarian, and yet ready above most men to make allowance for the weak-

ness and shortcomings of others. He loved hard work in all its details, and yet took a keen delight in many kinds of sport and amusement. He believed in England as the best and greatest country in the world, while he had not confined his observation to her affairs, but knew and cared more about foreign nations than any other public man. He had little or no vanity in his composition, and, as is seen in several of his letters to his brother, he claimed but a modest value for his own abilities; yet no man had a better opinion of his own judgment, or was more full of self-confidence. It was amusing to notice the good-natured pity with which he quite unconsciously regarded those who differed from him in questions whereon he had made up his mind. He never doubted for an instant in such a case that he was right, and that they were wrong.

This gave him great tenacity of purpose, and helped him through many difficulties, and even mistakes, which would have swamped a weaker man. He seems almost to be describing himself when, writing to Sir Stratford Canning in December 1850 about the Turkish Ministers, he says: 'I believe weakness and irresolution are, on the whole, the worst faults that statesmen can have. A man of energy may make a wrong decision, but, like a strong horse that carries you rashly into a quagmire, he brings you by his sturdiness out on the other side.' During the critical moment before the breaking out of the Franco-Austrian war in 1859, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, talking to Lord Clarendon, used the same simile:—

'I sigh,' he said, 'for one hour of Palmerston. No one knows better than I do his faults. I have often suffered by them, and so has England, and so has Europe. But his merits, his sagacity, his courage, his trustworthiness, are invaluable when you want

"A daring pilot in extremity;"

with whom one feels as if one was mounted on a first-rate hunter, who pulls, indeed, and rears and kicks, but never swerves, never starts, and carries you over everything as long as you give him his head.'

He liked office and the possession of power, but no statesman showed more indifference to its trappings, or so cordially detested the flatteries which it not unfrequently attracts. Perhaps his strongest abhorrence was affectation of any sort. He could not abide it in others, and never even dreamt of it for himself.

He was, for instance, always above the timid and feeble tone of those who think it necessary to affect coyness with respect to office, and who can talk of nothing else but the sacrifice they made to duty on the last occasion of accepting it. His language was always frankly to the effect that office is the natural and proper object of a public man's ambition, as the sphere in which he can most freely use his powers for the interest and advantage of his country. Lord Palmerston never pretended to dislike it.

Who, again, at a social party, ever saw him retire into a corner with a colleague or a diplomat, in order by mysterious looks and enigmatical gestures to rouse an admiring curiosity among the bystanders? Many an ambassador of the old school must have felt chagrin at his own discomfiture, but he was indeed a clever man who could 'buttonhole' Lord Palmerston at an evening party, unless he really had something very pressing to say. She also was a clever woman who could at dinner draw him on to politics, with a view to impress the other guests with the high range of the conversation at the head of the table. The easy interchange of familiar talk on social subjects being the appropriate coin for the payment of what is due to society, Lord Palmerston was too downright a gentleman to allow a fraud on society for the sake of effect.

Men of one strong dominant idea are those that usually come most rapidly to the front, whether they succeed or not in afterwards retaining their foremost position. The tardiness with which Lord Palmerston reached political prominence, though no doubt owing to a variety of circumstances, may in part have had its origin in this very conflict of qualities by which his

sympathies were held in suspense, and he himself misunderstood. His manner, arising from an instinctive horror of pomposity or affectation, created a belief in his levity; his good-humour and forbearance, a belief in his indifference; his reticence, a belief in his paucity of ideas. A passage from 'Greville's Memoirs,' under the date of August 7, 1836, shows however that, whatever was the judgment of the public, his talents were early recognised by competent judges:—

It is surprising to hear how Palmerston is spoken of by those who knew him officially. Lady Granville a woman expert in judging, thinks his capacity first-rate; that it approaches to greatness from his enlarged views, disdain of trivialities, resolution, decision, confidence, and above all, his contempt of clamour and abuse. She told me that Madame de Flahault had a letter written by Talleyrand soon after his first arrival in England, in which he talked with great contempt of the Ministers generally, Lord Grey included, and said there was but one statesman among them, and that was Palmerston. His ordinary conversation exhibits no such superiority; but when he takes his pen in his hand, his intellect seems to have full play, and probably when engaged exclusively in business.

Perhaps the most valuable quality for a commander, whether in the field or the Cabinet, is 'knowledge of character.' To be able to choose fit instruments is often a battle half won; to be able to test reports that are brought in is often a defeat half saved. For both these purposes knowledge of character is indispensable—knowledge gleaned not from laborious investigations, for which there is seldom time, but from that instinctive judgment which is a gift in itself, and which only requires for its exercise a few moments' conversation with the person whose character is to be learned. This gift Lord Palmerston had in a large degree. The consciousness of its possession led him, no doubt, on some rare occasions, to be over-hasty in condemnation: but distrust of a new-comer is for a Minister a safer fault than blind confidence.

At the time when the Greeks were being urgently

pressed to satisfy certain English claims, M. Eynard, the banker, came to Lord Normanby and said that Coletti had, without any warning, drawn upon him for 500,000 francs in favour of the British Government, the Greeks availing themselves of an outstanding offer on his part; that it would cost him 80,000 francs to provide the money at once, and that he wished to make a request to the British Government to wait for a few months, so as to spare him this loss. The English ambassador, in a letter home, recapitulated the ingenuous statements of the financier, and was evidently moved by his appeal. Not so Lord Palmerston:—

C. G.: August 15, 1847.

My dear Normanby,—I have received your letter giving an account of your interview with Eynard. I rather think he what Lowther used to call *débüté* in London many years ago as an amateur actor; and he seems, according to what you say, not by any means to have trained off in his powers of performance in that line. He did his part throughout the whole scene admirably, and the only pity was that there were no spectators to crown him with applause. But as the report of the best-acted scene never can produce the same effect as the seeing and hearing would, just as the best speech is tame without the ‘*os habitumque hominis*,’ so I am concerned to say neither Mr. Eynard’s generosity, nor his impending loss of 80,000 francs, nor his desertion by Guizot, nor his European reputation, nor his Philhellenic enthusiasm, can light one spark of sympathy in my cold and gloomy mind, and I feel as stone-hearted as Shylock himself, even after reading your letter to an end. I don’t know Eynard as well as you do, and therefore, perhaps, I know him better. Rely upon it that in all these matters he is simply an instrument of humbug in the hands of other persons. But we are too old birds to be caught by such chaff. Pray, therefore, tell Eynard, in such civil terms as you think best, that we have nothing to do with him in this matter, and can enter into no communication with him on the subject. Our business is with the Government of Greece, and not with the banker of that Government. We mean to settle our affairs with Greece with the Greek Government, and he will, of course, settle his affairs with Greece with the Greek Government also; but we cannot settle our affairs with Greece with him, nor allow him to settle

his affairs with Greece with us. Depend upon it, the money will not come from his pocket, but from the till of Louis Philippe, and Guizot and Co., and they sent him to you to endeavour to bamboozle us. But, even if this were not so, and he was the good-natured, soft enthusiast he represents himself to be, the only result would be that Greece would have to pay him the 80,000 francs which he *says* he is going to lose, if that assertion is true. All this is nothing to us, and we have nothing whatever to do with the matter. It is a question entirely between the Greek Government and Eynard.

He was the most steadfast and loyal of chiefs to those who served under him. 'There is the devoted friend who stands or falls by one, like the noble Lord.' So spoke, satirically, the leader of the Opposition, referring to Lord Palmerston, in the debate of June 16, 1855. But the party sneer contained an acknowledged truth whose universal acceptance did Lord Palmerston both honour and good service during his long career. He was served with zeal because the absent knew that he would shirk no difficulties in their defence, and that he would listen to no depreciatory tales against them, unless accompanied by substantial proofs.

Lord Howden, British Minister at Madrid, begs him not to attend to private and slanderous reports about him. The reply is as follows:—

Broadlands: September 7, 1850.

My dear Howden,—I have received your letter of the 25th of last month, and beg you not to trouble yourself about the matters to which it relates. If I had not full confidence in you, I should not have recommended you to the Queen for the post you occupy: and when I have confidence in a man, I do not allow that confidence to be shaken by the tales of intriguers and backbiters, even if such should reach my ears, which in your case they have not and probably will not. I say will not, because the commercial principle that supply follows demand extends to other matters besides trade; and when certain supplies are known to be discouraged and rejected, they are apt to be withheld. In fact, the usual effect of underhand attempts to injure a man is, with me, to make me more disposed to take his part. I have some little experience in my own proper person of

the way in which falsehood is enlisted into the service of personal pique or unfounded resentment.—Yours sincerely,
PALMERSTON.

This is a letter which deserves to be remembered on account of the truth which it contains. Tale-bearers found no market for their goods in Lord Palmerston's study, and so did not attempt to smuggle them in.

Nor was he more willing to yield to the open efforts of those in high places who sought to persuade him to sacrifice his agents abroad to their prejudices or dislikes. 'Pray make him clearly comprehend,' he writes to an English Minister abroad, 'that I will never sacrifice any British diplomatic officer, high or low, to the whims and caprices of any foreign prince or potentate.'¹

When the Greek Court used its personal influence with our Court at home to bring pressure upon the Foreign Office for the removal of Lord Lyons from Athens, he writes to Lord John Russell:—

Broadlands : August 20, 1847.

Otho's dislike to Lyons is not personal, but political. It is not that Lyons is disagreeable in himself, but that the political advice which he has been always instructed to give, and the political principles and party which he has been instructed to support, are odious to Otho, and he hates Lyons upon the same principle that a dog snaps at a stick. You would not alter the feeling by changing the stick. It is the established formula of proceeding in such matters to run down the man as an easier method than combating his policy, or, rather, the policy of which he is the organ. I think it is very unwise to give way to an intrigue; to do so is a proof either of great blindness or of weakness of character; and when people once find out that by bringing a certain amount of combined intrigue to bear against a given individual, or upon a given object, they can carry their point, either by imposing upon belief or by tiring out resistance, their system of political tactics is reduced to the same certainty with which a general can tell you the precise number of days which it will take him to capture a fortress.

¹ To Sir J. Milbanke, January 31, 1848, when the Bavarian Government asked for the removal of the English Secretary of Legation at Athens.

When a public servant is molested abroad he speaks out plainly, and sends a direct message to the responsible authority :—

Broadlands : October 29, 1849.

My dear Moncorvo,¹—I am sorry to say that the last Lisbon mail brings me another correspondence which has taken place between Mr. Howard and Count Tojal upon the subject of another act of petty vexation on the part of Dr. Moacho, the Guarda Mor of the Health Department at Belem, towards Mr. Philipps, our Vice-Consul. I confess I am astonished that the Portuguese Government should permit one of their inferior officers to continue to carry on this system of malicious annoyance; but pray make Count Tojal clearly understand (which you will best do by sending him this note) that it is quite impossible for me to permit a deserving servant of the British Crown to be the victim of the low rancour and vulgar malignity of any Guarda, whether he be 'Mor' or not; and I do intreat the Portuguese Government not to allow this ill-conditioned Doctor to bring on a quarrel between England and Portugal.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

F. O. : March 10, 1851.

Dear Gordon,²—I have received your letter about the attacks made upon Sir E. Lyons, and I request you will tell Baron Sternfeld in plain terms that I will not stand a continuance or renewal in Sweden of those base intrigues which were got up against Sir E. Lyons at Athens. We have chosen for the Queen's representative at Stockholm an able and distinguished diplomatist, and a brave and honourable naval officer. We expect and require that he shall be received at Stockholm with all the courtesy which is due to his personal merits, and to the respect which is owing to the Government and country which he represents; and if the Swedish Government attaches any value to the maintenance of its friendly relations with England, it will take proper care that we shall have no just cause of complaint on that score. Pray read this letter to Baron Sternfeld.

The staunch support, which he was thus wont to give to all his fellow-workers, did not spring from a mere generous impulse, but was based upon wide expe-

¹ Portuguese Minister in London.

² British Minister at Stockholm.

rience of the world and upon a practical knowledge of its ways and difficulties. He well knew that none but the men who are actually engaged in the conduct of an affair can justly understand all the bearings of the circumstances, and the full value of all the separate incidents of which it consists; and that the tendency of the minds of one's best friends always is to think that one has done too much rather than too little, when difficulties arise which are connected with what has been done; and, on the contrary, to think that too little has been attempted, when difficulties arise in consequence of what has been omitted. But men must be taken as Nature made them, and it is well to make the best of things as they are. His own words constantly repeated this, and he added on one occasion that it was 'the duty of those who are charged with the conduct of a branch of the service *to support those who are acting with them, and to back them up well through the difficulties to which they may be exposed; and you may rely upon it that I shall always do that, which I hold to be the sine qua non condition upon which the co-operation of men of honour can be expected.*'¹

Not that he omitted to convey privately to his agents very plain expressions of his opinion if in any respect he considered that they had failed in judgment or energy; but such rebukes created no ill-feeling when the motive was not to shift blame but to discharge a duty. In the case of minor errors he managed to intimate his opinion without giving offence. 'But we must suspend our judgment and decision,' he writes to Lord Normanby, 'till we know exactly what has happened; and if a friend of mine had done so in his communications on these matters with the French Government, he would not have found himself worse placed thereby in subsequent discussions.'²

Nothing more annoyed him than that an agent should show indifference to the ill-treatment of a British sub-

¹ To Lord Normanby, March 5, 1847.

² Idem, May 10, 1850.

ject; and he pushed this laudable feeling at times further perhaps than the general principles of international law would strictly allow. An Englishman who goes to reside in a foreign country must be held undoubtedly subject to the laws of that country, and can strictly only claim that such laws in his case should be fairly carried out. But Lord Palmerston did not always abide by that rule. 'As to the laws of Venezuela,' he observes in one instance, 'the people of Venezuela must of course submit to them; but the British Government will not permit gross injustice to be done or gross oppression to be exercised on British subjects under the pretence of Venezuelan law.'

When a timid, hesitating Ministry is fearful of using the power confided to it, there is always a reason found for not doing so. Either the Government we have to complain of is powerful—and it would be imprudent to exact reparation from a State which might resent our demands and defy our power; or the Government we have to complain of is weak—and then it is beneath our dignity to force a nation so inferior to our own to do us justice. Lord Palmerston had none of these scruples. Right, in his eyes, was right; and if he insisted upon it when a formidable enemy might be provoked, he treated with becoming scorn the argument that we should deal more gently with an inferior delinquent.

'What!' he used to say; 'we are to tax our people for the purpose of giving them a strong Government, and then we are not to maintain the rights of our people because their Government is strong? The weaker a Government is, the more inexcusable becomes its insolence or injustice.' This mode of reasoning is in truth incontrovertible. Whenever it is asserted that we are to put up with a wrong or an affront because it comes to us from a contemptible antagonist, it is generally easy to recognise an attempt to cover an act of cowardice by an assumption of magnanimity.

Neither does it appear to signify much when once reparation has been demanded whether the act which

called for that reparation concerns a great interest or a small one. The only question is, whether reparation was justly demanded or not. Our honour is pledged to obtain satisfaction when we once demand it with reason and equity on our side. Our honour is tarnished when we demand it without such advocates in our behalf.

I have already alluded to his thoughtfulness about others. With this was combined that attention to details which alone makes such thoughtfulness of any practical utility. To the Commander-in-Chief he suggests that the Guards should be relieved of some of the weight of their headgear:—

There is another subject which seems deserving of your Royal Highness's attention. When your Royal Highness, or any other sportsman, goes out shooting, whether in winter or summer, carrying no other load than a double-barrelled gun weighing about eight pounds, and intending to walk leisurely only a few hours, the lightest possible wideawake is put upon the head, and a loose jacket and trousers leave the limbs as free as possible; but when a soldier of the Guards is ordered upon a long and fatiguing march, or has to make all the bodily exertion required on the field of battle, as if his tight clothing and his musket, knapsack, ammunition, and other things, weighing probably about sixty pounds, were not sufficient restraints upon muscular exertion, he has to carry on his head a great bearskin cap, weighing, it is said, about two pounds four ounces, whereas a far lighter headgear, even if made of bearskin, would answer every purpose, and relieve his head and brain from the heat and pressure of the present head-dress. I would venture to submit for your Royal Highness's consideration that a very light cap, partly bearskin, if that must be, but smaller and lower than the Artillery busby, would be a great relief to the men of the Guards; and that after such an improved head-dress had come into use everybody would wonder that the present high and heavy cap had ever been worn.¹

In another letter to Mr. S. Herbert when Secretary of State for War, after asking whether he had thought of preparing a little book of instructions for the Rifle Volunteers, he adds, 'Have you been able to persuade the

¹ To Duke of Cambridge: November 12, 1861.

Barrack Department to provide the sleeping rooms of the soldiers with decent civilized arrangements of utensils for night wants?'

When the rage for competitive examination for clerkships in our public offices first broke out he watched with anxiety its detailed development; and, wishing himself to revise the Papers of Questions on which the examinations were conducted, he writes thus to the Home Secretary:—

They (Civil Service Commissioners) continue to put the most absurd questions, which tend to throw ridicule upon the whole system, and answers to which are no more a test of the capacity of a young man to be a clerk than would be his happening to know the exact dimensions of one of the great craters in the moon.

This absurd pedantry is injurious to the interests of the public service. Would it suit you to appoint them to meet us in the Cabinet room in Downing Street on Wednesday at three? If so, I wish you would appoint them, and request them to bring with them their Papers of Questions for all the public departments for which examinations take place.'¹

When, for the purpose of preparing papers for Parliament, or from any other cause of pressure, the hours of work in some department of the Foreign Office were unusually prolonged, he used to send for a list of the clerks who had been so detained, and would convey to them individually his thanks and his appreciation of their work. I find notes put away, docketed "Names of Foreign Office Clerks who sat up" for such and such a purpose. It is not every chief who, in the middle of all his engrossing employments, would trouble himself about the share which each individual under him had taken in the general work.

During a fit of the gout he hears that a colleague is also laid up. Straightway, thinking of his friend's health, and not absorbed only in his own, he sends him the following letter:—

¹ To Sir George Lewis: Dec. 6, 1856.

Piccadilly: May 22, 1857.

My dear Clarendon,—Sympathy between colleagues is a good thing, but it may be carried too far, and I am sorry to hear that you have pushed it to the point of joining me in a touch of gout.

Peel said that no man should give advice till he is called in, and you have not called me in; but I am called in by the interest which we all take in your health. What, then, would be your objection to the following suggestion?

You want more air and exercise. Much you cannot have, a little you might have, and every mickle makes a muckle, and a little every day tells in the course of the year. Why should you not provide yourself with a steady hack, with good action, who would give you no trouble when on him, and not prevent you from thinking over the draft you are next going to write? Why should not the aforesaid quadruped be at your door every morning just as you finish your breakfast, and why should you not ride him to the end of Hyde Park and back again, or down to the Office, making a slight deviation by the way? It would take you only half an hour, but you would soon find the advantage of that half-hour, if daily taken.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

He himself practised what he preached. His groom relates that often in his early days the horses were kept waiting at the door of the Foreign Office up to ten or eleven o'clock at night, so that, at any rate, Lord Palmerston might ride home, and so observe his rule of daily exercise on horseback. He was fond of saying that 'Every other abstinence will not make up for abstinence from exercise.'

Although, perhaps, almost too hard in his language during the combat, he was, after it was over, entirely free from petty malice or lasting rancour. There was always a desire to forgive and forget within the bounds of what was just. This won him at length the attachment even of his political foes. 'He was always a very generous enemy,' said Cobden on his death-bed.

He had a wonderful faculty of dismissing from his mind any matter, however anxious, when, for the time, it was disposed of, and his disposition allowed him to

feel perfect confidence in his subordinates so long as they had done nothing to forfeit it. These two qualities were mighty aids to him in his work, as they not only assisted his power of concentration, which was already naturally strong, but freed him from that perpetual head-worry which has worn out so many busy men. It is almost needless to add that, in spite of his long official habits, he never succumbed to that infirmity of small minds which is well described and well understood by the term 'red-tapeism.'

Fearless truthfulness was one of his distinctive characteristics, which, while it made him some enemies, in the long run won him more friends. In his intercourse with foreign Ministers, however, it sometimes served a purpose which he at the time little anticipated. I have heard him say that he occasionally found that they had been deceived by the open manner in which he told them the truth. When he had laid before them the exact state of the case, and announced his own intentions, they went away convinced that so skilful and experienced a diplomatist could not possibly be so frank as he appeared, and imagining some deep design in his words, acted on their own ideas of what he really meant, and so misled their own selves.

A distinguished author of an essay on the working of the English Constitution lays down that a statesman who aspires to be a leader must also be an unflinching partisan. This appears to be so far true that it would, perhaps, be impossible to name any other man than Lord Palmerston whose life has been an illustration of the contrary; but he never seemed to take much interest in purely party politics, and party spirit influenced few of his acts. It used to be said of an eloquent Conservative leader that he led the Opposition with the spirit and keenness of a jockey riding a race; every nerve was strained, and every legitimate means resorted to, to 'dish' his opponents. Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, once owned, in a letter to his brother, that he was not fit to be a leader of Opposi-

tion, because, as he said, 'I have not faction enough in my composition.'

But if in public life he was genial, straightforward, and considerate, in his private life these qualities were equally marked. As an English country gentleman—that type of landed proprietor which foreigners recognise as peculiar to this country, and by which so many of our best qualities are fostered—he took a keen interest and a personal share in all rural pursuits and business. Sports or meetings, farmers' dinners or agricultural shows, village schools, where he sometimes himself examined the children, or labourers' teas, when he always had a cheery word ready, and friendly advice mingled with fun—as on one occasion, when handing to a man a prize of twenty-five shillings, given for the tidiest couple, he added: 'Scripture says that a virtuous woman is a crown to her husband; but in your case, you see, she is five crowns'—into each and all he threw himself with unaffected zest and enjoyment; for intercourse with his fellow-creatures, of whatever degree, was a positive pleasure to him, and in this Lady Palmerston resembled him. Her memory, cherished by his private friends, should not be less preserved in connection with his public career. Her assemblies—neutral ground where distinguished persons of all parties, whether foreign or domestic, met for social intercourse, forgetting for the moment their political differences—were a powerful aid to him as head of a Government. Shortly after her death, Mr. Disraeli, in a speech at Glasgow, while alluding to the happy circumstance of public life in England that we do not as a rule permit our political opinions to interfere with our social relations, recalled in the following words one of his reminiscences:—

If you are on the Continent and wish to pay your respects to a minister and go to his reception, you are invited by the minister. The consequence is that you find no one there except those that follow him. It is not so in England. I remember some years ago meeting, under the charming roof of one of the

most accomplished women of the time, the most celebrated diplomatist of certainly half a century, and he said to me, 'What a wonderful system of society you have in England! I have not been on speaking terms with Lord Palmerston for three weeks, and yet here I am; but you see I am paying a visit to Lady Palmerston.'

The manner in which she performed what Lord Palmerston, in reply to a complimentary letter from the American Minister, once termed her 'portion of our joint duties,' sufficiently proved that to the refinement and kindliness of a 'grande dame' she joined the genial and sympathetic nature of her husband. Both host and hostess succeeded in pleasing because they were pleased themselves; for age had not blunted their delight in the society of their fellow-men, or their pleasure in seeing others happy. By a natural law these hospitable efforts strengthened their influence in the political world, for the very reason that such was not the sole object they had in view when they threw open their doors not grudgingly or of necessity, but because they liked it.

Let two instances suffice to illustrate Lord Palmerston's considerate kindness to those round him in the country:—One day Lady Palmerston brought him home word that during her drive she had heard of one of his tenants having met with a serious accident. Although it was late, and the hour for his daily work in his library, he instantly ordered his horse, left his despatches, and within half-an-hour was by the side of what proved to be a dying man. Again, when, in 1859, he presented the parish clergyman, Mr. Moore of Romsey, to the living of Sutterton, knowing that Mrs. Moore had indifferent health, and was anxious about the quality of the water in her future home, he directed specimens of it to be sent to him out of Lincolnshire, and himself forwarding them for analysis to the Royal College of Chemistry, obtained a satisfactory report, which he handed to Mr. Moore.

Lord Palmerston was not a Democrat. He did not

think a democracy the best government for a people, and he wished to maintain an aristocracy as a part of ours. But all his feelings and sympathies were of a broad popular kind. Instances appear through his correspondence, when Secretary of War, of his interest in the private soldier's comfort and moral improvement. As a landlord he showed a constant attention to the comfort, education, and improvement of the peasant. But nowhere could be found a more complete exemplification of his feelings as to the happiness and enjoyment of the great masses of the population than in two letters to Sir Benjamin Hall, at that time First Commissioner of Works, with respect to the management of the parks.

94, Piccadilly : Oct. 31, 1857.

My dear Hall,—I cannot agree with you as to the principle on which the grass in the park should be treated. You seem to think it a thing to be looked at by people who are to be confined to the gravel walks. I regard it as a thing to be walked upon freely and without restraint by the people, old and young, for whose enjoyment the parks are maintained ; and your iron hurdles would turn the parks into so many Smithfields, and entirely prevent that enjoyment. As to people making paths across the grass, what does that signify ? If the parks were to be deemed hayfields, it might be necessary to prevent people from stopping the growth of the hay by walking over the grass ; but as the parks must be deemed places for public enjoyment, the purpose for which the parks are kept up is marred and defeated when the use of them is confined to a number of straight gravel walks.

When I see the grass worn by foot traffic, I look on it as a proof that the park has answered its purpose, and has done its duty by the health, amusement, and enjoyment of the people.

In the college courts of Cambridge a man is fined half-a-crown who walks over the grass plots, but that is not a precedent to be followed.

94, Piccadilly : Nov. 12, 1857.

My dear Hall,—I have been much surprised this morning at seeing a party of labourers employed in trenching a large piece of the Green Park. As head of the Government, I have

a right to expect that essential alterations should not be made in the spaces allotted for the enjoyment and recreation of the public without my previous sanction and concurrence, and I entirely disapprove of the restrictions which you are imposing upon the free enjoyment of the Green Park and Hyde Park by the public.

Your iron hurdles are an intolerable nuisance, and I trust that you mean shortly to remove them. To cut up the Green Park into enclosed shrubberies and plantations would be materially to interfere with the enjoyment and free recreation of the public; and I must positively forbid the prosecution of any such scheme. As head of the Government, I should be held by the public to have authorised these arrangements, and I do not choose to be responsible for things which I disapprove.

There is earnestness and determination here. There might have been a different way of looking at the subject. It might have been contended that pleasure may be derived from the eye—that the working man might be gratified by seeing pretty patches of flowers, and walking down nicely-gravelled walks; and the popular philosopher might have theorized on this subject with much grace and plausibility. But what the simple glance of Lord Palmerston saw was the labouring man, relieved from his toil, strolling with his wife as he listed along the broad common, sitting down under the trees, playing with his children, enjoying the free air and the open space in careless independence; and when he says that he likes to see the grass worn because it is a proof that the people have been enjoying themselves, we feel how completely his heart beat, even on the most ordinary questions, with the great public heart of the country—how much in reality he was one of the many, and concentrated in his own mind the feelings of the many.

It was this identity which he felt with the English people that made him so proud of their strength and so jealous of their honour.

It is singular how this feeling in a Minister—this feeling which distinguishes the great Minister from the ordinary one—raises his country, and elevates all those

in its service by a sort of magical influence that is felt both at home and abroad. Chatham was in the soul of Wolfe, and his son in that of Nelson. Mr. Canning's high bearing and splendid words gave to a few Guards sent to Lisbon a force which may be said to have paralysed the power of the great military monarchies of Europe. Lord Palmerston had not the genius of these men, but he had the spirit and the sentiment, and he took care that no one who served under him should be without them.

Lord Palmerston's correspondence, when read, serves to account at the same time for his popularity and his authority: the mixture of pleasantry with satire—of good humour with censure—of friendliness with command. The kindly tone of refusals, the full and ample expression of thanks, combine in a singular manner to exhibit the Minister who without exciting our imagination as the ideal of a statesman, orator, or hero, satisfied our mind with the reality of an able, practical, good-tempered man who loved his country and his countrymen, did his business with zeal and pleasure, liked a joke, would not be trifled with, and never showed a disposition either to cringe or to offend.

In short, there was a genuine desire to produce an agreeable impression as to themselves on others, which took away that character of selfishness which so often attaches to what a man when receiving or conferring an obligation usually says, and that makes one feel that the person who got the letter addressed to him must have felt lighter and happier on the afternoon he received it.

It is said that M. de Talleyrand had a formula for answering literary men who sent him their works. He usually wrote that he received them with a satisfaction which he felt sure would be increased on reading them.

But Lord Palmerston had no set formula. He put himself in his correspondent's position, and gave himself the trouble to realise the hopes and the feelings of the person he was addressing. Two letters—one giving

an appointment, the other expressing regret at not doing so—are models of their kind. The gentleman who got the appointment, and who might have thought it came through a private friendship for his father, is expressly told that he owes it to his own merits; and the gentleman who is not appointed would have shown the refusal with as much pride to his mother or his wife as if it had been the offer of a lucrative place.

94, Piccadilly : Dec. 14, 1859.

My dear Sir,—Many thanks for your note of the 12th. I can assure you that it gave me great pleasure to find myself able to do that which was agreeable to the son of a much esteemed and highly valued friend; but at the same time it is due to you to say that I should not have been guided by my personal feelings in this respect, if I had not thought that you were the fittest person I could choose for the office to which you have been appointed.

Piccadilly : June 24, 1859.

My dear Sir,—I return you the enclosed, and beg at the same time to express my regret that it has not been possible for me to avail myself of your very valuable assistance in regard to the arrangement which I have had to make, as I am well satisfied that any public duties which you might have consented to undertake would have been performed by you with that ability which you are known to possess.—Yours faithfully,

PALMERSTON.

He had a good-natured, gay way of giving reproofs when he did not mean them to be severe, of which everyone who had much correspondence with him will recollect some example. ‘Put a little more starch into your neckcloth, my dear ——,’ he said to a favourite diplomatist who he thought did not hold up his head high enough at the court where the Minister represented us.

It must often happen to a diplomatist who has any intellect to differ from some of the views which the Minister of Foreign Affairs may have conceived, because the Minister cannot know all the local circumstances to which his views have to be applied so well as the man

on the spot. Such independence never drew down Lord Palmerston's displeasure. At times he yielded or modified his previous instructions; at times he persisted in them; but he never rebuked an agent, who had anything to justify his sentiments, for expressing them.

But he hated anything like a subterfuge, and saw at once through a device which some clever diplomatists practise of putting their own opinions into somebody else's mouth.

On one occasion a *chargé d'affaires* who was told to carry out instructions he disapproved of related his conversation with the Minister on whom he was told to urge them, and gave the Minister's arguments in reply with all the skill and force he could supply.

Lord Palmerston, after answering these arguments with his usual ability, closed his despatch by these quiet observations :—

It may be, and no doubt is, the duty of a diplomatist, in reporting a conversation with a member of the Government to which he is accredited to report the nonsense, however great it may be, that may be said to him, but it would be more to the credit of his own sagacity if he took care in making his report not to let it be supposed that he did not see the absurdity of the things that had been said to him.

To one gentleman who was perpetually pressing on him some claims of his father to a peerage, which claims had been frequently put aside by him, after reminding his correspondent courteously of this fact and of the reasons for it, he writes, as if relieving himself from a disagreeable thought: 'I confess I cannot see what advantage or satisfaction can accrue to your father from drawing from me at repeated intervals a repetition of this statement.'

Lord Palmerston's style of writing illustrates his character, and may be studied with advantage. Let it be borne in mind that the letters which have been given in these volumes were for the most part written hastily, amid the press of business, and always without erasure

or correction. Great simplicity, fun, and clearness convey the true impression of a straightforward correspondent whose object in writing is not a display either of wit or of erudition, but the communication of what he has to impart in as short and as easy, but in as effective a manner as possible. As a pompous and reserved statesman too often gets, among the vulgar, the credit of wisdom, so a dark and heavy writer is supposed to be profound. If he is clear and light-hearted, he is often regarded as shallow. No greater mistake. Lord Palmerston's letters survive as a protest against any such false judgment.

He wants a reform both in the manner and substance of a young diplomatist's reports; so he says to Lord Normanby:—¹

Your new man sends a long bavardage in an illegible hand. Pray tell him that his reports are of no use if they cannot be read, and that unless he encloses a couple of spare half-hours with each report he had better keep them to himself. The F. O. is not a spelling school. He should write a larger hand, throw over his reflections, and state his facts concisely like a table of contents.

He is tormented by the difficulty of reading the faded colour of the Vienna despatches, so through Lord Ponsonby he takes the mission to task:—

Your attachés put me out of all patience by the paleness of the ink in which they write out your despatches. Pray give them my compliments, and say I have put them all at the bottom of their respective lists, and if they do not mend their ways I shall be obliged to send you in their stead another set who will pay more attention to writing that which can be read.²

His own language being simple and accurate, he was apt to speak out when he came across sentences of a different quality.

Lord Palmerston desires me [writes his secretary]³ to hint

¹ March 7, 1849.

² To Lord Ponsonby, February 8, 1849.

³ Sir G. Shee to Mr. Morier, April 22, 1834.

to you privately that he has great objection to the introduction of any Gallicism into a despatch which may have to be laid before Parliament. He observes, for instance, that you use the word *adhesion*, which he says is not an English word in the sense in which you use it; and he considers the same remark applicable to the phrase, *It may be permitted to doubt*, which is also employed.¹

To the Home Secretary he conveys a common-sense view about the supposed claims of civic functionaries to marks of royal favour:—

November 18, 1862.

My dear Grey,—It seems to me that there are strong objections to giving Baronetcies to Mayors and Lord Mayors. In the first place, it would be opening a door without being able to say how many would have to enter by it; for if once you begin, it would be difficult to draw a line of distinction between cases to be accepted and cases to be refused. But in fact it would be handing over to municipal corporations the power of disposing of dignities granted by the Crown; and no wonder that all the magistrates of Edinburgh express a wish that they may be allowed to make a Baronet.

Municipal corporations exercise their own prerogative in conferring upon one of their members the dignity of Mayor; and the Crown exercises its prerogative in conferring upon those whom it deems worthy of it the dignity of Baronet.

But each party should keep within its own bounds; and corporations should not try to make Baronets, any more than the Crown should try to make Mayors.

He declines to forward an oft-repeated recommendation from the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, in a note which is quite a model of brevity, because though curt

¹ So, also, once in a speech in the House of Commons, he raised his voice against a common error of expression:—‘We have heard the term ally and allies rung in our ears by those who either must be ignorant of the slipslop expression they were using, or who, through what I must admit to have been its general acceptation, forgot that they were using a totally unmeaning term. Why, what is an ally? An ally is a Power allied by treaty engagements in carrying on some active operation, political or otherwise. But to call a country an ally merely because it is in a state of friendship with you, is to use an expression that has no meaning whatever, because it is applicable to every other Power in the world with whom you may happen not to be in a state of war.’—*July 21, 1849.*

it is civil—a point in the letter being that the ‘sarcastic critic’ whom he was ‘remembering’ happened to be Lord Carlisle himself to whom he was writing:—

Broadlands: April 24, 1862.

My dear Carlisle.—I have received your letter of the 19th. I remember a sarcastic critic exclaiming, ‘Here comes Dudley Stuart with his eternal Poles.’ I shall parody the exclamation by saying, Here comes Carlisle with his eternal X——; but I think the Poles better entitled to their freedom than X—— is to the Commandership, and so let us adjourn the debate.

He was often very happy in the phrases with which he described a man’s failings. Of a diplomatist who would obstinately stick to his own idea in spite of instructions from home, and for whom he was meditating a rebuke, he says, ‘S—— is like a bad retriever, that will not let go his game till he gets a rap on the nose.’ Of another, whose charity was not so large as his egotism:—

I wish B——’s letters were not so full of backbiting: however, he makes up for his disparagement of others by his praises of himself.

There is a whole type of diplomatists described in the following sketch of a foreign ambassador:—

Colloredo is agreeable in private society, but diplomatically he is a very unsatisfactory man to deal with. He seems always in a fright lest he should say anything that would commit him: he is ever on the defensive, and there is no discussing any matter on equal terms with him. He ends a long conversation by saying, ‘Mais souvenez-vous que je ne vous ai rien dit,’ and while he is talking seems to fancy that there is a shorthand writer behind the screen taking down what he says.¹

‘What energy,’ he once said, speaking of the Turks, ‘can be expected of a people with no heels to their shoes?’ And when a message was sent to him from a foreign sovereign, asking that a baronetcy might be conferred on an Englishman for whom that sovereign professed an attachment, the only remark he made was

¹ To Lord Ponsonby, October 19, 1849.

that while titles and honours were said to be the cheap rewards bestowed by princes, they certainly were cheapest of all when borrowed from a neighbour.

Sir John Bligh, our Minister at Hanover, writes to complain that the King will persist in giving balls on Sunday, and asks for Lord Palmerston's approval if he leaves the palace when the band strikes up. The Foreign Secretary, in reply, sanctions the conduct of the English Minister, but so words his communication as to check any disposition that might exist to make too grave a matter of the affair:—

It is certainly somewhat singular that the King of Hanover, who lays so much stress upon religion, should choose Sunday of all days in the week for his ball-night, and in this respect he seems to be the reverse of Lord Fitzhardinge, who said to somebody, that, to be sure, he had not much religion, but that what little he had was of the best quality. The King of Hanover professes to have a great deal; but its quality seems rather indifferent, and I should think that his friends in England would not be much edified by hearing of his Sunday-evening polkas. However, I think you are quite right in making your bow at these parties, and in then going away.¹

His illustrations, often homely, generally went to the root of the matter, as, for instance, when discussing the policy of insisting on reciprocity from France before throwing our markets open to her, he thus condemned the notion:—

I look on the tariffs of the two countries as if they were two turnpikes, one on each side of a river dividing two counties, both of which require payment from all passing across. Who would not laugh at county A. if it were to insist on continuing to pay the turnpike on its own side, unless it were also relieved from paying the turnpike on the B. side of the river? But high customs duties are like turnpike tolls, a charge making passage more expensive for everything that comes in.

As a public speaker, Lord Palmerston's success was very great, and surely results are good tests of merit in the art of persuasion. He always contrived to serve up

¹ Foreign Office, October 26, 1847.

food for every palate the best suited to his audience for the moment, whether learned, municipal, political, or artizan. He certainly never aspired to the lofty rank of a great orator, nor to the magic wand of a great master of phrases; but in the power of conveying abundant knowledge in an apt, logical, and convincing form, he yielded the palm to none. I find traces of careful preparation for the speeches of his earlier years; but during the latter half of his life he made little or none. The great changes in the constitution of the House of Commons which successive Reform Bills have made must never be forgotten by those who would compare the Parliamentary speakers of the present with those of a former generation. The House of Commons of the nineteenth century, for a variety of reasons, all perhaps excellent, gives no encouragement to oratory. A man may succeed in spite of it if he possesses knowledge of details sufficient to redeem his defect; but if he cherishes the models studied by Pitt and Fox he bears about him rather a burden than a source of power.

Shortly after Lord Palmerston's death there appeared a short criticism on his public speaking which is so good, as far as it goes, that I here insert it. It is taken from the columns of a newspaper¹ which, as a Radical organ, had been very hostile to him. The tribute to his powers is all the more impartial:—

Lord Palmerston was successful chiefly because he always made it his business to understand the temper of his audience, and accommodate himself to it. He was not an orator in any critical sense of the word. He never made the slightest attempt to rival such men as Pitt and Fox, as Gladstone and Bright, in eloquence. But few men were ever more successful in effecting, by means of public speaking, the objects at which they aimed. Lord Palmerston never indulged in any attempts at fine language. He studied nothing of elocution except the art of speaking out distinctly. His action was generally monotonous. Although fluent, he had a fashion—perhaps an affectation—of

¹ The late *Morning Star*.

interjecting occasionally a sort of guttural sound between his words, which must necessarily have been fatal to anything like true oratorical effect, but which somehow seemed to enhance the peculiar effectiveness of his unprepared, easy, colloquial style. Certainly the occasional hesitation, real or affected, often did much to increase the humour of some of the jocular hits in which Lord Palmerston so commonly delighted. The joke seemed to be so entirely unpremeditated; the audience were kept for a moment in such amusing suspense, while the speaker was apparently turning over the best way to give the hit, that when at last it came it was enjoyed with the keener relish. His jokes were always suited to the present capacity of those whom he happened to address.¹ If the House seemed in a humour for mere nonsense, then Lord Palmerston revelled in mere nonsense. He had the happy art of making commonplaces seem effective. He never rose above his audience; he never vexed their intellect by difficult propositions or entangled arguments. Unless where he purposely chose to be vague or unintelligible, he always went straight to the mark, and talked in homely, vigorous Saxon English. He never talked too long; he never by any chance wearied his audience. He always knew, as if instinctively, what style of argument would best at any given moment tell upon the House. He brought to bear upon every debate an unsurpassed tact, and a memory hardly rivalled. He could reply with telling effect, and point by point, to a lengthened attack from an enemy, without the use of a note or memorandum of any kind. When argument failed, he employed broad, rough English satire. He was never dull; he was never ineffective; he was never uninteresting. One of his rough and ready speeches helped to carry many a division, when Burke would have turned friends into foes from sheer impatience, and when brilliant eloquence of any kind might have been as dangerous to play with as lightning.²

¹ Having, on one occasion, to make an open-air speech to his constituents while suffering from a bad cold, he left aside his ailment, to be guessed by his hearers, and said, amid much laughter, 'I beg that you will allow me to address you with my hat on, in order that I may be your true representative, for I see that you all have your hats on'

² As a chance illustration of his after-dinner speeches, let me give an extract from one of the last he made, namely, at the banquet of the Fishmongers' Company in 1864. He followed another Minister who descanted learnedly on the blessings of the British Constitution. Lord Palmerston spoke more appropriately of the blessings of fish:—'I believe that one of the functions of this ancient corporation is par-

But whatever his merits as a speaker, it was to the general confidence felt in his judgment, motives, and character that Lord Palmerston owed the great position which he latterly occupied in the country. Public confidence is, for a statesman in a free community, one of the first requisites for success ; and if this be wanting no amount of brilliancy in speaking will long supply such a capital defect. There have, no doubt, been temporary exceptions ; but leaders of party in England, and above all, leaders of the Liberal party, must command the moral trust as well as the intellectual homage of thinking men. It was felt that Lord Palmerston, with all his vigour of action and desire for personal distinction, which alone can give the necessary stimulus to exertion, was yet never moved by love of display, whether personal or national ; that, having a full sense of responsibility, he despised no details ; and therefore, while limiting the objects to be aimed at by a careful consideration of the means at his disposal, he would launch the country on no enterprise until he saw clearly how it should be carried through without being abandoned half-way. His calm judgment made him independent of the forces which so often act on our public men, namely, the taunts and reproaches of foreign statesmen and writers, whose interests are certainly not British interests, and who generally give us their warmest approval when we are playing their game and not our own, or at any rate are satisfying their feelings of not unnatural jealousy. In short, Lord Palmerston's

ticularly connected with the position of the country to which it belongs, because in an island country it is natural that one of the first functions of an efficient civic corporation should be to regulate the immigration of the vast multitude of the inhabitants of the ocean that come in contact with the population (laughter). That duty has been from time to time most worthily performed by this corporation ; and I am told that to this day the inhabitants of this great metropolis are weekly and daily indebted to its guardian care ; for that there are multitudes of immigrants that come here from the depths of the ocean unfitted to mix with the population of this island, and being unable to obtain the necessary passport are refused an entrance through the vigilance of this ancient corporation (laughter).

character, free from bombast, though not deficient in self-assertion, was typical of the English of his day, and inspired the confidence which it deserved. I find among his papers the following passage, copied out by himself from some essay which he had been reading about De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland. It may serve as an appropriate ending to this story of his career :—

The statesman who, in treading the slippery path of politics, is sustained and guided only by the hope of fame or the desire of a lofty reputation, will not only find himself beset with incessant temptations to turn aside from the line of strict integrity, but the disappointment he is sure to meet with will probably drive him to misanthropy, perhaps even irritate him to tarnish by vindictive treachery a virtue founded upon no solid or enduring principle. But the statesman who looks in the simple performance of his duty for consolation and support amid all the toils and sufferings which that duty may call him to encounter, who aims not at popularity, because he is conscious that continued popularity rarely accompanies systematic and unyielding integrity; who, as he is urged to no questionable measures by the hope of fame, so he is deterred from none that are just by the fear of censure, such a man may steer a steady course through the shoals and breakers of the stormiest sea; and whether he meet with the hatred or gratitude of his countrymen is to him a consideration of minor moment, for his reward is otherwise sure. He has laboured with constancy for great objects; he has conferred signal benefits upon his fellow-men; nobler occupation man cannot aspire to; greater reward it would be very difficult to obtain.

This extract bears date 1843. Did Lord Palmerston make these maxims his own? His public life, I venture to think, proves that he did.

INDEX.

ABE

ABERDEEN, Earl of: estimate of, i. 168 (*note*), ii. 165; his action at the Foreign Office, i. 450; Lord Palmerston's speech criticising his foreign policy and contrasting his own, 471; formation of his Coalition Ministry, ii. 258, declaration of his policy, an indirect tribute to Palmerston's foreign policy, 260; letters to, 274, 279; reply to Palmerston's mem. suggesting sending fleet to Black Sea, 275; different views as to action, 279; effect of his bias on negotiations, 282. Correspondence on the Russian question, 283-291, hesitation to adopt Palmerston's decisive measures, influence of the Prince Consort, 284; disagrees with Palmerston's suggested ultimatum to Russia, 290; Crimean disasters; declines Lord J. Russell's suggestion to transfer Palmerston to War Office, 301, Roebuck's motion for inquiry, 301, startling majority against the Government, 303, end of the Coalition Ministry, *ib.*

Acre, St. Jean d', Capture of, i. 394

Adelaide, Queen, health of, i. 326; influence of, *ib.*

Adrianople, Treaty of, i. 118

Afghanistan: defeat of Dost Mahommed, i. 396; history of the Cabul expedition, 398, British support of Soojah Shah, 399; occupation of Cabul and subsequent disaster, 400

Alexander, Emperor, contrasted with his father, ii. 329

Algeria: speech on French cruelties in, i. 411; French occupation of, 472

* **All the Talents**, Sudden collapse of ministry of, i. 35

AUC

Almack's, Lady Cowper at, i. 86

Althorp, Lord, breaks down on the Irish Coercion Bill, i. 303

Anglesey, Marquis of: difficulties as Lord Lieutenant, i. 182; reserve used towards him by Wellington, *ib.*; his recall, 185; activity of, 440

Anstey, Mr., attacks Palmerston's foreign policy, ii. 61

Anti-Catholics, Opposition of, i. 91

Anti-Corn Law League. See **Free Trade**

Apponyi, Count, warned by Palmerston that our fleet would follow that of Austria to the Baltic, ii. 432

Aquila, Count, Interview with, ii. 235

Arbitration, International, proposed by Cobden, ii. 60; Palmerston's reservations, *ib.*

Army: force under arms in 1810, i. 63; in 1816, i. 73

Ascot, Emperor of Russia at, i. 466

Ashburton, Lord: qualifications as a special ambassador, i. 422; Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster, *ib.*; Palmerston's opinion of him, 452, and of his treaty, *ib.*

Ashburton Treaty, The, i. 421; denounced by Palmerston, 423, 452

Ashley Lord: Mining Act for the protection of women and children, i. 447, supported by Lord Palmerston, *ib.*; his factory act, 460, supported by Lord Palmerston, *ib.*

Asiatics, Necessary policy towards, defined, ii. 33

Attacks in the press upon him on various occasions, ii. 249; and efficacy of legal proceedings, *ib.*

Auckland's, Lord, meeting with Runjeet Singh, i. 400

AUS

Austria (see also 'Metternich'): inefficiency of her army, i. 173, Lord Cowley's opinion thereon, *ib.*; suppression of insurrection in Papal States, and Modena and Parma, 240; Austria and the Italian confederation, 295, 299; Palmerston's policy towards Austria and Italy, 299; death of the Emperor, 315; state of the country in 1835, 316; decline of Metternich's influence, 324; Austria and France, 382; caution to Metternich concerning Switzerland, *ii.* 10; relation to Italy in 1846, and British views thereon, 12; 'The Holy Alliance' and Cracow, 31, violation of the Treaty of Vienna, *ib.*, British protest against, 32; occupation of Ferrara, 42; action in Italy, 45; retirement of Metternich, 57; imminent interference in Italy and Palmerston's warning, 63; further complications, 84, attitude of Great Britain, *ib.*; Baron Hummalaue as envoy, *ib.*; evil influence of Metternich's example, 84; expected independence of Lombardy, 84; abdication of Ferdinand foreseen by Palmerston, 84; her policy indicated, 86, necessity of a strong sovereign shown, 87; complete Austrian success and mediation of England and France, 88; Palmerston on the Austrians in Italy, 88; offensive attitude to Palmerston personally, 91; failure of negotiations, 92; disaster of Novara, *ib.*; dependence on Russia, 94; leaning of a section of the English towards, 99, 106. Civil war in Hungary, 103, position of the Kaiser king, 104, Palmerston on the position, 104, his sympathy for oppressed Hungary, 105. Joint demand of Russia and Austria for delivery of Kossuth and the other fugitives by the Porte, 107, attitude of Turkey supported by England, 107, decisive action of the British cabinet—the fleet to the Dardanelles, 110, Palmerston's negotiations, 113, and warning, 114, successful result of united action of England and France, 114, Palmerston's objection to confinement of the refugees, 121, their ultimate release, 124. General

BEL

Haynau and Barclay's draymen, 169; rivalry of Prussia in Germany, 170; her position, 172; non-attendance at Wellington's funeral, 255. Abrupt menace of the French emperor, 362, conclusion of the Austro-French war, 365, Palmerston's objections to the French peace proposals, 366, conference at Zurich, 367, sympathy of the English court, 369, hostility attributed to Palmerston, 371. His efforts for Italian unity, 372; his memorandum on policy towards Italy, 380; ultimate results of the war, 385; raises difficulties in the negotiations concerning the Polish outbreak, 421. The Sleswig-Holstein difficulty, outbreak of war, 430, warning from Palmerston that English fleet would follow that of Austria to the Baltic, 432

Azeglio, M. de, acknowledges Palmerston's aid to Italy, *ii.* 94

BALEARIC ISLANDS, Assembly of French squadron with intention to seize the, i. 386

Ballot, the, His objection to, *ii.* 245

Belgium: growing importance of the Belgian question, i. 212; discontent in, 215; M. Van der Weyer's mission to England, 216; constitution of the Netherlands kingdom, 217; grievances of Belgium, 219; population of Belgium and Holland (*note*), *ib.*; English attitude to, 223; difficulties of the Belgic question, 228; crown offered to Duc de Nemours, 229, British objections, 234, selection of Prince Leopold, 230; earliest French concessions, 233; Baron de Chokier appointed regent, 239; the dismantling of the fortresses, 246; French claims to territory, 247, 248; Leopold's objection, 251; hesitation of the Belgians, 252; their pretensions rebuked, 253; new conditions of separation, 257; English resolve to recognise Leopold, 258; Leopold becomes king, 260; advance of the Dutch into, 261; entrance of the French, 262; Palmerston's refusal to treat of the fortresses whilst the French are in Belgium, 266,

BER

- marked result of this firmness (*note*) 266, and French concessions, 268, final success of the negotiations, 271, 275; Leopold's wish to retain French troops, 272, Palmerston's objection, 273; he points out danger of conceding territory, 272, Talleyrand's secret negotiation for partition, 272; judicious action of Leopold, 277; Palmerston's policy tested by the position to-day, 280, beneficial results of English policy, 321; high position of King Leopold, 322
- Berryer, M., French oratory and, i. 478
- Beyrout surrendered to Admiral Stopford, i. 382
- Bloomfield, Lord: refused an audience by the Czar, 123
- Blucher, Marshal: attempted escape with Hohenlohe after Jena, i. 29; tribute to, 30
- Borough franchise, Transfer of, i. 129; difficulties of, 149
- Borough seats, Traffic in, i. 31
- 'Bottle-holder, The Judicious,' origin of the term, ii. 125
- Bowring, Sir John, sent to Naples, i. 327; Palmerston's opinion of him, *ib.*
- Bribery at elections in 1841, i. 407
- Bright, John, Right Hon.: accuses Palmerston of levity in his speech on Sir C. Napier, ii. 294, Palmerston's reply, *ib.*, opinions upon it, *ib.*; isolated position towards the Crimean war, 325; loses his seat, 346
- Broadlands, Account of, i. 299
- Brougham, Lord: Palmerston's reply to, i. 73; Palmerston's opinion of, 112; in France after the revolution and desire to be naturalised, ii. 81; motion on foreign affairs, 96, and its defeat, 98
- Brunnow, M. de: friendly action of Russia through, i. 361; discussion with, on the demand for the delivery of the Hungarian refugees, ii. 108; letter to, 420
- Brunswick, Duke of: his death, i. 26; contemptuous treatment of, by Napoleon, *ib.*; his courage, 28
- Bunsen's, M., communication to Palmerston on Swiss affairs, ii. 6
- Butler's, General, proclamation at

CAV

- New Orleans: Palmerston's sympathy with its victims, ii. 105
- Byron's, Lord, sympathy with Greece, i. 114
- CAMBRIDGE University: successfully contests it with Copley, 92; again returned, 96, gratifying result of re-election, 97, and its incidents, *ib.*
- Canada: despatch of troops to, after the 'Trent affair,' ii. 412; Palmerston's watchful guard of, 415, shown in his last few days, 455
- Canning, Mr.: becomes foreign secretary, 90; made premier, 104; embarrassment in connection with his offer of the Exchequer to Palmerston, 107; difficulties in formation of ministry, 108; death, 111; what was a Canningite? 124; tribute to Canning and his party, 125; compared with Chateaubriand, 209; the Quadruple Alliance, the completion of his policy, 301
- Canton, Capture of, ii. 358
- Capo d'Istria, Assassination of, i. 281
- Carlos, Don: pretensions of, i. 283; hopelessness of his cause, 330, 339
- Casimir Périer: becomes premier of France, i. 230; appreciation of, 241, 253; encouraged, 259; agreement with Sebastiani, 264, *note*; assurance from, *ib.* and 265
- Catholic Emancipation: limited relief proposed by Lords Grenville and Howick, i. 35, George III.'s objections, *ib.*, Perceval's opposition, 38, Lord Palmerston's comments thereon, 39; advocated by him, and his reasons, 71; opposition of the anti-Catholics, 91; Palmerston returned for Cambridge University as its advocate, 91; Wellington's change of attitude towards, 165; speech on, 190; accepted by George IV., 193
- Catholic University, Palmerston's objection to a, ii. 444
- Catholic vote, The, and Italy, ii. 443; and the colleges, *ib.*
- Catholics, Proposed State aid to, i. 464
- Cavour, Count: retains Palmerston's translation of Garter Oath as an archive, ii. 235; conference at Zurich and his resignation, 367

CLIA

- Character, His: general characteristics, i. 1; its completeness, ii. 458; tenacity, 459; frankness and simplicity, 460; his knowledge of character, 461; loyalty to his subordinates, 463; protection of them, and ministers abroad, 464, firm rule of ministers abroad, 466, protection of Englishmen abroad, 467; thoughtfulness for and attention to others 468; absence of rancour, 470; ability to dismiss business from his mind, *ib.*; freedom from red-tapeism, 471; fearless truthfulness, *ib.*; not a strong partisan, *ib.*; delight in private life, 472; influence of Lady Palmerston's *salon*, *ib.*; kindness to his neighbours, 473; thoughtfulness for the masses, 474; his identification of himself with his country, and resulting moral influence, 476
- Charles X.: Palmerston's account of the critical state of his government in 1829, i. 204
- Chartists, the: ii. 80; special constables sworn in, *ib.*; receive no sympathy, *ib.*; contemptuous hearing given to Smith O'Brien in the House, 80
- 'Chiltern Hundreds, The,' refused to Lord Chelsea by Mr. Goulburn; and Palmerston's protest, i. 448
- China: Capture of Chusan, i. 396; affairs in China, 397; opium-smuggling, *ib.*; reasons leading to the war with, 397 (*note*), 398; cession of Hong Kong, 398; the 'opium war,' 405; successes in, 457; threatened disturbance in, ii. 33; Palmerston's views on, *ib.*; outrages of Commissioner Yeh, 344, Cobden's resolution on, 345; capture of Canton, 358; successful operations in second war, 450
- Chokier, Baron de, appointed Regent of Belgium, i. 239
- Cholera in England, in 1849, ii. 101; reappearance in 1853, 265; Palmerston's celebrated despatch concerning 'a fast day,' *ib.*, 266
- Christina, Queen: Christina and Ferdinand, i. 282; her tact as Queen-Regent, 283; driven from Spain, 386
- Church Patronage, His treatment of, ii. 417

COM

- Cinque ports, Installation as Warden of, ii. 403
- Clarence, Duke of: *see* William IV.
- Clarendon, Lord (*when* Geo. Villiers): and M. de Torrens, i. 332; unfounded Spanish charge against, 334; imprudent language to France on Eastern affairs, 375; letters on Irish affairs, ii. 47, 50; on Dr. McHale, 50; succeeds Lord Russell at the F.O., 265, Palmerston's approval of the appointment, *ib.*; Palmerston's tribute to, 273; disagreement with Palmerston's desire to act promptly against Russia, 279; distinct refusal to aid Lord Russell, 305; attends the Congress of Paris, 325
- Classic oratory no longer demanded in House of Commons, ii. 483
- Clive, Lord, sent to Palmerston by Wellington, i. 211
- Clyde, Lord, Instant despatch of, to the Indian Mutiny, ii. 348
- Cobden, Mr.: on international arbitration, ii. 60; letter to, 413; proposed reduction of armaments, 187, Palmerston thereon, 188; resolution on the China outrages, 345, loses his seat on the consequent dissolution, 346; declines Palmerston's offer of the Board of Trade, 364; letter to, on national defences, 413; successful reply to, when attacked, 416; concludes treaty of commerce with France, and refuses titular distinction, 449
- Cockburn, Sir Alexander: Palmerston's tribute to his speech on the Greek debate, ii. 161
- Codrington, Admiral: dissatisfaction with, i. 145; his supineness after Navarino, 174
- Coercion-bill: The, effect of, i. 303; Lord Althorp and Mr. Stanley on it, 303; Littleton's indiscreet communication to O'Connell on it, 306
- Coletti, M. (the Greek Premier), ii. 134; his character traced by Palmerston, *ib.*
- Colonial Office, the, Palmerston undertakes supervision of, ii. 312
- Colonial possessions, Value of our, i. 75; parallel cases, 76; Palmerston's opinion of, 77
- Commons, House of, Leadership of the: Palmerston's distaste to, i. 113, 310; Tierney's claim to, 113

CON

- Confidence of the people, in Palmerston, the reason of his success, ii. 485
- 'Conspiracy to Murder' Bill: its introduction, ii. 354; threats of 'the French Colonels,' and change of feeling in the House, 355; Milner Gibson's amendment, 355; Disraeli's quick change of sides, and suspected agency of Lord Derby, *ib.*; opposition of Russell and Gladstone, 356; defeat of, *ib.*, Lord Derby's later acknowledgment of accidental nature of this defeat, 357
- Continental tour in 1844, i. 475
- Continental troops, Criticism of, i. 85
- Convocation, Restricts ambition of, ii. 444
- Corfu, Palmerston's estimate of value of, ii. 184
- Cornelius, (the fresco-painter), Interview with, i. 480
- Corn-laws. *See* Free Trade
- Corn-resolutions, Difficult position of Wellington cabinet in respect to, i. 133
- Coronation, the, Influx of state personages at, i. 345
- Correspondence, His: examples of its character and variety, i. 92; its directness, ii. 476; absence of all offence, 477; power of conveying good-natured reproof, *ib.*; its tolerance of just independence, 478; reproof of subterfuge, *ib.*; outspokenness, 479; characteristic lightness, *ib.*; clearness, and demand for the same from others, i. 82, 413; ii. 479; its civil brevity, 480; happiness of phrase and description, 481; its nicety when requisite, 482; its use of homely illustrations, 482.
- Costa-Cabral's, Senhor, influence during the civil war in Portugal, ii. 17
- County franchise: its extension defeated, ii. 179
- Coup d'état*, The. *See* France
- Cowley, Lord: on the inefficiency of the Austrian army, i. 173; letters to, ii. 171, 371, 386, 395, 445; attends Congress of Paris with Clarendon, 325; Palmerston's letter to, on his supposed hostility to Austria, 371; *idem*, giving reasons for distrust of designs of Napoleon, 395
- Cracow and 'The Holy Alliance,' ii. 31
- Creptovich, Count: interview with,

DEF

- ii. 331; reasons for delay in his presentation, 335
- Crimean War, The: the Jerusalem question the first inkling of it, ii. 188; Palmerston's proposed mediation, 191; the crossing of the Pruth, 274; the fleet to Constantinople, 283; Palmerston urges descent on Crimea, 294, unpreparedness of the French, 295; expedition to the Crimea, 299; battle of the Alma, *ib.*; false report of fall of Sebastopol, *ib.*; Crimean disasters, 301, Mr. Roebuck's motion for inquiry, *ib.*; active measures of Palmerston as premier, 308; his instructions to Lord Raglan, *ib.*; death of Emperor Nicholas, 310; alliance with Sardinia, *ib.*; Conference of Vienna, 310, hesitation of the French, 315; result of Palmerston's energy and attention to details, 318; refusal of foreign contingents, 319; fall of Sebastopol, 322; imminent recall of the French army, *ib.*, decisive refusal of the English cabinet, 323; exhaustion of Russia, 325; end of the war, 327, British plans for its continuation if needful, *ib.*; Palmerston's conduct of, 448
- Croker, Mr. Wilson: acts as Wellington's intermediary with Palmerston, i. 213; graceful verbal encounter between the two, 225
- Cumberland, Duke of: interference in politics, 162; Palmerston's opinion of, *ib.*; compared with the Duke of Clarence, 163; the Duke of Sussex's opinion of him, 164; ill-advised interference of, 196;
- Currency, Paper, Palmerston's opinion of the evil of, i. 165
- DALY, Father: Palmerston's open treatment of his menace on withdrawal of subsidy to Galway packets, ii. 409
- Danger of over-strength to a ministry, i. 303
- Dardanelles, the: the Straits closed, i. 284; England accused of violating treaty of, ii. 116, and Palmerston's defence, 120, defends stay of fleet in, 118
- Davis, Lieut., attempts his life, i. 82
- Defences (*see also* Land Defences): his

DEF

- support of the militia; 'England the bulwark of freedom,' ii. 241; Letters to Cobden and Gladstone on, 412
- Defensive measures, His, approval of, i. 491
- Delancey, Gen., Palmerston's objection to Sir David Dundas's appointment of, i. 57, and *note*, 58
- Denman's, Lord, opinion of Daniel O'Connell's trial, i. 463
- Derby, Earl of: (*when Mr. Stanley*) on the Coercion bill, i. 303; secession from Lord Grey's ministry, 304; position towards the Peel ministry, 315; (*when Lord Stanley*) attacked by Lord Palmerston, 428; his son (the present earl's) opinion of him, ii. 140; leads adverse vote against government on the Greek question in the Lords, 150; failure to form a ministry on resignation of Lord John Russell, 179; letter to, declining to join his cabinet, 304; forms a ministry, ii. 230, Palmerston refuses to join, *ib.*; brings in a Militia bill supported by Palmerston, 231; weakness of his government, 236, 252; Palmerston's aid to on Mr. Villiers' motion against Protection, ii. 256; defeat of the ministry on Disraeli's budget and resignation, 257; attempt to form a ministry on Aberdeen's resignation, 304; offers leadership of Commons to Palmerston, *ib.*; other offers to Gladstone and Sidney Herbert, *ib.*; suspected agency in defeat of the 'Conspiracy to Murder' bill, 356, succeeds to office on Palmerston's defeat thereon, 356, frank confession of accidental nature of it, 357; aided by Palmerston in settling French affairs, 358; in a minority, 360; Reform-bill thrown out and dissolution, *ib.*, unfavourable result of election, 362; renewed overtures to Palmerston, *ib.*; resigns, *ib.*
- Diplomacy: refusal of gifts by British ministers, ii. 99; evils of the removal of ministers, ii. 129; difficulties of the diplomatist, 130; 'The Art of Diplomacy,' 149
- 'Diplomatic Relations with Rome' Bill, passed, ii. 53; objections to reception of Nuncio, *ib.*
- Disraeli, Benj., Rt. Hon.: last effort for Protection, ii. 95, support given to

EGY

- the government by Sir R. Peel, *ib.*; remark on Palmerston's dismissal, 227; his budget more liked by the opposition than supporters, 231; only Disraeli and the premier, 236, 252; defeat of the government on his budget and resignation, 257; attacks Palmerston on the China question, 345; rapid change of sides on the 'Conspiracy to Murder Bill,' and suspected influence of Lord Derby, 355; tribute to the influence of Lady Palmerston's salon, 473
- Dissenters, The, and the Education grant, ii. 34
- Distress of the masses in 1842, i. 447; affirmed by Palmerston, *ib.*; in the manufacturing districts, 450
- Divorce Court Bill, Passes the, ii. 347
- Dockyard fortifications: advocacy of, ii. 375, letter to Gladstone thereon, 375; success of the resolution, 378; pushed on in distrust of French designs, 391
- 'Don Pacifico' affair, The, ii. 126; (*see also* Greece)
- Dost Mahommed: defeat of, i. 396; British support given to Soojah Shah, 399
- Drouyn de Lhuys: letter to, ii. 138; ordered back to Paris in consequence of apprehended hostilities, 146, Wellington's happy comment thereon, *ib.*
- Dudley, Lord: hesitation to leave the Wellington Cabinet, i. 123; his part in it, 127, 129; his ultimate resignation and reasons for it, 160
- Dundas, Sir David (Commander-in-chief): pretensions to supremacy over Secretary at War repelled by Lord Palmerston, 66
- Durham's, Lord, opinion of Lord Melbourne, i. 308, *note*

E— and his intrigues, Account of, i. 454

'Ecclesiastical Titles' Bill and papal aggression, ii. 172; Cardinal Wiseman's position towards it, 174

Egypt: treaty for the evacuation of the Morea, i. 173, its completion, 177; successes of Mehemet Ali, 283, Palmerston's opinion of his designs, 284; powerful position of Mehemet Ali, 348, declares his independence,

ELL

350, English cabinet decides to give naval support to Turkey, 351; French designs on Egypt, 358; defeat of the Turks at Nezib, *ib.*; surrender of the Turkish fleet by Achmet Pacha, 359; French proposal for a new boundary, 363; Mehemet Ali's threats, 366, terms offered by the Four Powers, 374; blockade of Syrian coast, 382; Beyrout surrenders to Admiral Stopford, 382, Sidon stormed by Sir C. Napier, 382, defeat on the Lebanon by marines under Sir C. Napier, *ib.*; Louis Philippe's fear of Mehemet Ali's power, 391, echoed in London, *ib.*, fallacy shown by easy defeat, *ib.*; capture of St. Jean d'Acre, 394; final submission of Mehemet Ali, 401; Palmerston resists French designs on, *ii.* 338, insists on right of transit, *ib.*

Ellenborough, Lord: recall of, *i.* 465; censure of Lord Canning and resignation, *ii.* 360, *note*

Ellice, Mr. Edward: high eulogy of Palmerston's speech, *i.* 343; letter to on the American civil war, *ii.* 405

Enlistment Act, Debate on the Tory, *i.* 345

Enlistment question with the United States: our minister receives his passports, *ii.* 336, we do not retaliate, *ib.*; debate in the House and Palmerston's reply, *ib.*

Espartero, Marshal, made Regent of Spain, *i.* 386

Esterhazy, Prince: conversation with on foreign affairs, *i.* 293; agreement on Eastern affairs, 362

Europe: unsettled state of in 1830, *i.* 215; state of in 1832, 281; disturbances in, in 1847, *ii.* 2; state of politics in 1850, 164; Continental exaltation on Palmerston's supposed downfall, 213; effect of his absence from the Foreign Office on Continental affairs, 272

Evans, General Sir de Lacy, Defeat of, *i.* 342

FACTORY ACT, Lord Ashley's, *i.* 460; supported by Palmerston, *ib.*; curious incident in connexion with it, 460

Famine in Ireland, The, *ii.* 34

FRA

Father, His: letter to Dugald Stewart, *i.* 9, death of, *i.* 11

Fenian disturbances, Palmerston's energy concerning, in his last days, *ii.* 454

Ferdinand Emperor (of Austria): his abdication foreseen by Palmerston, *ii.* 84

Fixed Duty and the Sliding Scale, *i.* 419; Palmerston's advocacy of the former, 420

Flahault, Comte de: Palmerston's arguments to, *i.* 235; plain explanations to, showing his distrust of the French Emperor, *ii.* 392

Force under arms in 1810, *i.* 63; in 1816, 73.

Four Powers, Treaty of the, *i.* 369; good results of, 393

Fox, Charles James: health of, *i.* 18; his anxiety to conclude peace, *ib.*; death of, 22; Palmerston's opinion of, 22

France: French army sent to the Morea, *i.* 170; attitude towards Greek slavery, 176; feeling in France, in 1829, on European affairs, 186; prosperous state of, *ib.*; curious state of Paris streets in 1829, 190; Palmerston's account of the critical state of the government of Charles X. in 1829, 204; religious liberty the moving power in, 210; Casimir Périer becomes premier, 230; aim to gain territory, 231, 239; earliest concessions on the Belgic question, 233; distinct language used to, 236; attitude towards insurrectionary movement in Modena and Parma, 240; our satisfaction at Périer's appointment, 241; final claim for territory, 246, concessions, *ib.*, revival of pretensions to territory, 248; Palmerston's denial of her right to discuss fortress question, 249; appreciation of the friendship of, 253; reprisals in the Tagus, 255, British attitude thereupon, 256, 258; arrogant speech of Louis Philippe, 258, Talleyrand's explanation of it, *ib.*; entry of French army into Belgium, 262; agreement of Périer and Sebastiani, 264, *note*; assurance from Périer, *ib.* and 265; Talleyrand's secret negotiations for partition, 272; extreme language of 'The Times' towards, 272; cha-

FRA

racteristics of the nation, 275; dispute with the United States; British mediation, 323; Louis Philippe's inclination to a Spanish marriage, 325; gradual coolness towards England, Talleyrand's share in it, 331; effects of her intrigues in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 336; Palmerston's complaints against her Government, 339; position of France and Russia, 352; her designs on Egypt, 358; reservation under Soult's premiership in the agreement of the Powers to support Abdul-Medjid, 359, Palmerston's opinion of her attitude, 360; proposes a new boundary for Egypt, 363; danger to England of a Russo-French alliance, 364; expected opposition of Soult, 364; increase of her navy, 365; her position, 366; administration of M. Thiers with M. Guizot, 367; suspicions of Louis Philippe, 367, exculpation of him, 368 (*footnote*); French object in delay, 369; Thiers' purpose frustrated by execution of the treaty of the Four Powers, *ib.*, anger of Guizot and Thiers, 375, imprudent language of Lords Holland and Clarendon, 375; indignation in France, 376, threatening language of Thiers and Guizot, 377, Palmerston's opinion of her intentions, 378; protest against the language of the French ambassador at Constantinople, 379; British naval preparations, 380; France seeks some concessions, 381. France and Austria, 382; supposed plan to burn the British fleet, and curious incident, 383; possibility of war with, 384, communication to Louis Philippe thereon, 385; assembly of her squadron with intention to seize the Balearic Islands, 386, break up of the Thiers' ministry, 388; Louis Philippe's fear of Mehemet Ali, 391; difficult position of Louis Philippe, 392; Guizot succeeds Thiers, *ib.*; Guizot's better appreciation of the position, *ib.*; her participation in the treaty of the Four Powers refused by Palmerston, 393; mediates between England and Naples, 403; remains of Napoleon given up to her, 405; Palmerston's desire to conclude Slave Trade Convention and Guizot's jealousy, 411; difficulties

FRA

of the ministry, 414. French action in Tahiti through Admiral de Thouars, 432, imprisonment of Mr. Pritchard, 433, disavowed by Guizot, 434. Guizot's refusal to exercise the Slave Treaty, 444; suspected concord between France and America, 445; French occupation of Algeria, 472; imminence of war with, 475; condition of in 1844, 478; irritation in England toward, 479. The Spanish marriages and the Duc de Montpensier, ii. 10, Guizot's action in, and its retributive results, 12, causes leading to downfall of Louis Philippe, *ib.* The Quadruple Treaty and the civil war in Portugal, 20; suggests union of Spain and Portugal, and Palmerston's objections, 29; bribery of M. Teste and attempted suicide, 40; shortsighted policy of Guizot and Louis Philippe in the Sicilian revolt, 56; interference of the fleet in the bombardment of Palermo, &c., 58. The revolution in Paris (1848), 65, causes leading to it, *ib.*, vacillation and infatuation of Louis Philippe, 66, Lord Normanby's description, i. 67, undignified position of Guizot, 68, courageous conduct of the Duchess d'Orleans, 70, effect of the news in the House of Commons, *ib.*, fears of warlike action of the Provisional Government, 72, attitude of England towards, 73, Lamartine's circular, 75, his reception of the Irish appeal and Palmerston's remonstrance, 76, his ultimate effective action, 77, attitude of England and Russia, 79, Foreign Office policy at this crisis, *ib.* The French in Rome, 95; joint action with England in the affair of the Hungarian refugees and successful result, 114. Anti-British influence in the 'Don Pacifico' affair, 136, desire of M. Thouvenel to despatch fleet to Athens and better discretion of the admiral, 138, ultimately offers mediation, 140, limited acceptance of the offers, 141, Baron Gros appointed mediator, 140, his dilatoriness, 144, and resignation, 145, hostile attitude to England and apprehensions of war, *ib.*, confidence of Palmerston, *ib.*, Drouyn de Lhuys ordered to return, 146-147.

FRA

Influence of the *coup-d'état*, 191, antagonistic position of the French and Russian emperors, 192, critical position of Napoleon, 198, his position to the Assembly, 199, evidence of intended action of the latter and the ex-royal family, 200, Napoleon's marriage, *ib.* The Russians cross the Pruth, allied fleets at Besika Bay, 274, and at Constantinople, 285, unpreparedness of the army in the Crimean war, 295, expedition to Crimea and battle of the Alma, 299, French hesitation to proceed, Palmerston's letter to the emperor, 315, fall of Sebastopol, influence of Austrian and Russian intrigue and imminent recall of French troops, 322, firmness of British cabinet, 323, Congress of Paris, 325, Walewski's leaning to Russia, 325. Designs on Egypt opposed by Palmerston, 338, his insistence on right of transit, *ib.*; the Orsini conspiracy, 353, threats of 'the French colonels,' 354. Abrupt menace to Austrian envoy, 362, conclusion of the Austro-French war, 365, Palmerston's objections to proposals of peace and designs on Italy, 366, conference at Zurich, 367, Palmerston's efforts for Italian unity and ultimate modifications, 370, his memorandums on our policy therein, 380, demand for Savoy, 380, ultimate results of the war, 385. The Lebanon massacres, successful Anglo-French expedition, 385; French territorial designs, 389; attitude to Switzerland, 387; Palmerston's first distrust, of the Emperor's designs, explanations and preparations, 390; his opinion of the French occupation of Rome, 410; joint-note on the Polish outbreak declined by Palmerston, 421; his objections to proposal of a European Congress, 424; obstacles thrown in the way of interference in Sleswig-Holstein, 430; Palmerston contrasts the friendship of the government and that of the people, 445; his attitude to France when premier, 449; conclusion of Commercial Treaty through Cobden, *ib.*; Palmerston declines to join in interference in Mexico, 450.

GLA

Free trade: Palmerston's early advocacy of, i. 139; the Anti-Corn-Law League, 419; the fixed duty and the sliding scale, 419, Palmerston's speech in favour of the fixed duty, 420; the Tory government and free trade, 428; Palmerston's speech on it, 443; Disraeli's last attempt for Protection, ii. 95, attitude of Sir R. Peel, *ib.*; Mr. Villiers' final motion in condemnation of Protection, ii. 256
 Fuller, Mr.: disturbance in the House of Commons, i. 60

GAETA, Surrender of, to the French, i. 21

'Gaiter, a,' Installation as, at Glasgow, ii. 423; amusing speech of Dr. Norman McLeod, *ib.*

George III.: his objections to Catholic relief, i. 37

George IV. (*as prince regent*): action in the dispute between Sir David Dundas and Lord Palmerston, i. 68; (*as king*) dislike to Lord Palmerston, 89, 106, preference for Herries, ii. 106, 113; overrules Huskisson's resignation, 136; at a drawing-room, 141; share in Huskisson's resignation, 154, refuses an audience to Huskisson, 159; reception of Donna Maria, 180; Peel's advice to, in the Catholic question, 185; accepts Catholic emancipation, 193

George, Prince, of Denmark, assisted by Palmerston to the throne of Greece, ii. 451

Germany: Palmerston's interest in German affairs, i. 301; rivalry of Austria and Prussia in, ii. 170.

Gibbs, Sir Vicary, i. 14 (*footnote*); stands with Palmerston for Cambridge University, 14

Gladstone, W. E.: resigns from the Peel cabinet, i. 488; allegations against the Naples Government and counter assertions, ii. 179, supported by Palmerston, 181, effect in Naples, 182; tribute to Palmerston's foresight in selection of Crimea for seat of operations, 300; asked to join Lord Derby, 304; leaves Palmerston's ministry, 310; joins in attack on Palmerston, 345; opposes 'Conspiracy to Murder' Bill, 356

GLA

- Glasgow: visit to, ii. 422
- Goderich, Viscount: becomes premier, i. 111; the Goderich cabinet, 113; difficulties with the King, 119; Huskisson and Goderich, *ib.*
- Gordon, Duchess of, *Repartee of*; 'old men and old women,' ii. 242
- Graham, Sir James: secession from Lord Grey's ministry, i. 304; his position in 1847, ii. 35; leaves Palmerston's ministry, 310
- Grant, Mr. Charles (Vice-president Board of Trade): letter of resignation on the corn resolutions, i. 131; retires, 147
- Granville, Lord: (*the late*) Palmerston's instructions to, on our relations with France, 337; (*the present*), succeeds Palmerston at Foreign Office, ii. 213; called to form a ministry, 363, limited assent of Palmerston, *ib.*, resigns the task, 364
- Great Britain: religious liberty the moving power in, i. 210; prejudice for the Dutch, 224; increasing favour of reform in, 239; prosperity of, in 1833, 294; acts as mediator between France and the United States, 323; accession of Victoria, 340, creation of peers, 344; effect on British status of Palmerston's foreign policy, 413; result of the elections of 1841, 416; the ten pound householder, 419; distress of the masses in 1842, 447, 450; imminence of war with France, 475, popular irritation against, 479; weakness of navy in 1844, 484; position of parties in 1845, 490; reviving prosperity of, ii. 47; naval force in the Mediterranean in 1849, 113; accused of violating Treaty of Dardanelles, 116, Palmerston's defence, 116, 120; excellent European effect of our action in the Kossuth affair, 114; British feeling in respect to Russian interference in Greece, 143; state of parties in 1850, 164; necessity of land defences appreciated by Palmerston, 175, Sir John Burgoyne's opinion, *ib.*; public sympathy on Palmerston's supposed downfall, 214, impression of the completeness of it, 223, 227; his support of the militia: 'England the bulwark of freedom,' 241; menacing attitude of France: defences pushed forward, 261; unani-

GRE

- mity of the nation in the Crimean War, 325; election of 1857 dependent on Palmerston's personal prestige, 346; jumble of parties in 1860, 402; feeling on the outbreak of war between Prussia and Denmark, 430, warlike feeling on this occasion, and on the Polish outbreak, restrained by Palmerston, 451
- Great Exhibition of 1851, ii. 177; apprehensions from influx of foreigners, 178; enthusiastic reception of Wellington at, *ib.*
- Greece: Palmerston's sympathy with Byron and the Greeks, i. 114; battle of Navarino, 115; differences in Wellington cabinet on Greek affairs, 126; Palmerston's advocacy of, 137, 139; adoption by the cabinet of Palmerston's views, 170. Enslavement of Greeks after Navarino, 173, Palmerston's urgency for their liberation, *ib.*, indifference of the English cabinet and its manoeuvres in the House of Commons, 174, Palmerston's appeal to Polignac, and immaterial result, 176, halting policy of our Government towards, 177 (*footnote*). Discussion of Greek affairs with Pozzo di Borgo, 188; Palmerston's championship of, 201; extension of territory, 281; accession of King Otho, *ib.*; evil effects of French intrigue, 336. British claims upon, ii. 101, the 'Don Pacifico' affair, 126, characteristics of Greece, 126, ill-advised conduct of, 127, Capt. Lyons and King Otho, 128, acknowledged financial dishonesty, 130, Continental influence at the court, 131, isolated position of England, 132, support of France and Russia, 136, ill-treatment of British subjects, *ib.*, action of Sir Thomas Wyse, 133, character of M. Coletti, the premier, traced by Palmerston, 134, intrigues against Captain Lyons, 135, British ultimatum, 136, Palmerston's defence of our attitude, 137, reprisals made, 138, desire of M. Thouvenel to send French fleet to Athens, 138, ultimate offered mediation of the French, and its limited acceptance, 140, firmness of Palmerston, 141; covert hostility of Russia, 142,

GRE

Baron Gros appointed mediator, 140, his dilatoriness, 144, and resignation, 145; removal of embargo and ultimate success of British claims, 145; adverse vote of the Lords, led by Lord Stanley, 150; debate in the Commons, 151; Palmerston's defence of his policy, 151; triumph of the Government, 161. Prince George of Denmark becomes King, assistance given by Palmerston, 451

Grenville, Lord: opening speech in Parliament, i. 34; proposes limited relief to Catholics, 36; the Grenville clique, 89

Grey, Lord (as Lord Howick): proposes limited relief to Catholics, i. 37; (as Lord Grey), Wellington's objections to, 211; becomes premier, 213; his firmness, 265; Palmerston's perfect accord with, 289; strength of his ministry, 290, 300; succession of Stanley and Graham, 304; succeeded by Lord Melbourne, 305; Lord Palmerston's regret on his retirement, 308

Guizot, M.: joins the government of Thiers, i. 367; his anger at the convention of the Four Powers, 375; threatening language of, 377; succeeds Thiers, 392, his better appreciation of the position, 392; fulfils action in present convention of Slave Trade Convention, 411; disavowal of seizure of Mr. Pritchard, 434; refusal to expedite the Slave Treaty, 444; his position in 1845, 489; conduct in regard to the Spanish marriages, and retributive result in the revolution and his downfall, ii. 10; undignified position, 'l'affaire Petit,' 68; reception by Palmerston, 77; demonstration of the natural results of his policy, 91

HAMPSHIRE (South), Loses his seat for, i. 314

Hardinge, Viscount: opposition to annexation of the Crimea, ii. 37; Lord Palmerston's estimate of, 36; on Russian intentions in Asia, 37

Hare, Francis: (as Footnote); Jewish correspondence with, 4

Harrow School: education at, i. 8

HOB

visit to, and characteristic speech, ii. 408

Havna, General, thrashed by Barclay's draymen, ii. 169

Heathcote, Sir William, Attempted coercion of, by Lord Temple, i. 33

Helps, Sir A., Palmerston's solicitude for, when ill, ii. 454

Herbert, Sidney: Palmerston's good opinion of, i. 488; letter to, on 'the Vienna note' and the situation, ii. 280; requested to join Lord Derby, 304; leaves Palmerston's ministry, 310

Herries, Mr., George IV.'s preference for, as Chancellor of Exchequer, i. 106, 107

Heytesburg, Lord: mission to St. Petersburg, i. 172; despatches to, on Poland, 273 (footnote)

Hohenlohe's, Prince, attempted escape with Blucher, after the battle of Jena, i. 73

Holland: moderation of the Prince of Orange, i. 216; constitution of the Netherlands kingdom, 217; population of Holland and Belgium, 270 (footnote); British prejudice for, 224; new conditions of separation, 257; victorious advance into Belgium, 261; improved position of, 276; obstinacy of the king, 279; dubious action of the Dutch, 286

Holland, Lord: his interest in Palmerston's speech on Spanish affairs, i. 343; imprudent language to France in favour of Mehemet Ali, 375; (as Footnote); his attitude to Palmerston, *ib.*; Palmerston's tribute to, 388; letter from, ii. 182

Home Office: Palmerston's selection of, in the Aberdeen ministry, and reasons, ii. 25; 'Immoral Traffic of Leave,' prohibits intramural burials, 222; extends factory Acts to children, *ib.*; happy manner at; instance 'the Rugeley deputation,' 263; duties of the office, 263; notable despatch on application for cholera fast-day, 265; refuses burial under Act of 1845, 268

Hong Kong, Cession of, i. 398

Hood's, Sir Samuel, victory over the French fleet at Rangoon, i. 43

Horrors of the Slave Trade, Description of the, i. 467

Horsham, Unseated on petition for, i. 13

HUM

Hume, Mr. Joseph, Palmerston's reply to, i. 88

Hummelauer, Baron, comes as Austrian envoy, ii. 84

Hungary. *See* Austria

Huskisson, Mr.: Palmerston's opinion of, i. 112; Goderich and Huskisson, 119; his independence in the Wellington cabinet, 128; Palmerston's necessity to act as he did, 135; George IV. overrules his resignation, 136; Palmerston's estimate of, 148; Huskisson and Wellington, *ib.*; Wellington's determination to force him to resign, and George IV.'s part in it, 152; refused an audience, 159; resigns, 161

'**L**IONE': success of this mare at Newmarket, i. 439; discussion as to the name, 439

Income tax, Unpopularity of the, i. 446

India (*see also* Afghanistan): designs of Persia and Russia, i. 399; meet- of Runjeet Singh and Lord Auckland, 400; victories in the Punjab, ii. 35, its annexation proposed, 37, Viscount Hardinge's objections, *ib.*, Palmerston thereon, and on the designs of Russia, 36, Wellington and Hardinge on the designs of Russia and 'the Khyber Pass,' 37. News of the mutiny, 348, instant despatch of troops, *ib.*, anxiety of the Queen, *ib.*, Palmerston's assurances, *ib.*, he declares must be quelled by British forces alone, 351. Transfer to the Crown, opposition in Parliament, and unexpected overwhelming ministerial majority, 352

India, Viceroyship of, Palmerston declines, i. 89; and again, 107

Infanta, The, and the Spanish marriages, ii. 10

Ingilby's, Sir W., motion on the malt-tax, i. 289 (*footnote*)

Intramural interments, He prohibits, ii. 262

Ionian Islands, The: disaffection in, ii. 184; Palmerston's high estimate of Corfu, 184, later modification of his views concerning, 186

Ireland: Palmerston's management of his estates in, i. 47, 93, 99, 100, 117; his enthusiasm for, 198;

ITA

effect of the Coercion Bill, 303; Lord John Russell on Irish affairs, *ib.*; Irish measures in Lords and Commons, 323; visit to, 438; trial of O'Connell, 462; proposed state aid to Catholics, 464, the Maynooth Grant, 485; Palmerston advocates liberality to, 487; the railway mania in, 490; famine in, ii. 34; priestly influence in, 45, Pio Nono and the Queen's Colleges, 45, his disapproval of proceedings of the clergy, 53; Dr. McHale, 46, 50; Lord Clarendon on Irish affairs, 47, 50. Disturbances following the French revolution, 76, appeal of the revolutionists to Paris, *ib.*, Palmerston remonstrates with Lamartine, and effective action of the latter, 77. Offer and refusal of Viceroyalty, and reasons, 212; his opinion of the demand for tenant-right, 441; the Catholic vote and Italy and the colleges, 443, Palmerston's objection to a Catholic university, 444; Fenian disturbances, 454

Ireland, secretaryship for, Palmerston declines, i. 70

Isabella: proclaimed Queen of Spain, i. 283; her attitude towards the Spanish marriages, ii. 10

Italy. (*See also* Naples, Sardinia, Pio Nono.) Encouragement given to the King of Naples, i. 292, 295; Austria and the Italian confederation, 295, 299; Palmerston's policy towards Austria and Italy, 295; advice to, in 1847, ii. 3; position of, 12, 42, Austria's relation thereto, and British views, 13; elements of discord in, 14; Lord Minto's mission to, 42; Sardinia and Charles Albert, *ib.*; Pio Nono, *ib.*; Austrian occupation of Ferrara, *ib.*; influence of Mazzini, *ib.*; message to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 43; reception of Lord Minto, 44; Austrian action in, 45; revolution in Sicily, 54; Palmerston's prophecy of a united Italy, 57; imminent interference of Austria, 63, Palmerston's advice thereon, 64; effects of the revolution in Paris, 78, appeals to Great Britain, *ib.* Dispute with Austria and attitude of England, 84, expected independence of Lombardy, 84, complete Austrian suc-

JAM

cess and causes of disaster, 87, mediation of England and France, 88, Palmerston on the Austrians in Italy and on natural barriers, 88, weakness of, 92, failure of negotiations, *ib.*, disaster of Novara, *ib.*, French interests in the affair, and our policy defined, 93, M. de Azeglio's acknowledgment of Palmerston's aid, 94; Palmerston's efforts for Italian unity at end of Austro-French war, and ultimate modifications, 370; memorandum on policy to Italy in reference to France, Austria, Sardinia, and the Pope, 380; the Catholic vote and policy towards Italy, 443; Palmerston's services to, 449

JAMAICA, Declines governorship of, i. 107

Jena, Battle of, i. 24, 27; treachery at, 27; attempted escape of Hohenlohe and Blucher after, 29

Jesuits, The, in Switzerland, ii. 4, 8

Joubert's, M., incautious speech in reference to French action towards the Balearic Islands, i. 387

Judicious Bottle-holder, The': origin of the title, ii. 125

KAFIR WAR, The, and Sir Harry Smith, ii. 183

Khyber Pass, The: Wellington and Hardinge on the annexation of the Punjab and Russian intentions, 36; its value, 39; Palmerston thereon, 36

Kinglake, Mr., on Palmerston's instinct for popular feeling, ii. 291

Kossuth: joint demand of Russia and Austria for his delivery by the Porte, ii. 107, attitude of Turkey and support of England, 107, successful result of action of England and France, 114; ultimate release of, 124; reception in England, 183

LAMARTINE, M.: Palmerston's confidence in, ii. 74; his circular, 75; remonstrance of Palmerston concerning reception of the Irish appeal, 76, his effective action, 77

Lamb, Sir F., Action of, as minister at Lisbon, i. 130

LEW

Land defences: Palmerston's appreciation of necessity of, ii. 175, Sir John Burgoyne thereon, 175; advocates dockyard fortifications and successfully passes resolution, 375

Landed interest: antagonism to that of trade, i. 418; Sir R. Peel and the landed interest, 452

Lansdowne, Lord (*as Mr. Petty*), defeats Lord Palmerston for Cambridge University, i. 12; (*as Lord Lansdowne*) Wellington's objections to, 211; letters to, ii. 223, 253; sympathetic letter to Palmerston on his dismissal, 214, Palmerston's reason for his reticence (*loyalty*), given in letter to him, 223. Palmerston's desire that he should be premier, 250, general wish that it should be so and his objections, Palmerston's rejoinder, 251, new Parliament meets, his conditional assent, 255. Overcomes Palmerston's scruples to join the Aberdeen cabinet, 259

Lauderdale's, Lord, mission to Paris, i. 20; his return, 24

Layard's, Mr., motion on the Crimean War, ii. 309

Lebanon, The: defeat of the Egyptians in, by marines under Sir C. Napier, i. 382; massacre of the Maronites; Anglo-French expedition, ii. 386

Leopold, King: selection of, as king of Belgium, i. 230, his objections, 251, our resolve to recognise him, 258, becomes king, 260; his wish to retain French troops, 272, Palmerston's objection, 273; judicious action of, 277; letters from in appreciation of Palmerston's conduct, 277; high position of, 322; his cordial reception of Palmerston, 475; testimony to Palmerston's services as foreign minister during the French Revolution of 1848, ii. 74; confidences between the king and Palmerston: letter of the latter, 82; letters to, 82, 421, 436; *idem* on Napoleon's proposal of a European Congress, 424; *idem* on the Prusso-Danish War, 437

Lewis, Sir George C.: eulogy of Palmerston's speech in defence of his Greek policy, ii. 162; joins Palmerston's ministry, 310

LIB

- Liberty, Popular, Palmerston's estimate of, i. 79
- Lieven. M. and Madame de: departure from England, i. 306; resentment of Madame Lieven on removal of hostile feeling in France, ii. 149
- London, Treaty of, i. 132; successful completion, 401
- Louis Philippe: arrogant speech of, i. 258; his interference in Spain, and earliest predilection for the Spanish marriages, 325, 327; suspicious conduct of, 367, exculpation of, 368 (*footnote*): communication to, on threatened outbreak of war, 385; his fear of Mehemet Ali, 391; difficult position of, 392; the Spanish marriages and causes leading to his downfall, ii. 12; vacillation and infatuation of, 66-70
- Lunacy as an excuse for murder, Palmerston's objections to (Victor Townley's case), ii. 441
- Lyndhurst, Lord (*as Mr. Copley*): contests Cambridge University with Palmerston, i. 92; (*as Lord Lyndhurst*) false charge against, 196
- M**CHALE, DR. Opposition of, ii. 46; Lord Clarendon on, 50
- McLeod, Mr., Seizure of, by the United States, i. 406; Palmerston's firmness, 408
- Mahmoud, Sultan: attempts to introduce civilisation, i. 346; his desire to overthrow Mehemet Ali, 357, his preparations, 358; his death, 359
- Mahon's, Lord, attack on formation of Spanish legion, i. 341
- Maida, Victory of, i. 21
- Maiden speech in Parliament, i. 44.
- Malmesbury, Lord: correspondence with, on Palmerston's refusal of the Exchequer, i. 49-58; weakness of, at the Foreign Office, ii. 236
- Maria, Donna, at Windsor, i. 180; reception by George IV. *ib.*
- Maritime warfare declaration on, ii. 326 and *footnote*; privileges of the neutral flag, *ib.*; privateering abolished, *ib.*, refusal of agreement of the United States, *ib.*
- Marriage with Lady Cowper, i. 401

MIG

- Maynooth grant, The, i. 485; Palmerston's letter on, *ib.*
- Mehemet Ali: treaty with, for evacuation of the Morea, i. 173; successes of, 283; Palmerston's opinion of his design, 284; powerful position of, 348; declares his independence, 350; Sultan Mahmoud's desire to overthrow him, 357; his threats, 366; terms offered by the four Powers, 374; Louis Philippe's fear of, 391, echoed in London, *ib.*, fallacy shown by easy defeat, *ib.*; final submission of, 401
- Melbourne, Lord (*as William Lamb*): riots at his election, i. 87; position in the Wellington cabinet, 135; opinion of Wellington, 161; reasons for leaving his cabinet, *ib.*; (*as Lord Melbourne*), overtures from Wellington, 211; becomes premier, 308; Lord Durham's opinion of him, 308 (*footnote*); Palmerston's opinion of the cabinet, 308; dismissed by William IV., 309; becomes again premier, 317; his opinion of Palmerston, *ib.*; Palmerston's difficulty with a section of the cabinet, 369, 381, leading to a letter tendering resignation, with explanations, 370, Melbourne requests its withdrawal, asserting it would break up the ministry, 373, the section yields, 374. Dissolution of Parliament, 409; decline and fall of the ministry, 409, 411; qualities of it, 416
- Melville, Lord, Trial of, i. 17
- Mendizabal, M. de, Rise and fall of, i. 334
- Metternich: Palmerston's opinion of his policy in 1827, i. 117; his change of front, 168; his duplicity, 172; Metternich and Switzerland, 306; Metternich and 'his dear Tories,' 309; decline of his influence, 324; cautioned concerning interference in Swiss affairs, ii. 10; his retirement, 57; ill-influence of his example, 84; the result of his policy demonstrated, 91
- Mexico: the United States and, ii. 40; Palmerston objects to join France in interference in, 450
- Miguel, Don: attitude and duplicity of, i. 130, 131; causes a panic in Lisbon, 132; his folly and contrariety, 141; makes a *coup d'état*,

MIL

- 146; disastrous state of Portugal under, 177, withdrawal of diplomatic intercourse, *ib.*; Miguelites take Madeira, 179, repulsed at Terceira, *ib.*; declining prospects of, 292; surrender of, 305; threatened return of, ii. 19
- Militia Bill: Lord John Russell's, ii. 229; Palmerston's objections, *ib.*; Lord Derby's, opposed by Lord J. Russell, supported by Palmerston, 231
- Minto, Lord: mission to Italy, ii. 56; his reception; his opinion of Pio Nono, *ib.*; instructions to, on the Sicilian revolt, 57
- Modena and Parma, Insurrection in, i. 240; suppressed by Austria, *ib.*; attitude of France to, *ib.*
- Morea, French expedition to, i. 172; treaty with Mehemet Ali and its ultimate evacuation, 173, 177
- 'Morning Chronicle, The,' Palmerston's connection with, i. 453, 456
- Morpeth, Lord: mission to the King of Prussia, i. 26; inefficiency of, 27
- Mother, his, Grief on death of, i. 11 (*footnote*)
- Mulready's design for postal envelope, i. 405
- Murray, Mr. Charles (consul-general at Alexandria), letter to, ii. 99; on Continental feeling with respect to Palmerston's downfall, 213
- Mutiny in India: news of, ii. 348; instant dispatch of Lord Clyde, *ib.*; rapid despatch of troops, *ib.*; anxiety of the Queen, and Palmerston's assurances, *ib.*; his eulogy of the British, not only soldiers, but civilians, and especially women, 349; declares necessity to quell by British power alone, 351

NAAS, LORD, letter to, about his horse 'Baldwin,' ii. 398

- Napier, Sir Charles: Sidon stormed by, i. 382; with his marines defeats Egyptians in the Lebanon, *ib.* Banquet to, ii. 291, Palmerston's speech and tribute to, *ib.*, Mr. Bright's charge of levity and Palmerston's bitter reply, 294, opinions upon it
- Naples (*see also* Sicily): encouragement given to the King, i. 292, 295; relations with, in regard to chapels,

NAP

- 318; anticipated disturbances, 325; mission of Sir John Bowring, 327; Dispute with about the sulphur contract, 401, Palmerston's instructions to Sir William Temple, 402, British reprisals, 402, mediation of France, 403. Revolt in Sicily, ii. 54; British claim upon, 101. Gladstone's allegations against, 179, supported by Palmerston, 181; counter-assertions, 180, effect in Naples, 182. Affairs in, *ib.*; complaints concerning refugees in England, 264, Palmerston's opinion thereon, *ib.*; he demands satisfaction for Bomba's insults, 321
- Naples, Prince of, proposed as King of Belgium, i. 233
- Napoleon I.: Lord Palmerston comments on his designs, i. 20; his idea of 'peace,' 24; contemptuous treatment of the Duke of Brunswick, 26; defeated at Pultusk, 34; letters to Talleyrand and Bernadotte, 46; delivery of his remains to the French, 405
- Napoleon III.: Palmerston's predilection for, 186. Influence of the *coup d'état*, 191, antagonistic position of the Russian and French emperors, 192, critical position at this time, 198, popular and actual estimate of his character at the time, *ib.*, his position to the Assembly, 199, Palmerston's opinion of it, *ib.*, the *coup d'état*, 200, evidence of intended action of the Assembly and ex-Royal family, 200. His marriage, 261, Palmerston's approval of it, *ib.*; visit to, 300; appearance of the Empress, *ib.*; letter to, ii. 315; influence of Russian and Austrian intrigue on, 322. At Osborne, conference with Palmerston on the Principalities, 339, result of policy adopted, *ib.*, mutual feelings of the two men, 340. Takes umbrage at Palmerston's eulogy of British in India; the intention not disavowed, 351; the Orsini conspiracy, 353; visited by Palmerston, and conversation, 359; abrupt menace to Austria at the New Year reception, 362; Palmerston's estimate of, 386, his first distrust of, reasons given to Lord J. Russell and Duke of Somerset, to Persigny and Flahault, 390;

NAT

- proposes European Congress, 424, Palmerston's objections, *ib.*
 Natural barriers, Palmerston on, ii. 89
 Naturalised citizens, Palmerston's defence of the rights of, ii. 117
 Navy force in the Mediterranean in 1849, ii. 113
 Navarino, Battle of, i. 115
 Navigation Laws, Repeal of the, ii. 59
 Navy, The: Palmerston's reliance on, i. 234, 288 (*footnote*); its weakness in 1844, 484; supposed French plan to burn our fleet and curious incident, 383
 Neaves', Lord, lines on Palmerston's mare 'Ilione,' i. 439
 Nemours, Duc de: offered the crown of Belgium, i. 229, English objections to, 234; evidence of intended action of the ex-Royal family before the *coup d'état*, ii. 200
 Neutral flag, The privileges of the, established, ii. 326
 Newcastle, Duke of (*as Lord Lincoln*), Palmerston's good opinion of, i. 488; (*as Duke of Newcastle*) letter to, on requirements of Crimean campaign, ii. 298
 Newtown (Isle of Wight), Elected for, i. 16
 'New Whig Guide, The,' Contributions to, i. 226 (*footnote*)
 Nicholas, Emperor: health of, i. 344; visit to England, 466, at Ascot, *ib.*; antagonistic position of the Emperors Nicholas and Napoleon, ii. 192; death of, 310; contrasted with his successor, 329
 Normanby, Lord, his description of the revolution in Paris, 67, Palmerston's letter to him thereon, 71; a hint to, 141. Instruction to, concerning the *coup d'état*, 202, his hostility to Napoleon, 203, his actions, 204, despatches to and from, with Palmerston's comments, 204, Walewski's evidence in the affair, 203, 216, 224

- O'BRIEN, SMITH, Contemptuous reception of, by the House, ii. 80
 Obstructive power of individual members of Parliament, i. 465
 O'Connell, Daniel: elected for Clare, i. 181; vital effect of the election,

PAL

- ib.*; peaceable behaviour of his supporters, 181; Littleton's indiscreet communication to, on Coercion Bill, i. 306. Trial of, 462, Lord Denman's opinion thereon, 463, imprisoned, 466, released, 481.
 O'Connor, Feargus, and the Chartists, ii. 80
 Old things, English liking for—'The Old Hat' Tavern, ii. 240
 'Old women and old men,' repartee of the Duchess of Gordon, ii. 242
 'Opium war,' The Chinese, i. 405
 Opposition, Palmerston's activity in, i. 435
 Orange, Prince of: moderation of, i. 216; Palmerston's predilection for, 230
 Oratory, his: his style in debate, i. 46; examples of his powers in, 83; preparation of, in his early years, ii. 483, abandoned in his later, *ib.*; House of Commons no longer demands classic oratory, *ib.*; able description of Palmerston's oratory by 'Morning Star,' 483
 Orleans, Duc de: impression of, i. 289; his death, 451
 Orleans, Duchesse de, Courageous conduct of the, in the French revolution, ii. 70
 Orsini conspiracy, The: ii. 353; introduction of the 'Conspiracy to Murder' Bill, 354
 Otho, King: accession of, i. 281

- PALMELLA, MARQUIS OF, and Wellington, i. 178
 Palmerston, Lady (*when Lady Cowper*), at Almack's, i. 86; marriage with Lord Palmerston, 401; (*when Lady Palmerston*) his portrait presented to her by the House of Commons, ii. 100, 162; her husband's tenderness for, in his last illness, 453; influence of her 'salon,' Disraeli's tribute to it, 472
 Palmerston, Lord: dates at which he took office, 3; parentage, 4; education, *ib.*; boyish correspondence with Francis Hare, 4; his youthful manliness at Harrow, 8; a pupil of Dugald Stewart, 9; his father's death, 11; grief at the loss of his mother (*footnote*) 11; defeated by Petty for Cambridge University, 12; takes

PAL

his degree, 13; unseated on petition for Horsham, 13; again defeated for the University, 14; appointed junior lord of the Admiralty, 14; elected for Newtown, 16; Mr. Canning's wish to appoint him to the Foreign office, 42; his maiden speech in Parliament, 44, his opinion of the speeches of others, *ib.*, his style in debate, 46; management of his estates, 47, 93, 99, 100, 117; made a Privy Councillor, 49; offered Chancellorship of the Exchequer, 49, accepts instead Secretaryship at War, 50, reasons for declining the Chancellorship and correspondence with Lord Malmesbury, 51; variety of his occupations, 59, 92; his universality, 64; successful defence of the civil position of the Secretary at War against the pretensions of Sir David Dundas, 66; refuses Secretaryship for Ireland, 70; advocates Catholic emancipation, 71, 91, his reasons for so doing, 71; reply to Henry Brougham, 73; his opinion of the value of a vast empire, 77; visit to Paris in 1815, descriptive letter, 81; attempt on his life by Lieutenant Davis, 82; lucidity of his correspondence, *ib.*, 413; examples of his debating power, 83; reply to Joseph Hume, 88; comparative isolation in politics, 89, 318; declines Governor-Generalship of India, 89; George IV.'s dislike to him, *ib.*, 106; returned for Cambridge University as an advocate of Catholic emancipation, 91, second election, 96; doings on the turf, 93, 99; characteristic and varied correspondence, 92; comparative silence in the House, 102, 317; called to the Cabinet, 105; offered Chancellorship of Exchequer by Canning, *ib.*, intrigues against his appointment, and Canning's embarrassment, 106, offered Governorship of Jamaica, 107, second offer of Governor-Generalship of India, *ib.*; his discernment in connection with his distaste to lead in the Commons, 112; his opinion of Huskisson, *ib.*, and of Brougham, *ib.*; sympathy with the Greeks, 114; opinion on European policy in 1827, 116; ob-

PAL

jection to Turkish policy in 1829, 118; reasons for remaining with the Wellington Cabinet, 122; necessity to act with Huskisson, 135; his advocacy of Greece, 137, 139, 201; his early advocacy of Free Trade, 139; leaves the Wellington Cabinet, and speech in defence of the action, 162; opinion of the evil of paper currency, 165; inclines the cabinet to his views on Greece, 170; correctness of his view of the Eastern question, 171, later adoption of it, 172; his urgency for the liberation of the Greek slaves, 174, appeal to Polignac thereon, and immaterial result, 176; opinion of the position of Turkey, 187; second visit to Paris, 185; speech on Catholic emancipation, 190; speech on foreign affairs, 194; enthusiasm for Ireland, 198; able speech on Portugal, 199; his treatment of foreign affairs, 203; example of his foresight, 210; overtures from Wellington through Lord Clive, 211, interview with Wellington, 213, Croker's endeavour to influence him, 213; succeeds Lord Aberdeen at the Foreign Office, *ib.*, characteristic letter, *ib.*; personal appearance in 1830, 223; his reliance on the navy, 234, 288 (*foot-note*); distinct language used to the French, 236; predilection for the Prince of Orange, 230, 242 (*foot-note*); defines the correct policy of France, 242, 250; insists on inviolability of treaties, 245; his characteristic firmness, 247; decisive denial of French right to discuss fortress question, 249; rebukes Belgian pretensions, 253; appreciation of friendship with France, and of Casimir Périer, 253; urges retirement of the French from Belgium, 262; encourages parliamentary discussion, 264 (*foot-note*); straightforwardness of his diplomacy, 265; marked result of his firmness with France in the Belgic fortress question, 266 and *foot-note*, points out danger of conceding territory, 272; sympathy with the Poles, 273; final success of his Belgic policy, 275, his policy towards Belgium tested by position to-day, 280; per-

PAL

fect accord with Lord Grey, 289; despatch of business, 299; the Quadruple Alliance entirely his doing, 300; regret at Lord Grey's retirement, 308; again demurs to lead in the Commons, 310; loses his seat for South Hants, 314; public estimate of him in 1835, 317; succeeded at Foreign Office by Wellington, 318; returned for Tiverton and goes back to Foreign Office, 318; initiates formation of Spanish legion, 319; justifies his interference in foreign affairs, 319; his treatment of Talleyrand, 331; his principle of treating 'men as they are,' 336; instructions to Lord Granville on our relations with France, 337; complaints against France, 339; defends formation of Spanish legion against Lord Mahon, 341, and his foreign policy, 342, eulogy of his speech by Edward Ellice and Lord Holland, 343; protection of British interests his guiding star, 346; suggests convention with France on Eastern affairs, 351; his opinion of affairs in Europe in 1838, his plan of concerted action, 352; his constant endeavour to upset the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 353; his opinion of the attitude of France, 360. His difficulties with a section of the cabinet, 369, 381, tenders resignation to Melbourne, letter and explanations, 370, Melbourne requests its withdrawal, stating it will break up the ministry, 373, the section yields, 374. Palmerston's opinion of the attitude of France, 378; declines to allow French participation in the treaty of the Four Powers, 393; marriage with Lady Cowper, 401; goes out of power with the Melbourne ministry, 411; his desire to conclude Slave Trade Convention, and Guizot's jealousy, 411; effect of his foreign policy on status of England, 413; foreign estimate of it, 415; his policy emphatically English, *ib.*; speech against the sliding scale, 420; denounces the Ashburton Treaty; 423; exposition of his foreign policy, 424; able speech against the Government, reviewing past events, 425; attacks Lord

PAL

Stanley, 428; claims credit for past treaties, 430; boldness of his attitude, 431; his position towards Lord John Russell, 432; his activity in opposition, 435; his earnestness for abolition of slavery, 436; public estimate of him in 1841, 437; visit to Ireland and Wales, 438; speech on the sliding scale and freedom of trade, 443; affirms distress of the masses in 1842, 447; supports Lord Ashley's Mining Act, *ib.*; objects to Mr. Goulburn's refusal of the Chiltern Hundreds to Lord Chelsea; 449; his opinion of Lord Ashburton and his treaty, 452; his independent position, 453; Lord William Russell's tribute to his foreign policy, 453 (*footnote*); connection with 'The Morning Chronicle,' 453, 456; in reply to Mr. Roebuck, vindicates his Afghan and foreign policy, 457; supports Lord Ashley's Factory Act, 460, curious incident in connection with it, *ib.*; his detestation of the slave trade, 467; speech criticising Lord Aberdeen's foreign policy, denouncing concessions, and contrasting his own, 471; Continental tour in 1844, 475, reception by King Leopold, *ib.*; predicts the future of Prussia, 483; speech on the Right of Search, 484; letter on the Maynooth Grant, 485; advocates toleration in religion, 486, and liberality to Ireland, 487; approval of defensive measures, 491; uneasiness at the railway mania, *ib.*; at the Foreign Office in 1846, *ii.* 1; his policy of reform, 2; attitude to Switzerland and the Sonderburg, 5, advice to Switzerland, 9; action in the civil war in Portugal, 15, objections to French proposal for union of Spain and Portugal, 29, value set by him on possession of the Tagus, 30; view of disturbances in China, 33; on the annexation of the Punjab and the designs of Russia, 36; instructions to Lord Minto on the Sicilian revolt, 56; prophesies a United Italy, 57; opinion on the repeal of the Navigation Laws, 60; reservations in respect to Cobden's proposed international arbitration, 61; defends his foreign policy against

PAL

Urquhart and Anstey, 62; advice to Italy on Austrian interference, 65. Letter to Normanby on the French Revolution (1848), 71, on republics, 73, value of his services at the Foreign Office at this crisis, and testimony of King Leopold, 74, confidence in Lamartine, *ib.*, remonstrates with him on reception of Irish appeal, 77. Letter to King Leopold on Continental affairs, 82; foresees abdication of Emperor Ferdinand (Austria), 84, shows the necessity of a strong sovereign, 87; on the Austrians in Italy, 89, on natural barriers, 90; demonstrates the result of such policy as Guizot's and Metternich's, 91; Austrian offensiveness to him personally, 91; our policy defined, 93; M. d'Azeglio's acknowledgment of his aid to Italy, 94; on the position of the Pope, 97; on presents to British ministers, 99; his portrait presented by House of Commons to Lady Palmerston, 100, 162. On the civil war in Hungary, 104, his sympathy with oppressed Hungary, 105, the same sympathy exhibited later in respect to General Butler's proclamation at New Orleans, 105, discussion with Brunnow, 108, negotiations and caution to Austria, 112, defence of the despatch of fleet to Dardanelles, 116, 118, 120. Defends the rights of naturalised citizens, 117, objects to confinement of the refugees, 121. 'The judicious bottle-holder,' origin of the term, 125. Defence of our attitude on the 'Don Pacifico' affair, 137, a hint to Lord Normanby, 141, his firmness, *ib.*, defends British conduct to Greece by reference to action of other nations, 144, his confidence in respect to hostility of France and apprehensions of war, 145, speech in the House in defence of his policy, 151, and government triumph, 161. Styled by Lord John Russell 'a minister of England,' 163; his estimate of Lord Aberdeen, 164; appreciation of necessity of land defences, 175; temporary resignation of the ministry, 179; supports Gladstone's allegations against Naples, 181; high estimate of Corfu,

PAL

184, later modification of his views concerning, 186; liking for Louis Napoleon, *ib.*; on Cobden's proposal for reduction of armaments, 188; proposes British mediation between Russia and Turkey in the dispute leading to the Crimean War, 191. Disagreement with Lord John Russell, 193, relations of the two, *ib.*, Palmerston 'not a Whig,' 194, his notions of the duties and privileges of a foreign secretary, *ib.*, and in relation to the sovereign, 195, royal influence in foreign relations, the Prince Consort and Stockmar, *ib.*, and actual interference, 196, necessity to repudiate this, 196, rarity of able foreign secretaries, Palmerston's experience and qualifications, 197, the *coup d'état*—critical position of Napoleon, 198, interview with Walewski, 200, evidence of the intended action of the Assembly, 200, instructions to Lord Normanby and special despatches, 204, evidence of Walewski, 203, 216, 224, explanations to Lord John Russell, 207; dismissed: 'The expelled minister,' 211, refuses viceroyalty of Ireland, and reasons, 212, evidence of royal wish, *ib.*, exultation on the Continent, 213, sympathy at home, 214, letter from Lansdowne, *ib.*, his account to his brother, 215, explanations in the House, 218, Lord John's speech and disclosure of the Queen's memorandum of August 1850, 219, 227, his opinion of unfairness of the step, 226, his reply, 220; general sentiment of his complete downfall, 223, 227, his explanation of this ('loyalty') explained in a letter to Lansdowne, 223, and Lord Dalling's testimony, 228. Opposes Lord John Russell's Militia Bill, and collapse of the ministry, 229; declines to join Lord Derby's cabinet, 230; supports Lord Derby's Militia Bill, 23; quick ending of resentment to Russell, 232; his knowledge of Italian: an illustration—his translation of Garter oath for Victor Emmanuel, retained by Cavour as an archive, 235; speculations as to change of ministry,

PAL

to Canada, *ib.*, his remarkable energy, though ill at the time, 412; letters to Cobden and Gladstone on national defences, 413; watchful guard of Canada, 415; successfully replies to Cobden's attack, 416; his treatment of Church patronage, 417; urges Admiralty to increased prevention of slavery: his constancy to this object, *ib.*; chariness of speech as premier, 419; letter to Russian ambassador on the Polish outbreak, 420, declines joint note with France, and reasons, 421; visit to Glasgow: installation as a 'Gaiter,' 422; objections to Napoleon's proposal of a European Congress: letters to King Leopold and Lord John Russell, 424. The Sleswig-Holstein question: difficulties with France, letter to Lord John Russell, 430, advocates dispatch of fleet to Baltic, 431, independently warns Apponyi that our fleet would follow that of Austria to the Baltic, 432, active mediation, 434, unsuccessful result, and final surrender of the Duchies, 435, four nights' debate and ministerial triumph, 436, letter to King Leopold on the situation, 437. Enthusiastic reception in the provinces, 437, characteristic speech at Towcester, 439; reaches his eightieth year; his habits and his health, 440; on the Irish demand for tenant right, 441; on lunacy as an excuse for crime, *ib.*; the Catholic vote and Italy and the colleges, 443, objects to a Catholic university, 444; restricts the ambition of Convocation, 444; contrasts the friendship of the French as a people and as a Government, 445; his policy as to destiny of the Duchies, 446. Review of the later part of his official career, 446-451, his foreign policy and reasons of its success, 446, its enemies, 447, his conduct of the Crimean War, 448, his attitude to France, 449, his services to Italy, *ib.*, commercial treaty with France through Cobden, *ib.*, financial successes through Gladstone, 450, successful operations in China, *ib.*, objection to join France in interference

PEE

with Mexico, *ib.*, helps Prince George to be King of Greece, 451, restrains war feeling in the Polish outbreak and in the Danish war, *ib.* Returned for Tiverton in 1865 after a contest, 452. Goes to Brocket: commencement of his last illness, *ib.*, tenderness for his wife, 453, solicitude for others, 454, his death, 453. Energy of his last few days in the Fenian disturbance and for protection of Canada, 454; duration of his career and felicity of his death, 456; burial in Westminster Abbey, 457. Reasons for his success: the confidence of the public, 485, 'De Witt on true statesmanship:' extract found amongst his papers. 486. (For illustrations of his character, *see* Character, Correspondence, and Oratory)

Pannure, Lord: becomes War Minister and at the same time Secretary of State, 308; letter to, ii. 318

Papal States, Insurrection in, i. 240; suppressed by the Austrians, *ib.*; attitude of France, *ib.* (*see also* Pio Nono)

Paper currency, His opinion of the evils, of, i. 165

Paper duty, the, Collision between Lords and Commons on, ii. 399

Paris, Congress of, attended by Lords Clarendon and Cowley, ii. 325

Paris: visit to, in 1815, i. 81; descriptive letter, *ib.*; visit in 1829, 185, curious state of its streets at the time, 190

Parks, the: his care that they should be kept open for the people, ii. 474

Parliamentary discussion encouraged by Palmerston, i. 264 (*footnote*)

Partisan, Palmerston not a strong, ii. 471

Patriotism, His: moral influence of his absolute identification of himself with his country, ii. 475

Patronage, Church, His treatment of, ii. 417

Peel, Sir Robert: his clearheadedness, i. 132; his advice to George IV. on the Catholic question, 185; forms a ministry with Wellington, 312; the Peel ministry, 314; defeated on Lord John Russell's Irish Appropriation Bill, 316, resigns, 317;

PER

the Queen's firmness with him in the matter of her household, 356; difference with Wellington, 376; growing favour of, 417; his bold fiscal measures, *ib.*, anticipations of his fiscal measures, 442; proposes the sliding scale, 443; his difficulties in office, 446, 459; Peel and the landed interest, 452; bad diplomatic appointments, 454; changes in the Cabinet, 488, resignation of Gladstone, *ib.*; his position in 1847, ii. 55; neat reply to Feargus O'Connor, 81; supports Lord J. Russell's Government against Disraeli's last effort for Protection, 95; eulogy of Palmerston's speech in defence of his Greek policy, 160; his death, 162

Perceval, Mr.: opposes limited relief to Catholics, i. 38; accession to the premiership, 49; offers Chancellorship of Exchequer to Palmerston, *ib.*; death of, 70

Persia: designs of, i. 399; war with, occupation of Herat, ii. 340, her claims abandoned, 341, abolition of slavery in the Persian Gulf, *ib.*, characteristic letter to the Persian minister, 342

Persigny, Comte de: letters to, ii. 322, 368, 387, 393; letter to, on the Swiss borders, 387; plain reasons given to, for distrust of Napoleon's designs, 393

Personal appearance, His, in 1830, described by Sir Henry Bulwer, i. 223

Pio Nono: his position in 1847, ii. 42, 44, 55; Lord Minto's opinion of, 44; his attitude to the Irish colleges, 45, 47, disapprobation of the proceedings of the Irish clergy, 53; 'Diplomatic Relations with Rome' Bill passed, *ib.*, Lord Eglington's objection to reception of a nuncio, *ib.*, and Lord Palmerston's concurrence, 54; the French in Rome, 95, position of the Pope, 96, Palmerston on his position, 97; Ecclesiastical Titles Bill and papal aggression, 172, attitude of Cardinal Wiseman, 174; Palmerston's opinion of French occupation of Rome, 410; the Catholic vote and Italy, 443, *idem* and the Colleges, 443, Palmerston's objections to a Catholic university, 444

POR

Plate, the River, Settlement of difficulties in the, ii. 28

Poland: Polish victory at Wawer, i. 248; warning to Bulow against interference, 251; Palmerston's sympathy with, 273; suppression of the revolt, *ib.*, despatches to Lord Heytesbury thereon, *ib.*; Polish outbreak and cruel measures of Russia, ii. 419, Palmerston's letter to the Russian ambassador, 420, Prussian assistance to Russia, 421, Palmerston declines joint note with France, and reasons, *ib.*; negotiations amongst the Powers, recalcitrancy of Austria, 421; English war feeling restrained by Palmerston, 451

Polignac: immaterial result of Lord Palmerston's appeal to him in behalf of the Greek slaves, i. 176; Wellington and Polignac, 192; comparison of the two, 210

Ponsonby, Lord, ambassador to the Porte with Admiral Roussin, i. 350

Pope, The. See Pio Nono.

Portrait, His, presented to Lady Palmerston by the House of Commons, ii. 100, 162

Portugal: affairs in, i. 131; attitude and duplicity of Don Miguel, 130; action of Sir F. Lamb as minister at Lisbon, *ib.*; Don Miguel causes a panic in Lisbon, 132; folly and contrariety of Don Miguel, 141; abdication of Don Pedro, 146; *coup d'état* of Don Miguel, *ib.*; disastrous state of, under Don Miguel, 177; withdrawal of diplomatic intercourse *ib.*; Oporto declares for Donna Maria, 178; Pedroites landed at Plymouth, *ib.*; Marquis Palmella and Wellington, 179; Miguelites take Madeira, *ib.*; repulsed at Terceira, *ib.*; inconsistent action of our cabinet, 180; Donna Maria at Windsor, *ib.*; British interference at Terceira, *ib.* (*footnote*): able speech upon, 199; public opinion of Wellington's attitude to, 200; French reprisals in the Tagus, 255, attitude of England thereon, 256, 258; Don Pedro's expedition to Oporto, 282; Admiral Sartorius and Don Pedro, 287; dubious prospects of Miguel, 292; surrender of Miguel, 305; position of Saldanha, 329; local difficulties,

POZ

- ib.*; evil effect of French intrigues, 336. Civil war in, ii. 14, the Junta, *ib.*, Palmerston's action in, 15, Colonel Wyldé sent out and suggested as chief of the staff, 16, 23; British squadron in the Tagus, 16; influence of Costa Cabral, 17; position of Saldanha, 18, 22, 26; threatened return of Don Miguel, 19; baneful influence of Diez, *ib.*; British proposals, *ib.*; the Quadruple treaty, 20; amnesty demanded by England and resistance of the Portuguese Court, 22, 25; expected attack of Sá de Bandeira, 26; final settlement, 27; union with Spain suggested by France, and Palmerston's objections, 29; his value of the possession of the Tagus, 30
- Pozzo di Borgo: conversation with, i. 181; discusses European affairs with, 186; discusses Greece with, 188; ambassador in London, 316
- Press, Independence of the, defended by Palmerston when attacked by Mr. Horsman, ii. 400
- Prince Consort: position of, i. 374; public liking for, 403; influence in foreign affairs of Baron Stockmar, ii. 195; letter to Lord John Russell in evidence of desire for Palmerston's removal, 212; hesitation in high quarters in the Crimean War, 284, Palmerston's reply to his memorandum, 285; death of, 411, Palmerston's regrets for, 412
- Princess Royal, Marriage of the, ii. 352; Palmerston's happy speech on, *ib.*
- Pritchard, Mr.: action of at Tahiti, i. 432; imprisonment of by the French, 433, disavowed by Guizot, 434, compensation made to, 435; Palmerston's good opinion of him, 476
- Privateering abolished, ii. 326; dissent of the United States, *ib.*
- Privy Councillor, Made a, i. 49
- Property, His: management of his English and Irish estates, i. 47, 93, 99, 100, 117
- Prussia; military weakness of, in 1831, i. 243; education in, in 1844, 481; reception by the King of, 482; her future predicted by Palmerston, 483; associated with Russia and Austria in violation of Treaty of Vienna, ii. 31, British protest against, 32;

ROU

- rivalry of Austria in Germany, 170; the Sleswig-Holstein dispute with Denmark, British mediation, 171; assists Russia in the Polish outbreak, 421. Antecedents of the Sleswig-Holstein dispute, 428, outbreak of war and the feeling in England, 430, Palmerston on difficulties of action with France, *ib.*, success at Düppel, 432, active mediation but unsuccessful result, 434, final surrender of the Duchies by Denmark, 435
- Prussia, King of: visit of, i. 441; his reception, 482; Palmerston's opinion of, *ib.*
- Pultusk, Victory of Benningsen at, i. 34
- Punjab, The: victories in, ii. 35; Viscount Hardinge's opposition to its annexation, 37, Lord Palmerston's opinion, 36
- QUADRUPLE Alliance, The, i. 297; completion of, 300; entirely due to Palmerston, *ib.*; was the fulfilment of Canning's policy, 301; its good effect, 305
- Queen's Colleges, The, and the Pope, ii. 45, 47
- RACING, His connexion with. *See* The Turf.
- Raglan, Lord, letters to, on the necessity of sanitary measures in the Crimea, ii. 308
- Railway mania, The: in Ireland, i. 488; his uneasiness at, 491
- Religious liberty the moving power in France and England, i. 210
- Republics, Palmerston on, ii. 74
- 'Right of Search, The,' i. 422; Palmerston's speech on, 484
- Roebuck, Mr.: motion for inquiry into elections, i. 448; Palmerston's reply to, vindicating his Afghan and foreign policy, 457; motion for inquiry into Crimean war management, leading to the fall of the Aberdeen ministry, ii. 301, Palmerston's later reluctant assent to the committee, 309
- Rothschild, M. Anselm, Conversation with, i. 350
- Roussin, Admiral, French ambassador to the Porte, i. 350

ROW

Rowcliff (the Tiverton butcher) answered, ii. 243, 361, 403

Russell, Lord John : on Irish affairs, i. 303, 305 ; defeats Peel on the Irish Appropriation Bill, 316 ; his qualities as a parliamentary leader, 416 ; Palmerston's position towards, 432 ; strength of his Government, ii. 35 ; dissolution of Parliament and triumph of Government, 41 ; styles Palmerston 'A minister of England,' 163 ; extension of County Franchise defeated, 179 ; defeat of the Government, *ib.*, resignation, *ib.*, Lord Stanley sent for, *ib.*, return to power, *ib.* Dispute with Palmerston, 193, relations of the two, *ib.*, royal influence, 195, 212, evidence of intended action of the French Assembly 200, evidence of Count Walewski, 203, 216, 224, Palmerston's explanation and correspondence, 207, dismisses Palmerston, 211, Prince Consort's letter to, 212, speech in Parliament and disclosure of the Queen's memorandum, 219, 227, Palmerston's opinion of this action, 226, and reasons for his reticence in reply, 223, proposes Militia Bill, 229, Palmerston's opposition and collapse of the Ministry, *ib.* Opposes Lord Derby's Militia Bill, 231 ; his altered position to the Whigs described, 232, 237, 247, 250 ; short duration of Palmerston's resentment to, 232 ; Palmerston's objection to serve under again, and opinion of, 247, 250, 252, 254, but continued friendliness, 252 ; at the Foreign Office, in the Aberdeen Cabinet, 259, Palmerston's approval, *ib.*, wishes Palmerston at the War Office, and Aberdeen's refusal, 301 ; resigns on Mr. Roebuck's motion ; Palmerston's disapproval of the step, 302 ; again entrusted to form a ministry, disinclination of the Whigs and of Clarendon, 305, promises support to Palmerston, letter in reply, *ib.* ; joins Palmerston's Ministry, 310 ; goes to the Vienna Conference, *ib.*, Sir E. Bulwer's motion against his conduct at, and resignation, 317 ; attacks Palmerston on 'the fortuitous concourse of atoms,' 345 ; opposes 'Conspiracy to Murder' Bill

RUS

356 ; agreement with Palmerston, 362 ; accepts Foreign Office under Palmerston, 364 ; letter from, in defence of Cabinet against Court sympathy for Austria at conclusion of Austro-French war, 370 ; *idem* on proposal for a congress, 372, intimate accord with Palmerston at this time, 379 ; explanation from Palmerston of his distrust of Napoleon, 390 ; letter to, on Napoleon's proposal of a European Congress, 427 ; *idem* on difficulties with France on the Sleswig-Holstein question, 430

Russell's, Lord William, tribute to Palmerston's foreign policy, i. 453 (*footnote*)

Russia : victory at Pultusk, i. 34 ; imminence of war with Turkey, 129 ; declared views of, 130 ; the Treaty of London and her promises, 132 ; threatens war against Turkey, *ib.* ; Wellington's dislike to, 138 ; declaration on her part, 142 ; attitude to Turkey and Greece, 143 ; makes concessions, 169 ; correctness and later adoption of Palmerston's view of the Eastern Question, 171 ; Lord Heytesbury's mission to, 172 ; successfully opposed by Turkey, 180, severe losses in the campaign, 186 (*footnote*), equality in the field with Turkey, 191 ; weakness of, 202 ; the Sultan asks her aid, 283 ; the Dardanelles closed, 284 ; British fleet sent to the Dardanelles, 293 ; the Black Sea difficulty, 294 ; her doubtful attitude in 1834, 296, 297, 298 ; position towards England in 1834, 306 ; in 1835, 316 ; departure of the Lievens, 306 ; health of the Emperor Nicholas, 344 ; position of France and Russia in 1838, 352 ; Palmerston's constant endeavour to upset Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 353 ; her friendly advances through M. de Brunnow, 361 ; danger to England of a Russo-French alliance, 364 ; the advantages of an English alliance, 368 ; designs upon India, 399 ; visit of the Emperor, 466 ; policy of, in 1844, 480 ; 'The Holy Alliance' and Cracow, ii. 31, violation of the Treaty of Vienna *ib.*, British protest against, 32 ; Russian intentions in India, the

POZ

- ib.*; evil effect of French intrigues, 336. Civil war in, ii. 14, the Junta, *ib.*, Palmerston's action in, 15, Colonel Wylde sent out and suggested as chief of the staff, 16, 23; British squadron in the Tagus, 16; influence of Costa Cabral, 17; position of Saldanha, 18, 22, 26; threatened return of Don Miguel, 19; baneful influence of Diez, *ib.*; British proposals, *ib.*; the Quadruple treaty, 20; amnesty demanded by England and resistance of the Portuguese Court, 22, 25; expected attack of Sá de Bandeira, 26; final settlement, 27; union with Spain suggested by France, and Palmerston's objections, 29; his value of the possession of the Tagus, 30
- Pozzo di Borgo: conversation with, i. 181; discusses European affairs with, 186; discusses Greece with, 188; ambassador in London, 316
- Press, Independence of the, defended by Palmerston when attacked by Mr. Horsman, ii. 400
- Prince Consort: position of, i. 374; public liking for, 403; influence in foreign affairs of Baron Stockmar, ii. 195; letter to Lord John Russell in evidence of desire for Palmerston's removal, 212; hesitation in high quarters in the Crimean War, 284, Palmerston's reply to his memorandum, 285; death of, 411, Palmerston's regrets for, 412
- Princess Royal, Marriage of the, ii. 352; Palmerston's happy speech on, *ib.*
- Pritchard, Mr.: action of at Tahiti, i. 432; imprisonment of by the French, 433, disavowed by Guizot, 434, compensation made to, 435; Palmerston's good opinion of him, 476
- Privateering abolished, ii. 326; dissent of the United States, *ib.*
- Privy Councillor, Made a, i. 49
- Property, His: management of his English and Irish estates, i. 47, 93, 99, 100, 117
- Prussia; military weakness of, in 1831, i. 243; education in, in 1844, 481; reception by the King of, 482; her future predicted by Palmerston, 483; associated with Russia and Austria in violation of Treaty of Vienna, ii. 31, British protest against, 32;

ROU

- rivalry of Austria in Germany, 170; the Sleswig-Holstein dispute with Denmark, British mediation, 171; assists Russia in the Polish outbreak, 421. Antecedents of the Sleswig-Holstein dispute, 428, outbreak of war and the feeling in England, 430, Palmerston on difficulties of action with France, *ib.*, success at Düppel, 432, active mediation but unsuccessful result, 434, final surrender of the Duchies by Denmark, 435
- Prussia, King of: visit of, i. 441; his reception, 482; Palmerston's opinion of, *ib.*
- Pultusk, Victory of Benningsen at, i. 34
- Punjab, The: victories in, ii. 35; Viscount Hardinge's opposition to its annexation, 37, Lord Palmerston's opinion, 36
- QUADRUPLE Alliance, The, i. 297; completion of, 300; entirely due to Palmerston, *ib.*; was the fulfilment of Canning's policy, 301; its good effect, 305
- Queen's Colleges, The, and the Pope, ii. 45, 47
- RACING, His connexion with. *See* The Turf.
- Raglan, Lord, letters to, on the necessity of sanitary measures in the Crimea, ii. 308
- Railway mania, The: in Ireland, i. 488; his uneasiness at, 491
- Religious liberty the moving power in France and England, i. 210
- Republics, Palmerston on, ii. 74
- 'Right of Search, The,' i. 422; Palmerston's speech on, 484
- Roebuck, Mr.: motion for inquiry into elections, i. 448; Palmerston's reply to, vindicating his Afghan and foreign policy, 457; motion for inquiry into Crimean war management, leading to the fall of the Aberdeen ministry, ii. 301, Palmerston's later reluctant assent to the committee, 309
- Rothschild, M. Anselm, Conversation with, i. 350
- Roussin, Admiral, French ambassador to the Porte, i. 350

ROW

Rowcliff (the Tiverton butcher) answered, ii. 243, 361, 403

Russell, Lord John : on Irish affairs, i. 303, 305 ; defeats Peel on the Irish Appropriation Bill, 316 ; his qualities as a parliamentary leader, 416 ; Palmerston's position towards, 432 ; strength of his Government, ii. 35 ; dissolution of Parliament and triumph of Government, 41 ; styles Palmerston 'A minister of England,' 163 ; extension of County Franchise defeated, 179 ; defeat of the Government, *ib.*, resignation, *ib.*, Lord Stanley sent for, *ib.*, return to power, *ib.* Dispute with Palmerston, 193, relations of the two, *ib.*, royal influence, 195, 212, evidence of intended action of the French Assembly 200, evidence of Count Walewski, 203, 216, 224, Palmerston's explanation and correspondence, 207, dismisses Palmerston, 211, Prince Consort's letter to, 212, speech in Parliament and disclosure of the Queen's memorandum, 219, 227, Palmerston's opinion of this action, 226, and reasons for his reticence in reply, 223, proposes Militia Bill, 229, Palmerston's opposition and collapse of the Ministry, *ib.* Opposes Lord Derby's Militia Bill, 231 ; his altered position to the Whigs described, 232, 237, 247, 250 ; short duration of Palmerston's resentment to, 232 ; Palmerston's objection to serve under again, and opinion of, 247, 250, 252, 254, but continued friendliness, 252 ; at the Foreign Office, in the Aberdeen Cabinet, 259, Palmerston's approval, *ib.* ; wishes Palmerston at the War Office, and Aberdeen's refusal, 301 ; resigns on Mr. Roebuck's motion ; Palmerston's disapproval of the step, 302 ; again entrusted to form a ministry, disinclination of the Whigs and of Clarendon, 305, promises support to Palmerston, letter in reply, *ib.* ; joins Palmerston's Ministry, 310 ; goes to the Vienna Conference, *ib.*, Sir E. Bulwer's motion against his conduct at, and resignation, 317 ; attacks Palmerston on 'the fortuitous concourse of atoms,' 345 ; opposes 'Conspiracy to Murder' Bill

RUS

356 ; agreement with Palmerston, 362 ; accepts Foreign Office under Palmerston, 364 ; letter from, in defence of Cabinet against Court sympathy for Austria at conclusion of Austro-French war, 370 ; *idem* on proposal for a congress, 372, intimate accord with Palmerston at this time, 379 ; explanation from Palmerston of his distrust of Napoleon, 390 ; letter to, on Napoleon's proposal of a European Congress, 427 ; *idem* on difficulties with France on the Sleswig-Holstein question, 430

Russell's, Lord William, tribute to Palmerston's foreign policy, i. 453 (*footnote*)

Russia : victory at Pultusk, i. 34 ; imminence of war with Turkey, 129 ; declared views of, 130 ; the Treaty of London and her promises, 132 ; threatens war against Turkey, *ib.* ; Wellington's dislike to, 138 ; declaration on her part, 142 ; attitude to Turkey and Greece, 143 ; makes concessions, 169 ; correctness and later adoption of Palmerston's view of the Eastern Question, 171 ; Lord Heytesbury's mission to, 172 ; successfully opposed by Turkey, 180, severe losses in the campaign, 186 (*footnote*), equality in the field with Turkey, 191 ; weakness of, 202 ; the Sultan asks her aid, 283 ; the Dardanelles closed, 284 ; British fleet sent to the Dardanelles, 293 ; the Black Sea difficulty, 294 ; her doubtful attitude in 1834, 296, 297, 298 ; position towards England in 1834, 306 ; in 1835, 316 ; departure of the Lievens, 306 ; health of the Emperor Nicholas, 344 ; position of France and Russia in 1838, 352 ; Palmerston's constant endeavour to upset Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 353 ; her friendly advances through M. de Brunnow, 361 ; danger to England of a Russo-French alliance, 364 ; the advantages of an English alliance, 368 ; designs upon India, 399 ; visit of the Emperor, 466 ; policy of, in 1844, 480 ; 'The Holy Alliance' and Cracow, ii. 31, violation of the Treaty of Vienna *ib.*, British protest against, 32 ; Russian intentions in India, the

RUS

Punjab and the Khyber Pass, 36 ; attitude towards the Paris revolution, 79 ; dependence of Austria on, 94. Joins Austria in demanding Kossuth and other fugitives from the Porte, 107, attitude of the Porte and support of England, 107, discussion with Baron Brunnow, 108, opposition in high quarters against interference with Russia, 110, decisive action of the cabinet, the fleet to the Dardanelles, 110, successful result of action of France and England, 114, irritation in Russia, 117, demand to keep the refugees in confinement, and Palmerston's objections, 121, audience refused to Lord Blomfield, 123. Influence against England at the Greek court, 136, covert hostility of, 142, complaints of the English press, 143, resentment in England *ib.* First inkling of the Crimean war: the Jerusalem difficulty and Palmerston's proposed mediation ill received, 188, antagonistic position of the Emperors of Russia and France, 192, demand to protect the Greek Church in Turkey, crosses the Pruth, and occupies Principalities, 274, Palmerston's experience of her designs, *ib.*, French and English fleets at Besika Bay, *ib.*, Palmerston suggests fleet to Black Sea, and Aberdeen's reply, 275, 'the Vienna note,' 277, Count Nesselrode's circular, *ib.*, Palmerston's memorandum on this, and on position of France and England, 278, declaration of the Porte, and fleets to Constantinople, 283, hostilities with Turkey, 289, destruction of Turkish fleet at Sinope, *ib.*, British ultimatum, 291, despatch of British troops to the East, 291, unpreparedness of the French, 295, expedition to the Crimea, 299, battle of the Alma, *ib.*, death of the Emperor Nicholas, 310, fall of Sebastopol, 322, influence of Russian intrigue and imminent recall of French troops, 322, firmness of the English cabinet, 323, exhaustion of the country, 325, Walewski's influence for her, *ib.*, Congress of Paris, 325, end of the Crimean War, 327, British plans for carrying it on, *ib.* The Russo-

SEY

Turkish wars of 1854 and 1877 contrasted, 328, Emperors Nicholas and Alexander contrasted, 329. Minor disputes about Serpents' Island and Bolgrad, 330, Palmerston's memorandum upon this, 331, interview with Count Creptovich, and delay in his presentation, 331, 335. Cruel measures on the Polish outbreak, 419, Palmerston's letter to the ambassador, 420, Prussian assistance, 421, negotiations amongst the Powers, recalcitrancy of Austria, *ib.*, English warlike feeling restrained by Palmerston, 451

SA DE BANDEIRA, Viscount, Threatened attack of, on Lisbon, ii. 26

St. Jean d'Acre, Capture of, i. 394

Saldanha, Duke of: difficult position of, i. 329 ; his position during the Portuguese civil war, ii. 18, 22, 26

Sardinia: Charles Albert and, ii. 42 ; becomes our ally in the Crimea, 310 ; termination of the Austro-French war, 365, conference at Zurich and resignation of Cavour, 367 ; Palmerston's efforts for Italian unity, 370 ; his memorandum on proper policy of Great Britain, 380 ; French demand for Savoy, *ib.* ; ultimate results of the war, 385

Sebastiani, Marshal: meeting with, 189, 192 ; arrogance of his opinions, 189, ultimate surrender, 235 and *footnote* ; distinct language used to, 237 ; agreement with Casimir Périer, 264 (*footnote*) ; conversation with, 338 ; negotiations with him on Turkish and Egyptian affairs, 352 ; Palmerston's better opinion of, 414

Sebastopol: false report of its fall, ii. 299 ; its fall, 322

Secretary at War: is made, i. 50 ; duties of the Secretary at War and Secretary for War defined, 65 ; civil position of, successfully defended by Palmerston against pretensions of Sir David Dundas, 66

Self-interest, not friendship, the bond between States, ii. 62

Seymour, Sir Hamilton: minister at Lisbon during the civil war, ii. 18 ; letters to, 18, 24, 26, 324

SIC

Sicily : revolution in, ii. 54; refusal of Lord Napier to mediate, 55; instructions to Lord Minto thereon, *ib.*; shortsighted policy of Guizot and Louis Philippe, 56; negotiations upset by news of French Revolution, 56; Palermo and Messina bombarded, and interference of the English and French fleets, 58; the revolt finally subdued, *ib.*

Slate quarries, His, at Tan-y-Bwlch, i. 439

Slave Trade, the: its abolition carried, i. 34, 290; Palmerston's earnestness in its extinction, 436, ii. 418; his detestation of it, i. 467; descriptive account of its horrors, i. 467; his insistence to the Admiralty on increased prevention of, ii. 417; his unflinching efforts against, 418

Slave Trade Convention: Palmerston's anxiety to conclude, i. 411; Guizot's jealousy, *ib.*, and refusal to ratify, 444

Sleswig Holstein: British mediation in the Schleswig-Holstein question, ii. 171; antecedents of the dispute with Germany, 428; outbreak of war-feeling in England, 430, restrained by Palmerston, 451; Palmerston's difficulties with France, explained in letter to Lord John Russell, 430; advocates despatch of fleet to Baltic, 431; Prussian success at Düppel, 432; Palmerston independently warns Apponyi that our fleet would follow that of Austria to the Baltic, 432; active mediation but unsuccessful result, 434; final surrender of the Duchies, 435; debate in the House, and ministerial triumph, 436; Palmerston to Leopold on the situation, *ib.*; his policy with regard to the Duchies, 446

Sliding Scale, The: and the Fixed Duty, i. 419; Palmerston's advocacy of a fixed duty, 420; proposed by Sir R. Peel, 443

Somerset, Duke of: letter to, explaining Palmerston's reasons for distrusting the French Emperor, ii. 391

Soult, Marshal: reservation of France in Eastern affairs under his premiership, i. 359; expected opposition of, 364

Spain: Salic law, i. 282; the Spanish

TAG

succession, *ib.*; Ferdinand and Christina, 282; Isabella proclaimed Queen, 283; Christina's tact as Queen Regent, *ib.*; pretensions of Don Carlos, *ib.*; M. Zea Bermudez, *ib.*, Palmerston's opinion of him, 286; death of Ferdinand and crisis, 292; formation of the Spanish Legion, 319; condition in 1829 and 1879 compared, 320; Louis Philippe's interference, with a view to Spanish marriages, 325, 327; the Spanish constitution, 328; hopelessness of the Carlist cause, 330, 339; Torreno becomes premier, 332; rise and fall of M. de Mendizabal, 334; ill-effects of French intrigue, 336; defeat of Sir de Lacy Evans, 342; affairs in, 344; Christina driven from, 386; Espartero made Regent, 386; Wellington's description of, ii. 10. The Spanish marriages: Queen Isabella, the Infanta, the Duc de Montpensier, 10, British objections to, 11, 29, Guizot's conduct in, 11, and its retributive results, 12. Union with Portugal suggested by France, and Palmerston's objections, 29; cautioned against occupation of Morocco, 374

Spanish Legion, the, Palmerston initiates formation of, i. 319

Spanish marriages, The, and Louis Philippe, i. 325, 327; fresh proposals of, preceding his downfall, ii. 12

Stockmar, Baron, Influence of, i. 228 (*footnote*); *idem* with the Prince Consort on foreign affairs, ii. 195

Switzerland: Metternich and Switzerland, i. 306; troubles in; the Sonderburg and the Jesuits, ii. 4, Palmerston's attitude to, 5, Bunsen to Palmerston thereon, 6; British policy to, 6; mediation proposed, 8; capture of Freyburg, *ib.*; Palmerston's advice to, 9; caution to Metternich, 10; French action in reference to Swiss borders, 387, Palmerston to Persigny thereon, *ib.*

Syria: blockade of Syrian coasts, i. 382. *See* the Lebanon, Sidon, Beyrout, St. Jean d'Acre

TAGUS, The river: French reprisals in, i. 255, and action of England,

TAH

- 256, 258; value set by Palmerston on its possession, ii. 30
- Tahiti: Queen Pomaré, i. 432; Mr. Pritchard's imprisonment, *ib.*; French action at, through Admiral de Thouars, *ib.*
- Talleyrand: meeting with, i. 189; his anxiety for the English alliance, 227 and (*footnote*) 241; negotiations with, 231, 246; his explanation of Louis Philippe's speech, 258; his proposal to Bulow, 263; negotiations with, 270; his secret negotiations for partition of territory, 272; his influence on coolness between France and England, 331; indifferent treatment of, at St. James's, 331, Palmerston's scant respect to, *ib.*
- Temple family, the, Lineage of, i. 3
- Temple, Sir William, i. 11 (*footnote*); appointed ambassador at Naples, 284; commendation of his despatches, 345; instructions to, on dispute with Naples, 402; his death, ii. 337, relations of the two brothers, *ib.*
- Tenant-right demands, Irish, Palmerston on, ii. 441
- Thiers, M.: friendship for England, i. 323; becomes premier with M. Guizot, 367; his purpose in Eastern affairs frustrated by signature of treaty of the Four Powers, 369, his anger thereat, 375, threatening language of, 377; break-up of his ministry, 388; succeeded by Guizot, 392
- Ticket of leave, The, instituted by Palmerston, ii. 262
- "Times, The": its extreme language against France, i. 272; its independence attacked by Mr. Horsman and ably defended by Palmerston, ii. 400
- Tiverton: returned for, i. 318; characteristic speech at, 409; curious condition and reform of its electoral body, *ib.*; speech at, answers 'the Tiverton butcher,' ii. 238; returned again for, 346; re-elected for; the butcher again, 361; again returned, 403; last return for, after a contest, 452
- Toryism: approaching demise of, i. 141; weakness of the party, 290;

TUR

- the Tory Government and free trade, 428
- Town sewage, Palmerston on the advantage of its use, ii. 246
- Trade and landed interests, Antagonism of, i. 418
- Traffic in borough seats, i. 31
- Transfer of borough franchises, i. 129; difficulties of, 149
- Travelling in England in 1836, i. 330
- Treaties: Palmerston insists on inviolability of, i. 245; Treaty of the Four Powers, 369, its good effects, 393; Treaty of London successfully completed, i. 401. (For other treaties, see under different heads)
- 'Trent affair, The,' ii. 411; despatch of troops to Canada, 412; Palmerston's energy, though ill, *ib.*
- Turf, Doings on the, i. 93, 99; success of his mare 'Ilione,' 439; of 'Buckthorne,' ii. 250; disappointment with 'Mainstone' in the Derby, 397; his connexion with, 398
- Turkey: alliance against and battle of Navarino, i. 115; Palmerston's objection to her policy in 1829, 118; imminence of war with Russia, 129; threatened by Russia, 132; Russia, Turkey, and Greece, 143; correctness and later adoption of Palmerston's view of the Eastern Question, 171; successful resistance of Russia, 180; severe Russian losses, 186 (*footnote*); Palmerston's view of her position in 1829, 187; equality in the field with Russia, 191; the Sultan asks Russian aid, 283; successes of Mehemet Ali, 284; treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, *ib.*; the Dardanelles closed, *ib.*; difficult position of the Sultan, 287; our fleet despatched to the Dardanelles, 293; the Black Sea difficulty, 294; Sultan Mahmoud's attempt to introduce civilisation, 346; Khosrew and Reschid Pashas, 347; Palmerston's opinion of Ottoman regeneration, 348; powerful position of Mehemet Ali, *ib.*; Admiral Roussin and Lord Ponsonby ambassadors to the Porte, 350; excitement in Constantinople, *ib.*; Mehemet Ali declares his independence, *ib.*, our decision to give naval support to the Sultan, 351; opinion of the position of Turkey in 1838, 354; uncivilised state of, 355;

TUR

the Sultan's desire to overthrow Mehmet Ali, 357; position of the Five Powers, 357; Mahmoud's preparations, 358; Turkish defeat at Nezib, *ib.*; death of Mahmoud, 359; surrender of the fleet by Achmet Pasha, *ib.*; agreement of the Powers to protect young Abdul Medjid, *ib.*, reservation of the French, *ib.*; value of peace to, 361; boundary of Egypt proposed by France, 363. Joint demand of Russia and Austria for delivery of Kossuth and Hungarian fugitives, ii. 107, attitude of the Porte and support of England, *ib.*, decisive action of the cabinet; the fleet to the Dardanelles, 110, successful result of action of England and France, 114, demand of Russia for confinement of the refugees, 121, Palmerston's objections, *ib.*, ultimate release of, 124. Palmerston urges reform, 168, warning to ambassador, 165. First inkling of Crimean war; the Jerusalem question, and Palmerston's proposed mediation, 188, Russia demands to protect the Greek Church, 274, crosses the Pruth, *ib.*, French and English fleets at Besika, *ib.*, declaration of the Porte, and fleets to Constantinople, 283, Palmerston to the Prince Consort on her position and prospects, 287, proposed draft of note to Russia, 288, hostilities, 289, destruction of fleet at Sinope, *ib.*, despatch of British troops, 291, expedition to the Crimea, 299, Palmerston summarises needful reforms, 313, his indignation at the squandering of the first Turkish loan, 314, Congress of Paris, 325, end of the Crimean war, 327. Russo-Turkish wars of 1854 and 1877 compared, 328; Palmerston urges reforms on the Sultan, 407.

Tuscany, Grand Duke of, British message to, ii. 43

UNITED STATES: mediation of Great Britain between France and the United States, i. 322; boundary question with, 401, 421; seizure of McLeod, 406, Palmerston's firmness, 408; Palmerston's letter to

VIC

Mr. Fox, minister at Washington, 408; the Ashburton treaty, 421, Lord Ashburton's qualifications, 422; Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster, *ib.*; the right of search, *ib.*; suspected concord with France, 445; Palmerston's speech on the right of search, 484; relation to Mexico, ii. 40; General Butler's proclamation at New Orleans; Palmerston's sympathy with the victims, 105; refuses agreement to abolish privateering, 326. Difficulties of the enlistment question, 336, our minister receives his passports, *ib.*, we do not retaliate, *ib.*, debate, and Palmerston's reply, *ib.* Outbreak of civil war, 404, Palmerston's attitude to the belligerents, *ib.*, 411, his theory of the cotton supply, 406, the 'Trent' affair, 411, despatch of British troops to Canada, 412, Palmerston's energy though ill, *ib.*

Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, i. 284; Palmerston's constant endeavour to upset it, 353

Urquhart, Mr., attacks Palmerston's foreign policy, ii. 61

VAN DE WEYER, M.: first sent to London, i. 216; his ability, 228; his excellent and courageous decision, 278

Victoria, Queen: accession of, i. 340; her first council, *ib.*; the coronation; influx of State personages, 345; firmness with Sir Robert Peel, in respect to the ladies of her household, 356; letters to, ii. 348, 363. Palmerston's view of relation of Foreign Secretary to the Crown, 195, royal interference in foreign relations and actual interference, 195, 197, evidence of desire for Palmerston's removal, 212, the Queen's requirements; and the memorandum of August 1850, 219, 227, use made of it by Lord John Russell, *ib.*, reason of Palmerston's reticence in reply, 223, his definition of loyalty, 226. Anxiety on news of Indian mutiny, 348, reassured by Palmerston, *ib.*; Palmerston's letter to, giving limited assent to join Lord

VIE

- Gránville, 363; court anxiety for Austria on termination of Austro-French war, 369, Lord J. Russell's defence of ministerial action, 370
- Vienna Conference, The: Lord John Russell attends, ii. 310; Palmerston's instructions, *ib.*; its futility, 314; Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's motion and Lord John Russell's resignation, 317
- 'Vienna Note, The,' Palmerston upon, ii. 276
- Vienna, Treaty of, Violation of, by Russia, Austria and Prussia, ii. 31; England's protest, 32; discussion in the House of Commons, *ib.*
- Volunteers, The: encouragement given by him to the movement, ii. 391

WALES, Account of his visit to, i. 438

- Walewski: interview with, in relation to the *coup d'état*, ii. 200, his actions and evidence in favour of Palmerston, 203, 216, 224; leaning to Russia, 325, Palmerston's frankness to him upon it, 335; letter on the Orsini conspiracy, 353
- Ward, Sir Henry (Ionian High Commissioner), letter to, ii. 184
- Waterloo, Battle of, i. 72
- Wellesley's, Marquis of, expectation to be made premier, and reported disappointment on the elevation of his brother, i. 121
- Wellington, Duke of, resignation as commander-in-chief, i. 108; return to office, 114, effect of his re-appointment, 120; becomes premier, 121, reported disappointment of the Marquis of Wellesley, *ib.*; dislike to Russia, 138; Huskisson and Wellington, 148; determination to force Huskisson to resign, 152; Melbourne's opinion of him, 161; change of attitude towards Catholics, 164; attitude to Marquis Palmella, 178; reserve towards Lord Anglesey, 182; Wellington and Polignac, 192, comparison of the two, 210; yielding policy of, 195; public opinion of his action towards Portugal, 200; overtures to Melbourne, 211, and to Palmerston, *ib.*, objection to Lords Grey and

WIL

- Lansdowne, *ib.*, interview with Palmerston, *ib.*, joins Peel's ministry, 313, succeeds Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office, 314, Palmerston's tribute to his conduct of foreign affairs, 318; difference with Peel, 376; declining health of, 405; his description of Spain, ii. 10; on Russian designs on India, and 'The Khyber Pass,' 39, Palmerston's value of this opinion, 36; happy comment on withdrawal of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 146; enthusiastic reception at the Great Exhibition, 178; his death, 250; Palmerston's tribute to, *ib.*; absence of Austria at his funeral, 255
- Wellington cabinet: Palmerston's reasons for remaining with, i. 122; causes of its feebleness, 123; Dudley's hesitation to leave it, 123; Palmerston's opinion of it, 123; its differences on Greek affairs and generally, 126; Huskisson's independence in it, 128; Dudley's part in it, 129; difficult position in respect to the corn resolutions, 133; differences on Eastern affairs, 137; secession of Lamb and Dudley, and their reasons, 160; forced resignation of Huskisson, 161; resignation of Palmerston and his speech thereon, 162; adoption of Palmerston's views in favour of Greece, 170; indifference to enslavement of the Greeks and consequent manœuvres in the House of Commons, 174; halting policy towards Greece, 177 (*footnote*); inconsistent action towards the Miguelites and Pedroites, 179; weakness in debating power in the Commons, 191, 194
- Westbury's, Lord, tribute to Palmerston's party leadership, ii. 400
- Whigs, the: Palmerston 'not a Whig,' ii. 194; position of Lord John Russell to the party described, 232, 237, 247, 250
- William IV. (*when Duke of Clarence*): satisfaction at his appointment to the navy, i. 108; compared with Duke of Cumberland, 163; his conduct at the Admiralty, and resignation, 176; (*when King*) dismisses Lord Melbourne, 309; writes approving Lord Palmerston's action at Foreign Office, 312; his relations

WIN

- with his ministers, 324; death of, 340
 Winter, Severity of the, in 1844-5, i. 489.
 Wiseman, Cardinal, Position of, towards Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, ii. 174

ZEA

- YEH, Mr. Commissioner, Outrages of, ii. 344; Cobden's resolution on, *ib.*
 ZEA-BERMUDEZ, M. DE, i. 283; Palmerston's opinion of, 286

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